server-test / test (push) Successful in 34s
Two gaps found while answering where configuration lives. The confidential admin client needs a secret and there was nowhere to put one - I had added the issuer and both client ids but not the secret the admin login actually needs. It now reads from ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and preferably from ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE: a secret in the environment is readable by anything that can see /proc/<pid>/environ and lands in every dump of the unit's config, whereas a path is one file whose permissions an operator can reason about. (/etc/echolot-server.env was also 0644; now 0600 on fmr.) And the server now refuses to serve the admin UI in plaintext on a non-loopback address. The session cookie is a bearer credential for everything the server can do, and the OIDC authorization code arrives in a URL; in the clear, both belong to anyone on the path - and on a globally routable address that is the internet. A hard stop rather than a warning, because a warning in a log is not read by the person who most needs it, and because the safe answers are cheap: bind to loopback and tunnel, or supply a certificate. ECHOLOT_ADMIN_INSECURE=1 overrides it, so the decision is made rather than stumbled into. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
325 lines
16 KiB
Go
325 lines
16 KiB
Go
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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// Package config resolves server configuration with the precedence
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// flags > environment > defaults. In Docker mode (detected or forced with
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// --docker) env vars are the expected source; native installs typically use
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// flags baked into the systemd unit by --install-systemd.
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package config
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import (
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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// Config holds everything the daemon needs. Every field maps to exactly one
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// env var (ECHOLOT_*) and one flag; keep the three in sync when adding fields.
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type Config struct {
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// Control plane (HTTPS + JSON). TLS is pin-based per spec §1: self-signed
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// is first-class, so cert+key are generated if the paths don't exist.
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ControlListen string // ECHOLOT_CONTROL_LISTEN / --control-listen
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TLSCert string // ECHOLOT_TLS_CERT / --tls-cert
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TLSKey string // ECHOLOT_TLS_KEY / --tls-key
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// Data plane
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UDPListen string // ECHOLOT_UDP_LISTEN / --udp-listen (spec default port 8442)
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TCPListen string // ECHOLOT_TCP_LISTEN / --tcp-listen (spec default port 8441)
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StunListen string // ECHOLOT_STUN_LISTEN / --stun-listen (spec default 3478; empty disables)
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DNSListen string // ECHOLOT_DNS_LISTEN / --dns-listen (canary zone; empty disables)
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CanaryZone string // ECHOLOT_CANARY_ZONE / --canary-zone (e.g. c.echo-lot.app)
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// Optional cleartext HTTP-echo listener (spec §4 plaintext-path test).
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// Default empty = off; it exposes only POST /v1/echo, no auth, no secrets.
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HTTPEchoListen string // ECHOLOT_HTTP_ECHO_LISTEN / --http-echo-listen
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// Comma-separated anchors for the egress-MTU self-proof (host or ip).
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MTUProbeTargets string // ECHOLOT_MTU_PROBE_TARGETS / --mtu-probe-targets
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// Admin UI / health listener (spec §7: localhost-only by default)
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AdminListen string // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_LISTEN / --admin-listen
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// State directory: device store, generated TLS material.
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StateDir string // ECHOLOT_STATE_DIR / --state-dir
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// Profile identity
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Name string // ECHOLOT_NAME / --name (profile "name", e.g. "homelab")
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// Self-update (native mode only; ignored in containers — images update
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// by pulling a new tag). Empty = disabled. Value: Gitea repo API base,
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// e.g. https://git.example.net/api/v1/repos/owner/repo
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SelfUpdateAPI string // ECHOLOT_SELF_UPDATE_API / --self-update-api
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// Uploaded-run storage. The default is "anonymous": any enrolled device may upload,
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// which is what a self-hosted server wants. Operators of shared servers turn it down.
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UploadsMode string // ECHOLOT_UPLOADS / --uploads (off|anonymous|account)
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UploadMaxBytes int64 // ECHOLOT_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES / --upload-max-bytes
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UploadRetentionDays int // ECHOLOT_UPLOAD_RETENTION_DAYS / --upload-retention-days
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UploadMaxRuns int // ECHOLOT_UPLOAD_MAX_RUNS / --upload-max-runs (per device)
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UploadMinAnon string // ECHOLOT_UPLOAD_MIN_ANONYMIZATION / --upload-min-anonymization
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// Client compatibility window. Bounds are SemVer; an empty maximum means unbounded. The
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// defaults sit at breaking boundaries, so shipping a patch never requires changing them.
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MinAppVersion string // ECHOLOT_MIN_APP_VERSION / --min-app-version
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MaxAppVersion string // ECHOLOT_MAX_APP_VERSION / --max-app-version (exclusive)
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// Where clients reach the control plane, for enrollment links. Empty = derive from the
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// first control listen address.
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PublicControlURL string // ECHOLOT_PUBLIC_URL / --public-url
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// Identity provider. Empty issuer disables sign-in entirely; the server is a relying
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// party and never stores passwords.
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OIDCIssuer string // ECHOLOT_OIDC_ISSUER / --oidc-issuer
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OIDCClientID string // ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID / --oidc-client-id (confidential, admin UI)
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OIDCAppClientID string // ECHOLOT_OIDC_APP_CLIENT_ID / --oidc-app-client-id (public, the phone app)
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OIDCAdminGroup string // ECHOLOT_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUP / --oidc-admin-group
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// Break-glass admin username; the password lives hashed in the state store.
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AdminUser string // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_USER / --admin-user
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// Secret for the *confidential* admin client. Prefer ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE: a path
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// keeps the secret out of the environment, where it is readable by anything that can see
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// /proc/<pid>/environ and lands in every dump of the unit's configuration.
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OIDCClientSecret string // ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET / _FILE
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// Where the admin UI is reachable, used to build the OIDC redirect URI. Must match what is
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// registered at the IdP exactly.
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AdminBaseURL string // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_BASE_URL / --admin-base-url
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// TLS for the admin listener. Without these it serves plaintext, which is only acceptable on
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// loopback — see checkAdminExposure.
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AdminTLSCert string // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_TLS_CERT / --admin-tls-cert
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AdminTLSKey string // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_TLS_KEY / --admin-tls-key
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// Deliberate override for serving the admin UI in plaintext off loopback, so that decision
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// is made rather than stumbled into.
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AdminInsecure bool // ECHOLOT_ADMIN_INSECURE / --admin-insecure
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// Mode
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Docker bool // --docker (or autodetected; env ECHOLOT_DOCKER=1 forces)
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}
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// secretOr reads ECHOLOT_<key>, or the contents of the file named by ECHOLOT_<key>_FILE.
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//
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// The file form exists because a secret in the environment is readable by anything that can see
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// /proc/<pid>/environ and lands in every dump of the unit's configuration. A path costs nothing
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// and keeps the value in one file whose permissions an operator can reason about.
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func secretOr(key, def string) string {
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if path := envOr(key+"_FILE", ""); path != "" {
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if b, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
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}
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}
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return envOr(key, def)
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}
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// envInt reads ECHOLOT_<key> as an integer with a fallback.
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func envInt(key string, def int) int {
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if v := envOr(key, ""); v != "" {
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if n, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
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return n
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}
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}
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return def
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}
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// envOr reads ECHOLOT_<key> with a fallback.
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func envOr(key, def string) string {
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if v, ok := os.LookupEnv("ECHOLOT_" + key); ok {
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return v
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}
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return def
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}
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// Load parses flags/env. Returns the config plus the action flags that make
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// the process do something other than serve (install/uninstall/update).
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func Load(args []string) (*Config, *Actions, error) {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet("echolot-server", flag.ContinueOnError)
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c := &Config{}
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a := &Actions{}
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fs.StringVar(&c.ControlListen, "control-listen", envOr("CONTROL_LISTEN", ":8443"), "control-plane HTTPS listen address(es), comma-separated")
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fs.StringVar(&c.TLSCert, "tls-cert", envOr("TLS_CERT", ""), "TLS cert path (empty: self-signed in state dir)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.TLSKey, "tls-key", envOr("TLS_KEY", ""), "TLS key path (empty: self-signed in state dir)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.UDPListen, "udp-listen", envOr("UDP_LISTEN", ":8442"), "UDP data-plane listen address(es), comma-separated")
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fs.StringVar(&c.TCPListen, "tcp-listen", envOr("TCP_LISTEN", ":8441"), "TCP echo listen address(es), comma-separated")
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fs.StringVar(&c.StunListen, "stun-listen", envOr("STUN_LISTEN", ":3478"), "STUN listen address(es), comma-separated; empty disables (spec §4)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.DNSListen, "dns-listen", envOr("DNS_LISTEN", ""), "canary-DNS listen address(es) udp+tcp/53, comma-separated; empty disables (spec §6.1)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.CanaryZone, "canary-zone", envOr("CANARY_ZONE", ""), "authoritative canary zone, e.g. c.echo-lot.app")
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fs.StringVar(&c.HTTPEchoListen, "http-echo-listen", envOr("HTTP_ECHO_LISTEN", ""), "optional CLEARTEXT http-echo listen address(es); empty disables (spec §4)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.MTUProbeTargets, "mtu-probe-targets", envOr("MTU_PROBE_TARGETS", "1.1.1.1,2606:4700:4700::1111"), "egress-MTU self-proof anchors, comma-separated")
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fs.StringVar(&c.AdminListen, "admin-listen", envOr("ADMIN_LISTEN", "127.0.0.1:8444"), "admin/health listen address (keep localhost)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.StateDir, "state-dir", envOr("STATE_DIR", defaultStateDir()), "state directory (device store, generated TLS)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.Name, "name", envOr("NAME", "echolot"), "server profile name")
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fs.StringVar(&c.SelfUpdateAPI, "self-update-api", envOr("SELF_UPDATE_API", ""), "Gitea repo API base for self-update; empty disables")
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fs.StringVar(&c.UploadsMode, "uploads", envOr("UPLOADS", "anonymous"), "who may upload measurement runs: off|anonymous|account")
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fs.Int64Var(&c.UploadMaxBytes, "upload-max-bytes", int64(envInt("UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES", 4<<20)), "largest accepted uploaded run, bytes")
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fs.IntVar(&c.UploadRetentionDays, "upload-retention-days", envInt("UPLOAD_RETENTION_DAYS", 90), "delete uploaded runs older than this; 0 disables")
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fs.IntVar(&c.UploadMaxRuns, "upload-max-runs", envInt("UPLOAD_MAX_RUNS", 200), "keep at most this many runs per device; 0 disables")
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fs.StringVar(&c.UploadMinAnon, "upload-min-anonymization", envOr("UPLOAD_MIN_ANONYMIZATION", "full"), "least anonymization accepted: full|balanced|strict")
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fs.StringVar(&c.OIDCIssuer, "oidc-issuer", envOr("OIDC_ISSUER", ""), "OpenID Connect issuer URL; empty disables sign-in")
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fs.StringVar(&c.OIDCClientID, "oidc-client-id", envOr("OIDC_CLIENT_ID", ""), "confidential OIDC client id for the admin UI")
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fs.StringVar(&c.OIDCAppClientID, "oidc-app-client-id", envOr("OIDC_APP_CLIENT_ID", ""), "public OIDC client id used by the Android app (PKCE)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.OIDCAdminGroup, "oidc-admin-group", envOr("OIDC_ADMIN_GROUP", ""), "group claim required for admin access; empty means nobody is an admin via OIDC")
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fs.StringVar(&c.OIDCClientSecret, "oidc-client-secret", secretOr("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", ""), "secret for the confidential admin client; prefer ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE")
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fs.StringVar(&c.AdminBaseURL, "admin-base-url", envOr("ADMIN_BASE_URL", ""), "public URL of the admin UI, for the OIDC redirect (e.g. https://admin.example.net)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.AdminTLSCert, "admin-tls-cert", envOr("ADMIN_TLS_CERT", ""), "TLS certificate for the admin listener")
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fs.StringVar(&c.AdminTLSKey, "admin-tls-key", envOr("ADMIN_TLS_KEY", ""), "TLS key for the admin listener")
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fs.BoolVar(&c.AdminInsecure, "admin-insecure", envOr("ADMIN_INSECURE", "") == "1", "allow the admin UI in plaintext off loopback (you are on your own)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.PublicControlURL, "public-url", envOr("PUBLIC_URL", ""), "public control-plane URL for enrollment links, e.g. https://probe.example.net:8443")
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fs.StringVar(&c.MinAppVersion, "min-app-version", envOr("MIN_APP_VERSION", "0.2.0"), "oldest app version this server will serve (SemVer, inclusive)")
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fs.StringVar(&c.MaxAppVersion, "max-app-version", envOr("MAX_APP_VERSION", "1.0.0"), "first app version this server will refuse (SemVer, exclusive); empty = unbounded")
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fs.BoolVar(&c.Docker, "docker", envOr("DOCKER", "") == "1", "force container mode (config from env, no systemd/self-update)")
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fs.BoolVar(&a.InstallSystemd, "install-systemd", false, "install a systemd unit for this binary and exit")
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fs.BoolVar(&a.UninstallSystemd, "uninstall-systemd", false, "remove the systemd unit and exit")
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var daemon bool
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fs.BoolVar(&a.Serve, "serve", false, "run the server (bind listeners and answer requests)")
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fs.BoolVar(&daemon, "daemon", false, "alias for --serve")
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fs.BoolVar(&a.SetAdminPassword, "set-admin-password", false,
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"set the break-glass admin password (username as --admin-user, password read from stdin) and exit")
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fs.StringVar(&c.AdminUser, "admin-user", envOr("ADMIN_USER", "admin"), "username for the break-glass admin")
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fs.BoolVar(&a.SelfUpdate, "self-update", false, "check for a newer release, replace this binary, and exit")
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fs.BoolVar(&a.Version, "version", false, "print version and exit")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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if !c.Docker {
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c.Docker = inContainer()
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}
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a.Serve = a.Serve || daemon
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// No verb at all means the caller has not said what they want. Usage is the answer, and it
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// is a usage error rather than success — otherwise a service manager sees a clean exit and
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// concludes the server ran and finished.
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if !a.Serve && !a.InstallSystemd && !a.UninstallSystemd && !a.SelfUpdate &&
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!a.SetAdminPassword && !a.Version {
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a.Help = true
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}
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if a.Serve {
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if err := c.checkAdminExposure(); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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if c.Docker && (a.InstallSystemd || a.UninstallSystemd || a.SelfUpdate) {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("systemd/self-update actions are native-mode only (container detected; override with ECHOLOT_DOCKER=0 if this is wrong)")
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}
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return c, a, nil
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}
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// Usage prints the verbs first and the tuning flags second, because the question someone has
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// when they run this by name is "what does it do", not "what can I set".
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func Usage(w io.Writer) {
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fmt.Fprint(w, `echolot-server — the Echolot probe server
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USAGE
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echolot-server --serve run the server
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echolot-server --version print the version
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echolot-server --install-systemd install and enable a systemd unit
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echolot-server --uninstall-systemd remove it
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echolot-server --self-update replace this binary with the latest release
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echolot-server --set-admin-password set the break-glass admin password (stdin)
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echolot-server --help full flag list
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Every flag can also be set as an environment variable: --control-listen becomes
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ECHOLOT_CONTROL_LISTEN. In a container, configuration comes from the environment.
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Running with no verb prints this and exits non-zero: starting to serve the internet
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should be something you asked for.
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`)
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}
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// checkAdminExposure refuses to serve an unencrypted admin UI on a non-loopback address.
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//
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// The admin session cookie is a bearer credential for everything this server can do, and the OIDC
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// authorization code arrives in a URL. In plaintext, both are readable by anyone on the path — and
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// on a globally routable address "the path" means the internet. This is a hard stop rather than a
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// warning because a warning in a log is not read by the person who most needs it, and because the
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// two safe answers are cheap: bind to loopback and tunnel, or supply a certificate.
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func (c *Config) checkAdminExposure() error {
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if c.AdminTLSCert != "" || c.AdminInsecure {
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return nil
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}
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for _, addr := range Addrs(c.AdminListen) {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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ip := net.ParseIP(strings.Trim(host, "[]"))
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if host == "" || ip == nil || ip.IsLoopback() {
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continue // loopback, or a name we cannot judge; RFC 8252 blesses loopback plaintext
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}
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"refusing to serve the admin UI in plaintext on %s: the session cookie and the OIDC "+
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"authorization code would cross the network in the clear.\n"+
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" Fix it one of three ways:\n"+
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" - bind to 127.0.0.1 and reach it over an SSH tunnel (no certificate needed)\n"+
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" - set ECHOLOT_ADMIN_TLS_CERT and ECHOLOT_ADMIN_TLS_KEY\n"+
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" - set ECHOLOT_ADMIN_INSECURE=1 if you genuinely mean it", addr)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Addrs splits a comma-separated listen spec into individual addresses.
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// Explicit per-address binds matter on multi-IP hosts: a wildcard bind
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// (":8443") would also claim addresses reserved for other purposes (e.g. an
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// SSH-only management IP).
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func Addrs(spec string) []string {
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var out []string
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for _, a := range strings.Split(spec, ",") {
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if a = strings.TrimSpace(a); a != "" {
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out = append(out, a)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// Actions are the verbs. Serving is one of them, and it is explicit: running the binary with no
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// arguments prints usage rather than binding a dozen ports and starting to answer the internet.
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// Someone typing the name of an unfamiliar program on a terminal should be told what it does, not
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// have it start doing it.
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type Actions struct {
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Serve bool
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// Help is set when there is nothing to do: no verb was given.
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Help bool
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InstallSystemd bool
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UninstallSystemd bool
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SelfUpdate bool
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SetAdminPassword bool
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Version bool
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}
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func defaultStateDir() string {
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if os.Geteuid() == 0 {
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return "/var/lib/echolot-server"
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}
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home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
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if err != nil {
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return "./echolot-state"
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}
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return home + "/.local/share/echolot-server"
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}
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// inContainer detects Docker/Podman/K8s without being asked: /.dockerenv,
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// /run/.containerenv (podman), or a container hint in /proc/1/cgroup
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// (cgroup v1 era) / KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST. Best-effort — --docker and
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// ECHOLOT_DOCKER always win.
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func inContainer() bool {
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for _, marker := range []string{"/.dockerenv", "/run/.containerenv"} {
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if _, err := os.Stat(marker); err == nil {
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return true
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}
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}
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if os.Getenv("KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST") != "" {
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return true
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}
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if b, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/1/cgroup"); err == nil {
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s := string(b)
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if strings.Contains(s, "docker") || strings.Contains(s, "containerd") || strings.Contains(s, "kubepods") {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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