Four passive collectors join long mode: SSDP (passive NOTIFY plus paced
M-SEARCH from the capture socket, so unicast replies land in the same
capture), LLMNR, NetBIOS-NS and WS-Discovery. All are periodic and sparse
by nature, which is exactly why they belong to a window rather than a
probe - a thirty-second run mostly hears silence and would report an
empty network as confidently as a quiet one.
NetBIOS reports unsupported on the app tier and says why: UDP 137 is
privileged. The decoder and evidence shape are tested and waiting for the
Shizuku tier; a recorded reason beats a missing test.
Silence without a multicast lock or a group join is PARTIAL, never OK -
that case is a fact about this app, not about the network. Hostnames,
banners and device UUIDs are classified in core-privacy so the anonymizer
treats them like every other identifier rather than letting a neighbour's
device model ride out in an upload.
No active WSD Probe and no NBSTAT sweep: the app listens to what a
network broadcasts, it does not announce itself to strangers or
interrogate its neighbours.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Long mode starts listeners at t=0 and keeps them running past the
battery: a network-change watcher that finally fills networks[].changes[]
(defined since the schema's first draft, never populated), an RSSI log, a
ping series giving loss and jitter over minutes, and mDNS listening for
the whole window. This is the class of fault a short run cannot see - a
link that drops for four seconds between two probes is reported healthy
by both of them. run.mode records which question was asked, because
silence means different things in the two modes.
The adb relay replaces the retired beacon: AdbRelay watches adbd's own
mDNS with the resolve-once discipline the beacon learned the hard way
(resolving re-arms adbd and pops a notification), a foreground service
keeps it alive with the screen off, and the heartbeat re-posts the cached
endpoint rather than re-resolving. It exists because mDNS does not cross
subnets and the wireless-debug port rotates every few minutes.
Also records why LLDP/CDP cannot follow SSDP into long mode: both are raw
L2 frames, so they need CAP_NET_RAW - root tier, not app, and Shizuku's
shell user does not have it either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
rmnet_data1 on the OnePlus is the carrier's IMS/VoLTE network: it carries
IMS&MMTEL but neither INTERNET nor NOT_RESTRICTED, so binding needs
CONNECTIVITY_USE_RESTRICTED_NETWORKS - signature-level, unobtainable.
EPERM there is permanent and says nothing about any network's health, but
the constraint detector counted it, so a phone with VoLTE reported
'measurement blocked' on every run and every verdict came out
INCONCLUSIVE. Capabilities now decide: networks an app may never bind are
recorded as app_usable:false in networks[] and skipped, rather than
reported as something the run failed to do.
Also retires the 'while it tears down' wording, which was a guess that
turned out to be wrong - the refusal outlasts the VPN indefinitely, so
the text now names the VPN as the usual cause without asserting a
timeline it cannot know.
App version 0.2.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ETA table was fixed at compile time, but real durations are a property
of this phone and the network it stands in - ICMPv6 answers in
milliseconds where IPv6 works and waits out its timeout where it does
not. Estimates now prefer an EMA (70/30) of what this device actually
measured, seeded by the old constants on first run.
VPN detection had two lies in it, both found on hardware: a disconnected
tunnel lingers in allNetworks while tearing down, so 'VPN active' is now
judged from the ACTIVE network only; and any bind failure counted as
'per-network blocked', so a network dying mid-run flipped a healthy run
to INCONCLUSIVE - now only a genuine EPERM refusal counts. Banner and
finding split three ways (VPN + blocked / blocked only / VPN only) so the
app never names a VPN the user just turned off.
App version 0.2.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
traceroute.udp4 lands as TracerouteProbe: ICMP time-exceeded read off the
socket error queue via Os.recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) through the reflection
facade the prober validated on both devices - no root, no raw socket, and
the C-over-JNI shim stays dead. Emits the schema's TracerouteEvidence with
rtt_ns. OsAbi carries the hardcoded sockopt ABI numbers across, including
the measured fact that Os.getsockoptInt exists on neither device, so PMTU
must come from the errqueue, never getsockopt(IP_MTU).
local.mdns_inventory lands as MdnsInventoryProbe with both hardware-bought
lessons intact: the meta-query lies (0 results beside live services on both
devices), and 4s of listening misses what 10s catches.
App version 0.2.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Constraints are detected up front (one throwaway bind per network) and land
in run.constraints, a measurement.vpn_constrained finding, the $7.3 verdict
(INCONCLUSIVE outright) and a banner on the run screen - a VPN'd run looked
exactly like a clean run of a healthy network before this.
v6.broken returns to the registry now that it can be earned: V6ConnectProbe
(v6.brokenness) makes a real TCP connection over IPv6 to the enrolled
server, and only both transports failing on a network that advertises IPv6
justifies the claim. TCP succeeding turns the finding into 'ICMPv6 is
filtered, IPv6 works' at high confidence instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A tablet on a healthy network could not resolve anything. The DNS server
answered the bare name correctly — NOERROR, two records, A and AAAA, with
and without EDNS0 — so the earlier finding blamed the device's resolver.
It was wrong. The network advertised hudelist.local as a search domain and
the server silently dropped every query under it: not NXDOMAIN, nothing at
all. Resolvers append search domains, so they waited for a reply that was
never coming.
Silence is the part that makes this vicious. A negative answer moves a
resolver on; no answer looks like packet loss, so it retries, and some
give up on the lookup entirely. It also explains how two devices on one
network can disagree about whether DNS works — the phone tried the plain
name first and never noticed.
The probe now asks about a nonce name under each advertised search domain,
where the wanted answer is NXDOMAIN and only silence is a fault. The
finding is ordered ahead of dns.system_resolver_broken so the two cannot
both fire: without that, this exact network gets told its device is
broken.
Severity follows the harm rather than the shape. HIGH when resolution is
actually failing, MEDIUM when the domain is a black hole but this resolver
happens to try the plain name first — calling that HIGH would be crying
wolf on a network that works. The message names the fix and notes that
.local is reserved for mDNS by RFC 6762 and widely dropped by design,
while home.arpa (RFC 8375) is the name reserved for this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The probe counted any well-formed packet from the server as "the server
answers", checking only the transaction id and a minimum length. REFUSED
and SERVFAIL are well-formed packets. So a server actively refusing this
client would have been reported as healthy, and the finding — whose whole
output is "the network is fine, your device is not" — would have pointed
confidently at the wrong component.
It now requires rcode 0 and at least one record, and reports a refusal as
what it is: a working server saying no, which points back at the network.
The rcode is named rather than numbered, because "REFUSED" is a fact an
operator can act on and "rcode 5" is a lookup.
Caught by decoding what fmr's router actually replied — ab cd 81 80 00 01
00 02, NOERROR with two answers — after realising the earlier check only
counted bytes. The reply was genuinely good, so the finding on the tablet
stands; the check was wrong regardless.
The advice is broader too. That tablet's fault survived a reboot, which
makes "toggle wifi and it clears" wrong as a flat claim: it now says what
to look at when a restart does not fix it — something on the device
filtering DNS, or a per-client rule on the router.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diagnosing a tablet that claimed "no internet" took twenty adb commands
to establish something the app should have said in one run: ping to
1.1.1.1 worked, the configured DNS server answered a raw UDP query in
65 bytes, and Android still could not resolve a hostname. The network was
fine; netd had wedged.
Those two failures look identical to a user and want opposite responses —
"look at your router" against "toggle your wifi" — so dns.resolver asks
the network's own servers directly and compares the answer against what
the platform returns for the same name. The query is hand-rolled over a
plain DatagramSocket on purpose: anything routed through a resolver API
would inherit the very fault being looked for.
dns.system_resolver_broken fires only on the pairing that is otherwise
unattributable: server answered, platform did not. Per network, because a
phone can have wedged wifi and working cellular at once.
Also records Android's own verdict per network — validated, captive
portal, partial connectivity — which the app reproduced with its own HTTP
probes but never stored. It is free, it is what the user sees in the
status bar, and its disagreement with our measurements is exactly what
identified the tablet. NET_CAPABILITY_PARTIAL_CONNECTIVITY is @SystemApi
so the constant is inlined with its rationale, in the manner of OsAbi.kt,
and read defensively enough to report unknown rather than false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The canary-DNS zone and the STUN host were compiled in as c.echo-lot.app
and fmr-1.echo-lot.app, so every copy of the app measured against this
particular deployment whatever server its owner had enrolled with. On
someone else's install those two tests describe our infrastructure and
report the result as a fact about their network.
The zone comes from the server's own profile, which has advertised
canary_zone all along — the app simply never read it. It is cached in
settings because the canary probe runs at device tier, before anything
has contacted the control plane, and a probe that had to make a call
first would fail on exactly the networks worth measuring. The STUN host
is derived from the configured server URL rather than stored, since a
second copy of the server's name goes stale the moment someone
re-enrolls elsewhere.
With no server configured both now report SKIPPED. StunProbe previously
would have reported FAILED on a blank host, which reads as a finding
about the network when the truth is that no packet was ever sent — the
same conflation between "measured nothing" and "measured a fault" that
the ICMPv6 finding had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-network attribution fix worked — the finding named rmnet_data1
instead of the IPv4-only wifi — and immediately exposed a worse problem
underneath. Cellular's result was `ok: false` because binding a socket to
it failed with EPERM, so no echo request was ever sent; the finding then
reported "IPv6 is configured, but ICMPv6 gets no reply" about a network
the app had never pinged. That is an assertion about the user's carrier
with nothing behind it.
`attempted` now travels beside `ok`, set only once sendto has returned,
and the finding requires both. Failing to bind is a fact about this app's
permissions on this device; it says nothing about the network, and the
two must not share a boolean.
Verified on hardware with a VPN active: every network fails to bind with
EPERM, nothing is sent, and no ICMPv6 finding is emitted — where the
previous build would have blamed the carrier. Recorded in build-status:
Android blocks per-network binding entirely while a VPN holds the default
route, so per-network measurement is unavailable to anyone with one
connected. That needs a deliberate answer rather than a silently green run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signing in and being allowed to administer the server were the same
question: the OIDC callback refused a session outright to anyone outside
the admin group. A legitimate user could authenticate, be told what they
could not do, and be left with no way to see or delete the data their own
devices had uploaded.
They are separate questions now. Everyone who authenticates gets a
session; the admin flag rides inside the MAC'd payload, so promoting
yourself means forging a signature rather than editing a cookie, and a
role that does not parse fails closed to "user".
Pages scope themselves through visibleDevices/mayTouchRun rather than
filtering individually — per-page scoping is what the next page added
will be missing, and that failure is silent, since a listing that leaks
other people's uploads looks exactly like one that does not. Someone
else's run answers 404, not 403: a distinguishable refusal would confirm
the run exists. Revoking devices and minting enrolment tokens affect the
whole server and stay behind adminOnly at the route table, where someone
looking for who-may-do-what will actually find it.
Ownership is re-read per request instead of captured at sign-in, so
unlinking an account takes effect immediately rather than at session
expiry. Tests cover that, plus the degenerate case of an empty subject,
which must own nothing rather than everything with an empty account id.
Also: attribute the ICMPv6 finding per network. It compared "is IPv6
configured anywhere on this device" against "did any network answer",
which on a phone reports IPv6-is-broken about a network where IPv6 was
never configured. network_ref is null on every test, so the probe now
records per-network outcomes structurally rather than as prose a finding
would have to parse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Probe.estimatedMs (measured per probe; timeout-bound ones dominate)
drives a determinate progress bar and "test N of M · ~Xs left",
including the Shizuku battery in the total.
- Cancel stops the run and shows the partial results as a normal document
(findings + verdict over what was collected) but never uploads them.
- safeDrawingPadding() on the root column: Android 15 is edge-to-edge by
default and the title was colliding with the status-bar clock and the
camera cutout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The probe identified the LAN's IPv6 RA sender end to end from an
unprivileged app: EUI-64 MAC recovery (78:9A:18:54:B8:F9, matching the
Shizuku neighbor table) -> MikroTik by OUI, corroborated by the UPnP
device description (RouterOS/7.23.2, MikroTik Router) and reverse DNS
(router.hudelist.local). Cellular's RFC 7217 privacy RA source is
correctly reported as not-EUI-64 instead of guessed. The SSDP sweep also
inventoried a Synology DS1522+ and a Sky gateway — the raw material for
future LLDP/mDNS cross-matching.
Fixes found by running it: added the confirmed MikroTik OUI 78:9A:18 (+
other RouterBOARD ranges) and an elvis-operator bug that printed "no UPnP
response" alongside valid UPnP data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
link.ra_source answers "who advertises IPv6 here, and which box is it":
RA source per network, MAC recovered from the modified-EUI-64 link-local
(privacy addresses reported as such, not guessed), vendor via a curated
OUI table, UPnP/SSDP M-SEARCH for the gateway's server banner + device
description (manufacturer/model/friendly name), and reverse DNS. All SSDP
responders are recorded so a rogue RA sender that isn't the gateway can
still be matched; the MAC accompanies every identity source as the hook
for future LLDP/mDNS cross-matching. UI gains a "Router / IPv6 advertiser"
panel.
Icons: branding adaptive icon converted to vector drawables (+ PNG
mipmaps, monochrome layer). The debug build is now a separate app —
applicationIdSuffix .dev, label "Echolot DEV", DEV-badged icon — so it
installs alongside a production build and can't be confused with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hand-rolled RFC 5389/5780 STUN client (stdlib only) that exercises the
server's stun-5780 capability: one socket, three binding requests
(primary, OTHER-ADDRESS alternate IP, CHANGE-REQUEST port) — the
comparison classifies NAT mapping and filtering behavior.
Verified on the OnePlus: local 10.13.102.124 -> mapped
178.191.120.247:53259 (behind_nat true), alternate address answered from
the server's second IP, mapping endpoint-independent, filtering
address/port-dependent. Finding nat.symmetric (medium) for the
P2P-hostile case.
Two real bugs found by running it: port preservation was misread as "no
NAT" (compare addresses, not ports), and an unbound socket reports the
wildcard local address (resolve via a throwaway connected socket).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the server's canary zone through the platform resolver and
compares against the spec-frozen ground truth (probe-protocol §6.1):
reference records detect answers rewritten in flight, and a per-run nonce
name (uncacheable) proves the query reached the authoritative server.
Findings: dns.answer_rewritten (high), dns.authoritative_unreachable
(medium).
Verified on the OnePlus against the deployed fmr zone: 4/4 reference
records matched exactly, nonce name answered 192.0.2.21 with
reached_authoritative=true. First full client<->server measurement loop
on real hardware; report archived.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors NetworkMonitor: per active network, fetch the AOSP default
generate_204 endpoints and check for HTTP 204 No Content.
- HTTPS https://www.google.com/generate_204 == 204 -> validated internet
- HTTP http://connectivitycheck.gstatic.com/generate_204: 204 -> clean;
an unfollowed 3xx or a 200-with-body -> captive portal (Location captured)
- both fail -> no_internet
Per-network verdicts (bound via Network.openConnection), redirects not
followed (the 3xx IS the evidence). Findings: captive_portal (medium) and
no_internet (high). New test type net.captive_portal (net family ->
connectivity category). App gains usesCleartextTraffic (a network
diagnostic that intentionally probes plain HTTP).
Builds; measurement verdict tests still green. On-device verification
deferred with the rest (flaky test devices).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First assembling build of the production app. Android toolchain mirrors
the prober (AGP 9 built-in Kotlin; applying kotlin.android too
double-registers the kotlin extension — the one gotcha).
core-probe (Android lib): Probe→core-measurement Test abstraction;
NetworkInventory (LinkProperties→networks[]), LinkSnapshotProbe,
per-network IcmpProbe (ported from the prober's validated logic).
app (Compose): RunViewModel orchestrates probes into a MeasurementDocument
with a §7.3 summary + first-pass findings; UI renders traffic lights,
networks, tests, findings; JSON export. Rotation-safe (ViewModel).
App-tier only; server-facing (core-engine) + Shizuku are additive
follow-ups. Debug APK 9.5 MB, assembles clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
