Sharing port 443 between the admin UI and the control plane forces two hostnames — one port and one name is one certificate, and the two need different ones. That difference had been leaking into every enrollment link, so an operator handed out fmr-1.echo-lot.app when the thing they and their users know is fmr.echo-lot.app. The link now carries the public name and the app asks GET /v1/discover where to actually connect. The endpoint is plumbing: it exists to select a certificate, and nobody needs to see it. Discovery hands out an address and never a pin. The pin stays in the link. Fetching it over an ordinary TLS connection would make pinning worth exactly what the certificate authorities are worth, and pinning is there to survive one the operator does not control — a root injected by corporate device management, say, which is unremarkable on the networks this tool gets pointed at. With the pin pre-shared, an intercepted discovery can only send a device somewhere the pin will not match: an outage, not a compromise. Optional on both sides. A server that does not answer, or a link that already names the control endpoint, works unchanged — enrollment must not start failing because a lookup did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Echolot app
The production Android client (spec). Native Kotlin + Jetpack Compose. Multi-module; built bottom-up from a verifiable protocol spine.
Modules
| Module | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|
core-protocol |
pure Kotlin/JVM | done — client half of probe-protocol.md, verified live against the server |
core-measurement |
pure Kotlin/JVM | planned — measurement-schema.md types |
core-probe |
Android lib | planned — app-tier probes, ported from echolot-prober |
core-shizuku |
Android lib | planned — dual-path executor (UserService + newProcess fallback) |
app |
Android app | planned — Compose UI |
core-protocol is deliberately Android-free so it builds and unit-tests on any JDK (no Android
SDK) and can run integration tests against a live server.
core-protocol
Implements the control plane (SPKI-pinned enrollment/profile/sessions via HttpsURLConnection —
Android-API-1 compatible, hostname verification off because trust is the pin), the HKDF-SHA256
session-key schedule, and the binary ELT1 UDP data plane (HMAC gate, ECHO + observation block,
MTU probe) — byte-compatible with the Go server.
./gradlew :core-protocol:test # unit tests (crypto vectors, wire round-trip)
scripts/test-fmr.sh # live end-to-end test against the deployed server
test-fmr.sh mints an enrollment token over SSH, enrolls via the public control plane, computes
the SPKI pin from the served cert, and runs LiveServerTest — proving the client speaks the wire
protocol to the real server (enroll → profile → session → echo+observation → MTU → observations).
The live test self-skips when ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env vars are absent, so unit runs and CI stay green
offline.