5 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5	ce1aaa332a	server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used ... fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on .150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT, which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving; the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened. Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this. Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings and history screens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5	7a94c9a3d7	chore: ignore the VSCodium Java extension's bin/ output ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 10:26:30 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5	2521d39989	server: DF-mode big_send + uploaded-run storage with an operator policy ... big_send now forces the Don't-Fragment bit for the whole burst by default, so the largest size that arrives IS the downstream path MTU rather than "fragments got through" — two different measurements the schema already separates. Sizes above our own egress MTU (from the startup self-test) are refused up front and reported as max_df_bytes, because absence caused by our kernel must not be read as a limit of the client's path. Uploads: one JSON file per run under the state dir, with the policy the operator actually cares about — who may upload (off / anonymous / account), how large, how long to keep, and the least anonymization accepted. The profile advertises all of it so the app can present the switch honestly instead of discovering the rules by failing. `account` refuses today rather than falling back to anonymous: picking the strict setting before OIDC lands must not silently mean the loose one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 10:26:19 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5	59ba1c16bc	app: dns.canary probe — client half of the canary measurement, verified live ... Resolves the server's canary zone through the platform resolver and compares against the spec-frozen ground truth (probe-protocol §6.1): reference records detect answers rewritten in flight, and a per-run nonce name (uncacheable) proves the query reached the authoritative server. Findings: dns.answer_rewritten (high), dns.authoritative_unreachable (medium). Verified on the OnePlus against the deployed fmr zone: 4/4 reference records matched exactly, nonce name answered 192.0.2.21 with reached_authoritative=true. First full client<->server measurement loop on real hardware; report archived. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-01 09:02:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5	49c6197aff	app: core-engine — run engine; full server-facing vertical proven vs fmr ... Composes core-protocol probes into core-measurement documents. Injected clock/UUID source keeps it pure and unit-testable. Runs a server ECHO train and derives RTT distribution, loss, and NAT-rebinding detection (from the server's observed source port) as train.udp_updown, then findings + a §7.3 summary. Verified end-to-end against fmr: 20-packet train, 0% loss, RTT 1.7/2.5/6.9ms, no rebinding → valid MeasurementDocument (2.3kB), overall GREEN. The whole server-facing stack (protocol → engine → schema → verdict) now produces the real product artifact against the live server, no device required. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 21:28:09 +02:00