server: self-test — sysctl audit + egress-MTU self-proof ("server proven good")
A measurement server must prove its own host isn't distorting results:
- sysctl audit (/proc/sys): flags accept_ra on a static host, ICMP
redirects, ICMP rate-limiting of the server's own errors, and disabled
TCP options — each a measurement-fidelity hazard, with the "why".
- egress-MTU self-proof: DF PMTUD probe (IP_MTU_DISCOVER + getsockopt
IP_MTU, no root — Linux-only, stub elsewhere) to external anchors. If the
server's own uplink is below 1500, client MTU tests measure THIS server,
so we say so.
Exposed at GET /admin/selftest (full report) and as server_selftest
{mtu_ok, sysctl_ok} in the profile so clients can trust or skip MTU tests.
Recommended deploy/99-echolot-sysctl.conf + README section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
parent
c9e0d06ea2
commit
4ae744aae5
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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// Package selftest lets the daemon prove its own host is a clean measurement
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// target: the kernel isn't silently altering what clients measure, and the
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// server's own egress reaches full MTU. If the server side is already broken,
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// client-side results (especially MTU/PMTUD) measure the server, not the
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// client — so the daemon says so.
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package selftest
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import (
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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// Severity of a check result.
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type Severity string
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const (
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OK Severity = "ok"
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Warn Severity = "warn"
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)
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// Check is one sysctl (or derived) assertion.
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type Check struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Got string `json:"got"`
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Want string `json:"want"`
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Severity Severity `json:"severity"`
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Why string `json:"why"`
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}
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// MTUResult is one egress path-MTU probe outcome.
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type MTUResult struct {
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Target string `json:"target"`
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DiscoveredMTU int `json:"discovered_mtu"`
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FullMTU bool `json:"full_mtu"` // >= 1500
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Err string `json:"err,omitempty"`
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}
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// Report is the whole self-test.
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type Report struct {
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Sysctls []Check `json:"sysctls"`
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EgressMTU []MTUResult `json:"egress_mtu"`
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// SysctlOK / MTUOK are the compact "server proven good" signals; the
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// profile surfaces these so a client can skip MTU tests the server can't
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// support honestly.
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SysctlOK bool `json:"sysctl_ok"`
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MTUOK bool `json:"mtu_ok"`
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}
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// readSysctl reads /proc/sys/<dotted.name>. Empty string if unavailable.
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func readSysctl(name string) string {
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p := "/proc/sys/" + strings.ReplaceAll(name, ".", "/")
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b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
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if err != nil {
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return ""
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
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}
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// sysctlChecks are the measurement-fidelity assertions. Each closure returns
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// OK/Warn given the read value; a missing value (non-Linux / restricted) is
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// reported as Warn "unreadable" but never fatal.
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var sysctlChecks = []struct {
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name string
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want string
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why string
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ok func(v string) bool
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}{
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{"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra", "0", "static v6 host must not let RAs mutate routing (the very thing Echolot detects)", eq("0")},
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{"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects", "0", "ICMP redirects could alter routing mid-measurement", eq("0")},
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{"net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects", "0", "an endpoint should not emit ICMP redirects", eq("0")},
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{"net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all", "0", "server must answer ping so clients can measure to it", eq("0")},
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{"net.ipv4.ip_no_pmtu_disc", "0", "server must honor path MTU on its own sends", eq("0")},
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{"net.ipv4.tcp_sack", "1", "so a missing SACK in mss_observed is the path's fault, not the server's", eq("1")},
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{"net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps", "1", "so TCP-timestamp absence reflects the path, not the server", eq("1")},
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{"net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling", "1", "so wscale absence reflects the path, not the server", eq("1")},
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{"net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit", "0", "nonzero throttles the server's ICMP errors → false loss/black-hole readings", eq("0")},
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}
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func eq(want string) func(string) bool { return func(v string) bool { return v == want } }
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// Sysctls runs the sysctl audit.
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func Sysctls() []Check {
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out := make([]Check, 0, len(sysctlChecks))
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for _, c := range sysctlChecks {
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got := readSysctl(c.name)
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sev := Warn
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switch {
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case got == "":
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got = "(unreadable)"
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case c.ok(got):
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sev = OK
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}
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out = append(out, Check{Name: c.name, Got: got, Want: c.want, Severity: sev, Why: c.why})
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}
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return out
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}
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// Run performs the full self-test: sysctl audit + egress MTU probes to the
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// given targets (each "host" — port is irrelevant for PMTUD).
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func Run(mtuTargets []string) Report {
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r := Report{Sysctls: Sysctls()}
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r.SysctlOK = true
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for _, c := range r.Sysctls {
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if c.Severity == Warn {
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r.SysctlOK = false
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}
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}
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r.MTUOK = true
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for _, t := range mtuTargets {
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res := probeEgressMTU(t)
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r.EgressMTU = append(r.EgressMTU, res)
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if !res.FullMTU {
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r.MTUOK = false
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}
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}
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if len(r.EgressMTU) == 0 {
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r.MTUOK = false // couldn't prove it
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}
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return r
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}
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var _ = strconv.Atoi
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