server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used
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fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right
family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on
.150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT,
which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving;
the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of
wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened.

Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and
granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback
to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and
the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this.

Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local
run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings
and history screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrambossek
2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 7a94c9a3d7
commit ce1aaa332a
31 changed files with 2018 additions and 50 deletions
@@ -54,19 +54,35 @@ class LiveGrantedTest {
"sizes=${down.map { it.sizeBytes }.distinct()}")
assertTrue(down.isNotEmpty(), "no DOWNTRAIN_DATA arrived — granted send path is broken")
// --- big_send: which downstream sizes survive? ---
// --- big_send with DF: the largest size that arrives is the downstream path MTU ---
val sizes = listOf(600, 1200, 1400, 1472, 1500, 2000, 4000)
val bsResp = control.action(
val dfResp = control.action(
cred, session.sessionId,
"""{"action":"big_send","sizes_bytes":${sizes}}""",
"""{"action":"big_send","df":true,"sizes_bytes":${sizes}}""",
)
println("big_send accepted: ${bsResp.take(160)}")
val big = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }
val arrived = big.map { it.sizeBytes }.sorted()
println("big_send arrived sizes: $arrived (requested $sizes)")
assertTrue(big.isNotEmpty(), "no BIG_SEND packets arrived")
println("largest downstream datagram delivered: ${arrived.maxOrNull()}")
println("big_send(df) accepted: ${dfResp.take(200)}")
val dfArrived = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }.map { it.sizeBytes }.sorted()
println("big_send(df) arrived: $dfArrived")
assertTrue(dfArrived.isNotEmpty(), "no unfragmented BIG_SEND packets arrived")
val pathMtu = dfArrived.max()
// --- and without DF, to see whether fragments get through above that ---
val fragResp = control.action(
cred, session.sessionId,
"""{"action":"big_send","df":false,"sizes_bytes":${sizes}}""",
)
println("big_send(frag) accepted: ${fragResp.take(200)}")
val fragArrived = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }.map { it.sizeBytes }.sorted()
println("big_send(frag) arrived: $fragArrived")
// The distinction the DF flag exists for: fragmented delivery may exceed the
// unfragmented path MTU, and reporting the former as the latter would be a lie.
println("downstream path MTU (payload bytes) = $pathMtu; " +
"largest fragmented delivery = ${fragArrived.maxOrNull()}")
assertTrue((fragArrived.maxOrNull() ?: 0) >= pathMtu,
"fragmented delivery should reach at least as far as unfragmented")
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Anonymizer
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Salt
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.UploadRefused
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Drives the upload path against a LIVE server: anonymize, upload, list, fetch back, delete.
*
* The point is not that the HTTP works — it is that what comes *back off the server* has been
* stripped. Uploading and then re-reading the stored document is the only check that proves the
* anonymizer ran on the bytes that actually left, rather than on a copy. Self-skips without
* ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*/
class LiveUploadTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val json = Json { prettyPrint = false }
private fun sampleRun(id: String) = """
{
"schema": "echolot/measurement",
"run": {
"id": "$id", "trigger": "manual", "started_at": "2026-08-01T10:00:00Z",
"notes": "kitchen table",
"device": {"manufacturer": "OnePlus", "model": "CPH2747"}
},
"networks": [{
"id": "net-1", "ssid": "Rambossek WLAN", "bssid": "78:9a:18:aa:bb:cc",
"gateway_ip4": "192.168.1.1", "public_ip4": "203.0.113.77",
"ssdp_responders": [{"friendly_name": "Living Room TV"}]
}],
"tests": [{"id": "t1", "type": "train.udp_updown", "status": "ok",
"metrics": {"rtt_ms_avg": 12.4, "loss_pct": 0.0}}],
"findings": [{"id": "f1", "code": "nat.udp_rebinding", "severity": "medium"}],
"summary": {"verdict": "warn"}
}
""".trimIndent()
@Test
fun uploadRoundTrip() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null) {
println("LiveUploadTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin))
val profile = control.profile(cred)
val policy = profile.uploads
println("upload policy: mode=${policy.mode} min_anon=${policy.minAnonymization} " +
"max_bytes=${policy.maxBytes} retention_days=${policy.retentionDays}")
val runId = "livetest-" + System.nanoTime().toString().takeLast(10)
val level = PrivacyLevel.max(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, PrivacyLevel.fromWire(policy.minAnonymization))
val redacted = json.encodeToString(
JsonObject.serializer(),
Anonymizer(level, Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { 9 }))
.anonymize(json.parseToJsonElement(sampleRun(runId)).jsonObject),
)
assertFalse(redacted.contains("Rambossek"), "the anonymizer did not strip the SSID before upload")
if (!policy.accepted) {
// A server configured to refuse must refuse — that is the behaviour worth asserting.
try {
control.uploadRun(cred, redacted)
throw AssertionError("server advertises mode=${policy.mode} but accepted an upload")
} catch (e: UploadRefused) {
println("upload correctly refused: ${e.message?.take(140)}")
return
}
}
val created = control.uploadRun(cred, redacted)
println("stored: ${created.take(200)}")
val listed = control.listRuns(cred)
assertTrue(listed.contains(runId), "uploaded run is missing from the server's list")
val fetched = control.getRun(cred, runId)
assertFalse(fetched.contains("Rambossek"), "the SSID is sitting on the server")
assertFalse(fetched.contains("Living Room TV"), "an SSDP neighbour name is sitting on the server")
assertFalse(fetched.contains("kitchen table"), "a free-text note is sitting on the server")
assertTrue(fetched.contains("nat.udp_rebinding"), "the finding code should survive — it is the point")
assertTrue(fetched.contains("12.4"), "metrics should survive anonymization")
println("round trip verified: identifiers stripped, measurements intact")
control.deleteRun(cred, runId)
assertFalse(control.listRuns(cred).contains(runId), "delete did not remove the run")
println("deleted")
}
}