Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7e1015c211 server: §3.4 asymmetric grants + downtrain and big_send actions
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / image (push) Successful in 34s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 29s
The grant is the keystone that makes server->client sends safe: created
only by an authenticated control-plane action, bound at creation to the
session's OBSERVED data-plane source (so it can never be aimed at a third
party), and bounded by bytes, average rate and expiry. Sends stop the
moment the budget runs out, so a buggy action cannot become a flood.

Two granted actions on top of it:
- downtrain: N packets at a given size/interval toward the client, with
  seq + send-timestamp in the payload — downstream loss/reorder/jitter,
  which an upstream-only train cannot measure.
- big_send: one datagram per requested size, echoing the intended size in
  the payload — downstream MTU / black-hole evidence the client cannot
  produce for itself (only the far end can emit a large packet toward it).

Tests cover the security properties: no grant without a verified
destination, client requests clamped to server limits, byte budget stops
sending exactly, expiry refuses, and the rate ceiling throttles a burst.
Capabilities gain downtrain + big-send.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:09:13 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 c9e0d06ea2 server: MTU probe (MTU_PROBE/MTU_ACK) — path-MTU / black-hole measurement
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 27s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 27s
Server ACKs each DF-flagged probe with a tiny MTU_ACK carrying the size it
received; the client binary-searches the path MTU. Non-amplifying by
construction. Tested.

Also records: v0.3.2 (http-echo + tls-reference) verified live on fmr, and
the finding that upstream trains are already observable via the
observations API (dedicated TRAIN_REPORT deferred — needs an
anti-amplification grant + columnar encoding).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:37:20 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7b676e666e server: STUN, TCP echo, observations API, delayed-echo + connect-back actions
server-test / test (push) Successful in 27s
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 27s
- stun: RFC 5389 binding responder + RFC 5780 attributes (OTHER-ADDRESS,
  RESPONSE-ORIGIN, CHANGE-REQUEST) on a primary/alt-port socket grid per
  address; advertises stun-5780 with >=2 same-family addrs, else
  stun-basic. Unmodified framing for tooling interop. Tested.
- tcpecho: JSON greeting with observed src + TCP_INFO MSS/options
  (Linux getsockopt; zeroed elsewhere via build tags), then byte echo.
- session: per-packet UDP observations + connect-back results, ByID lookup.
- control: GET /v1/sessions/{id}/observations, POST .../actions
  (delayed_echo → DELAYED_ECHO at the observed data-plane source;
  connect_back → dial the control-plane source, record connected/refused/
  timeout+rtt). Capabilities computed from what is actually wired.
- config/main: comma-separated STUN listeners; all planes bind explicit
  addresses; graceful shutdown of the new listeners.

Full flow smoke-tested; go test green (stun binding/change-port,
dataplane wire format).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 19:53:36 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8a80026d49 server: Go skeleton — control plane, UDP data plane, Docker + systemd modes
Pure stdlib. Implements the spec's core: enrollment (single-use tokens),
profile (SPKI pin, only real capabilities advertised), sessions with the
§2.4 HKDF-SHA256 key schedule; UDP data plane with the 32-byte ELT1
header, 4-byte HMAC gate, 1024-wide anti-replay window, ECHO_RESP with
observation block, TIMESYNC, and the §3.4 anti-amplification cap. Wire
format has tests (roundtrip + silent-drop cases); enroll→profile→session
smoke-tested live.

Modes: container (autodetect /.dockerenv|/run/.containerenv|cgroup, or
--docker/ECHOLOT_DOCKER=1; config via ECHOLOT_* env; distroless image;
network_mode host required — Docker NAT would falsify observed sources)
and native (--install-systemd/--uninstall-systemd with a hardened unit,
opt-in --self-update from Gitea releases; refused in containers).

CI: tests on any server/ push; server-v* tags build+push the image to the
Gitea registry and attach linux amd64/arm64 binaries + SHA256SUMS to a
release — the artifact self-update consumes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 13:09:08 +02:00