server: self-test — sysctl audit + egress-MTU self-proof ("server proven good")
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A measurement server must prove its own host isn't distorting results:
- sysctl audit (/proc/sys): flags accept_ra on a static host, ICMP
  redirects, ICMP rate-limiting of the server's own errors, and disabled
  TCP options — each a measurement-fidelity hazard, with the "why".
- egress-MTU self-proof: DF PMTUD probe (IP_MTU_DISCOVER + getsockopt
  IP_MTU, no root — Linux-only, stub elsewhere) to external anchors. If the
  server's own uplink is below 1500, client MTU tests measure THIS server,
  so we say so.
Exposed at GET /admin/selftest (full report) and as server_selftest
{mtu_ok, sysctl_ok} in the profile so clients can trust or skip MTU tests.
Recommended deploy/99-echolot-sysctl.conf + README section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrambossek
2026-07-31 20:44:38 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent c9e0d06ea2
commit 4ae744aae5
8 changed files with 359 additions and 4 deletions
+103
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
//go:build linux
package selftest
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"syscall"
"time"
)
// Linux IP-level constants for PMTU discovery. Not all are exported by the
// stdlib syscall package across versions, so they are pinned here (stable
// kernel ABI) — same rationale as the prober's OsAbi.
const (
ipMTUDiscover = 10 // IP_MTU_DISCOVER
ipMTU = 14 // IP_MTU
ipPMTUDiscDo = 2 // IP_PMTUDISC_DO (set DF, honor PMTU)
ipv6MTUDiscover = 23 // IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER
ipv6MTU = 24 // IPV6_MTU
ipv6PMTUDiscDo = 2 // IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO
)
// probeEgressMTU sends a DF-flagged full-size UDP datagram toward target and
// reads back the kernel's discovered path MTU. A reduction below 1500 means
// the SERVER's own uplink can't carry full-size packets — so client MTU
// results would measure the server, not the client. No root, no raw socket:
// IP_MTU_DISCOVER + a getsockopt on IP_MTU, mirroring the prober's approach.
func probeEgressMTU(target string) MTUResult {
res := MTUResult{Target: target}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(target)
if err != nil {
// allow "host" that resolves
ips, e := net.LookupIP(target)
if e != nil || len(ips) == 0 {
res.Err = "resolve: " + errStr(err)
return res
}
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(ips[0])
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
is4 := addr.Is4()
fam := syscall.AF_INET6
if is4 {
fam = syscall.AF_INET
}
fd, err := syscall.Socket(fam, syscall.SOCK_DGRAM, 0)
if err != nil {
res.Err = "socket: " + errStr(err)
return res
}
defer syscall.Close(fd)
if is4 {
_ = syscall.SetsockoptInt(fd, syscall.IPPROTO_IP, ipMTUDiscover, ipPMTUDiscDo)
} else {
_ = syscall.SetsockoptInt(fd, syscall.IPPROTO_IPV6, ipv6MTUDiscover, ipv6PMTUDiscDo)
}
// Full-size probe: 1500 total IP/UDP headers (28 v4, 48 v6).
payload := 1472
sa := sockaddr(addr, 33434)
if !is4 {
payload = 1452
}
// A DF send larger than the local MTU fails immediately with EMSGSIZE; a
// path reduction updates IP_MTU after the ICMP frag-needed returns, so we
// send, briefly wait, and read the discovered MTU.
_ = syscall.Sendto(fd, make([]byte, payload), 0, sa)
time.Sleep(700 * time.Millisecond)
_ = syscall.Sendto(fd, make([]byte, payload), 0, sa) // second send observes any reduction
level, opt := syscall.IPPROTO_IP, ipMTU
if !is4 {
level, opt = syscall.IPPROTO_IPV6, ipv6MTU
}
mtu, err := syscall.GetsockoptInt(fd, level, opt)
if err != nil || mtu <= 0 {
res.Err = "getsockopt IP_MTU: " + errStr(err)
return res
}
res.DiscoveredMTU = mtu
res.FullMTU = mtu >= 1500
return res
}
func sockaddr(a netip.Addr, port int) syscall.Sockaddr {
if a.Is4() {
return &syscall.SockaddrInet4{Port: port, Addr: a.As4()}
}
return &syscall.SockaddrInet6{Port: port, Addr: a.As16()}
}
func errStr(err error) string {
if err == nil {
return "nil"
}
return err.Error()
}
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
//go:build !linux
package selftest
// probeEgressMTU: PMTUD via IP_MTU_DISCOVER is Linux-specific. Off-Linux the
// self-test reports MTU as unproven rather than guessing (the daemon runs on
// Linux in production; this keeps dev builds compiling).
func probeEgressMTU(target string) MTUResult {
return MTUResult{Target: target, Err: "egress MTU probe is Linux-only"}
}
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package selftest lets the daemon prove its own host is a clean measurement
// target: the kernel isn't silently altering what clients measure, and the
// server's own egress reaches full MTU. If the server side is already broken,
// client-side results (especially MTU/PMTUD) measure the server, not the
// client — so the daemon says so.
package selftest
import (
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// Severity of a check result.
type Severity string
const (
OK Severity = "ok"
Warn Severity = "warn"
)
// Check is one sysctl (or derived) assertion.
type Check struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Got string `json:"got"`
Want string `json:"want"`
Severity Severity `json:"severity"`
Why string `json:"why"`
}
// MTUResult is one egress path-MTU probe outcome.
type MTUResult struct {
Target string `json:"target"`
DiscoveredMTU int `json:"discovered_mtu"`
FullMTU bool `json:"full_mtu"` // >= 1500
Err string `json:"err,omitempty"`
}
// Report is the whole self-test.
type Report struct {
Sysctls []Check `json:"sysctls"`
EgressMTU []MTUResult `json:"egress_mtu"`
// SysctlOK / MTUOK are the compact "server proven good" signals; the
// profile surfaces these so a client can skip MTU tests the server can't
// support honestly.
SysctlOK bool `json:"sysctl_ok"`
MTUOK bool `json:"mtu_ok"`
}
// readSysctl reads /proc/sys/<dotted.name>. Empty string if unavailable.
func readSysctl(name string) string {
p := "/proc/sys/" + strings.ReplaceAll(name, ".", "/")
b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
}
// sysctlChecks are the measurement-fidelity assertions. Each closure returns
// OK/Warn given the read value; a missing value (non-Linux / restricted) is
// reported as Warn "unreadable" but never fatal.
var sysctlChecks = []struct {
name string
want string
why string
ok func(v string) bool
}{
{"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra", "0", "static v6 host must not let RAs mutate routing (the very thing Echolot detects)", eq("0")},
{"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects", "0", "ICMP redirects could alter routing mid-measurement", eq("0")},
{"net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects", "0", "an endpoint should not emit ICMP redirects", eq("0")},
{"net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all", "0", "server must answer ping so clients can measure to it", eq("0")},
{"net.ipv4.ip_no_pmtu_disc", "0", "server must honor path MTU on its own sends", eq("0")},
{"net.ipv4.tcp_sack", "1", "so a missing SACK in mss_observed is the path's fault, not the server's", eq("1")},
{"net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps", "1", "so TCP-timestamp absence reflects the path, not the server", eq("1")},
{"net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling", "1", "so wscale absence reflects the path, not the server", eq("1")},
{"net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit", "0", "nonzero throttles the server's ICMP errors → false loss/black-hole readings", eq("0")},
}
func eq(want string) func(string) bool { return func(v string) bool { return v == want } }
// Sysctls runs the sysctl audit.
func Sysctls() []Check {
out := make([]Check, 0, len(sysctlChecks))
for _, c := range sysctlChecks {
got := readSysctl(c.name)
sev := Warn
switch {
case got == "":
got = "(unreadable)"
case c.ok(got):
sev = OK
}
out = append(out, Check{Name: c.name, Got: got, Want: c.want, Severity: sev, Why: c.why})
}
return out
}
// Run performs the full self-test: sysctl audit + egress MTU probes to the
// given targets (each "host" — port is irrelevant for PMTUD).
func Run(mtuTargets []string) Report {
r := Report{Sysctls: Sysctls()}
r.SysctlOK = true
for _, c := range r.Sysctls {
if c.Severity == Warn {
r.SysctlOK = false
}
}
r.MTUOK = true
for _, t := range mtuTargets {
res := probeEgressMTU(t)
r.EgressMTU = append(r.EgressMTU, res)
if !res.FullMTU {
r.MTUOK = false
}
}
if len(r.EgressMTU) == 0 {
r.MTUOK = false // couldn't prove it
}
return r
}
var _ = strconv.Atoi