Signing in and being allowed to administer the server were the same question: the OIDC callback refused a session outright to anyone outside the admin group. A legitimate user could authenticate, be told what they could not do, and be left with no way to see or delete the data their own devices had uploaded. They are separate questions now. Everyone who authenticates gets a session; the admin flag rides inside the MAC'd payload, so promoting yourself means forging a signature rather than editing a cookie, and a role that does not parse fails closed to "user". Pages scope themselves through visibleDevices/mayTouchRun rather than filtering individually — per-page scoping is what the next page added will be missing, and that failure is silent, since a listing that leaks other people's uploads looks exactly like one that does not. Someone else's run answers 404, not 403: a distinguishable refusal would confirm the run exists. Revoking devices and minting enrolment tokens affect the whole server and stay behind adminOnly at the route table, where someone looking for who-may-do-what will actually find it. Ownership is re-read per request instead of captured at sign-in, so unlinking an account takes effect immediately rather than at session expiry. Tests cover that, plus the degenerate case of an empty subject, which must own nothing rather than everything with an empty account id. Also: attribute the ICMPv6 finding per network. It compared "is IPv6 configured anywhere on this device" against "did any network answer", which on a phone reports IPv6-is-broken about a network where IPv6 was never configured. network_ref is null on every test, so the probe now records per-network outcomes structurally rather than as prose a finding would have to parse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
224 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
224 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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package adminui
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"sort"
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"time"
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"echo-lot.app/server/internal/adminauth"
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"echo-lot.app/server/internal/runs"
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"echo-lot.app/server/internal/store"
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)
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// visibleDevices returns the devices a session may see: everything for an administrator, and for
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// anyone else the devices linked to their own account.
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//
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// Every page goes through this rather than filtering for itself. Scoping applied per-page is
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// scoping that will be missing from the next page someone adds, and the failure is silent — a
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// listing that quietly shows other people's uploads looks exactly like one that does not.
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func (s *Server) visibleDevices(sess *adminauth.Session) []store.Device {
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all := s.Store.Devices()
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if sess.Admin {
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return all
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}
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owned := make(map[string]bool)
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for _, id := range s.Store.DeviceIDsForAccount(sess.Subject) {
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owned[id] = true
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}
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out := make([]store.Device, 0, len(owned))
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for _, d := range all {
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if owned[d.ID] {
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out = append(out, d)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// mayTouchRun reports whether this session may read or delete a given run.
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//
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// Checked against the device list rather than against the run's own metadata, so an unlinked or
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// revoked device stops granting access the moment the link is gone.
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func (s *Server) mayTouchRun(sess *adminauth.Session, device string) bool {
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if sess.Admin {
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return true
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}
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for _, d := range s.visibleDevices(sess) {
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if d.ID == device {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func (s *Server) loginForm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if s.session(r) != nil {
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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s.render(w, r, "login", map[string]any{
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"OIDC": s.oidcAvailable(),
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"LocalSet": s.Store.LocalAdmin() != nil,
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"AdminUser": s.AdminUser,
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) dashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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devices := s.visibleDevices(sess)
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linked := 0
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for _, d := range devices {
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if d.LinkedToAccount() {
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linked++
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}
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}
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var selftest any
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// The self-test describes the server's own health, which is an operator's concern; a user
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// looking at their uploads has no use for it and no ability to act on it.
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if s.SelfTest != nil && sess.Admin {
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selftest = s.SelfTest()
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}
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s.render(w, r, "dashboard", map[string]any{
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"Session": sess,
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"CSRF": s.csrfToken(sess),
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"Devices": len(devices),
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"Linked": linked,
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"Runs": s.totalRuns(devices),
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"SelfTest": selftest,
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"Version": s.Version,
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"Admin": sess.Admin,
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) totalRuns(devices []store.Device) int {
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if s.Runs == nil {
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return 0
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}
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n := 0
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for _, d := range devices {
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n += len(s.Runs.List(d.ID))
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}
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return n
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}
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func (s *Server) devices(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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devices := s.visibleDevices(sess)
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// Newest first: the device someone is looking for is almost always the one just enrolled.
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sort.Slice(devices, func(i, j int) bool { return devices[i].Enrolled.After(devices[j].Enrolled) })
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type row struct {
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store.Device
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Runs int
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}
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rows := make([]row, 0, len(devices))
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for _, d := range devices {
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n := 0
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if s.Runs != nil {
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n = len(s.Runs.List(d.ID))
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}
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rows = append(rows, row{Device: d, Runs: n})
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}
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s.render(w, r, "devices", map[string]any{
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"Session": sess, "CSRF": s.csrfToken(sess), "Rows": rows,
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"Link": r.URL.Query().Get("link"), "Admin": sess.Admin,
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) revokeDevice(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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id := r.PathValue("id")
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if err := s.Store.DeleteDevice(id); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Worth a log line: revoking a device is destructive, immediate, and someone will eventually
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// want to know who did it and when.
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slog.Info("device revoked", "device", id, "by", sess.Subject)
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/devices", http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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func (s *Server) mintToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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tok, err := s.Store.NewEnrollToken(24*time.Hour, "admin-ui")
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("enrolment token minted", "by", sess.Subject)
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// The whole link, not the bare token: it carries the URL and the pin as well, and assembling
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// those by hand is where an operator gets a pin wrong by one character.
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/devices?link="+url.QueryEscape(s.EnrollLink(tok)), http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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// EnrollLink is supplied by the caller so this package does not need the control server's pin.
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var _ = 0
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func (s *Server) runsList(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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type row struct {
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runs.Meta
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DeviceName string
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}
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var rows []row
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for _, d := range s.visibleDevices(sess) {
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if s.Runs == nil {
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break
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}
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name := d.Name
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if name == "" {
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name = d.ID
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}
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for _, m := range s.Runs.List(d.ID) {
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rows = append(rows, row{Meta: m, DeviceName: name})
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}
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}
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sort.Slice(rows, func(i, j int) bool { return rows[i].UploadedAt.After(rows[j].UploadedAt) })
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if len(rows) > 200 {
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rows = rows[:200] // a page, not the archive; the count is on the dashboard
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}
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s.render(w, r, "runs", map[string]any{
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"Session": sess, "CSRF": s.csrfToken(sess), "Rows": rows, "Admin": sess.Admin,
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) runView(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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// 404 rather than 403 for someone else's run: a distinguishable "you may not see this" tells
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// an unauthorised caller that the run exists, which is itself something they should not learn.
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if !s.mayTouchRun(sess, r.PathValue("device")) {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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body, err := s.Runs.Get(r.PathValue("device"), r.PathValue("id"))
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if err != nil {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Re-indented for reading, but otherwise exactly what was stored. An admin sees the document
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// at the privacy level its uploader chose — there is nothing here that can un-redact it.
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var pretty json.RawMessage = body
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out, err := json.MarshalIndent(json.RawMessage(pretty), "", " ")
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if err != nil {
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out = body
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}
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s.render(w, r, "run", map[string]any{
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"Session": sess, "CSRF": s.csrfToken(sess), "Admin": sess.Admin,
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"Device": r.PathValue("device"), "ID": r.PathValue("id"),
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"JSON": string(out),
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) runDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *adminauth.Session) {
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device, id := r.PathValue("device"), r.PathValue("id")
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if !s.mayTouchRun(sess, device) {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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if err := s.Runs.Delete(device, id); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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slog.Info("run deleted", "device", device, "run", id, "by", sess.Subject)
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/runs", http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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