Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ce1aaa332a server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 30s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 30s
fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right
family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on
.150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT,
which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving;
the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of
wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened.

Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and
granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback
to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and
the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this.

Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local
run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings
and history screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7e1015c211 server: §3.4 asymmetric grants + downtrain and big_send actions
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / image (push) Successful in 34s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 29s
The grant is the keystone that makes server->client sends safe: created
only by an authenticated control-plane action, bound at creation to the
session's OBSERVED data-plane source (so it can never be aimed at a third
party), and bounded by bytes, average rate and expiry. Sends stop the
moment the budget runs out, so a buggy action cannot become a flood.

Two granted actions on top of it:
- downtrain: N packets at a given size/interval toward the client, with
  seq + send-timestamp in the payload — downstream loss/reorder/jitter,
  which an upstream-only train cannot measure.
- big_send: one datagram per requested size, echoing the intended size in
  the payload — downstream MTU / black-hole evidence the client cannot
  produce for itself (only the far end can emit a large packet toward it).

Tests cover the security properties: no grant without a verified
destination, client requests clamped to server limits, byte budget stops
sending exactly, expiry refuses, and the rate ceiling throttles a burst.
Capabilities gain downtrain + big-send.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:09:13 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7b676e666e server: STUN, TCP echo, observations API, delayed-echo + connect-back actions
server-test / test (push) Successful in 27s
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 27s
- stun: RFC 5389 binding responder + RFC 5780 attributes (OTHER-ADDRESS,
  RESPONSE-ORIGIN, CHANGE-REQUEST) on a primary/alt-port socket grid per
  address; advertises stun-5780 with >=2 same-family addrs, else
  stun-basic. Unmodified framing for tooling interop. Tested.
- tcpecho: JSON greeting with observed src + TCP_INFO MSS/options
  (Linux getsockopt; zeroed elsewhere via build tags), then byte echo.
- session: per-packet UDP observations + connect-back results, ByID lookup.
- control: GET /v1/sessions/{id}/observations, POST .../actions
  (delayed_echo → DELAYED_ECHO at the observed data-plane source;
  connect_back → dial the control-plane source, record connected/refused/
  timeout+rtt). Capabilities computed from what is actually wired.
- config/main: comma-separated STUN listeners; all planes bind explicit
  addresses; graceful shutdown of the new listeners.

Full flow smoke-tested; go test green (stun binding/change-port,
dataplane wire format).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 19:53:36 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8a80026d49 server: Go skeleton — control plane, UDP data plane, Docker + systemd modes
Pure stdlib. Implements the spec's core: enrollment (single-use tokens),
profile (SPKI pin, only real capabilities advertised), sessions with the
§2.4 HKDF-SHA256 key schedule; UDP data plane with the 32-byte ELT1
header, 4-byte HMAC gate, 1024-wide anti-replay window, ECHO_RESP with
observation block, TIMESYNC, and the §3.4 anti-amplification cap. Wire
format has tests (roundtrip + silent-drop cases); enroll→profile→session
smoke-tested live.

Modes: container (autodetect /.dockerenv|/run/.containerenv|cgroup, or
--docker/ECHOLOT_DOCKER=1; config via ECHOLOT_* env; distroless image;
network_mode host required — Docker NAT would falsify observed sources)
and native (--install-systemd/--uninstall-systemd with a hardened unit,
opt-in --self-update from Gitea releases; refused in containers).

CI: tests on any server/ push; server-v* tags build+push the image to the
Gitea registry and attach linux amd64/arm64 binaries + SHA256SUMS to a
release — the artifact self-update consumes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:09:08 +02:00