Pure stdlib. Implements the spec's core: enrollment (single-use tokens), profile (SPKI pin, only real capabilities advertised), sessions with the §2.4 HKDF-SHA256 key schedule; UDP data plane with the 32-byte ELT1 header, 4-byte HMAC gate, 1024-wide anti-replay window, ECHO_RESP with observation block, TIMESYNC, and the §3.4 anti-amplification cap. Wire format has tests (roundtrip + silent-drop cases); enroll→profile→session smoke-tested live. Modes: container (autodetect /.dockerenv|/run/.containerenv|cgroup, or --docker/ECHOLOT_DOCKER=1; config via ECHOLOT_* env; distroless image; network_mode host required — Docker NAT would falsify observed sources) and native (--install-systemd/--uninstall-systemd with a hardened unit, opt-in --self-update from Gitea releases; refused in containers). CI: tests on any server/ push; server-v* tags build+push the image to the Gitea registry and attach linux amd64/arm64 binaries + SHA256SUMS to a release — the artifact self-update consumes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
141 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
141 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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// Package store persists enrollment tokens and device credentials as a single
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// JSON file in the state dir. Deliberately boring: the expected scale is a
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// handful of devices per homelab server; a database would be ceremony.
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package store
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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type EnrollToken struct {
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// SHA-256 of the token, hex. Plaintext exists only in the admin's hands.
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Hash string `json:"hash"`
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Expires time.Time `json:"expires"`
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Used bool `json:"used"`
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Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
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}
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type Device struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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// SHA-256 of the bearer credential, hex. The credential itself is also
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// the HKDF ikm for session keys (spec §2.4), so the server needs it in
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// cleartext at session time — kept alongside, file mode 0600.
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// TODO(hardening): move cleartext creds to a separate keyring file.
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CredentialHash string `json:"credential_hash"`
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Credential string `json:"credential"`
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Enrolled time.Time `json:"enrolled"`
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Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
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}
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type Store struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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path string
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data fileData
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}
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type fileData struct {
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Tokens []EnrollToken `json:"tokens"`
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Devices []Device `json:"devices"`
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}
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func Open(stateDir string) (*Store, error) {
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if err := os.MkdirAll(stateDir, 0o700); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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s := &Store{path: filepath.Join(stateDir, "devices.json")}
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b, err := os.ReadFile(s.path)
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
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return s, nil
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case err != nil:
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return nil, err
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}
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return s, json.Unmarshal(b, &s.data)
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}
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func (s *Store) save() error {
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b, err := json.MarshalIndent(s.data, "", " ")
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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tmp := s.path + ".tmp"
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if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, b, 0o600); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return os.Rename(tmp, s.path)
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}
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func hashOf(tok string) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(tok))
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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func randomHex(n int) string {
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b := make([]byte, n)
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_, _ = rand.Read(b)
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return hex.EncodeToString(b)
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}
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// NewEnrollToken mints a single-use token (returned in cleartext once).
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func (s *Store) NewEnrollToken(ttl time.Duration, note string) (string, error) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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tok := randomHex(24)
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s.data.Tokens = append(s.data.Tokens, EnrollToken{
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Hash: hashOf(tok), Expires: time.Now().Add(ttl), Note: note,
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})
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return tok, s.save()
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}
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// Redeem consumes a valid enrollment token and mints a device credential.
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func (s *Store) Redeem(token, name string) (*Device, error) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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h := hashOf(token)
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for i := range s.data.Tokens {
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t := &s.data.Tokens[i]
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(t.Hash), []byte(h)) == 1 {
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if t.Used || time.Now().After(t.Expires) {
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return nil, errors.New("token used or expired")
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}
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t.Used = true
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d := Device{
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ID: randomHex(8),
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Credential: randomHex(32),
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Enrolled: time.Now().UTC(),
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Name: name,
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}
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d.CredentialHash = hashOf(d.Credential)
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s.data.Devices = append(s.data.Devices, d)
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return &d, s.save()
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}
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}
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return nil, errors.New("unknown token")
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}
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// DeviceByCredential authenticates a bearer credential.
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func (s *Store) DeviceByCredential(cred string) *Device {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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h := hashOf(cred)
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for i := range s.data.Devices {
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(s.data.Devices[i].CredentialHash), []byte(h)) == 1 {
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d := s.data.Devices[i]
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return &d
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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