Types 0x03/0x04/0x05 land with a bounded columnar train buffer (head kept, truncation declared) and grant-free multi-part reports - a report row is smaller than the packet it answers, so $3.4 holds without a grant. The read loop now collects TTL/TOS cmsgs on Linux, replacing the 0xFF stubs in the observation block with what the kernel saw; downtrain gained a dscp parameter, so DSCP survival is measurable in both directions. Rate limiting ($2.5) exists now: per-credential AND per-source buckets, 429 on the control plane, silent drop on the data plane after the HMAC gate and before the replay window. UDP ceilings default above the largest legitimate run - a limit that clips a real measurement produces a confidently wrong number. Every granted packet carries its action_id at payload[8:16]; overlapping actions were unattributable before. Canary DNS logs now honor the stated 24h privacy default. /admin/enroll-tokens answers the spec's JSON shape. protocol_version 1.0.1 (additive). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
319 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
319 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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// Package session implements spec §2.4 sessions and the §2.4 key schedule:
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// HKDF-SHA256(ikm=device_credential, salt=key_salt, info="echolot-v1/"+session_id).
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package session
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import (
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"crypto/hkdf"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"net/netip"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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type Session struct {
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ID string // opaque hex; first 8 bytes (16 hex chars) are the wire prefix
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Key [32]byte // derived, never crosses the wire
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Epoch time.Time // server wall clock at creation (spec: RFC3339 in the response)
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Expires time.Time
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Device string // device ID
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// Observed source of the session-creating request — the ONLY address
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// reflected/generated traffic may target (spec §2.5).
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ControlSource netip.Addr
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// Last data-plane source seen with a valid HMAC (NAT rebinding evidence).
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mu sync.Mutex
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dataSource netip.AddrPort
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dataLocal netip.AddrPort
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// Replay window (spec §3.1: 1024-wide seq window). Highest seq seen plus
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// a bitmask of the 1024 preceding.
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maxSeq uint32
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window [16]uint64
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// Active asymmetric grants (spec §3.4/§5) — the only licence to send more than we receive.
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grants []*Grant
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// Observations (spec §6): per-packet UDP view + connect-back results.
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packetsSeen uint64
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udpObs []UDPObservation // ring, newest last, cap obsCap
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connectBack []ConnectBackResult
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throughput []ThroughputReport
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upstream UpstreamCounter
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// Upstream trains (spec §3.2), buffered apart from udpObs — see train.go for why the
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// flat ring must not be the only home of a 5000-packet train.
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trains []*Train
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}
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const obsCap = 4096
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// UDPObservation is the server's witnessed view of one data-plane packet.
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type UDPObservation struct {
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Seq uint32 `json:"seq"`
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TRxNs int64 `json:"t_rx_ns"`
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TTxNs int64 `json:"t_tx_ns"`
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Src string `json:"src"`
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Size int `json:"size"`
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Type uint8 `json:"type"`
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}
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// ThroughputReport is the server's own account of a sustained send: what it managed to put on
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// the wire, and what stopped it. The client needs this to interpret its own count — the gap
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// between the two IS the loss, and without the sender's number a receiver can only guess.
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type ThroughputReport struct {
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ActionID string `json:"action_id"`
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Packets int `json:"packets"`
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Bytes int64 `json:"bytes"`
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DurationMs int64 `json:"duration_ms"`
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Kbps int `json:"kbps"`
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LimitedBy string `json:"limited_by"`
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}
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// UpstreamCounter is the server's tally of a client-driven throughput run.
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//
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// Deliberately a counter and not a list. A five-second upstream run at 20 Mbps is around ten
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// thousand packets; one observation struct each would turn a measurement into an allocation
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// storm on a shared server, and nothing downstream needs the per-packet detail - the client
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// already has its own send record. The gap between the two counts IS the loss.
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type UpstreamCounter struct {
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Packets int `json:"packets"`
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Bytes int64 `json:"bytes"`
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FirstRxNs int64 `json:"first_rx_ns"`
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LastRxNs int64 `json:"last_rx_ns"`
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}
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// SpanMs is the time between the first and last packet, which is the interval the rate should be
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// computed over - not the client's requested duration, which includes ramp-up and the tail.
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func (u UpstreamCounter) SpanMs() int64 {
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if u.Packets < 2 || u.LastRxNs <= u.FirstRxNs {
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return 0
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}
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return (u.LastRxNs - u.FirstRxNs) / 1_000_000
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}
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// Kbps is bits per millisecond, which is kilobits per second - no scaling constant to get wrong.
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func (u UpstreamCounter) Kbps() int {
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if ms := u.SpanMs(); ms > 0 {
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return int(u.Bytes * 8 / ms)
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}
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return 0
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}
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// ConnectBackResult records one connect-back action outcome.
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type ConnectBackResult struct {
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ActionID string `json:"action_id"`
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Result string `json:"result"` // connected | refused | timeout
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RttMs float64 `json:"rtt_ms"`
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}
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// RecordUDP appends a packet observation (ring-capped).
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func (s *Session) RecordUDP(o UDPObservation) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.packetsSeen++
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if len(s.udpObs) >= obsCap {
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s.udpObs = s.udpObs[1:]
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}
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s.udpObs = append(s.udpObs, o)
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}
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// RecordConnectBack appends a connect-back outcome.
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func (s *Session) RecordConnectBack(r ConnectBackResult) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.connectBack = append(s.connectBack, r)
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}
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// Observations returns a copy of everything witnessed so far.
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func (s *Session) Observations() (packetsSeen uint64, udp []UDPObservation, cb []ConnectBackResult) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return s.packetsSeen, append([]UDPObservation(nil), s.udpObs...),
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append([]ConnectBackResult(nil), s.connectBack...)
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}
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// CountUpstream tallies one client-sent throughput packet.
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//
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// Called on the hot path for every packet of an upstream run, so it does exactly two additions
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// and two comparisons under the lock and allocates nothing.
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func (s *Session) CountUpstream(sizeBytes int, tRxNs int64) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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if s.upstream.Packets == 0 {
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s.upstream.FirstRxNs = tRxNs
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}
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s.upstream.Packets++
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s.upstream.Bytes += int64(sizeBytes)
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s.upstream.LastRxNs = tRxNs
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}
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// Upstream returns the tally so far.
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func (s *Session) Upstream() UpstreamCounter {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return s.upstream
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}
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// ResetUpstream clears the tally, so a second run in one session measures itself rather than
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// inheriting the first one's packets.
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func (s *Session) ResetUpstream() {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.upstream = UpstreamCounter{}
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}
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// RecordThroughput stores the server's account of one sustained send.
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//
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// Kept as a per-action summary rather than per-packet records: a ten-second run at 50 Mbps is
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// half a million packets, and holding one struct each would turn a measurement into a memory
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// exhaustion. The client has the per-packet view; the server only needs to say how many it sent.
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func (s *Session) RecordThroughput(actionID string, packets int, bytes, durationMs int64, kbps int, limitedBy string) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.throughput = append(s.throughput, ThroughputReport{
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ActionID: actionID, Packets: packets, Bytes: bytes,
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DurationMs: durationMs, Kbps: kbps, LimitedBy: limitedBy,
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})
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}
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// ThroughputReports returns the server's account of every sustained send in this session.
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func (s *Session) ThroughputReports() []ThroughputReport {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return append([]ThroughputReport(nil), s.throughput...)
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}
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// DataSource returns the last verified data-plane source (invalid when the
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// session has not sent data-plane traffic yet).
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func (s *Session) DataSource() netip.AddrPort {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return s.dataSource
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}
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// KeySalt returns nothing — the salt is not retained after derivation; it is
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// generated in New and returned once for the response body.
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type Manager struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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byPrefix map[string]*Session // key: first 16 hex chars of ID
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ttl time.Duration
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}
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func NewManager(ttl time.Duration) *Manager {
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return &Manager{byPrefix: map[string]*Session{}, ttl: ttl}
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}
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// New creates a session for a device credential per the spec key schedule.
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// Returns the session and the one-time key_salt for the response.
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func (m *Manager) New(deviceID, credential string, controlSource netip.Addr) (*Session, []byte, error) {
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idBytes := make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := rand.Read(idBytes); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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salt := make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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id := hex.EncodeToString(idBytes)
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key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, []byte(credential), salt, "echolot-v1/"+id, 32)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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s := &Session{
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ID: id,
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Epoch: time.Now().UTC(),
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Expires: time.Now().Add(m.ttl),
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Device: deviceID,
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ControlSource: controlSource,
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}
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copy(s.Key[:], key)
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m.mu.Lock()
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m.byPrefix[id[:16]] = s
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m.mu.Unlock()
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return s, salt, nil
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}
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// ByWirePrefix resolves the 8-byte on-the-wire prefix (as raw bytes).
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func (m *Manager) ByWirePrefix(prefix [8]byte) *Session {
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m.mu.Lock()
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defer m.mu.Unlock()
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s := m.byPrefix[hex.EncodeToString(prefix[:])]
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if s == nil || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
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return nil
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}
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return s
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}
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// ByID resolves a full session id (sessions are keyed by their wire prefix).
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func (m *Manager) ByID(id string) *Session {
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if len(id) < 16 {
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return nil
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}
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m.mu.Lock()
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defer m.mu.Unlock()
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s := m.byPrefix[id[:16]]
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if s == nil || s.ID != id || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
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return nil
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}
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return s
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}
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func (m *Manager) Delete(id string) {
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m.mu.Lock()
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defer m.mu.Unlock()
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delete(m.byPrefix, id[:16])
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}
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// CheckSeq enforces the 1024-wide anti-replay window. Returns false for
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// replays and for packets older than the window.
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func (s *Session) CheckSeq(seq uint32) bool {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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switch {
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case seq > s.maxSeq:
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shift := seq - s.maxSeq
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for i := uint32(0); i < shift && i < 1024; i++ {
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idx := (s.maxSeq + 1 + i) % 1024
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s.window[idx/64] &^= 1 << (idx % 64)
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}
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s.maxSeq = seq
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case s.maxSeq-seq >= 1024:
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return false
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}
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idx := seq % 1024
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if s.window[idx/64]&(1<<(idx%64)) != 0 {
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return false
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}
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s.window[idx/64] |= 1 << (idx % 64)
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return true
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}
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// DataLocal returns the server-side address that received this session's data-plane traffic.
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//
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// This matters more than it looks: a server bound to several addresses must send granted traffic
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// back from the one the client has been talking to. Any stateful firewall or NAT in between has
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// a mapping keyed on that exact pair, and a reply from a sibling address is dropped — which the
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// client would then measure as downstream loss. See connFor.
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func (s *Session) DataLocal() netip.AddrPort {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return s.dataLocal
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}
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// NoteDataLocal records which of our own bound addresses saw this session's traffic.
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func (s *Session) NoteDataLocal(ap netip.AddrPort) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.dataLocal = ap
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}
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// NoteDataSource records the latest verified data-plane source.
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func (s *Session) NoteDataSource(ap netip.AddrPort) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.dataSource = ap
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s.mu.Unlock()
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}
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