server: §3.4 asymmetric grants + downtrain and big_send actions

The grant is the keystone that makes server->client sends safe: created
only by an authenticated control-plane action, bound at creation to the
session's OBSERVED data-plane source (so it can never be aimed at a third
party), and bounded by bytes, average rate and expiry. Sends stop the
moment the budget runs out, so a buggy action cannot become a flood.

Two granted actions on top of it:
- downtrain: N packets at a given size/interval toward the client, with
  seq + send-timestamp in the payload — downstream loss/reorder/jitter,
  which an upstream-only train cannot measure.
- big_send: one datagram per requested size, echoing the intended size in
  the payload — downstream MTU / black-hole evidence the client cannot
  produce for itself (only the far end can emit a large packet toward it).

Tests cover the security properties: no grant without a verified
destination, client requests clamped to server limits, byte budget stops
sending exactly, expiry refuses, and the rate ceiling throttles a burst.
Capabilities gain downtrain + big-send.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/cmd/echolot-server/main.go

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func serve(cfg *config.Config) error {
 		TLSConfig: &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
 	}
 
-	caps := []string{"udp-probe", "delayed-echo", "connect-back", "http-echo"}
+	caps := []string{"udp-probe", "delayed-echo", "connect-back", "http-echo", "downtrain", "big-send"}
 	if len(config.Addrs(cfg.TCPListen)) > 0 {
 		caps = append(caps, "tcp-echo", "tls-echo")
 	}
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ func serve(cfg *config.Config) error {
 		UDPPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.UDPListen)), TCPPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.TCPListen)),
 		StunPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.StunListen)), PinB64: pin, CertChain: cert.Certificate,
 		DelayedEcho: dp.SendDelayedEcho,
+		DownTrain:   dp.DownTrain,
+		BigSend:     dp.BigSend,
 		TCPRecent:   func(ip string) any { return tcpSrv.RecentFor(ip) },
 	}
 

server/internal/control/control.go

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ type Server struct {
 	TCPRecent func(ip string) any
 	// DelayedEcho schedules/sends a DELAYED_ECHO for a session (may be nil).
 	DelayedEcho func(sess *session.Session, actionID string) error
+	// Granted server->client sends (spec §5). Both consume an asymmetric grant.
+	DownTrain func(sess *session.Session, g *session.Grant, count, sizeBytes, intervalUs int) (int, error)
+	BigSend   func(sess *session.Session, g *session.Grant, sizes []int) ([]int, error)
 	// CanaryQueries returns logged canary lookups for a session prefix (may be nil).
 	CanaryQueries func(sessionPrefix string) any
 	// CanaryZone is surfaced in the profile so the app knows what to query.
@@ -70,8 +73,7 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/sessions/{id}/actions", s.actions)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/echo", s.httpEcho)
 	mux.HandleFunc("GET /v1/tls-reference", s.tlsReference)
-	// TODO(spec §4): TLS-echo/JA4 (tls-echo capability, needs ClientHello capture)
-	// TODO(spec §5): downtrain, big_send, frag_send, throughput
+	// TODO(spec §5): frag_send, throughput (both build on the same grant machinery)
 	return mux
 }
 
@@ -150,6 +152,10 @@ func (s *Server) actions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		DelayS     int    `json:"delay_s"`
 		Protocol   string `json:"protocol"`
 		Port       int    `json:"port"`
+		Count      int    `json:"count"`
+		SizeBytes  int    `json:"size_bytes"`
+		IntervalUs int    `json:"interval_us"`
+		SizesBytes []int  `json:"sizes_bytes"`
 	}
 	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
 		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "bad body"})
@@ -200,11 +206,81 @@ func (s *Server) actions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			sess.RecordConnectBack(res)
 		}()
 		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"action_id": actionID, "target": target})
+	case "downtrain":
+		if s.DownTrain == nil {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, map[string]string{"error": "downtrain not wired"})
+			return
+		}
+		// A downstream train sends far more than it receives, so it needs a grant (§3.4).
+		count := clamp(req.Count, 1, 5000)
+		size := clamp(req.SizeBytes, dataMinPacket, 1500)
+		interval := clamp(req.IntervalUs, 0, 1_000_000)
+		g := sess.NewGrant(actionID, int64(count*size), 0, session.DefaultGrantLimits)
+		if g == nil {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, noDataPlaneYet)
+			return
+		}
+		go func() {
+			sent, err := s.DownTrain(sess, g, count, size, interval)
+			slog.Info("downtrain finished", "action", actionID, "sent", sent, "bytes", g.Sent(), "err", err)
+		}()
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
+			"action_id": actionID, "count": count, "size_bytes": size, "interval_us": interval,
+			"grant": map[string]any{"max_bytes": g.MaxBytes, "max_kbps": g.MaxKbps},
+		})
+
+	case "big_send":
+		if s.BigSend == nil {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, map[string]string{"error": "big_send not wired"})
+			return
+		}
+		sizes := req.SizesBytes
+		if len(sizes) == 0 {
+			sizes = []int{1200, 1400, 1472, 1500, 2000, 4000}
+		}
+		if len(sizes) > 32 {
+			sizes = sizes[:32]
+		}
+		total := 0
+		for _, x := range sizes {
+			total += clamp(x, dataMinPacket, 9000)
+		}
+		g := sess.NewGrant(actionID, int64(total), 0, session.DefaultGrantLimits)
+		if g == nil {
+			writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, noDataPlaneYet)
+			return
+		}
+		go func() {
+			attempted, err := s.BigSend(sess, g, sizes)
+			slog.Info("big_send finished", "action", actionID, "attempted", attempted, "err", err)
+		}()
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
+			"action_id": actionID, "sizes_bytes": sizes,
+			"grant": map[string]any{"max_bytes": g.MaxBytes, "max_kbps": g.MaxKbps},
+		})
+
 	default:
 		writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "unknown or unimplemented action"})
 	}
 }
 
+// dataMinPacket is the smallest datagram that still carries a header + a little payload.
+const dataMinPacket = 40
+
+var noDataPlaneYet = map[string]string{
+	"error": "no data-plane traffic seen yet — send an ECHO first so the destination is verified",
+}
+
+func clamp(v, lo, hi int) int {
+	if v < lo {
+		return lo
+	}
+	if v > hi {
+		return hi
+	}
+	return v
+}
+
 func isTimeout(err error) bool {
 	var ne net.Error
 	return errors.As(err, &ne) && ne.Timeout()

server/internal/dataplane/granted.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package dataplane
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"echo-lot.app/server/internal/session"
+)
+
+// Server-to-client sends that exceed the request size, and are therefore only legal under an
+// asymmetric grant (spec §3.4). Every one of them:
+//   - targets the session's observed data-plane source, fixed when the grant was created;
+//   - stops the moment the grant's byte/rate/time budget is exhausted;
+//   - is HMAC-signed with the session key, so the client can tell our packets from injected ones.
+
+// DownTrain sends `count` DOWNTRAIN_DATA packets of `sizeBytes` spaced `intervalUs` apart. The
+// client measures downstream loss, reordering and jitter from what arrives — the direction an
+// upstream-only train cannot see. Returns how many packets actually went out (the grant may cut
+// it short, which is itself reportable).
+func (s *Server) DownTrain(sess *session.Session, g *session.Grant, count, sizeBytes, intervalUs int) (int, error) {
+	target := sess.DataSource()
+	if !target.IsValid() {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("no observed data-plane source")
+	}
+	conn := s.connFor(target)
+	if conn == nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("no data-plane socket matches target family")
+	}
+	if sizeBytes < HeaderSize+8 {
+		sizeBytes = HeaderSize + 8
+	}
+	payload := make([]byte, sizeBytes-HeaderSize)
+	sent := 0
+	for i := 0; i < count; i++ {
+		if !g.Allow(sizeBytes) {
+			break // budget or rate exhausted — stop, do not sleep it off
+		}
+		// Sequence + send timestamp in the payload head so the client can order and time them
+		// even when packets arrive out of order.
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[0:4], uint32(i))
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[4:8], uint32(time.Since(s.start).Microseconds()))
+		s.send(conn, target, sess, TypeDownTrainData, uint32(i), payload)
+		sent++
+		if intervalUs > 0 && i < count-1 {
+			time.Sleep(time.Duration(intervalUs) * time.Microsecond)
+		}
+	}
+	return sent, nil
+}
+
+// BigSend transmits one datagram per requested size, largest-first metadata intact, so the client
+// can see which sizes survive the *downstream* path — the mtu.pmtud_down / mtu.blackhole evidence.
+// The client cannot produce this itself: only the far end can emit a large packet toward it.
+func (s *Server) BigSend(sess *session.Session, g *session.Grant, sizes []int) ([]int, error) {
+	target := sess.DataSource()
+	if !target.IsValid() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no observed data-plane source")
+	}
+	conn := s.connFor(target)
+	if conn == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no data-plane socket matches target family")
+	}
+	attempted := make([]int, 0, len(sizes))
+	for i, size := range sizes {
+		if size < HeaderSize+8 {
+			size = HeaderSize + 8
+		}
+		if size > 9000 { // jumbo ceiling; beyond this the kernel will refuse anyway
+			size = 9000
+		}
+		if !g.Allow(size) {
+			break
+		}
+		payload := make([]byte, size-HeaderSize)
+		// Echo the intended size into the payload so a truncated/fragmented arrival is
+		// still attributable to the size we meant to send.
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[0:4], uint32(size))
+		s.send(conn, target, sess, TypeBigSend, uint32(i), payload)
+		attempted = append(attempted, size)
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) // keep bursts from being read as congestion loss
+	}
+	return attempted, nil
+}

server/internal/dataplane/udp.go

@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ const (
 	TypeMtuProbe    = 0x09
 	TypeMtuAck      = 0x0A
 	TypeDelayedEcho = 0x0B
+	// Server->client under an asymmetric grant (spec §3.4/§5).
+	TypeDownTrainData = 0x06
+	TypeBigSend       = 0x0C
 )
 
 type Server struct {

server/internal/session/grant.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package session
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Grant is the spec §3.4 "asymmetric grant": the ONLY thing that lets the server send more than
+// it receives. Without one, every response is capped at the request size, which is what keeps an
+// unauthenticated observer from using this server as a reflector/amplifier.
+//
+// A grant is created by an authenticated control-plane action (§5) for one session, and is bounded
+// three ways: total bytes, send rate, and wall-clock expiry. It is consumed as the data plane
+// sends; when the budget runs out the send stops, so a bug in an action cannot turn into an
+// unbounded flood.
+type Grant struct {
+	ActionID string
+	// Destination is fixed at creation to the session's observed data-plane source — a grant can
+	// never be pointed somewhere else, so it cannot be used to attack a third party.
+	Dest      string
+	MaxBytes  int64
+	MaxKbps   int
+	ExpiresAt time.Time
+
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+	sentBytes int64
+	started   time.Time
+}
+
+// GrantLimits are the server-side ceilings an action may not exceed, independent of what the
+// client asks for.
+type GrantLimits struct {
+	MaxBytes int64
+	MaxKbps  int
+	MaxHold  time.Duration
+}
+
+var DefaultGrantLimits = GrantLimits{
+	MaxBytes: 8 << 20,          // 8 MiB per action
+	MaxKbps:  50_000,           // matches the profile's advertised max_kbps
+	MaxHold:  30 * time.Second, // an action must finish inside this window
+}
+
+// NewGrant clamps the request to the server's limits and binds it to the session's observed
+// data-plane source. Returns nil when the session has no observed source yet — refusing to send
+// anywhere we have not verifiably received from is the whole point.
+func (s *Session) NewGrant(actionID string, wantBytes int64, wantKbps int, lim GrantLimits) *Grant {
+	dest := s.DataSource()
+	if !dest.IsValid() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if wantBytes <= 0 || wantBytes > lim.MaxBytes {
+		wantBytes = lim.MaxBytes
+	}
+	if wantKbps <= 0 || wantKbps > lim.MaxKbps {
+		wantKbps = lim.MaxKbps
+	}
+	g := &Grant{
+		ActionID: actionID, Dest: dest.String(),
+		MaxBytes: wantBytes, MaxKbps: wantKbps,
+		ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(lim.MaxHold),
+		started:   time.Now(),
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.grants = append(s.grants, g)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	return g
+}
+
+// Allow reports whether n more bytes may be sent now, consuming the budget when they may. It
+// enforces the byte ceiling, the expiry, and the average rate (by refusing early sends rather
+// than sleeping, so callers stay in control of pacing).
+func (g *Grant) Allow(n int) bool {
+	g.mu.Lock()
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+	if time.Now().After(g.ExpiresAt) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if g.sentBytes+int64(n) > g.MaxBytes {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Average-rate check: bytes allowed so far = kbps/8 * elapsed_seconds.
+	elapsed := time.Since(g.started).Seconds()
+	allowed := float64(g.MaxKbps) * 125 * elapsed // kbps -> bytes/s is kbps*1000/8 = kbps*125
+	if elapsed > 0.05 && float64(g.sentBytes+int64(n)) > allowed {
+		return false
+	}
+	g.sentBytes += int64(n)
+	return true
+}
+
+// Sent returns how many bytes this grant has consumed.
+func (g *Grant) Sent() int64 {
+	g.mu.Lock()
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+	return g.sentBytes
+}

server/internal/session/grant_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package session
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func sessionWithSource(t *testing.T) *Session {
+	t.Helper()
+	m := NewManager(time.Minute)
+	s, _, err := m.New("dev", "cred", netip.MustParseAddr("127.0.0.1"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.NoteDataSource(netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:5000"))
+	return s
+}
+
+// Without an observed data-plane source there is nowhere verified to send, so no grant may exist.
+func TestNoGrantWithoutObservedSource(t *testing.T) {
+	m := NewManager(time.Minute)
+	s, _, _ := m.New("dev", "cred", netip.MustParseAddr("127.0.0.1"))
+	if g := s.NewGrant("a1", 1000, 1000, DefaultGrantLimits); g != nil {
+		t.Fatal("granted a send with no verified destination")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGrantIsBoundToObservedSourceAndClamped(t *testing.T) {
+	s := sessionWithSource(t)
+	g := s.NewGrant("a1", 1<<40, 1<<30, DefaultGrantLimits) // absurd request
+	if g == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected a grant")
+	}
+	if g.Dest != "127.0.0.1:5000" {
+		t.Fatalf("grant destination = %s, want the observed source", g.Dest)
+	}
+	if g.MaxBytes != DefaultGrantLimits.MaxBytes || g.MaxKbps != DefaultGrantLimits.MaxKbps {
+		t.Fatalf("client request was not clamped to server limits: %d bytes / %d kbps",
+			g.MaxBytes, g.MaxKbps)
+	}
+}
+
+// The byte budget must actually stop sending — this is the anti-amplification guarantee.
+func TestGrantStopsAtByteBudget(t *testing.T) {
+	s := sessionWithSource(t)
+	g := s.NewGrant("a1", 1000, 0, DefaultGrantLimits)
+	sent := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+		if !g.Allow(100) {
+			break
+		}
+		sent += 100
+	}
+	if sent != 1000 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d bytes, want exactly the 1000-byte budget", sent)
+	}
+	if g.Allow(1) {
+		t.Fatal("grant allowed a send after the budget was exhausted")
+	}
+	if g.Sent() != 1000 {
+		t.Fatalf("Sent() = %d, want 1000", g.Sent())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExpiredGrantRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	s := sessionWithSource(t)
+	g := s.NewGrant("a1", 10_000, 0, GrantLimits{MaxBytes: 10_000, MaxKbps: 1000, MaxHold: time.Millisecond})
+	time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
+	if g.Allow(10) {
+		t.Fatal("expired grant still allowed a send")
+	}
+}
+
+// The rate ceiling must throttle a burst that is well inside the byte budget.
+func TestGrantEnforcesRate(t *testing.T) {
+	s := sessionWithSource(t)
+	// 8 kbps = 1000 bytes/s. A burst far beyond one second's worth must be refused.
+	g := s.NewGrant("a1", 1<<20, 8, DefaultGrantLimits)
+	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond) // let the rate window open a little
+	sent := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
+		if !g.Allow(100) {
+			break
+		}
+		sent += 100
+	}
+	if sent > 5000 {
+		t.Fatalf("rate limit let %d bytes through in ~60ms at 8kbps", sent)
+	}
+}

server/internal/session/session.go

@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ type Session struct {
 	maxSeq uint32
 	window [16]uint64
 
+	// Active asymmetric grants (spec §3.4/§5) — the only licence to send more than we receive.
+	grants []*Grant
+
 	// Observations (spec §6): per-packet UDP view + connect-back results.
 	packetsSeen uint64
 	udpObs      []UDPObservation // ring, newest last, cap obsCap