// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later

// Package oidc verifies OpenID Connect ID tokens against a configured issuer.
//
// Echolot is a *relying party*, never an identity provider. It delegates to whatever IdP the
// operator already runs and stores no passwords — no hashing, no reset flow, no lockout policy,
// and no credential database to leak. For a tool people self-host on a box they also use for
// other things, that is the difference between "one more service" and "one more thing that can
// lose your users' passwords".
//
// Verification is written against the stdlib rather than a JWT library, because the server has no
// external dependencies by design. That is a real constraint and it cuts both ways: the code below
// is longer than `jwt.Parse`, but it is also auditable in one sitting and cannot be broken by
// somebody else's release. The algorithm allow-list is the part that matters — accepting `alg`
// from the token itself is the classic JWT forgery, so it is fixed here and `none` can never
// appear.
package oidc

import (
	"context"
	"crypto"
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/elliptic"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/sha512"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"math/big"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"
)

// Claims are the parts of an ID token Echolot acts on.
type Claims struct {
	Issuer   string   `json:"iss"`
	Subject  string   `json:"sub"`
	Audience audience `json:"aud"`
	Expiry   int64    `json:"exp"`
	IssuedAt int64    `json:"iat"`
	Nonce    string   `json:"nonce"`
	Email    string   `json:"email"`
	Name     string   `json:"name"`
	Username string   `json:"preferred_username"`
	Groups   []string `json:"groups"`
}

// AccountID is the stable identity of a person: issuer plus subject.
//
// Subject alone is not enough — it is only unique within an issuer — and email is not stable,
// since people change them and IdPs allow reuse. Keying on iss+sub means an operator can switch
// IdPs and know that the accounts did not silently merge.
func (c Claims) AccountID() string { return c.Issuer + "#" + c.Subject }

// Display is the friendliest name available, for the admin UI.
func (c Claims) Display() string {
	for _, s := range []string{c.Name, c.Username, c.Email} {
		if s != "" {
			return s
		}
	}
	return c.Subject
}

// audience tolerates the spec's two shapes: a string or an array of strings.
type audience []string

func (a *audience) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
	var one string
	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &one); err == nil {
		*a = audience{one}
		return nil
	}
	var many []string
	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &many); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	*a = many
	return nil
}

func (a audience) contains(s string) bool {
	for _, v := range a {
		if v == s {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// Config is what the operator supplies.
type Config struct {
	// Issuer is the IdP's base URL, e.g. https://auth.example.net/application/o/echolot/
	Issuer string
	// ClientID is this server's registered client. Tokens must be addressed to it.
	ClientID string
	// AdminGroup, when set, is the group claim a person must hold to reach the admin UI.
	// Empty means no one is an admin via OIDC, which is the safe default: an operator who has
	// not said who may administer the server has not said "everyone".
	AdminGroup string
	// Skew tolerated on exp/iat, for ordinary clock drift between the IdP and this server.
	Skew time.Duration
}

func (c Config) Enabled() bool { return c.Issuer != "" && c.ClientID != "" }

// Discovery is the subset of the provider metadata document that is used.
type Discovery struct {
	Issuer                string `json:"issuer"`
	AuthorizationEndpoint string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
	TokenEndpoint         string `json:"token_endpoint"`
	JWKSURI               string `json:"jwks_uri"`
	UserinfoEndpoint      string `json:"userinfo_endpoint"`
	EndSessionEndpoint    string `json:"end_session_endpoint"`
}

// Verifier fetches provider metadata and keys, and checks tokens against them.
type Verifier struct {
	cfg    Config
	client *http.Client

	mu        sync.RWMutex
	discovery *Discovery
	keys      map[string]crypto.PublicKey
	keysAt    time.Time
}

func New(cfg Config, client *http.Client) *Verifier {
	if cfg.Skew == 0 {
		cfg.Skew = 2 * time.Minute
	}
	if client == nil {
		client = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
	}
	return &Verifier{cfg: cfg, client: client, keys: map[string]crypto.PublicKey{}}
}

func (v *Verifier) Config() Config { return v.cfg }

var (
	ErrDisabled  = errors.New("no OIDC issuer is configured on this server")
	ErrMalformed = errors.New("token is not a well-formed JWT")
	ErrSignature = errors.New("token signature does not verify")
	ErrClaims    = errors.New("token claims are not acceptable")
)

// Discover fetches (and caches) the provider metadata.
func (v *Verifier) Discover(ctx context.Context) (*Discovery, error) {
	if !v.cfg.Enabled() {
		return nil, ErrDisabled
	}
	v.mu.RLock()
	d := v.discovery
	v.mu.RUnlock()
	if d != nil {
		return d, nil
	}

	url := strings.TrimRight(v.cfg.Issuer, "/") + "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	resp, err := v.client.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: %s returned %d", url, resp.StatusCode)
	}
	var got Discovery
	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&got); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: %w", err)
	}
	// The issuer in the document must match the one configured, or a redirect could point us at
	// somebody else's keys while we keep believing we are talking to the configured provider.
	if strings.TrimRight(got.Issuer, "/") != strings.TrimRight(v.cfg.Issuer, "/") {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: document says issuer %q, configured %q", got.Issuer, v.cfg.Issuer)
	}
	v.mu.Lock()
	v.discovery = &got
	v.mu.Unlock()
	return &got, nil
}

// jwksTTL is how long keys are trusted before refetching. Short enough to pick up a rotation
// without an operator restarting anything; long enough that token checks are not IdP round trips.
const jwksTTL = 15 * time.Minute

func (v *Verifier) keyFor(ctx context.Context, kid string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
	v.mu.RLock()
	k, ok := v.keys[kid]
	fresh := time.Since(v.keysAt) < jwksTTL
	v.mu.RUnlock()
	if ok && fresh {
		return k, nil
	}
	if err := v.refreshKeys(ctx); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	v.mu.RLock()
	defer v.mu.RUnlock()
	if k, ok := v.keys[kid]; ok {
		return k, nil
	}
	// A kid we have never seen, after a refresh, is a token from somewhere else.
	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: no key %q at the issuer", ErrSignature, kid)
}

func (v *Verifier) refreshKeys(ctx context.Context) error {
	d, err := v.Discover(ctx)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, d.JWKSURI, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	resp, err := v.client.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("jwks: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
		return fmt.Errorf("jwks: %s returned %d", d.JWKSURI, resp.StatusCode)
	}
	var set struct {
		Keys []jwk `json:"keys"`
	}
	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&set); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("jwks: %w", err)
	}
	parsed := make(map[string]crypto.PublicKey, len(set.Keys))
	for _, k := range set.Keys {
		if pub, err := k.publicKey(); err == nil {
			parsed[k.Kid] = pub
		}
	}
	if len(parsed) == 0 {
		return errors.New("jwks: no usable keys")
	}
	v.mu.Lock()
	v.keys = parsed
	v.keysAt = time.Now()
	v.mu.Unlock()
	return nil
}

type jwk struct {
	Kty string `json:"kty"`
	Kid string `json:"kid"`
	Alg string `json:"alg"`
	Use string `json:"use"`
	N   string `json:"n"`
	E   string `json:"e"`
	Crv string `json:"crv"`
	X   string `json:"x"`
	Y   string `json:"y"`
}

func (k jwk) publicKey() (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
	switch k.Kty {
	case "RSA":
		n, err := b64uint(k.N)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		e, err := b64uint(k.E)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if !e.IsInt64() || e.Int64() > 1<<31 {
			return nil, errors.New("implausible RSA exponent")
		}
		return &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}, nil
	case "EC":
		curve, err := curveFor(k.Crv)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		x, err := b64uint(k.X)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		y, err := b64uint(k.Y)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		return &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: curve, X: x, Y: y}, nil
	}
	return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type %q", k.Kty)
}

// Verify checks a serialized ID token and returns its claims.
//
// The order is deliberate: structure, then algorithm, then signature, then claims. Nothing about
// the token's contents is believed before its signature has been checked — reading `iss` or `aud`
// out of an unverified token and acting on it is how "verified" tokens turn out not to be.
func (v *Verifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Claims, error) {
	if !v.cfg.Enabled() {
		return nil, ErrDisabled
	}
	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
	if len(parts) != 3 {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	headerJSON, err := b64(parts[0])
	if err != nil {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	var hdr struct {
		Alg string `json:"alg"`
		Kid string `json:"kid"`
		Typ string `json:"typ"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(headerJSON, &hdr); err != nil {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	// The allow-list is fixed here rather than taken from the token. Trusting the token's own
	// `alg` is the classic JWT forgery: "none" turns any token into a valid one, and swapping RS256
	// for HS256 lets an attacker sign with the public key. Neither is reachable from here.
	if _, ok := allowedAlgs[hdr.Alg]; !ok {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: algorithm %q is not accepted", ErrSignature, hdr.Alg)
	}

	pub, err := v.keyFor(ctx, hdr.Kid)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	sig, err := b64(parts[2])
	if err != nil {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	signed := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
	if err := verifySignature(hdr.Alg, pub, []byte(signed), sig); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	payload, err := b64(parts[1])
	if err != nil {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	var claims Claims
	if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
		return nil, ErrMalformed
	}
	if err := v.checkClaims(claims); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return &claims, nil
}

func (v *Verifier) checkClaims(c Claims) error {
	if strings.TrimRight(c.Issuer, "/") != strings.TrimRight(v.cfg.Issuer, "/") {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: issued by %q, expected %q", ErrClaims, c.Issuer, v.cfg.Issuer)
	}
	// A token addressed to a different client is a valid token that was not meant for us —
	// accepting it lets any other client of the same IdP authenticate here.
	if !c.Audience.contains(v.cfg.ClientID) {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: addressed to %v, not to %q", ErrClaims, []string(c.Audience), v.cfg.ClientID)
	}
	if c.Subject == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: no subject", ErrClaims)
	}
	now := time.Now()
	if c.Expiry == 0 || now.After(time.Unix(c.Expiry, 0).Add(v.cfg.Skew)) {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: expired", ErrClaims)
	}
	if c.IssuedAt != 0 && now.Add(v.cfg.Skew).Before(time.Unix(c.IssuedAt, 0)) {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: issued in the future", ErrClaims)
	}
	return nil
}

// IsAdmin reports whether these claims carry the configured admin group.
//
// With no group configured nobody is an admin: an operator who has not said who may administer
// the server has not thereby said "anyone who can log in".
func (v *Verifier) IsAdmin(c *Claims) bool {
	if c == nil || v.cfg.AdminGroup == "" {
		return false
	}
	for _, g := range c.Groups {
		if g == v.cfg.AdminGroup {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

var allowedAlgs = map[string]crypto.Hash{
	"RS256": crypto.SHA256, "RS384": crypto.SHA384, "RS512": crypto.SHA512,
	"ES256": crypto.SHA256, "ES384": crypto.SHA384, "ES512": crypto.SHA512,
}

func verifySignature(alg string, pub crypto.PublicKey, signed, sig []byte) error {
	h := allowedAlgs[alg]
	digest := hashOf(h, signed)

	switch {
	case strings.HasPrefix(alg, "RS"):
		k, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
		if !ok {
			return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s token against a non-RSA key", ErrSignature, alg)
		}
		if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(k, h, digest, sig); err != nil {
			return ErrSignature
		}
		return nil
	case strings.HasPrefix(alg, "ES"):
		k, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
		if !ok {
			return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s token against a non-EC key", ErrSignature, alg)
		}
		// JWS packs ECDSA signatures as r||s, fixed width — not the ASN.1 form ecdsa.Verify
		// would otherwise expect.
		if len(sig)%2 != 0 {
			return ErrSignature
		}
		half := len(sig) / 2
		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:half])
		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[half:])
		if !ecdsa.Verify(k, digest, r, s) {
			return ErrSignature
		}
		return nil
	}
	return ErrSignature
}

func hashOf(h crypto.Hash, b []byte) []byte {
	switch h {
	case crypto.SHA384:
		d := sha512.Sum384(b)
		return d[:]
	case crypto.SHA512:
		d := sha512.Sum512(b)
		return d[:]
	default:
		d := sha256.Sum256(b)
		return d[:]
	}
}

func curveFor(crv string) (elliptic.Curve, error) {
	switch crv {
	case "P-256":
		return elliptic.P256(), nil
	case "P-384":
		return elliptic.P384(), nil
	case "P-521":
		return elliptic.P521(), nil
	}
	return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported curve %q", crv)
}

// b64 decodes JWT base64url, which omits padding.
func b64(s string) ([]byte, error) { return base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s) }

func b64uint(s string) (*big.Int, error) {
	b, err := b64(s)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if len(b) == 0 {
		return nil, errors.New("empty value")
	}
	return new(big.Int).SetBytes(b), nil
}