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Author SHA1 Message Date
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 c5f3c2e7af app: learn probe durations per device; stop claiming VPN after teardown
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 31s
The ETA table was fixed at compile time, but real durations are a property
of this phone and the network it stands in - ICMPv6 answers in
milliseconds where IPv6 works and waits out its timeout where it does
not. Estimates now prefer an EMA (70/30) of what this device actually
measured, seeded by the old constants on first run.

VPN detection had two lies in it, both found on hardware: a disconnected
tunnel lingers in allNetworks while tearing down, so 'VPN active' is now
judged from the ACTIVE network only; and any bind failure counted as
'per-network blocked', so a network dying mid-run flipped a healthy run
to INCONCLUSIVE - now only a genuine EPERM refusal counts. Banner and
finding split three ways (VPN + blocked / blocked only / VPN only) so the
app never names a VPN the user just turned off.

App version 0.2.3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:41:10 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 3214cc877a app: parse the Shizuku dumps into link.ra_source and sec.arp_watch
Pure-Kotlin parsers over the captures the battery already makes, tested
against the real archived dumps from both devices - including the
Lenovo's 1000000015 route tables (table ids stay strings), the OnePlus's
stray uid=2000 prefix and mid-line hoplimit, and an ip_monitor that only
ever said EXEC_TIMEOUT. ShizukuProbe now returns three tests; a failed
capture is SKIPPED with its reason so no test type silently vanishes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:34:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 515a6aef04 app: speak train (0x03-0x05) and mark downtrains with DSCP
ProbeSession sends paced upstream trains and fetches the server's columnar
received view; UpstreamTrainMeasurement lines both ledgers up per sequence
number into TrainEvidence - the directional loss attribution a round trip
cannot make. Loss is computed against the server's total count, not its
row list, so a buffer-capped report can never invent loss on big trains.
A missing report stays ambiguous by name (report lost, or server predates
trains) instead of being blamed on the train.

downtrain actions can now request a DSCP marking, recording dscp_applied
so a survival comparison never blames the path for a marking the sender
skipped.

Also logged: fmr runs v0.11.2 built from commits this repo's remote never
saw, so --self-update on fmr is OFF-LIMITS until that lineage is repaired
- the fresh server-v0.9.2 release is newest-created but semantically
older, and the updater compares strings, not SemVer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:34:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d574c76630 docs: log the prober fold and server v0.9.2 feature work
server-release / image (push) Successful in 16s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 48s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 1m2s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:06:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8118e213ae server: upstream trains, observed TTL/DSCP/ECN, rate limits, action ids
Types 0x03/0x04/0x05 land with a bounded columnar train buffer (head kept,
truncation declared) and grant-free multi-part reports - a report row is
smaller than the packet it answers, so $3.4 holds without a grant. The
read loop now collects TTL/TOS cmsgs on Linux, replacing the 0xFF stubs in
the observation block with what the kernel saw; downtrain gained a dscp
parameter, so DSCP survival is measurable in both directions.

Rate limiting ($2.5) exists now: per-credential AND per-source buckets,
429 on the control plane, silent drop on the data plane after the HMAC
gate and before the replay window. UDP ceilings default above the largest
legitimate run - a limit that clips a real measurement produces a
confidently wrong number.

Every granted packet carries its action_id at payload[8:16]; overlapping
actions were unattributable before. Canary DNS logs now honor the stated
24h privacy default. /admin/enroll-tokens answers the spec's JSON shape.
protocol_version 1.0.1 (additive).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:04:54 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 f6849f8e6a app: fold the prober's validated capabilities into core-probe
traceroute.udp4 lands as TracerouteProbe: ICMP time-exceeded read off the
socket error queue via Os.recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) through the reflection
facade the prober validated on both devices - no root, no raw socket, and
the C-over-JNI shim stays dead. Emits the schema's TracerouteEvidence with
rtt_ns. OsAbi carries the hardcoded sockopt ABI numbers across, including
the measured fact that Os.getsockoptInt exists on neither device, so PMTU
must come from the errqueue, never getsockopt(IP_MTU).

local.mdns_inventory lands as MdnsInventoryProbe with both hardware-bought
lessons intact: the meta-query lies (0 results beside live services on both
devices), and 4s of listening misses what 10s catches.

App version 0.2.2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 12:39:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7d98a43866 docs: close the VPN, v6, reserved-probe and signing items in the build log
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 12:32:02 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 a49bef5821 server: refuse unsigned releases and polluted reserved addresses
Self-update now verifies SHA256SUMS.sig (ed25519, relsign package) against
a public key baked into the binary; the private key exists only in the CI
secret store, so a compromised release host can withhold updates but not
inject one. CI signs on every server-v* tag and hard-fails without the
secret. Operators with their own pipeline override the key via
ECHOLOT_SELF_UPDATE_PUBKEY (mint a pair with release-sign -gen).

Startup also now proves 80/443 are actually free on the reserved
measurement addresses by asking the OS (throwaway bind), not the config -
CheckReserved could never see a stray process, and the adb-beacon receiver
on 0.0.0.0:443 was exactly that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 12:32:02 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 20cfecf566 app: name what a VPN blocked, and prove v6 broken before saying so
Constraints are detected up front (one throwaway bind per network) and land
in run.constraints, a measurement.vpn_constrained finding, the $7.3 verdict
(INCONCLUSIVE outright) and a banner on the run screen - a VPN'd run looked
exactly like a clean run of a healthy network before this.

v6.broken returns to the registry now that it can be earned: V6ConnectProbe
(v6.brokenness) makes a real TCP connection over IPv6 to the enrolled
server, and only both transports failing on a network that advertises IPv6
justifies the claim. TCP succeeding turns the finding into 'ICMPv6 is
filtered, IPv6 works' at high confidence instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 12:31:44 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 987b2ceb47 server: read the verdict from where the schema puts it
Every uploaded run showed "not recorded" in the web UI because the meta
extractor read summary.verdict. Schema §7.3 calls that field
summary.overall; "verdict" is the per-category field one level down. So
the verdict was never stored, and the UI faithfully reported a gap that
was this parser's doing rather than the document's.

The test encoded the same mistake — its fixture posted
summary.verdict:"warn" — so it passed throughout against a parser that
read a field nothing writes. Corrected to summary.overall, and to a
verdict that exists: §7.3 defines green|yellow|red|inconclusive, and
"warn" was never one of them.

The eleven runs already stored had their meta backfilled from the
documents, which are kept byte-for-byte and still carry the real value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 10:52:25 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d5b1bab577 app: stop the autorun upload pointing at a listener that is gone
"upload failed: HTTP 400 client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server"
is a TLS listener rejecting cleartext, and the cleartext was ours:
REPORT_UPLOAD_URL was http://89.185.109.150:443/report, which used to be
the adb-beacon receiver holding 0.0.0.0:443 in plaintext. Disabling that
receiver and giving 443 to echolot-server left this posting plain HTTP at
a TLS port.

Blanked rather than repointed. The endpoint existed so an unattended run
could be collected without adb, and autorun reports are now read straight
off the device with `run-as cat` — so it was buying nothing and emitting
an alarming error for a debugging convenience. Deliberately not aimed at
/v1/runs either: that is the consent-gated upload, and a debugging
shortcut must not be able to satisfy it by accident.

The message says what happened instead of implying something broke.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 10:36:49 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 a17c3fd9e6 app: catch a search domain that swallows DNS queries
A tablet on a healthy network could not resolve anything. The DNS server
answered the bare name correctly — NOERROR, two records, A and AAAA, with
and without EDNS0 — so the earlier finding blamed the device's resolver.
It was wrong. The network advertised hudelist.local as a search domain and
the server silently dropped every query under it: not NXDOMAIN, nothing at
all. Resolvers append search domains, so they waited for a reply that was
never coming.

Silence is the part that makes this vicious. A negative answer moves a
resolver on; no answer looks like packet loss, so it retries, and some
give up on the lookup entirely. It also explains how two devices on one
network can disagree about whether DNS works — the phone tried the plain
name first and never noticed.

The probe now asks about a nonce name under each advertised search domain,
where the wanted answer is NXDOMAIN and only silence is a fault. The
finding is ordered ahead of dns.system_resolver_broken so the two cannot
both fire: without that, this exact network gets told its device is
broken.

Severity follows the harm rather than the shape. HIGH when resolution is
actually failing, MEDIUM when the domain is a black hole but this resolver
happens to try the plain name first — calling that HIGH would be crying
wolf on a network that works. The message names the fix and notes that
.local is reserved for mDNS by RFC 6762 and widely dropped by design,
while home.arpa (RFC 8375) is the name reserved for this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 10:29:04 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 cfa58e8d60 app: a DNS reply is not a DNS answer
The probe counted any well-formed packet from the server as "the server
answers", checking only the transaction id and a minimum length. REFUSED
and SERVFAIL are well-formed packets. So a server actively refusing this
client would have been reported as healthy, and the finding — whose whole
output is "the network is fine, your device is not" — would have pointed
confidently at the wrong component.

It now requires rcode 0 and at least one record, and reports a refusal as
what it is: a working server saying no, which points back at the network.
The rcode is named rather than numbered, because "REFUSED" is a fact an
operator can act on and "rcode 5" is a lookup.

Caught by decoding what fmr's router actually replied — ab cd 81 80 00 01
00 02, NOERROR with two answers — after realising the earlier check only
counted bytes. The reply was genuinely good, so the finding on the tablet
stands; the check was wrong regardless.

The advice is broader too. That tablet's fault survived a reboot, which
makes "toggle wifi and it clears" wrong as a flat claim: it now says what
to look at when a restart does not fix it — something on the device
filtering DNS, or a per-client rule on the router.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 10:10:36 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 2ed4d1f478 Reach the server by address when its name will not resolve
A measurement tool that cannot report from a broken network is useless
exactly when it matters, and a wedged resolver is one of the faults this
app is built to find — it should not also be the thing that stops the
finding being delivered. The profile already carries the server's
addresses; they are now kept and used when the name fails.

Safe because the pin is the trust and the name is not part of it: the
server presents the same certificate however it was reached, and a wrong
address fails the pin like anything else. Only the primaries are cached —
the alternate pair exists for NAT behaviour discovery and does not carry
the control plane, so falling back to one would fail for a second,
unrelated reason.

Substituted only when the name genuinely does not resolve, and only after
checking the candidate answers on the port: on a v4-only network a v6
address would otherwise be chosen and fail slowly, which is the wrong
answer delivered late.

The server had to meet it halfway. Sharing 443 by SNI meant a client
arriving by IP sent no server name and got the Let's Encrypt certificate,
failing the pin. A numeric host — or no SNI at all — now selects the
pinned certificate and routes to the control plane. That is sound because
the admin UI is only ever reached by name: browsers always send SNI, and
nobody bookmarks an IP for a site with a CA-issued certificate.

Verified against fmr: by IP on both families the served pin is the
control one and /v1/profile answers 401, while fmr.echo-lot.app still
serves the Let's Encrypt certificate and the admin UI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 10:03:14 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d65dbbc75a app: tell a broken device resolver apart from a broken network
Diagnosing a tablet that claimed "no internet" took twenty adb commands
to establish something the app should have said in one run: ping to
1.1.1.1 worked, the configured DNS server answered a raw UDP query in
65 bytes, and Android still could not resolve a hostname. The network was
fine; netd had wedged.

Those two failures look identical to a user and want opposite responses —
"look at your router" against "toggle your wifi" — so dns.resolver asks
the network's own servers directly and compares the answer against what
the platform returns for the same name. The query is hand-rolled over a
plain DatagramSocket on purpose: anything routed through a resolver API
would inherit the very fault being looked for.

dns.system_resolver_broken fires only on the pairing that is otherwise
unattributable: server answered, platform did not. Per network, because a
phone can have wedged wifi and working cellular at once.

Also records Android's own verdict per network — validated, captive
portal, partial connectivity — which the app reproduced with its own HTTP
probes but never stored. It is free, it is what the user sees in the
status bar, and its disagreement with our measurements is exactly what
identified the tablet. NET_CAPABILITY_PARTIAL_CONNECTIVITY is @SystemApi
so the constant is inlined with its rationale, in the manner of OsAbi.kt,
and read defensively enough to report unknown rather than false.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 09:44:49 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 40e76c52ca adminui: show the enrolment link as a QR code
Enrolling a device that cannot reach the admin UI meant transcribing a
200-character link with a base64 pin in it — the step the link format
exists to avoid, and the one where a pin wrong by one character fails
later as an inscrutable TLS error.

Rendered as inline SVG rather than a PNG data: URI, because the page's
CSP is default-src 'none' and means it: a data: image would need img-src
opened, markup needs nothing. One path rather than a rect per module,
since a link this long encodes to about 60x60 and two thousand elements
is a lot of DOM for a picture of a square. It is generated from the same
validated value as the href, so a rejected link produces neither.

This relaxes the stdlib-only rule, deliberately and recorded in CLAUDE.md.
The rule bought one self-contained binary with no supply chain to audit,
which one small pure-Go package barely dents; F-Droid never applied to
the server, only the app ships there. A correct QR encoder is ~500 lines
of Reed-Solomon that nobody should be hand-writing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:48:02 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 5b02d40802 app: notice when Shizuku is authorised
The banner watched only for the binder arriving or dying, and granting
permission does neither. So after the user tapped the banner, answered
the dialog and came back, it still read "running but not authorised" —
wrong at precisely the moment they were looking for confirmation that it
had worked.

Two listeners were missing, because there are two ways this changes.
Answering our own request now fires OnRequestPermissionResultListener.
That is not enough on its own: permission can equally be granted inside
Shizuku's own app, and Shizuku started or stopped there, none of which
calls back into this process — so the state is re-read whenever the
screen comes forward, which is the only thing that covers every route.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:37:45 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 416b783647 app: lay the server facts out in real columns
The block was rendered as one padded string, which only lines up in a
monospaced font — and the monospace never took, so the values sat at
ragged offsets and the point of the list was lost. Padding text to fake a
table makes the layout depend on a typeface decision made elsewhere.

It is a label column of fixed width and a value column that takes the
rest, so the addresses align whatever the font does and a long value wraps
inside its own column instead of under the labels. The capability list
goes back to plain comma-separated text: hand-wrapping it at three per
line was working around the same missing alignment.

Placement too. The facts now sit under the "Check server" button that
fetches them, rather than among the input fields, and the sentence
explaining the endpoint sits directly under the URL field it describes —
it had ended up orphaned between the two, reading as a comment on nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:24:00 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 c4f2a10790 app: show what the server reports as facts, not as inputs
The settings card offered three editable boxes and said nothing about the
server itself — which addresses a test will actually use, on which ports,
what it can measure. That is the part a person checks before trusting a
result, and "which address did this come from" is precisely the question
a report leaves open.

The server now publishes it. The profile's targets carried one IPv4 and a
TODO; it reports both families and both alternates, derived from the UDP
listen spec rather than configured separately, so the list cannot drift
from what is actually bound. No reservation means no alternate is
claimed: announcing a second address as the RFC 5780 alternate when none
was set aside would promise a redirect the server will not send.

The app renders them read-only, in a panel visibly distinct from the
fields above. An editable box that changes nothing is worse than no box,
and these are facts to read rather than settings to apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:14:42 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 fe4ec23ba1 app: show the server by the name its operator handed out
The Server URL field showed the endpoint the app dials, which after
discovery is not the name anyone was given — enrolling against
fmr.echo-lot.app left the settings reading fmr-1.echo-lot.app, with no
explanation of where the -1 came from.

It shows the public name now. The endpoint is not hidden, just demoted to
a line beneath that says where the connection actually goes and why the
two differ: a network engineer debugging a failed connection wants that,
and burying it would trade one confusion for another.

Typing a URL by hand sets both, since there is no discovery to consult in
that case — setting only the public one would leave the app still dialling
the previous server, which is the kind of half-applied change that fails
much later and somewhere else.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:07:55 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 33799b8135 adminui: the enrolment link was rendered as a dead anchor
html/template rewrites an href whose scheme it does not recognise to
"#ZgotmplZ". echolot:// is not on its list, so "Open in the Echolot app"
was not a link at all — tapping it did nothing, and nothing showed it:
the markup reads correctly, the app resolves the scheme, and only the
sanitised attribute in the served HTML gives it away.

Marking the value template.URL opts out of that sanitising, which is only
safe because the shape is now checked first. The link arrives in a query
parameter, so without the check a crafted /devices?link=javascript:… would
put a script URL into the page for an admin to click.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:04:56 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 f6e093944c build: document the poisoned build cache; compare like with like
An entire module was missing from the APK. The app died with
ClassNotFoundException for app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink while the
build was green, the module's jar was correct, and :app:dependencies
listed it on debugRuntimeClasspath — its code simply never reached AGP's
intermediates.

The cause was a poisoned Gradle build cache entry, which is why nothing
obvious fixed it: clean, rm -rf */build and --rerun-tasks all leave the
build cache alone. Only --no-build-cache did. Every app build made in this
session shipped without core-protocol, so enrolment, sign-in and upload
would all have crashed identically; several hours of "the tap does
nothing" were this, misread as a UI problem.

CLAUDE.md now carries the symptom, the fix, and the verification —
grepping the dex for a string literal only that module defines, because
grepping for a class *name* proves nothing: callers carry the name as a
reference whether or not the class is packaged. That false check is what
let me believe an earlier rebuild had fixed it.

Also: the enrolment dialog compared the stored endpoint against the link's
public URL, so re-enrolling with the same server announced itself as a
move to a different one. Those are deliberately different strings now that
discovery exists; the comparison uses the public name on both sides.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 08:01:58 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 bc384531e6 app: enrollment feedback beside its own button
The enrollment result was written to the same status line as everything
else, which renders at the far end of the server card below three text
fields — and on a fresh install renders nowhere at all, because that line
only appears once a run exists. So enrolling looked identical whether it
worked or not.

It has its own line now, directly under the Enroll button that caused it,
and its own state rather than sharing one with "Check server": two
actions, two results.

The server fields were also re-read the instant the button was pressed,
before the enrollment coroutine had done anything, so they showed the
previous server's values. They now refresh when the result lands, which
is the point at which there is something new to show.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 00:48:36 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 082a2314ef protocol: enrollment links carry the public name, not the endpoint
Sharing port 443 between the admin UI and the control plane forces two
hostnames — one port and one name is one certificate, and the two need
different ones. That difference had been leaking into every enrollment
link, so an operator handed out fmr-1.echo-lot.app when the thing they
and their users know is fmr.echo-lot.app.

The link now carries the public name and the app asks GET /v1/discover
where to actually connect. The endpoint is plumbing: it exists to select
a certificate, and nobody needs to see it.

Discovery hands out an address and never a pin. The pin stays in the
link. Fetching it over an ordinary TLS connection would make pinning
worth exactly what the certificate authorities are worth, and pinning is
there to survive one the operator does not control — a root injected by
corporate device management, say, which is unremarkable on the networks
this tool gets pointed at. With the pin pre-shared, an intercepted
discovery can only send a device somewhere the pin will not match: an
outage, not a compromise.

Optional on both sides. A server that does not answer, or a link that
already names the control endpoint, works unchanged — enrollment must not
start failing because a lookup did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 00:13:27 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 a720e84411 app: one activity for deep links, and say what re-enrolling actually does
MainActivity had no launchMode, so every echolot:// link stacked a fresh
activity with its own ViewModel. The enrolment then ran in a throwaway
copy and pressing back returned to the original screen showing none of
it — silent, and indistinguishable from the link not working at all.
singleTask plus onNewIntent means the link reaches the screen already in
front of the user.

The confirmation dialog also read as nonsense when re-enrolling with the
server already configured: "already enrolled with X ... enrolling with X
replaces that". Naming one URL twice looks like a bug and buries the
consequence that does apply — the credential is replaced, the old one
stops working at once, and the device appears on the server as a second
entry next to the first, which is worth revoking afterwards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:54:08 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 30d9501507 app: confirm before an enrollment link replaces an existing one
The scheme was already registered and the deep link already worked — it
enrolled on arrival, with no confirmation. Now that the web UI offers the
link as something to follow, that is one tap between a working enrollment
and a replaced one, from a page that might be showing a link minted for a
different device entirely.

Enrolling is not additive: the new credential replaces the old, and on
the previous server this device simply stops reporting. So the link is
held and the user is asked, with both server URLs named — the question is
"which server", and it cannot be answered without seeing both.

The dialog says what survives, because that is the part someone hesitates
over: uploads already on the old server stay there, runs stored on the
phone are untouched, and the device reappears on the new server as a new
device rather than carrying its history across.

Enrolling also clears the cached canary zone. It describes the old
server's deployment, and querying it against the new one would measure
somebody else's zone and file the answer under this network.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:42:37 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 c639d58043 adminui: make the enrolment link followable on the phone being enrolled
The link was printed as text next to an adb command, so enrolling a phone
meant getting a 200-character string from one device onto another —
which is the step that goes wrong, and it does not have to happen at all.
The app registers the echolot:// scheme, so on the phone being enrolled
following the link is the entire procedure.

The raw string and the adb form stay for every other case: reading it on
a laptop, or enrolling a device that is not the one holding the browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:39:55 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 6d042a9d89 server: control plane shares port 443 with the admin UI
Captive portals, hotel wifi and corporate firewalls routinely permit only
80 and 443 — exactly the networks this tool exists to diagnose. A control
plane on 8443 is unreachable precisely when it matters most, and it fails
as "cannot reach server", which tells the user nothing about why.

The two cannot share a certificate, so sharing the port needs two names.
The control plane is trusted by SPKI pin and uses a long-lived
self-signed certificate; a browser needs one a CA vouches for. One name
on one port is one certificate. Pinning the Let's Encrypt key instead was
considered and rejected: it survives renewal only while key reuse holds,
so a routine key rotation would brick the fleet.

One listener now picks the certificate by SNI and the handler by Host.
Both have to agree, or a client gets the pinned certificate with the
admin UI behind it.

8443 stays open. Devices enrolled before this carry that URL in their
settings, and closing it for the sake of a port number would strand every
one of them; it can go once nothing points at it.

Verified per SNI on 443: fmr.echo-lot.app serves the Let's Encrypt cert,
fmr-1.echo-lot.app serves the self-signed one whose pin is unchanged, and
/v1/profile answers 401 on the control name against 303 to the login page
on the UI name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:25:23 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 4aaaa5f5d4 app: probe the server this device is enrolled with, not ours
The canary-DNS zone and the STUN host were compiled in as c.echo-lot.app
and fmr-1.echo-lot.app, so every copy of the app measured against this
particular deployment whatever server its owner had enrolled with. On
someone else's install those two tests describe our infrastructure and
report the result as a fact about their network.

The zone comes from the server's own profile, which has advertised
canary_zone all along — the app simply never read it. It is cached in
settings because the canary probe runs at device tier, before anything
has contacted the control plane, and a probe that had to make a call
first would fail on exactly the networks worth measuring. The STUN host
is derived from the configured server URL rather than stored, since a
second copy of the server's name goes stale the moment someone
re-enrolls elsewhere.

With no server configured both now report SKIPPED. StunProbe previously
would have reported FAILED on a blank host, which reads as a finding
about the network when the truth is that no packet was ever sent — the
same conflation between "measured nothing" and "measured a fault" that
the ICMPv6 finding had.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:20:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 e0428b4c84 server: enroll against fmr.echo-lot.app; mint links from the CLI
The control plane now advertises the same name the web UI answers on.
That is safe because the client authenticates by SPKI pin and explicitly
does not verify the hostname — "pin is the trust, not the name" — so no
certificate covers or needs to cover either name.

The per-host name still means something, though, and the rule it encodes
has to survive: pinning binds a client to one server's key, so fmr may be
a CNAME to exactly one host and never a multi-address service record. A
second server gets enrolled as fmr-2 explicitly, because a client that
reaches a different key does not fail over, it fails.

Minting a link was broken and had been since the authenticated admin UI
replaced the old admin API: enroll-link.sh still posted to
127.0.0.1:8444/admin/enroll-tokens, an endpoint that no longer exists on
a listener that no longer binds loopback. Rather than add a second
unauthenticated door — which is how the old one ended up briefly reachable
from the network — the binary mints its own link. Whoever can run it
against the state directory already holds every privilege the server has,
so authenticating them to themselves would be theatre.

EnrollmentURI is shared with the running server's EnrollmentLink rather
than reimplemented. Two copies of that encoding would eventually disagree,
and the failure mode is a pin that looks right and surfaces as an
inscrutable TLS error rather than as a bad pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:16:23 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8001234e8b adminui: render the self-test instead of dumping it
The box under "Self-test" was `%+v` of a Go struct on one line, read
through a horizontal scrollbar — on a phone you could see about six words
of it, from the middle. The design pass had polished the frame around it
and left the contents a debug dump.

The report was structured the whole time: each sysctl check carries the
name, what was found, what was wanted, a severity, and a sentence
explaining why the setting matters to measurement. All of that was being
flattened into one string. It now renders as records like everything
else, with the explanation set as prose across the full row, because it
is a sentence and not a fourth column.

Two faults the render caught: the desktop row grid applied to every
readout, so the standalone summary panel was chopped into four narrow
columns and "full 1500" broke into "ful/l/150/0"; and a fixed first
column wrapped `net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra` mid-word. The grid is now
scoped to readouts inside a row, and the label column may grow to 18rem
before it wraps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 23:04:55 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 332b6f3589 adminui: give the admin UI the instrument's own visual language
Echolot is the German word for an echo sounder — an instrument that emits
a ping and reads what comes back — and the UI now looks like one instead
of like a dashboard. The three big-number stat cards went first: that
layout is the stock answer for any admin page, and it told a network
engineer nothing they could act on.

Palette is a water column rather than a neutral near-black, with a
desaturated sea-green return for the accent. Verdict colours come from
the domain, so they carry meaning rather than decorate. No web fonts —
the CSP forbids loading anything and shipping font files would trade
what makes this a single pleasant binary for a typeface — so the
character comes from treatment: machine-set headings, tracked small
caps, hairlines.

The one ornament is a trace of returns across time on the runs page, one
bar per run coloured by verdict, oldest to newest. It is real data, pure
CSS, and it is what an echo sounder actually draws.

The mobile fix is the same idea rather than a fallback. Tables become
label-and-value records with dotted leaders, which is how a sounding log
prints and is easier to read on a phone than any table that scrolls
sideways. Above 46rem every row shares one grid so the columns agree by
construction; the first attempt used table-cell and each row wrapped
independently, which produces a table that does not align — a list
paying for borders.

Found by rendering it rather than reading the CSS: the trace stranded
itself against the right edge when runs were few, "Open run" broke across
two lines, equal columns wrapped device names while a one-digit count
kept a quarter of the row, and the sign-in page carried no wordmark at
all, so you arrived somewhere that never said what it was.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 22:45:33 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 621ee99b77 adminui: make the web UI usable on a phone
The header was a rigid flex row, so on a narrow screen the account name
and the sign-out button were pushed off the side of the viewport where
they could not be reached at all — not merely ugly, unusable. It wraps
now, and below 40rem the account block takes its own full-width row so a
long display name cannot crowd out the navigation.

Wide content scrolls inside its own box rather than dragging the page
sideways with it. Tables sit in an overflow-x container and <pre> is
capped at the viewport width; without that, one long self-test line or
one device table makes every other column of text unreadable, and on a
phone it is not obvious that the page has moved at all. Long opaque
strings — device ids, enrolment links — wrap anywhere rather than
insisting on a width nothing has.

Also: box-sizing on everything, stat cards that share a row instead of
each claiming the full width, and larger touch targets on buttons, where
.4rem is comfortable with a mouse and fiddly with a thumb.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 22:33:41 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 89b084338f docs: fmr is on .150/::150 only; ::2 removed and verified across a reboot
Listeners came off ::2 before the address did — the other order fails to
bind on restart — and the address stayed up until the CNAME to fmr-1 had
landed, since dropping it earlier would have broken ACME renewal for the
name the certificate is issued to.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 22:27:57 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 23ed835e00 docs: record that a revived beacon belongs in the web UI, not its own listener
Its Python service wildcard-bound 0.0.0.0:443, which is what silently
compromised the reserved measurement address. Two routes on the admin UI
would inherit the TLS and certificate already in place, need no extra
port, and pick up authentication the standalone receiver never had.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 22:17:55 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 5b5a54db7d server: reserve measurement addresses; serve the UI on both families
fmr keeps .151/::151 for measurement. Their diagnostic value is entirely
in their listening state being known: a TLS handshake that completes on a
port nothing listens on proves interception, with no competing
explanation. One stray bind turns that proof into a shrug, and nothing
about the failure is visible — the run still says the network is clean.

CheckReserved refuses to start when a listener would take one. Wildcards
are refused outright, because that is how this actually happens: every
listener defaults to ":port" and the next one added gets copied from an
existing default, claiming every address without anyone deciding to.

Reserved is not silent, though. The first version of the guard would have
refused the live config's UDP and canary-DNS binds on .151, which are
deliberate — as is STUN's RFC 5780 alternate. Reserving an address and
then forbidding the measurements that need it defeats the purpose. The
rule is narrower: no services, and never ports 80 or 443.

The adb-beacon receiver was wildcard-bound to 0.0.0.0:443, holding port
443 on every IPv4 address including the reserved one, so the IPv4
interception test had been compromised for as long as it had run. It is
disabled; restore with systemctl enable --now echolot-adb-beacon. This
also marks the guard's limit: it governs this server's listeners, and a
process outside its config can still pollute a reserved address.

The admin UI and ACME responder were single-address, which is why the UI
could only live on ::2 and why the server was reachable over IPv6 alone —
the thing that made it look nonexistent from a phone without working
IPv6. Both now take address lists like every other listener.

Verified from outside: .150/::150/::2 answer on 443 with a valid cert for
fmr.echo-lot.app, .151/::151 are closed on 80 and 443, and canary DNS is
still up on .151.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 22:17:29 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d9ee8bc2ae app: don't report ICMPv6 silence that was never measured
The per-network attribution fix worked — the finding named rmnet_data1
instead of the IPv4-only wifi — and immediately exposed a worse problem
underneath. Cellular's result was `ok: false` because binding a socket to
it failed with EPERM, so no echo request was ever sent; the finding then
reported "IPv6 is configured, but ICMPv6 gets no reply" about a network
the app had never pinged. That is an assertion about the user's carrier
with nothing behind it.

`attempted` now travels beside `ok`, set only once sendto has returned,
and the finding requires both. Failing to bind is a fact about this app's
permissions on this device; it says nothing about the network, and the
two must not share a boolean.

Verified on hardware with a VPN active: every network fails to bind with
EPERM, nothing is sent, and no ICMPv6 finding is emitted — where the
previous build would have blamed the carrier. Recorded in build-status:
Android blocks per-network binding entirely while a VPN holds the default
route, so per-network measurement is unavailable to anyone with one
connected. That needs a deliberate answer rather than a silently green run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 21:32:34 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7a5004f293 server: a non-admin account can manage its own uploads
Signing in and being allowed to administer the server were the same
question: the OIDC callback refused a session outright to anyone outside
the admin group. A legitimate user could authenticate, be told what they
could not do, and be left with no way to see or delete the data their own
devices had uploaded.

They are separate questions now. Everyone who authenticates gets a
session; the admin flag rides inside the MAC'd payload, so promoting
yourself means forging a signature rather than editing a cookie, and a
role that does not parse fails closed to "user".

Pages scope themselves through visibleDevices/mayTouchRun rather than
filtering individually — per-page scoping is what the next page added
will be missing, and that failure is silent, since a listing that leaks
other people's uploads looks exactly like one that does not. Someone
else's run answers 404, not 403: a distinguishable refusal would confirm
the run exists. Revoking devices and minting enrolment tokens affect the
whole server and stay behind adminOnly at the route table, where someone
looking for who-may-do-what will actually find it.

Ownership is re-read per request instead of captured at sign-in, so
unlinking an account takes effect immediately rather than at session
expiry. Tests cover that, plus the degenerate case of an empty subject,
which must own nothing rather than everything with an empty account id.

Also: attribute the ICMPv6 finding per network. It compared "is IPv6
configured anywhere on this device" against "did any network answer",
which on a phone reports IPv6-is-broken about a network where IPv6 was
never configured. network_ref is null on every test, so the probe now
records per-network outcomes structurally rather than as prose a finding
would have to parse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 21:10:38 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7eaf0c4190 app: name the two half-configured IPv6 shapes, per network
v6.no_icmp_reply infers trouble from silence, which is ambiguous by
construction: a firewall dropping echo requests looks the same as a
network that cannot carry IPv6 at all. Two much stronger signals were
already sitting unread in the link snapshot, and a test device on a
Netbird tunnel surfaced both at once.

v6.route_without_address — a ::/0 route with no global address. The
router advertises itself as an IPv6 gateway while SLAAC produces nothing
usable. Hosts believe IPv6 is available and pay a connection timeout on
every dual-stack destination before falling back, which is felt as
general slowness with no packet loss to explain it.

v6.no_default_route — the mirror: a global address with nothing to route
it. A VPN installing host routes to specific destinations produces this
deliberately and it works, so a VPN transport reports it as INFO rather
than as a fault; without one it means the network handed out an address
it does not carry traffic for.

Both are read from the routing table, so neither is inferred from
silence, and both are reported per interface — "IPv6 is broken" is
useless advice when wifi is the broken one and cellular is fine.

Classification lives in core-measurement rather than the ViewModel so it
can be tested without a device; the fixtures are a real dumpsys table
(wifi advertising a route it cannot source from, working cellular, a
tunnel with two host routes) because the risk here is not bad boolean
logic but imagining shapes real networks do not produce.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 20:42:03 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 fec374abf5 findings: v6.broken claimed a cause it had no evidence for
A phone reported "IPv6 is configured but not working" while loading an IPv6-only
site over TCP perfectly well. The finding fired on one signal - ICMPv6 echo
getting no reply - at HIGH confidence. ICMPv6 echo is widely filtered on
networks where IPv6 works, so the two cases are indistinguishable from where the
app stands, and it was picking one.

Same class of error as the multi-homed downstream-loss bug: a confident
measurement of something that was not happening. Now v6.no_icmp_reply, low
severity, medium confidence, naming both explanations. Still reported, because
filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU Discovery - large packets vanish instead of
being reported as too big - which is a fault in its own right.

Corroborating with a real IPv6 connection would separate the two properly, but
needs a target, which runs into the hardcoded-deployment issue already open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 20:16:37 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 b5c8dda9a2 app: sign in to the server's identity provider
Authorization code with PKCE, a Sign in card in settings, and the echolot://auth
redirect handled next to the enrolment one - told apart by host, because one
spends a token and the other completes an authorization, and confusing them
would fail obscurely.

The detail that decides whether this survives a real phone: the PKCE verifier is
written to storage before the browser opens rather than held in memory. Handing
control to a browser backgrounds the process and Android may kill it, so the
callback arrives at a fresh one. An in-memory verifier works on a developer's
device and fails under memory pressure.

Pending state is cleared before the exchange is attempted, whatever the outcome:
it is single-use, and leaving it behind would let a later callback complete a
flow nobody started.

Also records an open issue the question about server requirements surfaced: two
probes hardcode the reference deployment, so a user with no server still sends
DNS and STUN traffic to fmr without being told. For a tool this careful about
what leaves the device, that is the wrong default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 19:53:38 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 4e6f2da3fb runs: scope by account; app: the PKCE half of signing in
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 36s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 38s
Three phones on one account now produce one history, which is the main reason to
have accounts beyond upload permission. GET /v1/runs returns the account's runs
and says how many devices contributed; fetching and deleting resolve a run id
against the caller's own devices, so an id from another account is not found
rather than fetched from wherever it happens to live.

The rule that needed stating: the empty account is never a group. Devices nobody
has signed in on are unrelated devices that share the absence of an owner, and
matching on "" would let any anonymous device read every other one's runs.
Tested, along with sibling-device access working and cross-account access not.

App side: authorization code with PKCE. The app is a public client - anything
compiled into an APK can be read out with unzip and strings - and the redirect
returns through a custom URI scheme that any app on the device may register, so
an intercepted code is a real risk. PKCE makes a stolen code worthless: it can
only be exchanged by presenting a verifier that never left the process.

A callback whose state does not match is refused before the code is spent and
before any network call, since that is exactly how someone gets a victim to
complete the attacker's sign-in.

Nothing from the IdP is retained. The ID token is used once to prove who is
signing in and then discarded; the device credential authenticates everything
afterwards. No access tokens to store, no refresh tokens to rotate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 19:46:32 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 0eaba6150b adminui: an admin interface, behind authentication without exception
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 36s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 38s
Replaces the unauthenticated admin mux. Everything but /healthz requires a
session, and that is the point: the previous arrangement relied on binding to
loopback, which worked exactly until the address changed and then failed
silently and publicly. A binding address is a deployment detail, not an access
control, and this package does not treat it as one.

Two ways in. OIDC through the confidential client, with state and PKCE - PKCE
even here, because it costs one hash and closes code interception independently
of the secret. And the break-glass password, throttled, for when the IdP is the
thing that is broken. Signing in without the admin group is refused with the
group named, because "you are not an admin" is a different problem from "your
password is wrong" and the remedy is elsewhere.

Sessions are MAC-checked cookies: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when TLS is on.
CSRF tokens are derived from the session rather than stored, so there is no
server-side table to keep in sync, and they are required on every state-changing
POST - SameSite already blocks cross-site posts in current browsers, but this is
the control that does not depend on the browser being current.

Server-rendered with html/template and no JavaScript: the pages are lists and
forms, and a framework would add a build step, a dependency tree and an update
treadmill to a program that has none of those. The CSP is default-src 'none'
accordingly.

Pages: overview, devices (with revocation and enrolment-link minting), uploaded
runs and a run viewer. Revocations and deletions are logged with who did them.
Runs are shown exactly as uploaded, at the privacy level their uploader chose -
nothing in the UI can un-redact one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 19:31:06 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 7bb54e1ec8 docs: record the admin-listener exposure, and the encrypted-upload design
The incident is written down with its cause rather than just its fix: the admin
listener was built localhost-only, and that assumption travelled with it when I
changed the address. The compounding error is the one worth remembering -
checkAdminExposure verifies encryption and says nothing about authentication, so
it passed and gave false confidence. A green light on an adjacent property is
worse than no check.

Also records the encrypted-upload idea while the reasoning is fresh, including
the four consequences that decide whether it is worth building: what metadata
must stay readable (and what the UI loses if it does not), that losing the
passphrase loses the data by design, that metadata is not hidden regardless, and
that it makes a server-side anonymization floor unenforceable - which is fine,
since encryption serves the same purpose better.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 19:04:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 c7750fbf0b oidc: one verifier per issuer, because IdPs mint one per application
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 34s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 35s
Authentik derives the issuer from the application slug, so two applications mean
two issuers - and a token's `iss` must match whoever signed it. A single pinned
issuer could therefore only ever serve one of the two clients.

So there is a verifier per issuer, and each accepts only the client belonging to
it. That is tighter than the previous arrangement as well as more general: a
token minted for the phone cannot be replayed at the admin login, and vice
versa, because they arrive at different verifiers with different audiences.

ECHOLOT_OIDC_APP_ISSUER is optional - empty means both clients share
ECHOLOT_OIDC_ISSUER, which is what IdPs with one global issuer do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 18:47:34 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 5d7f59a66a acme: answer HTTP-01 from the server itself, on port 80
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 34s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 35s
HTTP-01 always arrives on port 80 - the CA chooses the port, not the operator -
so it never collides with an admin UI on 443. The conflict only exists for
TLS-ALPN-01, which is the challenge type that does use 443.

Given that, the server keeps a permanent listener on 80 that answers challenges
from a webroot and redirects everything else to the admin UI. Same arrangement
as the webroot plugins for Apache and nginx, and better than letting the ACME
client bind 80 per renewal: nothing binds and unbinds, so a renewal cannot fail
because the port was briefly busy, and the client needs only write access to a
directory instead of the privilege to bind a low port. Port 80 also gets a use
it would want anyway.

The ACME client stays an external program. lego is also a Go library, but
importing it would put a large dependency tree into a server that deliberately
has none, and the CLI does the same job from a timer.

Tokens are validated by *shape* before any filesystem call, so traversal never
reaches the disk - a stronger guarantee than sanitising a path and trusting the
sanitiser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 18:16:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 6afcb131ef admin: terminate TLS in the binary, with a certificate that reloads itself
server-test / test (push) Successful in 33s
Direct rather than behind Caddy or nginx. This binary already serves TLS for the
control plane, so it is reuse rather than new machinery; one process with one
config file is most of what makes this thing pleasant to run; and a proxy on the
box would invite someone to eventually front the control plane too, which would
break SPKI pinning because clients pin that certificate's key.

The hard part of TLS is not termination, it is renewal - so the certificate is
re-read when the files change. No reload hook to write, and none to quietly stop
working months later and be noticed only after the certificate has expired. A
torn write (renewal tools write cert and key separately) keeps the previous
certificate rather than taking the listener down.

Not applied to the control plane, on purpose: clients pin that key, so replacing
it should cost an operator a moment's thought and a restart, not happen because
a file changed. Two listeners, two different right answers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:51:58 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 cd187f9ef5 config: the OIDC client secret, admin TLS, and a stop on plaintext admin
server-test / test (push) Successful in 34s
Two gaps found while answering where configuration lives.

The confidential admin client needs a secret and there was nowhere to put one -
I had added the issuer and both client ids but not the secret the admin login
actually needs. It now reads from ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and preferably
from ECHOLOT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE: a secret in the environment is readable by
anything that can see /proc/<pid>/environ and lands in every dump of the unit's
config, whereas a path is one file whose permissions an operator can reason
about. (/etc/echolot-server.env was also 0644; now 0600 on fmr.)

And the server now refuses to serve the admin UI in plaintext on a non-loopback
address. The session cookie is a bearer credential for everything the server can
do, and the OIDC authorization code arrives in a URL; in the clear, both belong
to anyone on the path - and on a globally routable address that is the internet.
A hard stop rather than a warning, because a warning in a log is not read by the
person who most needs it, and because the safe answers are cheap: bind to
loopback and tunnel, or supply a certificate. ECHOLOT_ADMIN_INSECURE=1 overrides
it, so the decision is made rather than stumbled into.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:49:26 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 3a4cb1c327 cli: survive the --serve transition when nobody is watching
server-release / image (push) Successful in 16s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 33s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 34s
Deploying v0.8.0 broke fmr, and the reason is a flaw I should have seen:
self-update is executed by the OLD binary, so the unit repair I put in the new
binary's updater cannot fix the very update that installs it. The unit kept its
argument-less ExecStart, the new binary answered that with usage and exit 2, and
the service went into a restart loop.

Fixed on fmr by hand, but that is not a fix for anyone else - and the whole
premise of an unattended self-update is that nobody is watching when it happens.

So: when started with no verb *and* systemd started us, the server repairs the
unit and serves anyway, loudly. systemd sets INVOCATION_ID for every service
invocation and nothing else does, so a person at a terminal still gets usage and
a non-zero exit. Marked as a one-release shim to remove once no deployment
predates --serve.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:44:33 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 3cdbccee18 cli: serving is an explicit verb; no arguments prints usage
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 33s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 34s
Running an unfamiliar binary by name should tell you what it does, not bind a
dozen ports and start answering the internet. --serve (or --daemon) now does
that, and a bare invocation prints usage and exits 2 - non-zero on purpose, so a
service manager sees a failure rather than concluding the server ran and
finished cleanly.

The hazard this creates is worth spelling out, because it bites once and
silently: three places started the binary with no arguments - the systemd unit,
the unit template, and the Dockerfile - and --self-update replaces the binary
but never the unit. A routine update would therefore leave a service that cannot
start, discovered whenever the host next rebooted.

So the updater repairs it: after replacing the binary it appends --serve to an
ExecStart that has no flags, but only in a unit this program wrote (identified
by its description). Editing an operator's hand-written unit would be overreach;
leaving ours broken would be negligence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:42:20 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 80d2092f1b oidc: accept both the app's public client and the server's confidential one
server-test / test (push) Successful in 37s
Explaining public vs confidential clients surfaced a gap in my own design: I had
assumed a single client id, but there are two clients here with genuinely
different properties.

  the Android app     public + PKCE, because an APK cannot keep a secret
  the admin UI        confidential, because the server can keep one in
                      /etc/echolot-server.env and weakening it to public buys
                      nothing

So the audience check now accepts either registered client id - and only those
two. "Any client of this issuer" would let every other application registered
with the same IdP authenticate here, which is the entire reason the check
exists. Either id alone is enough to enable sign-in, since an operator may
register only the app or only the admin UI.

The profile advertises the *app's* client id, since that is what a phone should
authorize as.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:31:33 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 89a5ff9139 adminauth: a break-glass local admin alongside OIDC
server-test / test (push) Successful in 44s
If the IdP is misconfigured, unreachable, or the admin group is a typo, the
operator is locked out of their own server with no way back short of editing
JSON on disk. A fallback that only matters when everything else is broken is
exactly the thing you cannot add later - by then you cannot get in to add it.

Stored as PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 from the standard library (Go 1.24+ has it, so no
dependency), 600k iterations, per-credential salt. A password rather than a
bearer token on purpose: a break-glass credential is the one most likely to end
up in a backup or a config-management repo, and a hash survives that where a
token does not. There is no email reset flow and should not be -
--set-admin-password on the host is the reset, and whoever can run it already
has the machine.

The password is read from stdin, never a flag, so it stays out of shell history
and the process list; piping still works for automation.

Details the tests pin, each for a reason:
  - the username is compared in constant time too, or a fast rejection is a
    timing oracle for which usernames exist;
  - the *stored* iteration count is used, so raising the constant later does not
    lock out existing passwords;
  - the throttle grows with consecutive failures but stays bounded and forgives
    after a quiet minute - a break-glass credential an attacker can lock out is
    a denial of service against the one person who needs it;
  - sessions are MAC-checked before anything in them is read, and rotating the
    secret invalidates every one at once, which is how they are revoked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:12:54 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ce6d0c2f64 oidc: the server becomes a relying party, and devices can carry an account
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 35s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 34s
Echolot delegates identity to whatever IdP the operator already runs and stores
no passwords - no hashing, no reset flow, no lockout policy, and no credential
database to lose. For a tool people self-host next to other services, that is
the difference between one more service and one more thing that can leak
someone's password.

Verification is stdlib-only, matching the server's no-dependency rule. Longer
than jwt.Parse, and auditable in one sitting. The part that matters is the
algorithm allow-list: taking `alg` from the token is the classic forgery, so it
is fixed in code. Tests cover the real attacks against a genuine signer - a
self-contained IdP with real keys, because a mock that returns success proves
nothing about a verifier:

  alg=none, HS256/RS256 confusion, a payload swapped under a valid signature,
  a token addressed to another client, a token from another issuer, expired
  and future-dated tokens, and discovery that renames the issuer (which would
  otherwise have us fetch a stranger's keys believing they were the provider's).

With no admin group configured nobody is an admin. An operator who has not said
who may administer the server has not thereby said "anyone who can log in".

Device and account stay separate concepts: enrollment admits a device (operator's
token), signing in attributes it to a person (POST /v1/account/link, device
credential plus ID token - both required, neither substitutes). uploads=account
now means what it says instead of refusing everyone, and signing in does not
override uploads=off.

The profile advertises the sign-in configuration so the app can offer the button
only when there is something behind it, and drive PKCE without anyone typing an
issuer URL. A discovery failure is reported rather than hidden, so "configured
but the provider is not answering" is distinguishable from "not configured".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 16:52:56 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 57a5ef8796 app: the stable-pseudonym switch was live at a level that pseudonymizes nothing
At `full` the anonymizer returns the document unchanged, so the salt has nothing
to act on - but the switch was enabled and looked like it did something. A
control that silently does nothing is the same class of fault as the preview
button and the archived-level label: the screen implying more than is true.

Shown disabled with the reason rather than hidden. The setting is still stored
and applies the moment the level changes, so making it vanish would hide state
that is still there; and a settings screen whose controls appear and disappear
as you touch other controls is harder to trust, not easier. The label dims with
the switch so "not active right now" reads at a glance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 16:16:36 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 c19f382640 privacy: scrub identifiers inside raw shell output
Running the Shizuku tier for the first time uploaded every MAC address on the
local network to the server at the balanced level - fourteen of them, router and
all. The probes embed raw command output verbatim (ip neigh, ip route), which is
good evidence and also a complete household device inventory, and the anonymizer
could not see it: classification is by field name and whole-value shape, and
ip_neigh is one long string that is itself neither a MAC nor an address.

measurement-schema.md flagged raw dumps as hard to anonymize and proposed
dropping them from exports. Scrubbing is better: identifiers inside unclassified
strings are replaced in place with the same pseudonyms used elsewhere, so a MAC
appearing in both a parsed field and a raw dump still reads as one device, and
the dump stays readable - neighbour-table shape, host count, RFC1918 addresses
and vendor prefixes all survive. Dropping it would have protected the same data
by destroying the reason for collecting it.

One pass, not three: sequential passes re-process their own output. Once a MAC
became 78:9a:18:xx:yy:zz the IPv6 pattern matched it - six hex groups separated
by colons is an address - and destroyed the vendor prefix the MAC rule had just
preserved. Ordered alternation resolves each position once, MAC first.

RealDocumentTest runs the anonymizer over a captured run when ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN
points at one and fails on any surviving MAC; it self-skips otherwise so no
one's network lands in the repo. Against the document that leaked: 14 in, 0 out.

Also: the Settings preview button did nothing, reading UiState.history which is
empty until the History screen has been opened - same root cause as the "0
run(s)" count. It reads the archive now, and says when there is nothing to show.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 16:12:13 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 d04babff51 engine: live test for upstream throughput
3125 sent, 3125 counted by the server, 0% loss. The assertion that earns its
keep is received <= sent: that is what catches a counter that was never reset
between runs, which would otherwise look like a suspiciously good result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:56:51 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 892e952a8e throughput: the upstream direction, counted by the only party that can
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 33s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 33s
The client generates the traffic and the server counts it. No grant is involved
- the client is sending its own packets, so there is nothing to amplify - but it
does need the server's tally, because only the far end knows how much arrived.
Without that number a sender measures how fast it can transmit, which is usually
just the speed of the local NIC and is not the question being asked.

A new wire type the server counts and deliberately never answers: a reply would
double the traffic and drag the return path into a measurement that is
specifically about the outbound one.

The tally is a counter, not a list, and short-circuits before the observation
log. A five-second run at 20 Mbps is around ten thousand packets; one struct
each would turn a measurement into an allocation storm on a shared server, and
nothing needs the per-packet detail since the client holds the send-side record.
The gap between the two counts is the loss.

direction=up on the throughput action sends nothing - it zeroes the counter, so
a second run in one session measures itself instead of inheriting the first.

Same honesty rule as downstream: measures_network is false when what arrived
matches what was offered, because then the path was never the constraint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:54:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 8646bab52d findings: adopt the registry in the app module; rename ipv6.* to v6.*
The registry was only used in core-engine. The app still emitted seven codes as
raw strings, so the registry test passed while codes lived outside it - among
them ipv6.broken, which fired on a real network and was in no registry at all.

All seven now take their code, category and severity from a registry entry, so
those three cannot disagree at a call site. Grepping for code = "..." across the
app, engine and probe modules now returns nothing.

ipv6.* -> v6.* is the third instance of the same rule being broken: they
declared Category.IPV6 while the prefix map only knows "v6", so
TestType.category("ipv6.broken") fell through to connectivity and the finding
rolled up under the wrong verdict light. The test-type registry already used v6.

Two severities reconciled rather than assumed:

  connectivity.captive_portal is medium, not high. The registry had guessed
  high; the probe emitting it had always said medium, and the probe was the
  considered value - a captive portal on hotel wifi is what should be there.
  no_internet keeps high, since nothing local fixes that.

  v6.not_offered stays info, and the registry now says why it must. Most
  networks still do not offer IPv6; a warning there lights a yellow verdict on a
  healthy network and teaches people to ignore the light.

Plus a BackHandler: the screen was a plain state variable with nothing tying it
to the back stack, so Back left the app from Settings/History instead of
returning to the run screen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:47:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 6bba420845 app: the history row was naming the wrong document's privacy level
A row read "22 kB · full" directly beneath "uploaded to fmr", while the status
line above said the upload went as BALANCED. Both were true and they described
different documents: the row showed ArchivedRun.anonymization, which describes
the *archived* copy - deliberately unredacted, so always "full" - and the status
line described the *uploaded* copy.

Read together, that says the complete data was uploaded when a redacted copy was
sent. A privacy display that overstates what left the device is worse than none,
and telling the user what left the device is the one thing this screen is for.

The level a run was uploaded at is now recorded separately (uploaded_as) and the
row says "kept complete on this device" / "uploaded to fmr as balanced" - each
label naming the copy it belongs to.

Two more from the same screenshot:

  - Every row showed no verdict. The archive read summary.verdict; the schema
    calls it summary.overall. Silently null on every run, so the list's most
    prominent element was blank while everything else looked fine. The test
    fixture had the same wrong field name, which is why it passed.
  - The status line rendered the server's raw JSON index entry into the UI.

Verified on device: a fresh run archives with verdict "yellow" and
uploaded_as "balanced" beside anonymization "full".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:37:05 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ac6c653115 privacy: pseudonymize the whole ULA prefix, not just its tail
Found in a real uploaded run from the phone: the server held
fda1:3fb1:ff92:6696::2662 for a DNS server. The general IPv6 path keeps the
leading two groups on purpose - for a global address that preserves the ISP
allocation, which is the useful part - but for a ULA that passes through 32 of
the 40 random bits of the global ID.

A ULA looks like the v6 RFC1918 and the instinct is to treat it the same. It is
not analogous, and the difference is the point: an RFC1918 prefix is shared by
millions of networks and identifies none of them, while a ULA global ID is
random and unique to one network by construction (RFC 4193). The prefix IS the
identifier, so it was a network fingerprint surviving redaction.

Pseudonymized as a unit now, so two addresses on one ULA subnet still share a
pseudonymous prefix - "these hosts are on one network" survives, "this is that
network" does not. RFC1918 stays readable, and the contrast is what justifies
it; a test pins both halves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:26:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 305d21f8a7 app: insets on the two newer screens, and one source for the run count
On-device verification found both.

safeDrawingPadding() was on the run screen but not on Settings or History -
they were added later and never got it - so "< Back  Settings" sat under the
status-bar clock. The same fault the run screen had already fixed, reintroduced
by new code that did not know about it.

Settings also read "0 run(s), 23 kB stored": the count came from
UiState.history, which stays empty until the History screen has been opened,
while the size read the archive directly. Two sources for one fact; the count
now reads the archive too.

Verified on a OnePlus 15 (A16): header clears the status bar, count reads
"1 run(s), 23 kB stored".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 15:20:57 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 172afb421d privacy: fix a real leak - global IPv6 addresses were uploaded verbatim
Setting out to build the machine-readable schema, the first step was checking
whether the anonymizer covers the fields the schema declares sensitive. It did
not, and five identifying values were going out at the `balanced` level:

  networks[].link.addresses[].addr   the device's own global IPv6 address
  networks[].link.routes[].gateway   the ISP allocation
  networks[].link.dns.servers[]      the configured resolver
  private_dns_hostname               an internal hostname
  search_domains[]                   the internal domain

The settings screen describes that level as pseudonymizing addresses.

Root cause: classification keyed on field names, and the schema's actual names
were never added to the table. Every existing test passed, because each checked
a field somebody had remembered to write a case for - an unfalsifiable design
for a privacy control.

So beyond adding the names, classification now falls back to the *value* when
the name is unknown: anything shaped like an IPv4/IPv6 address or a MAC is
treated as one. Hostnames deliberately are not inferred by shape, since
train.udp_updown is indistinguishable from a domain and mangling a test type
would corrupt the document to protect nothing.

LeakTest is the guard, and is written to fail for fields nobody thought of: it
plants identifying values wherever one can occur and asserts none survive. It
also pins that RFC1918 addresses stay readable, so it cannot pass by
over-redacting. Route prefixes and :: needed care - 0.0.0.0/0 must stay itself
or a routing table becomes unreadable for no privacy gain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 14:45:52 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 e7afc2210f findings: a registry, because the codes had already drifted
A finding code is the stable half of a result - what a dashboard groups by and
what someone greps a year of archived runs for. That only holds if a code means
exactly one thing forever, which fifteen ad-hoc string literals cannot promise.

By the time this was written the failure had happened twice:

  - Two emitters independently produced connectivity.downstream_loss and
    connectivity.loss_downstream for the same claim. Nothing objected. Anyone
    aggregating either would have silently seen half their data.
  - Two codes sat under nat.* while being declared Category.CONNECTIVITY.
    nat.udp_unreachable is not about NAT, and the prefix decides the category,
    which decides which verdict light the finding rolls up into. Renamed while
    that is still cheap.

Codes are now typed FindingSpecs carrying category and default severity;
emitters reference the spec rather than retyping the string, so a typo is a
compile error and two call sites cannot disagree about a finding's category.

docs/findings-registry.md is the contract and a test reads it, failing when the
document and the code disagree on which codes exist or how severe they are.
Documentation that drifts from its implementation is worse than none, because it
still looks authoritative. The check reads table rows only, so the prose can go
on explaining which codes were retired and why.

Closes open item 1 of measurement-schema.md section 9.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 14:25:54 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 f7701c2d2f engine: throughput is opt-in in the run config; document the work
A 5-second run at 50 Mbps moves ~30 MB. On a metered connection that is the
user's money, and a measurement tool that spends it unasked is not one people
keep installed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 14:14:20 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 3c9af04e6f grant: replace the rate check with a token bucket
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 32s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 33s
The live throughput test found it: a 3-second run delivered 104 packets and
stopped after 50 milliseconds.

The rate check exempted the first 50 ms entirely, meaning to be lenient at
startup. The effect was the opposite. A sender could dump an unbounded burst
into that free window, and the instant the check switched on it compared those
bytes against 50 ms worth of allowance and refused everything until real time
caught up. Every short test passed — downtrain sends 50 packets, big_send seven
— and every sustained send died about fifty milliseconds in.

A token bucket (allowance = burst + rate x elapsed) has no such cliff; it is
smooth from t=0. The burst is 100 ms of the allowed rate, floored at one
ordinary datagram so a single packet is never refused outright. The floor is
deliberately one datagram: at 8 kbps a 64 KB floor would be sixty-four seconds'
worth, which is precisely the instant dump the ceiling exists to prevent. The
existing rate test caught that when I first tried it, and it was right.

Second half of the same bug: callers treated any refusal as terminal. TryAllow
now says why, so a sender can pace through a transient "too fast just now" and
still stop dead on a spent budget or an expired grant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 14:10:30 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 3333788d9e throughput: paced downstream rate, with the qualifier that makes it honest
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 32s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 32s
A throughput number reports the smallest limit on the path, and the sender's own
ceiling is one of the candidates. If the server was asked for 50 Mbps and 50
Mbps arrived, the network was never the constraint and "50 Mbps" says nothing
about it. So the result always carries limited_by and measures_network, and a
finding is raised only when the path is actually implicated.

Loss is computed against the *sender's* count, not the requested rate: the
server reports what it put on the wire, and the gap is the loss. A receiver
alone cannot tell "the network dropped it" from "the sender never sent it", and
guessing turns a healthy server-side limit into a phantom network fault. The
count is stored per action, not per packet — half a million packets of structs
would turn a measurement into memory exhaustion.

Sending is paced rather than flat out. An unpaced burst measures the server's
NIC and the first queue it meets, then collapses into loss that reads as a
network fault. The schedule is absolute rather than sleep-per-packet, which
would accumulate scheduler error and drift the rate down over a ten-second run.

Throughput gets its own grant budget sized from the request, so every other
action stays bounded at 8 MiB. When the byte cap binds before the clock does,
the *duration* is shortened and reported, rather than the run being truncated
halfway: promising thirty seconds and delivering twenty-one is the same
information with a surprise attached, and it keeps "the clock ended the run" as
the normal case — the only case where the rate is a clean property of the path.

That last behaviour came out of a test that failed honestly: 30 s at 100 Mbps
needs 375 MB against a 256 MB cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 14:05:23 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 35744c609e docs: record frag_send and the current testing state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 13:49:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 a7dccf7da2 frag_send: crafted IP fragments, so ordering can be tested and not just delivery
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 32s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 32s
Letting the kernel fragment an oversized datagram answers one question — do
fragments get through. It cannot answer the more interesting one, because the
kernel always emits them in order, first one first.

The classic middlebox fault is exactly about that ordering. Only the first
fragment carries the UDP header, and therefore the ports; a stateful firewall
or NAT that has not seen it has no flow to match the rest against, and many
drop them. That is invisible to any in-order test and shows up in the field as
"large DNS answers fail on this network" or "the tunnel breaks when the MTU
drops" — it works until the network reorders, then fails intermittently, which
is the hardest kind of fault to chase.

So the server now builds the fragments itself (raw socket, IP_HDRINCL) and
controls their order: in_order as a baseline, reversed, and first-fragment-last.
The datagram is assembled and signed whole before being cut up, so what the
client reassembles is indistinguishable from an ordinary packet — otherwise it
would be measuring our sender rather than the path.

Two details that would silently produce wrong answers:
  - The UDP checksum is computed rather than left zero. A zero-checksum datagram
    is dropped by some middleboxes, and that drop would be recorded as a
    fragmentation failure, which is the wrong conclusion entirely.
  - Fragment offsets are in 8-byte units, so non-final fragments are rounded to
    a multiple of 8. A 100-byte fragment is not an error, it is a datagram no
    host will ever reassemble.

frag-send is advertised only when a raw socket can actually be opened — checked
by opening one, since a permission model has more ways to say no than a
capability bit has to say yes.

Fragment header arithmetic is unit-tested (reassembly coverage, MF flags, shared
IP ID, 8-byte offsets, checksum verification), cross-compiled and run on Linux
since the code is build-tagged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 13:45:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 4ffa6e4ae2 engine: split packet loss by direction using the server's observations
"3 % loss" sends an engineer looking in both directions at once. The server
records every packet it received per sequence number, so the two cases are
distinguishable: sent-but-never-seen is upstream loss, seen-but-no-reply is
downstream. The findings say which, and say what is not implicated.

Downstream loss is measured against what reached the server, not against what
was sent — the other denominator counts every upstream loss twice and
overstates the return path.

Per-direction jitter comes out of the same records without needing synchronised
clocks: (server_rx - client_tx) carries a constant unknown offset, and
differencing successive samples cancels it, so RFC 3393 variation is honestly
attributable to a direction even though absolute latency is not.

Correlation is by wire sequence number, not loop index — the counter is shared
with every packet type on the session. ProbeSession exposes it even for a lost
probe, since that is precisely the packet whose direction is in question.

Live against fmr: 0.08 ms upstream jitter vs 0.85 ms downstream, an asymmetry a
round-trip test cannot see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 13:09:59 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 3e7e3b8d33 scripts: one command to mint an enrollment link, QR included
Scanning beats pasting a 200-character string onto a phone, and with a device
attached the deep link can be delivered by adb with no typing at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 12:12:28 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 199807a8c9 docs: enrollment link encoding rules in the spec, session log in build-status
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 12:11:37 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 5291bdd045 enrollment: actually emit enroll_uri from the admin endpoint
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 30s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 31s
The previous commit's edit to the admin handler silently did not apply, so the
endpoint still returned just the token. Caught by deploying and looking at the
response rather than by trusting the build to have picked it up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 12:08:11 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 fe3658e009 chore: ignore the Kotlin compiler's .kotlin scratch directory
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 12:06:47 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ad85f3bfcd enrollment: the server mints the §2.1 bootstrap link, the app consumes it
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 31s
POST /admin/enroll-tokens now returns the whole link, not just the token:

  echolot://enroll?v=1&u=<control URL>&p=pin-sha256:<b64>&t=<token>

The server is the only party that knows all three parts at once, and the part
an operator gets wrong by hand is the base64 pin — which does not fail loudly,
it just never matches, surfacing days later as an inscrutable TLS error. The
app takes the link from a paste or from an echolot:// deep link (QR scan), and
writes URL, pin and credential together or not at all.

One trap the tests pin: an unencoded "+" in a query string decodes to a space,
so a hand-assembled link arrives with a pin wrong by one character. Base64 has
no spaces, so they are restored — unambiguous, and it cannot damage a correctly
encoded pin.

Also fixes a spec divergence: §2.1 names the field device_credential and the
first implementation shipped "credential". Both are sent now and the client
prefers the spec's; the alias goes once nothing reads it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 12:06:22 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 8166611af1 docs: record the compatibility-window work in build-status
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 11:43:02 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 33a6acb0bf compat: stop mangling refusal messages with HTML escapes
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 31s
The server's 426 body reached the user as "needs \u003e= 0.2.0, \u003c 1.0.0":
Go escapes <, > and & by default for JSON destined for a page, which this is
not. Disabled at the encoder. The client now parses the error field rather than
pattern-matching it, so it survives whatever a future encoder decides to escape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 11:41:00 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 9d6572bc33 compat: fix the too-new message's grammar, add a live gate test
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 30s
The generated refusal read "point at a app within range". Also adds
LiveCompatTest, which checks the half a unit test cannot reach: that two
independently-built artifacts agree on the window, that the profile stays
readable for a version the server refuses, and that both bounds are enforced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 11:38:45 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 0c5b021b63 compat: SemVer version windows between app and server
server-release / image (push) Successful in 14s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 30s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 30s
Both sides now declare what they will talk to, and enforce it. Two axes kept
deliberately separate, because conflating them is the trap:

  protocol_version  — CAN these builds talk. The correctness axis. Below 1.0.0
                      the minor is the breaking axis, per SemVer §4.
  release window    — MAY they, per policy. [min, max), advertised in the
                      profile, overridable by the operator.

The server refuses out-of-window apps with 426 and a body naming both versions
and the accepted range; the app checks the profile in both directions before a
run rather than discovering mid-measurement that it will be refused.

Three rules that shape the rest:

  - GET /v1/profile is never gated. It is where a refused client learns which
    version it needs; gating it leaves the user with a network error instead of
    an answer, which is precisely the confusion this exists to remove.
  - An unparseable or absent version is "unknown", and is allowed. Development
    builds report "dev", and a client too old to send the header cannot be
    identified anyway.
  - Bounds sit at breaking boundaries, not at releases, so shipping a patch
    never requires editing a range. The app's server minimum is 0.4.2 for a
    stated reason: earlier multi-homed servers mis-addressed granted sends and
    the client measured 100% downstream loss that never happened.

The app's versionCode is now derived from its SemVer instead of being a second
number someone has to remember to bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 11:36:34 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 277e33da75 chore: drop core-measurement/bin from the index too
deploy-site / deploy (push) Failing after 1m31s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:54:48 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 14e5fad1b2 engine: downstream MTU and downstream train in the measurement document
Three facts the client cannot produce alone, kept deliberately separate:
mtu.pmtud_down (largest datagram that arrives unfragmented — meaningful only
because the server sets DF), mtu.frag_delivery (whether larger ones arrive once
fragmentation is allowed), and train.udp_downstream (loss, reordering and
arrival spacing in the download direction, which a round trip cannot separate
from upstream loss).

ServerMeasurement now runs them on the same ProbeSession as the echo train. It
had to: a fresh session restarts client-side sequence numbers and the server's
anti-replay window discards the lot, so the re-primed source is never recorded
and every granted send goes to a socket that has already closed. That produced
four confidently-wrong FAILED tests and a RED verdict on a healthy network.

Live against fmr: path MTU 1500, fragments to 4000, 100/100 downstream, GREEN.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:54:38 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ce1aaa332a server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 30s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 30s
fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right
family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on
.150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT,
which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving;
the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of
wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened.

Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and
granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback
to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and
the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this.

Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local
run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings
and history screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 7a94c9a3d7 chore: ignore the VSCodium Java extension's bin/ output
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 28s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 29s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:26:30 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 2521d39989 server: DF-mode big_send + uploaded-run storage with an operator policy
big_send now forces the Don't-Fragment bit for the whole burst by default, so
the largest size that arrives IS the downstream path MTU rather than "fragments
got through" — two different measurements the schema already separates. Sizes
above our own egress MTU (from the startup self-test) are refused up front and
reported as max_df_bytes, because absence caused by our kernel must not be read
as a limit of the client's path.

Uploads: one JSON file per run under the state dir, with the policy the operator
actually cares about — who may upload (off / anonymous / account), how large,
how long to keep, and the least anonymization accepted. The profile advertises
all of it so the app can present the switch honestly instead of discovering the
rules by failing. `account` refuses today rather than falling back to anonymous:
picking the strict setting before OIDC lands must not silently mean the loose one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:26:19 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7e1015c211 server: §3.4 asymmetric grants + downtrain and big_send actions
server-test / test (push) Successful in 29s
server-release / image (push) Successful in 34s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 29s
The grant is the keystone that makes server->client sends safe: created
only by an authenticated control-plane action, bound at creation to the
session's OBSERVED data-plane source (so it can never be aimed at a third
party), and bounded by bytes, average rate and expiry. Sends stop the
moment the budget runs out, so a buggy action cannot become a flood.

Two granted actions on top of it:
- downtrain: N packets at a given size/interval toward the client, with
  seq + send-timestamp in the payload — downstream loss/reorder/jitter,
  which an upstream-only train cannot measure.
- big_send: one datagram per requested size, echoing the intended size in
  the payload — downstream MTU / black-hole evidence the client cannot
  produce for itself (only the far end can emit a large packet toward it).

Tests cover the security properties: no grant without a verified
destination, client requests clamped to server limits, byte budget stops
sending exactly, expiry refuses, and the rate ceiling throttles a burst.
Capabilities gain downtrain + big-send.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:09:13 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 c75a9f5eb7 app: accurate Shizuku handoff — name the steps, add developer-options shortcut
Verified against Shizuku 13.6's manifest (pulled APK, aapt2 xmltree): its
wireless-debugging entry points (AdbPairingTutorialActivity,
AdbPairingService, StarterActivity) have no intent filters, so they are
not exported and cannot be launched externally; MainActivity answers only
MAIN/LAUNCHER with no deep link. Starting wireless debugging from another
app is therefore not possible, which is why the handoff lands on the
root-start screen.

Instead the hint now names the exact steps inside Shizuku ("Pairing", then
"Start"), and a second tap opens Developer options — that action IS public
and exported, and Wireless debugging has to be on before Shizuku's
wireless start works.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:03:03 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 1d9e2063bf app: make the Shizuku banner actionable (open Shizuku / request permission)
A third-party app cannot start Shizuku — the wireless-debugging pairing
flow is privileged and lives in Shizuku's own app — so the banner
deep-links there when it is installed but stopped, and fires the
permission request directly when it is running but unauthorised. The hint
line says which.

Verified on-device together with the earlier UX work: progress bar showing
"test 4 of 8 · icmp.ping6 · ~33s left", Cancel beside the disabled Run
button, cutout-safe title, and the banner live-updating from
not-running to needs-permission via the binder listener.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:58:39 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d7dda40e4e app: tell the user before the run when Shizuku is installed but not started
Distinguishes not-installed (say nothing — don't nag users who don't use
Shizuku) from installed-but-stopped (amber banner: start it to include
shell-tier tests), plus running-unauthorised and ready. Detection is
listener-based since pingBinder() only becomes truthful once
ShizukuProvider delivers the binder; a launch-time poll would show a false
"not running". Installed-vs-not needs the <queries> entry on Android 11+.

Verified on-device: with shizuku_server stopped, the banner shows before
pressing Run; the title also now clears the status bar/cutout after the
safeDrawingPadding fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:51:01 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 217818f7b3 app: progress bar with ETA, cancel button, and cutout-safe layout
- Probe.estimatedMs (measured per probe; timeout-bound ones dominate)
  drives a determinate progress bar and "test N of M · ~Xs left",
  including the Shizuku battery in the total.
- Cancel stops the run and shows the partial results as a normal document
  (findings + verdict over what was collected) but never uploads them.
- safeDrawingPadding() on the root column: Android 15 is edge-to-edge by
  default and the title was colliding with the status-bar clock and the
  camera cutout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:48:18 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 2e34463c0a app: router identification verified on-device — named a MikroTik RouterOS 7.23.2
The probe identified the LAN's IPv6 RA sender end to end from an
unprivileged app: EUI-64 MAC recovery (78:9A:18:54:B8:F9, matching the
Shizuku neighbor table) -> MikroTik by OUI, corroborated by the UPnP
device description (RouterOS/7.23.2, MikroTik Router) and reverse DNS
(router.hudelist.local). Cellular's RFC 7217 privacy RA source is
correctly reported as not-EUI-64 instead of guessed. The SSDP sweep also
inventoried a Synology DS1522+ and a Sky gateway — the raw material for
future LLDP/mDNS cross-matching.

Fixes found by running it: added the confirmed MikroTik OUI 78:9A:18 (+
other RouterBOARD ranges) and an elvis-operator bug that printed "no UPnP
response" alongside valid UPnP data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:42:06 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 38f8036252 app: link.ra_source router identification + brand icons + DEV build variant
link.ra_source answers "who advertises IPv6 here, and which box is it":
RA source per network, MAC recovered from the modified-EUI-64 link-local
(privacy addresses reported as such, not guessed), vendor via a curated
OUI table, UPnP/SSDP M-SEARCH for the gateway's server banner + device
description (manufacturer/model/friendly name), and reverse DNS. All SSDP
responders are recorded so a rogue RA sender that isn't the gateway can
still be matched; the MAC accompanies every identity source as the hook
for future LLDP/mDNS cross-matching. UI gains a "Router / IPv6 advertiser"
panel.

Icons: branding adaptive icon converted to vector drawables (+ PNG
mipmaps, monochrome layer). The debug build is now a separate app —
applicationIdSuffix .dev, label "Echolot DEV", DEV-badged icon — so it
installs alongside a production build and can't be confused with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:35:54 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 dc094d1631 app: autorun mode (unattended run + upload + auto-exit); IPv6 severity rework
IPv6: absence is no longer a defect. If the network never provisioned v6
(no global address, no ::/0 route) the finding is ipv6.not_offered at INFO
(green) — most networks are still IPv4-only. If v6 IS advertised but
doesn't work, it's ipv6.broken at MEDIUM (yellow), because half-working v6
stalls connections. Verified on-device: our LAN advertises a v6 default
route with no path, and now reports ipv6.broken.

Autorun: `am start ... --ez autorun true` runs the suite immediately,
POSTs the report to the collection endpoint, shows the result for 3s and
finishes the activity (stays open if the upload failed). receiver.py gains
POST /report + GET /reports + GET /report/<name>. Verified end to end: one
adb command, report retrieved over HTTP, app closed itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:27:04 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 483de5ca54 app: nat.stun_5780 — NAT mapping/filtering discovery, verified vs live server
Hand-rolled RFC 5389/5780 STUN client (stdlib only) that exercises the
server's stun-5780 capability: one socket, three binding requests
(primary, OTHER-ADDRESS alternate IP, CHANGE-REQUEST port) — the
comparison classifies NAT mapping and filtering behavior.

Verified on the OnePlus: local 10.13.102.124 -> mapped
178.191.120.247:53259 (behind_nat true), alternate address answered from
the server's second IP, mapping endpoint-independent, filtering
address/port-dependent. Finding nat.symmetric (medium) for the
P2P-hostile case.

Two real bugs found by running it: port preservation was misread as "no
NAT" (compare addresses, not ports), and an unbound socket reports the
wildcard local address (resolve via a throwaway connected socket).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:15:29 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 dd9ecf5032 app: Shizuku shell tier verified on-device — 7/7 via UserService
Ran on the OnePlus with Shizuku started: tiers.shizuku=true, test ok,
commands_ok 7/7, exec_path=UserService (dual-path executor picked the
right path for this device). Evidence includes the live neighbor table,
per-table v6 routes, a real [NEIGH] netlink event, IpClient DHCP logs with
APF caps, and the wifi dump — as shell(2000).

Both v1 privilege tiers (app + shizuku) now verified end to end in the
production app on hardware. Report archived.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:06:24 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 59ba1c16bc app: dns.canary probe — client half of the canary measurement, verified live
Resolves the server's canary zone through the platform resolver and
compares against the spec-frozen ground truth (probe-protocol §6.1):
reference records detect answers rewritten in flight, and a per-run nonce
name (uncacheable) proves the query reached the authoritative server.
Findings: dns.answer_rewritten (high), dns.authoritative_unreachable
(medium).

Verified on the OnePlus against the deployed fmr zone: 4/4 reference
records matched exactly, nonce name answered 192.0.2.21 with
reached_authoritative=true. First full client<->server measurement loop
on real hardware; report archived.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 09:02:43 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 cf5cd2dc68 CLAUDE.md: record the beacon's inherent mDNS noise limitation
Network churn (SSID jump/roam) makes adbd re-publish its advertisement
repeatedly; each resolve re-arms the connection and posts a notification,
so the resolve-once guard can't fully prevent spam on the OnePlus. Noted
the alternatives (manual port, or Shizuku `ss` with no mDNS involved).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 08:55:44 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 68a6bcb9e3 CLAUDE.md: record the beacon's resolve-once rule and verified rotation behavior
Re-resolving adbd's own mDNS advertisement is what caused the notification
spam; resolving once per service instance (guard cleared on loss) keeps
rotation tracking intact — verified live, a 37089->33667 rotation was
reported 6s later and reconnected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 08:50:48 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 b751ca771e app: net.captive_portal verified on-device; archive first app run report
OnePlus 15 run: Android's generate_204 logic reproduced correctly —
default+wifi 204/204 -> validated, cellular -1/-1 -> no_internet (a
per-network asymmetry the OS itself hides). Shizuku tier degraded
correctly to UNSUPPORTED with tiers.shizuku=false since Shizuku isn't
running there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:17:35 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 4c51bd2aad beacon: stop causing "wireless debugging connected" notification spam
Root cause of the spam the user kept seeing: the service resolved adbd's
own mDNS advertisement repeatedly (every discovery callback, plus a 20s
heartbeat). Resolving that service makes adbd re-arm the connection, and
Android posts a "wireless debugging connected" notification each time —
so the beacon itself was the noise source, independent of the PC-side
connector loops.

Now: resolve each discovered service instance exactly ONCE (guard set,
cleared on onServiceLost so a genuine rotation re-resolves once), and the
heartbeat only re-POSTs the cached port (60s, no mDNS traffic).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:12:14 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 ee4031b086 tools: beacon receiver can serve a staged APK on /apk (443)
A test device that can only reach fmr on 443 (LAN blocks other outbound
ports) can pull an APK via its own downloader — more resilient than adb's
sustained transport over flaky wifi. GET /apk serves APK_PATH. (Doesn't
help the Lenovo tablet, which ships no curl; kept for devices that do.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:08:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 6e269d424b app: net.captive_portal probe — reproduce Android's internet/portal checks
Mirrors NetworkMonitor: per active network, fetch the AOSP default
generate_204 endpoints and check for HTTP 204 No Content.
- HTTPS https://www.google.com/generate_204 == 204 -> validated internet
- HTTP http://connectivitycheck.gstatic.com/generate_204: 204 -> clean;
  an unfollowed 3xx or a 200-with-body -> captive portal (Location captured)
- both fail -> no_internet
Per-network verdicts (bound via Network.openConnection), redirects not
followed (the 3xx IS the evidence). Findings: captive_portal (medium) and
no_internet (high). New test type net.captive_portal (net family ->
connectivity category). App gains usesCleartextTraffic (a network
diagnostic that intentionally probes plain HTTP).

Builds; measurement verdict tests still green. On-device verification
deferred with the rest (flaky test devices).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:01:22 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 aaed22dd3f app: core-shizuku — dual-path shell-tier executor + probe, wired into the app
Ports the prober's validated Shizuku tier: AIDL UserService, the build-4
dual-path ShizukuRunner (UserService bind where it works, legacy
newProcess reflection fallback where it doesn't — exec_path records
which), and ShizukuProbe running the shell command battery, emitting a
shizuku-tier link.ip_monitor Test with per-device dumps as evidence.
Self-degrades to UNSUPPORTED without Shizuku.

Wired into RunViewModel (sets tiers.shizuku); app APK assembles. On-device
verification deferred — no device reachable at build time (flaky LAN
dropped the tablet, phone debugging off). Expect UserService on OnePlus,
newProcess on Lenovo per the prober.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:37:48 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 9809ae57b4 tools: connector must not chase port rotation on a live connection
The connector tore down a working adb link whenever the beacon reported a
new port, reconnecting every loop and spamming the phone with "wireless
debugging connected" notifications (~every 8s). Existing connections
survive rotation, so now: if any device-state entry exists for the IP,
leave it; only (dis)connect when there's no working link at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:29:03 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 9bb3ac9df4 tools: version the beacon PC-connector; confirm Shizuku-toggle recovery
connect.sh polls the fmr beacon map and keeps `adb connect` current for
every device, now handling offline/stale entries and port changes
(disconnect+reconnect). Verified end to end: after Shizuku start + a
wireless-debugging toggle, the tablet's port rotated 38309->46667, the
beacon caught it, the connector reconnected, and Shizuku kept running as
an independent shell(2000) process.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:26:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 96422dd58c CLAUDE.md: document the beacon + the Shizuku-kills-adb finding
Verified live: starting Shizuku (non-root, via wireless debugging) hijacks
the debug channel — adb drops and adbd advertises a stale mDNS port, so the
beacon can't auto-recover. Workaround: toggle wireless debugging off/on
after starting Shizuku (it keeps running). Baked into the dev notes so the
Shizuku-tier build loop plans around it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:23:58 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 16836ea7b1 build-status: production app verified on both devices via beacon-managed adb
Overall YELLOW on OnePlus 15 (A16) + Lenovo TB330FU (A15), driven by the
real broken-LAN IPv6 finding — full probe→schema→verdict→UI vertical on
hardware.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:16:23 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 7b9b312dcd beacon: own-IP filter (shared-LAN fix) + wireless-debugging-off warning
Live multi-device test exposed two things:
- On a shared LAN, NsdManager discovers EVERY device's
  _adb-tls-connect._tcp advertisement, so a phone reported the tablet's
  port for its own IP (crossed). Now only accept the resolved service
  whose host matches this device's own wlan0 IP.
- When Wireless debugging is turned off, adbd drops its mDNS
  advertisement (onServiceLost) — the app now says so plainly in the
  status line and the ongoing notification ("Wireless debugging appears
  OFF — re-enable it"), instead of a vague "waiting".

Verified with phone + tablet on the same LAN: correct per-device ports,
both auto-connected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:13:13 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 38d4440412 tools: beacon fixes — cleartext, multi-device, validated-net POST, status URL
Debugging against a real restricted LAN surfaced three fixes:
- Android blocks app cleartext HTTP by default (targetSdk 36) — the port
  discovery + reachability were fine (phone curl reached fmr), only the
  app POST was denied. Added usesCleartextTraffic for this dev tool.
- Multi-device: report + receiver are keyed by device (Build.MODEL) so a
  phone and tablet don't clobber each other; connector connects each.
- POST over a VALIDATED internet network (prefer cellular) since the
  wireless-debug wifi is often a restricted LAN.
- Status/notification now show the target beacon URL + which network, per
  the request to surface what it's connecting to.
Verified live: beacon tracks the (frequently rotating) port via mDNS and
self-reports the current endpoint within seconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 22:07:35 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 52748ac853 tools: wireless-adb beacon — self-healing bridge across drops + port rotation
The phone's wireless-debug port rotates and the bridge drops; this makes
adb reconnect automatically. Three pieces:
- adb-beacon (Android dev app): reads adbd's own mDNS advertisement
  (_adb-tls-connect._tcp) via NsdManager for the live connect port — no
  root, no Shizuku — plus the wlan0 IPv4, and POSTs {ip,port} to fmr every
  time it changes (continuous NSD discovery catches rotation in seconds).
  Foreground service (specialUse) so it survives backgrounding.
- tools/adb-beacon/receiver.py: ~30-line rendezvous on fmr:9099 (secret-
  gated POST stores the latest endpoint; GET returns it). Deployed as
  echolot-adb-beacon.service.
- PC connector polls the endpoint and keeps `adb connect` current.

Dev tooling, separate from the product. Bootstrap: sideload the beacon
APK once (no adb needed); thereafter adb self-heals for everything.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:50:33 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 bc220f950e app: installable APK — core-probe (device-tier) + Compose UI
First assembling build of the production app. Android toolchain mirrors
the prober (AGP 9 built-in Kotlin; applying kotlin.android too
double-registers the kotlin extension — the one gotcha).

core-probe (Android lib): Probe→core-measurement Test abstraction;
NetworkInventory (LinkProperties→networks[]), LinkSnapshotProbe,
per-network IcmpProbe (ported from the prober's validated logic).

app (Compose): RunViewModel orchestrates probes into a MeasurementDocument
with a §7.3 summary + first-pass findings; UI renders traffic lights,
networks, tests, findings; JSON export. Rotation-safe (ViewModel).
App-tier only; server-facing (core-engine) + Shizuku are additive
follow-ups. Debug APK 9.5 MB, assembles clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:40:42 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 49c6197aff app: core-engine — run engine; full server-facing vertical proven vs fmr
Composes core-protocol probes into core-measurement documents. Injected
clock/UUID source keeps it pure and unit-testable. Runs a server ECHO
train and derives RTT distribution, loss, and NAT-rebinding detection
(from the server's observed source port) as train.udp_updown, then
findings + a §7.3 summary.

Verified end-to-end against fmr: 20-packet train, 0% loss, RTT
1.7/2.5/6.9ms, no rebinding → valid MeasurementDocument (2.3kB), overall
GREEN. The whole server-facing stack (protocol → engine → schema →
verdict) now produces the real product artifact against the live server,
no device required.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:28:09 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 1f8860f7f8 app: core-measurement — the measurement-schema.md document model
Pure Kotlin/JVM, faithful to the schema contract: two-clock (wall RFC3339 +
*_mono_ns), units in field names, observation/interpretation split
(tests[] vs findings[]), columnar train evidence (nulls preserved per
index), the full v1 test-type registry, the anonymization logical types as
field notes, and a finding-requires-evidence invariant.

The one piece with real logic — §7.3 deterministic verdict derivation
(category = worst finding light; >50% failed/unsupported → inconclusive;
overall = worst category, inconclusive only if all are) — is implemented
in Verdicts and fully unit-tested. Document JSON round-trips (snake_case
wire names, null-in-columns), typed builders for train/traceroute/resolver
evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:24:20 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 3520eabd21 app: scaffold echolot-app + core-protocol — client spine verified live vs fmr
Multi-module Android app, built bottom-up from a verifiable core.
core-protocol is pure Kotlin/JVM (no Android SDK): SPKI-pinned control
plane (enroll/profile/session over HttpsURLConnection — API-1 compatible,
hostname verification off, trust is the pin), HKDF-SHA256 session keys,
ELT1 UDP data plane (HMAC gate, ECHO+observation, MTU probe) —
byte-compatible with the Go server.

Unit tests incl. the RFC 5869 HKDF vector (key derivation provably matches
the server). LiveServerTest + scripts/test-fmr.sh prove the client
end-to-end against the deployed fmr server: profile (8 caps), session,
ECHO rtt~11ms with the observation block returning our observed NAT port,
MTU 1400->1400, observations. Live test self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.

Two client bugs caught live: java.net.http hostname verification (→
HttpsURLConnection, also the Android-minSdk-26 choice) and ECHO padding
needed for the observation to survive anti-amplification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:16:41 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 b229eeb674 build-status: tls-echo/JA4 live on fmr — spec §4 complete
Cross-client verified (openssl vs python ssl yield distinct JA4s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:01:19 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 1472a86508 server: tls-echo — ClientHello capture + JA4 on the TCP-echo port (§4 complete)
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 28s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 28s
A connection opening with a TLS handshake (first byte 0x16) and ALPN
elt-echo gets the ClientHello it sent back raw (b64) and as a JA4
fingerprint (sec.clienthello_echo), then a TLS byte-echo; plain
connections are unchanged. One port, multiplexed by a timed peek:
plain echo is server-speaks-first, so a silent client (peek timeout) is
greeted, while a TLS client's immediate ClientHello (0x16) routes to the
TLS path — 500ms tolerates ~1s RTT before misdetection.

JA4 (FoxIO): full ClientHello parser (ciphers, extensions, ALPN,
supported_versions, sig algs) with GREASE exclusion; a_b_c fingerprint,
unit-tested for structure + GREASE invariance. Live-verified: elt-echo
negotiated, JA4 t13d1712eo computed, 1530-byte ClientHello returned.
Capability tls-echo. This completes spec §4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:59:44 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8a854141c5 build-status: server self-test live; fmr proven good (sysctl+MTU clean)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:49:05 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 d5e15816b5 server: fix egress-MTU probe — connect the socket before reading IP_MTU
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 27s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 27s
IP_MTU getsockopt returns ENOTCONN on an unconnected socket; the v0.3.4
probe set IP_MTU_DISCOVER and Sendto but never Connect'd, so every probe
errored. UDP-connect (no handshake) pins the route so IP_MTU reflects the
path; switched to Write (two return values). Sysctl audit already flagged
the four real fmr issues in v0.3.4; this makes the MTU proof report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:46:47 +02:00
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 4ae744aae5 server: self-test — sysctl audit + egress-MTU self-proof ("server proven good")
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 27s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 28s
A measurement server must prove its own host isn't distorting results:
- sysctl audit (/proc/sys): flags accept_ra on a static host, ICMP
  redirects, ICMP rate-limiting of the server's own errors, and disabled
  TCP options — each a measurement-fidelity hazard, with the "why".
- egress-MTU self-proof: DF PMTUD probe (IP_MTU_DISCOVER + getsockopt
  IP_MTU, no root — Linux-only, stub elsewhere) to external anchors. If the
  server's own uplink is below 1500, client MTU tests measure THIS server,
  so we say so.
Exposed at GET /admin/selftest (full report) and as server_selftest
{mtu_ok, sysctl_ok} in the profile so clients can trust or skip MTU tests.
Recommended deploy/99-echolot-sysctl.conf + README section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:44:38 +02:00
247 changed files with 28690 additions and 266 deletions
+19 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,13 @@
# container registry (docker login → unauthorized).
# Create: user Settings → Applications → Generate token.
# REGISTRY_USER optional; defaults to the pushing actor's username.
# The release job needs only the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN.
# RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY base64 ed25519 seed that signs SHA256SUMS. Self-updating
# servers verify the signature against the public key baked
# into the binary (selfupdate.DefaultPublicKeyB64) and REFUSE
# unsigned releases, so this job hard-fails without it —
# a release nobody can install is better failed loudly here.
# Mint a pair with: go run ./cmd/release-sign -gen
# The release job otherwise needs only the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN.
name: server-release
on:
@@ -44,6 +50,18 @@ jobs:
done
(cd ../dist && sha256sum * > SHA256SUMS)
- name: Sign SHA256SUMS
working-directory: server
env:
RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
run: |
[ -n "$RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY" ] || { echo "::error::secret RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY is missing — self-updating servers refuse unsigned releases, so publishing one would strand the fleet. Add it under Settings → Actions → Secrets."; exit 1; }
go run ./cmd/release-sign ../dist/SHA256SUMS
# Verify with the key baked into the binary we just built — catches a
# secret that does not match DefaultPublicKeyB64 before it ships.
PUB=$(grep -o 'DefaultPublicKeyB64 = "[^"]*"' internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go | cut -d'"' -f2)
go run ./cmd/release-sign -verify -pub "$PUB" ../dist/SHA256SUMS
- name: Create release + attach binaries
env:
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+6
View File
@@ -40,3 +40,9 @@ keystore.properties
# wrangler build/dev artifacts
web/.wrangler/
# Eclipse/JDT output from the VSCodium Java extension — not a build artifact we own
echolot-app/*/bin/
# Kotlin compiler scratch/error logs
echolot-app/.kotlin/
+91 -4
View File
@@ -32,10 +32,25 @@ Keep prober result IDs aligned with the measurement-schema test-type registry.
## Versioning
Prefer **patch** bumps (`server-v0.3.1`) for additive/incremental work; reserve **minor** bumps
for real milestones. Don't burn through minor versions. Tags are namespaced: `server-v*` for the
Go server, `v*` for the app. Pushing a `server-v*` tag runs CI → binaries + Gitea release +
registry image; the server on fmr can `--self-update` from those releases.
Both artifacts are **SemVer**. Prefer **patch** bumps (`server-v0.3.1`) for additive/incremental
work; reserve **minor** bumps for real milestones. Don't burn through minor versions. Tags are
namespaced: `server-v*` for the Go server, `v*` for the app. Pushing a `server-v*` tag runs CI →
binaries + Gitea release + registry image; the server on fmr can `--self-update` from those
releases.
The app's version lives once, as `appVersionName` in `app/build.gradle.kts`; **`versionCode` is
derived from it** (`major*1e6 + minor*1e4 + patch*10`). Never set it by hand — a second number a
human has to remember to bump eventually disagrees with the first.
**Versions are load-bearing** (probe-protocol.md §8): the server refuses apps outside its window
with `426`, and the app refuses servers outside its own. Two axes, kept separate:
- `protocol_version`*can* they talk. The correctness axis; below 1.0.0 the **minor** is the
breaking axis.
- release-version window — *may* they, per policy. `[min, max)`, bounds at breaking boundaries so
a patch never strands a fleet. Client bounds: `Compat.kt`. Server: `ECHOLOT_MIN/MAX_APP_VERSION`.
Raise a minimum only when older peers are actively harmful, and say why in the constant's comment.
`GET /v1/profile` must stay ungated — it is how a refused client learns what it needs.
## Layout
@@ -52,6 +67,29 @@ echolot-prober/ the capability prober (self-contained Gradle buil
ui/ProberScreen.kt result cards colored by verdict
```
## Client modules (echolot-app/)
Pure Kotlin/JVM where possible, so the interesting logic is unit-testable without a device and can
be exercised against the live server from the PC:
- `core-protocol` — control plane (pinned TLS) + ELT1 UDP data plane. **One `ProbeSession` per
server session, for its whole lifetime**: a second one restarts sequence numbers, the server's
anti-replay window discards every packet, and granted sends then target the closed socket.
- `core-measurement` — the schema types. `core-engine` — composes probes into documents.
- `core-privacy` — the §8 anonymizer (`full` / `balanced` / `strict`). Field classification lives
in one table (`Classification.kt`); keep it there rather than annotating models.
- `core-archive` — on-device run storage + retention. `enabled` is separate from the three
ceilings: all-zeros means "no limits", not "keep nothing".
**The local archive keeps the unredacted document; anonymization happens per upload, on the way
out.** Never redact what is stored locally.
### Live testing without a device
`echolot-app/scripts/test-fmr.sh [gradle-task] [test-filter]` mints an enrollment token over SSH,
enrolls, computes the SPKI pin from the served cert and runs a `Live*Test` against fmr. This covers
the whole server-facing vertical (granted sends, downstream MTU, uploads) with no phone involved —
use it before asking the user to test on hardware.
## Conventions
- Every probe returns a `ProbeResult` — never throws to the caller (MainActivity wraps anyway).
@@ -83,6 +121,47 @@ First build downloads AGP/Compose/Shizuku from Google Maven + Maven Central.
- Known devices: OnePlus 15 (CPH2747, A16) — Shizuku UserService works;
Lenovo TB330FU (A15, multi-user) — UserService never binds, the `newProcess` fallback carries
it. Full history in build-status.md.
- **Wireless-adb beacon** (`echolot-app/adb-beacon` + `tools/adb-beacon/receiver.py`): the
wireless-debug port rotates every couple of minutes on these devices; the beacon reads the live
port from adbd's own mDNS (`_adb-tls-connect._tcp`, filtered to the device's own IP) and POSTs
it to fmr:443 (cleartext allowed; over a validated net); a PC connector polls and reconnects.
Bootstrap needs one manual adb connection to install it, then it self-heals. Existing adb
connections survive port rotation — only fresh connects need the new port.
**Resolve adbd's mDNS advertisement exactly ONCE per service instance** (re-resolving makes
adbd re-arm the connection, which spams "wireless debugging connected" notifications); the
periodic heartbeat only re-POSTs the cached port. Rotation is still caught: onServiceLost
clears the guard, so the new advertisement is resolved once and reported within seconds
(verified: 37089 -> 33667 reported 6 s after rotation).
**Known limitation — do not run the beacon on the OnePlus.** On network churn (SSID jump, roam)
adbd repeatedly drops and re-publishes its advertisement, so lost/found cycles keep clearing the
resolve-guard; each resolve makes adbd re-arm and post a "wireless debugging connected"
notification. Guarding reduces but cannot eliminate this — resolving adbd's own mDNS record is
inherently noisy on that device. Use manual `ip:port` there (ask the user), or read the port via
Shizuku (`ss -tlnp | grep adbd`, no mDNS) if the shell tier is available.
- **Shizuku start kills the adb bridge and the beacon can't auto-recover it.** Shizuku's non-root
start pairs over wireless debugging and runs its starter through adb, hijacking the channel:
adb goes device→offline→refused, and adbd keeps advertising the now-dead port over mDNS (stale),
so the beacon reports a port that no longer accepts connections. Workaround: after starting
Shizuku, **toggle Wireless debugging off/on** — Shizuku keeps running (separate process), a fresh
port + mDNS record appear, and the beacon/connector recover. Plan the Shizuku-tier dev loop
around this (or USB, if ever available).
- **A poisoned Gradle *build cache* entry can silently drop a whole module from the APK.**
Symptom: the app dies with `ClassNotFoundException` for a class that plainly exists, while the
build is green and `./gradlew :app:dependencies` lists the module on `debugRuntimeClasspath`.
The module's own jar is correct; its code simply never reaches AGP's intermediates. `clean`,
`rm -rf */build` and `--rerun-tasks` all fail to fix it, because **none of them touch the build
cache** — look for `compileKotlin FROM-CACHE` in the log. Fix: rebuild with `--no-build-cache`.
Verify by grepping the APK's dex for a string literal that only that module defines; grepping for
a *class name* proves nothing, because callers carry the name as a reference whether or not the
class is packaged:
`unzip -o -q app-debug.apk "classes*.dex" && grep -a "pin-sha256:" *.dex`
Suspect this whenever a runtime failure contradicts a successful build.
- **Empty-jar race with the IDE.** VSCodium's Java/Kotlin extension runs its own Gradle daemon on
the same project; when it overlaps a CLI build, a module's `build/libs/*.jar` can end up
containing only a manifest, and Gradle then considers `jar` up-to-date. Dependent modules fail
with "Unresolved reference" on symbols that plainly exist. Fix: `rm -f <module>/build/libs/*.jar`
and re-run the `jar` task. Suspect this whenever a reference resolves in one module but not in
its consumer.
- As of the AGP 9.2.0 / Gradle 9.6.0 / Kotlin 2.2.10 bump, JDK 17+ (including 25) works —
AGP 9 requires Gradle 9.1.0+ and Kotlin 2.2.10+ as its minimum KGP version. On machines with
Android Studio, its `jbr` directory works as `JAVA_HOME`.
@@ -94,3 +173,11 @@ First build downloads AGP/Compose/Shizuku from Google Maven + Maven Central.
are SUPPORTED on both known devices via `Os.recvmsg` + `StructMsghdr` reflection.
3. Fold the confirmed capabilities + Shizuku dump-format samples back into the production
`core-probe` / `core-shizuku` modules.
## Enrolling a device with a server
`echolot-app/scripts/enroll-link.sh [note]` mints a §2.1 bootstrap link on fmr over SSH and prints
it (plus a QR if `qrencode` is installed, plus the `adb shell am start -a …VIEW -d '<uri>'` command
when a device is attached). The link carries a single-use token — treat it as a secret until spent.
Never hand-assemble one: the base64 pin needs percent-encoding, and a pin wrong by one character
fails as an inscrutable TLS error rather than as a bad pin.
+1099 -3
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+126
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
<!--
SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-4.0
-->
# Echolot findings registry
Closes open item 1 of `measurement-schema.md` §9.
A **finding code** is the stable, machine-readable half of a result. The prose around it changes
freely; the code is what a dashboard groups by, what a diff between two runs keys on, and what
someone greps a year of archived runs for. That only works if a code means exactly one thing,
forever.
This document is the contract. It is kept in step with
`echolot-app/core-measurement/.../FindingRegistry.kt` by a test that fails when either side has a
code the other does not — a registry that drifts from its documentation is worse than none,
because it looks authoritative.
## Rules
1. **The prefix determines the category**, and the category determines which verdict light the
finding rolls up into (§7.3). A `nat.*` code appearing under *connectivity* is not a naming
quibble; it changes which light turns red. Two codes were renamed from `nat.*` to
`connectivity.*` for exactly this reason.
2. **One code per concept.** Two emitters independently produced `connectivity.downstream_loss`
and `connectivity.loss_downstream` for the same claim before this registry existed. Anyone
aggregating either would have silently seen half their data.
3. **Codes are declared, not typed.** Emitters reference a `FindingSpec`, so a typo is a compile
error and no two call sites can disagree about a finding's category or default severity.
4. **Severity in the registry is the default.** An emitter may escalate for a specific run; it may
not quietly reclassify the finding in general.
5. **Say what is ruled out**, where that is the useful half. "Loss upstream" is worth far more
when it also states that the return path is clean, because that halves where to look next.
6. **Renaming a code is a breaking change** once runs are archived at scale. Before 1.0 it is
cheap; after, it needs an alias and a deprecation window.
## Registry
### connectivity
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `connectivity.udp_unreachable` | high | No UDP echo replies came back from the server at all. | — |
| `connectivity.udp_unreachable_upstream` | high | The server received none of the probes, so traffic is dropped on the way out. | The return path: nothing arrived to be replied to. |
| `connectivity.udp_loss` | medium | A large fraction of round-trip probes were lost, direction unknown. | — |
| `connectivity.loss_upstream` | medium | Probes were lost on the way to the server. | The return path: replies came back for everything that arrived. |
| `connectivity.loss_downstream` | medium | Packets were lost on the way back from the server. | The outbound path: the server received what it was answering. |
| `connectivity.downstream_blocked` | high | Server-initiated packets never arrive, although round trips work. | Basic reachability: the path forwards replies, just not unsolicited traffic. |
| `connectivity.downstream_reorder` | low | Downstream packets arrive in a different order than they were sent. | — |
| `connectivity.captive_portal` | medium | A captive portal is intercepting connectivity checks. | — |
| `connectivity.no_internet` | high | Android's own connectivity checks fail on this network. | — |
### mtu
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `mtu.reduced_downstream` | low | The downstream path MTU is below the usual 1500 bytes. | — |
| `mtu.downstream_blackhole` | medium | Datagrams above the path MTU are dropped downstream, fragmented or not. | — |
| `mtu.fragments_blocked` | medium | IP fragments do not reach this device even when sent in order. | — |
| `mtu.fragment_reorder_sensitive` | low | Fragments are delivered in order but dropped when reordered or delayed. | Fragmentation itself: in-order fragments arrive fine. |
### nat
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `nat.udp_rebinding` | medium | A NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow. | — |
| `nat.symmetric` | medium | The NAT assigns a different external port per destination. | — |
### perf
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `perf.throughput_no_delivery` | high | No throughput traffic arrived, although the server sent it. | — |
| `perf.throughput_below_offered` | low | Less throughput arrived than the server sent for the whole run. | — |
### dns
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `dns.answer_rewritten` | high | A resolver returned an answer that differs from the authoritative record. | — |
| `dns.authoritative_unreachable` | medium | The canary zone's authoritative server could not be reached. | — |
### v6
The prefix is `v6.`, matching the test-type registry (`v6.brokenness`, `v6.happy_eyeballs`, …).
These were `ipv6.*` while declaring `Category.IPV6`; since the prefix map only knows `v6`, they
rolled up under *connectivity* instead — the third occurrence of rule 1 being broken.
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|---|---|---|---|
| `dns.search_domain_unanswered` | high | The network advertises a DNS search domain that its own server does not answer for. | A fault on this device: the same server answers ordinary names normally. |
| `dns.system_resolver_broken` | high | The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve names through it. | A network fault: the server replied to a query sent from this device. |
| `measurement.vpn_constrained` | info | A VPN was active, so the networks underneath it could not be measured. | Nothing — this run says little about the underlying network either way. |
| `v6.no_default_route` | medium | The device has a global IPv6 address but no IPv6 default route. | Guesswork: this is read from the routing table, not inferred from silence. |
| `v6.route_without_address` | medium | The network advertises an IPv6 default route but the device has no global IPv6 address. | A working IPv6 setup: SLAAC did not produce a usable address on this link. |
| `v6.no_icmp_reply` | low | IPv6 is configured but ICMPv6 echo gets no reply. | Nothing on its own: IPv6 may work fine with ICMP filtered. |
| `v6.broken` | high | IPv6 is advertised on this network but carries no traffic. | ICMP filtering as the benign explanation: a TCP connection over IPv6 failed too. |
| `v6.not_offered` | info | This network does not offer IPv6. | — |
`v6.no_icmp_reply` was `v6.broken` until a phone reported it while loading an IPv6-only site over
TCP perfectly well. The only evidence behind it is ICMPv6 echo, which is widely filtered on
networks where IPv6 works — so the finding now states what was observed and names both
explanations instead of choosing one. It is still worth reporting: filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU
Discovery.
`v6.broken` returned once that corroboration existed: the `v6.brokenness` test attempts a real TCP
connection over IPv6 to the configured server, and only when *both* transports fail on a network
that advertises IPv6 is the brokenness claim made — at high severity, because every dual-stack
destination pays a timeout before falling back to IPv4. When the TCP connect *succeeds*,
`v6.no_icmp_reply` is emitted at high confidence instead, now able to say plainly that ICMPv6 is
filtered while IPv6 works. With no server configured there is no corroboration target and the
two-explanation `v6.no_icmp_reply` stands unchanged.
`v6.not_offered` is **info and must stay info**. Most networks still do not offer IPv6 and that is
not a fault; reporting it as a warning lights a yellow verdict on a healthy network, which teaches
people to ignore the light — the one thing a diagnostic must never do.
## Adding a finding
1. Add a `FindingSpec` to `FindingRegistry`, and to its `all` list.
2. Add the row here, under the section its prefix names.
3. Emit it with `finding(FindingRegistry.YOUR_CODE, …)`.
The registry test checks 1 and 2 agree, that every prefix maps to the category it claims, and that
no two entries share a code.
+17 -2
View File
@@ -52,12 +52,26 @@ Export encoding: UTF-8 JSON, gzip for files (`.echolot.json.gz`), share intent u
},
"tiers": { "app": true, "shizuku": true, "root": false },
"profiles_used": ["profile-uuid", ...],
"constraints": {
"vpn_active": true,
"per_network_blocked": true,
"unmeasured_networks": ["net-0", "net-1"]
},
"notes": "free-text user annotation"
}
```
`tiers` records what was *available*; each test records what it *used*.
`constraints` records what was *prevented*. A constrained run is neither a failed run nor a normal
one, and the distinction has to survive into the data: a run taken through a VPN has the same shape
and the same green verdict as a clean run of a healthy network, so without this a reader — or a
server aggregating thousands of them — cannot tell that almost nothing was measured. The known case
is `per_network_blocked`: Android refuses `Network.bindSocket()` on the underlying networks while a
VPN holds the default route, so every per-network test measures the tunnel or nothing at all, and
any conclusion about the link underneath is unfounded. Consumers should treat findings from a
constrained run as scoped to what was actually reachable, and `unmeasured_networks` names the rest.
## 4. `networks[]` — one entry per Android `Network` in play
A run may exercise several networks simultaneously (Wi-Fi + cellular + USB ethernet). Everything is a snapshot at run start; a `changes[]` list captures mid-run deltas.
@@ -269,7 +283,7 @@ The JSON Schema (machine-readable companion, `measurement.schema.json`, generate
| type | example fields | v2 anonymizer transform |
|---|---|---|
| `ip4`, `ip6` | addresses, routes, hops, DNS answers | prefix-preserving pseudonymization, consistent per document; well-known/reserved ranges kept verbatim |
| `ip4`, `ip6` | addresses, routes, hops, DNS answers | prefix-preserving pseudonymization, consistent per document; well-known/reserved ranges kept verbatim. **Exception: ULA (`fc00::/7`) has its whole prefix pseudonymized as a unit.** It resembles RFC1918 but is not analogous: a ULA global ID is 40 random bits, unique to one network by construction (RFC 4193), so the prefix *is* the identifier, whereas `192.168.0.0/16` is shared by millions of networks and identifies none. Pseudonymizing it as a unit keeps "these hosts are on one subnet" while dropping "this is that subnet". |
| `mac`, `bssid` | wifi, arp_watch | OUI kept, NIC part pseudonymized |
| `fqdn` | DNS names, reverse lookups | per-label pseudonyms, public-suffix kept |
| `ssid` | wifi | pseudonym |
@@ -279,7 +293,8 @@ Free-text fields (`notes`, `error.detail`, dump excerpts from Shizuku parsers) c
## 9. Open items
1. Findings registry document — start alongside the first implemented tests.
1. ~~Findings registry document~~ — done: `findings-registry.md`, kept in step with
`FindingRegistry.kt` by a test that fails when the two disagree.
2. Whether Shizuku raw-dump excerpts (dumpsys/ip output) are embedded in `evidence` verbatim (auditable, but large and hard to anonymize) or parsed-only with an optional "attach raw dumps" toggle. Proposal: toggle, default on for local archive, default off for export.
3. Peer-mode documents: each device produces its own run; the coordinator embeds the peer's findings summary and cross-references by `run.id`. Full merge format deferred.
4. Size guardrails: soft cap 20 MB uncompressed per run; trains beyond that downsample evidence (keep aggregates + first/last N + all anomalies) and record `"evidence_truncated": true`.
+122 -6
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,34 @@ echolot://enroll?v=1&u=<control-URL, urlencoded>&p=pin-sha256:<b64 SPKI hash>&t=
```
POST /v1/enroll Authorization: Bearer <enrollment-token>
→ 200 { "device_credential": "<random 256-bit, b64url>",
"device_id": "uuid",
"profile": { ... §2.2 ... } }
→ 201 { "device_credential": "<random 256-bit, b64url>",
"device_id": "uuid" }
```
The **server assembles the bootstrap link**, because it is the only party holding all three parts
at once, and the part an operator gets wrong by hand is the base64 pin — which does not fail
loudly, it just never matches, and surfaces later as an inscrutable TLS error:
```
POST /admin/enroll-tokens
→ { "token": "…", "expires_in_s": 86400,
"enroll_uri": "echolot://enroll?v=1&u=…&p=…&t=…" }
```
The control URL in the link comes from `ECHOLOT_PUBLIC_URL`, falling back to the first control
listen address. A wildcard bind has no single right answer, so it warns rather than guessing.
Encoding notes that matter in practice:
- `u`, `p` and `t` are **percent-encoded**. The pin is base64, so it contains `+`, `/` and `=`,
every one of which means something else in a query string.
- A `+` that was *not* encoded decodes to a space. Base64 contains no spaces, so a parser SHOULD
restore them — the alternative is a pin wrong by one character and a failure that points nowhere
near the cause.
- The control URL MUST be `https://`. The pin only protects a TLS connection; a cleartext URL
would hand the token to anyone on the path.
- **The link is a secret** while it is live: it carries a bearer token, so anyone who sees it
before the device does can enroll instead.
Enrollment tokens are single-use with expiry, created in the admin UI, scoped `enroll`. The device credential is a long-lived bearer secret, scoped `run-tests`; it is also the HKDF input for session keys. Revocation = deleting the device in the admin UI.
### 2.2 Profile
@@ -61,7 +84,12 @@ The app re-fetches the profile at the start of every run (falling back to the ca
### 2.3 Capabilities (v1 registry)
`udp-probe`, `stun-basic`, `stun-5780`, `canary-dns`, `recursive-dns`, `connect-back`, `delayed-echo`, `big-send`, `frag-send`, `tls-echo`, `http-echo`, `throughput`, `ntp`. A server omits what it can't offer (e.g. `stun-5780` without a second IP degrades to `stun-basic`). Clients must skip, and record as `unsupported`, any test whose capability is absent. Unknown capability strings are ignored.
`udp-probe`, `stun-basic`, `stun-5780`, `canary-dns`, `recursive-dns`, `connect-back`, `delayed-echo`, `big-send`, `frag-send`, `tls-echo`, `http-echo`, `throughput`, `ntp`, plus:
- `downtrain` — server-sent downstream trains via the §5 `downtrain` action. Upstream trains need no capability of their own: they are plain client-sent data-plane packets and ride `udp-probe`.
- `tcp-echo` — the plain-TCP echo endpoint (§4); `tls-echo` is its ALPN variant on the same port.
A server omits what it can't offer (e.g. `stun-5780` without a second IP degrades to `stun-basic`). Clients must skip, and record as `unsupported`, any test whose capability is absent. Unknown capability strings are ignored.
### 2.4 Sessions
@@ -88,6 +116,31 @@ DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}
Per-credential and per-source-IP token buckets on: session creation, actions, UDP packets, bytes. `429` on control plane; silent drop on data plane (probes must tolerate loss anyway). All reflected/generated traffic goes **only** to the session's observed source address (or, for connect-back, the source address of the session-creating request). Data-plane responses to unauthenticated packets are never larger than the request (§3.4).
### 2.2 `GET /v1/discover` — where the control plane lives
Unauthenticated, and says almost nothing: the control-plane URL and the server's display name.
```json
{ "control_url": "https://probe.example.net", "name": "example" }
```
It exists so an enrollment link can carry the name a person recognises while the app still connects
to the name that selects the pinned certificate. When a server shares port 443 between its admin UI
and its control plane, those must be different hostnames — one port and one name is one certificate,
and the two need different ones (a browser-trusted certificate, and a long-lived self-signed one the
client pins). Without discovery, the difference leaks into every enrollment link an operator hands
out.
**It hands out an address, never a pin.** The pin travels in the link itself. Serving it here would
reduce pinning to whatever the certificate authorities are worth, and pinning exists precisely to
survive one the operator does not control — a root injected by corporate device management, for
instance, which is unremarkable on the networks this tool is pointed at. Because the pin is
pre-shared, an intercepted discovery response can only send a device to the wrong host, where the
pin will not match: an outage, not a compromise.
Clients treat it as optional. A server that does not answer, or a link that already names the
control endpoint, works unchanged — enrollment must not begin failing because a lookup did.
## 3. UDP probe protocol
### 3.1 Packet header (fixed 32 bytes, network byte order)
@@ -192,14 +245,77 @@ Note: exact RDATA constants to be frozen in the implementation's `dns_reference.
Same daemon, separate listener (default localhost-only): health + self-test (are both IPs live, is the canary zone delegated correctly, is UDP reachable from outside — tested via a public echolot "mirror" if configured), enrollment token management (create/expire/scope), device list + revocation, retention settings, QR rendering (client-side JS). Out of scope for this spec beyond the endpoints above.
## 8. Cross-references to the measurement schema
## 8. Version compatibility
Both artifacts are versioned with **SemVer**: the Go server (`server-vX.Y.Z` tags) and the Android
app (`versionName`; `versionCode` is derived from it, never maintained separately). Two independent
things are checked, and conflating them is the mistake this section exists to prevent.
### 8.1 Protocol version — *can* these builds talk?
`protocol_version` is the version of **this document**. It is advertised in the profile
(`compat.protocol_version`) and is the correctness axis: a peer in a different breaking series
cannot be talked to, whatever its release version says. Below `1.0.0` the **minor** is the breaking
axis (SemVer §4); at and above it, the major is. A patch bump of the protocol never splits a fleet.
### 8.2 Release-version window — *should* they, per policy?
Each side declares the range of peer release versions it will work with, as `[min, max)`
**minimum inclusive, maximum exclusive**, because the useful bound is always "the version that
broke it" and writing that literally is unambiguous. An empty maximum means unbounded.
The server advertises its window and enforces it:
```jsonc
"compat": {
"protocol_version": "1.0.0",
"schema_version": "1.0.0",
"app_min": "0.2.0",
"app_max": "1.0.0" // exclusive; "" = no upper bound
}
```
Operators override it with `ECHOLOT_MIN_APP_VERSION` / `ECHOLOT_MAX_APP_VERSION` (or
`--min-app-version` / `--max-app-version`). A malformed bound is **fatal at startup**, not ignored:
a typo must not silently disable a restriction the operator meant to set.
The app sends its version on every control-plane request:
```
X-Echolot-App-Version: 0.2.0
```
and carries its own bounds for the server (`MIN_SERVER` / `MAX_SERVER` in `Compat.kt`). It checks
the profile in **both** directions — is the server in our range, and are we in the server's — so a
mismatch is reported before a run starts rather than discovered halfway through one.
### 8.3 Rules
1. **`GET /v1/profile` is never gated.** It is where a refused client learns which version it needs.
Gating it leaves the user with a network error instead of an answer, defeating the check.
2. **Refusal is `426 Upgrade Required`**, with a body naming both versions and the accepted window:
```json
{ "error": "app 0.1.0 is older than this build supports (needs >= 0.2.0, < 1.0.0). Update the app.",
"app_version": "0.1.0", "accepts_app": ">= 0.2.0, < 1.0.0",
"server_version": "0.5.0", "protocol_version": "1.0.0" }
```
3. **An unparseable or absent version is `unknown`, and is allowed.** Development builds report
`dev`, and a client too old to send the header cannot be identified anyway. The check exists to
turn confusing failures into clear ones; refusing what it cannot identify does the opposite.
4. **Bounds move at breaking boundaries, not at releases.** Shipping a patch must never require
editing a range. A minimum is raised only when older peers are actually harmful — e.g. the app
requires server `>= 0.4.2` because earlier multi-homed servers sent granted traffic from an
address the session never used, which the client measured as 100 % downstream loss. A
confidently wrong measurement is worse than a refused one.
## 9. Cross-references to the measurement schema
- Observation-block fields (§3.3) appear as `*_seen_by_server` columns in `train` evidence (schema §6.2).
- `TIMESYNC` (§3.2) produces the `time.server_offset` test; without it, cross-clock fields must not be compared (schema §6.2 note).
- Capability strings (§2.3) are copied verbatim into `server_sessions[].capabilities` (schema §5); tests skipped for missing capability get `status: "unsupported"`.
- `session_id` maps to `server_sessions[].session_id`; `action_id`s appear in test `params`.
## 9. Open items
## 10. Open items
1. Whether TRAIN_REPORT should also stream during long trains (partial reports every N packets) for live UI feedback — leaning yes, same type with a `flags` bit.
2. Throughput methodology (fixed streams vs BBR-style ramp) — decide with `perf.*` test design.
+6
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
.gradle/
build/
/local.properties
/.idea/
*.iml
.DS_Store
+35
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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Echolot app
The production Android client ([spec](../docs/)). Native Kotlin + Jetpack Compose. Multi-module;
built bottom-up from a verifiable protocol spine.
## Modules
| Module | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `core-protocol` | pure Kotlin/JVM | **done** — client half of `probe-protocol.md`, verified live against the server |
| `core-measurement` | pure Kotlin/JVM | planned — `measurement-schema.md` types |
| `core-probe` | Android lib | planned — app-tier probes, ported from `echolot-prober` |
| `core-shizuku` | Android lib | planned — dual-path executor (UserService + newProcess fallback) |
| `app` | Android app | planned — Compose UI |
`core-protocol` is deliberately Android-free so it builds and unit-tests on any JDK (no Android
SDK) and can run **integration tests against a live server**.
## core-protocol
Implements the control plane (SPKI-pinned enrollment/profile/sessions via `HttpsURLConnection`
Android-API-1 compatible, hostname verification off because trust is the pin), the HKDF-SHA256
session-key schedule, and the binary ELT1 UDP data plane (HMAC gate, ECHO + observation block,
MTU probe) — byte-compatible with the Go server.
```sh
./gradlew :core-protocol:test # unit tests (crypto vectors, wire round-trip)
scripts/test-fmr.sh # live end-to-end test against the deployed server
```
`test-fmr.sh` mints an enrollment token over SSH, enrolls via the public control plane, computes
the SPKI pin from the served cert, and runs `LiveServerTest` — proving the client speaks the wire
protocol to the real server (enroll → profile → session → echo+observation → MTU → observations).
The live test self-skips when `ECHOLOT_LIVE_*` env vars are absent, so unit runs and CI stay green
offline.
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
/build
+39
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
// AGP 9 built-in Kotlin (no kotlin.android — see core-probe note).
alias(libs.plugins.android.application)
}
// Dev tool (NOT the product app): reports this phone's rotating wireless-debug
// endpoint to the fmr beacon so the PC can keep `adb connect` current. Reads
// the connect port from adbd's own mDNS advertisement (_adb-tls-connect._tcp)
// via NsdManager — no root, no Shizuku.
android {
namespace = "app.echo_lot.adbbeacon"
compileSdk = 36
defaultConfig {
applicationId = "app.echo_lot.adbbeacon"
minSdk = 26
targetSdk = 36
versionCode = 1
versionName = "0.1.0"
// Prefilled beacon config (dev tool — secret in the APK is fine).
buildConfigField("String", "BEACON_URL", "\"http://89.185.109.150:443/beacon\"")
buildConfigField("String", "BEACON_SECRET", "\"D4OmG5gGJsElqVVbtYIZbR\"")
}
buildTypes { release { isMinifyEnabled = false } }
compileOptions {
sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
}
buildFeatures { buildConfig = true }
}
dependencies {
implementation(libs.kotlinx.coroutines.android)
implementation(libs.androidx.core.ktx)
implementation("androidx.activity:activity:1.9.3")
}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later -->
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS" />
<application
android:allowBackup="false"
android:label="Echolot ADB Beacon"
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
android:theme="@android:style/Theme.Material.Light">
<activity android:name=".MainActivity" android:exported="true">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
</intent-filter>
</activity>
<service
android:name=".BeaconService"
android:exported="false"
android:foregroundServiceType="specialUse">
<property
android:name="android.app.PROPERTY_SPECIAL_USE_FGS_SUBTYPE"
android:value="wireless-debug-endpoint-beacon" />
</service>
</application>
</manifest>
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.adbbeacon
import android.app.Notification
import android.app.NotificationChannel
import android.app.NotificationManager
import android.app.Service
import android.content.Context
import android.content.Intent
import android.net.nsd.NsdManager
import android.net.nsd.NsdServiceInfo
import android.os.Build
import android.os.IBinder
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.Job
import kotlinx.coroutines.SupervisorJob
import kotlinx.coroutines.cancel
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import java.net.HttpURLConnection
import java.net.Inet4Address
import java.net.NetworkInterface
import java.net.URL
/**
* Foreground service that tracks this phone's wireless-debug endpoint and reports it to the fmr
* beacon. The port comes from adbd's own mDNS advertisement (`_adb-tls-connect._tcp`) via
* NsdManager — continuous discovery, so a port rotation re-fires and re-reports within seconds.
* The IP is the wlan0 private IPv4 (what the PC routes to). No root, no Shizuku.
*/
class BeaconService : Service() {
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.IO)
private lateinit var nsd: NsdManager
private var discoveryListener: NsdManager.DiscoveryListener? = null
@Volatile private var currentPort: Int = -1
/** Service instances already resolved — prevents repeat resolves (notification spam). */
private val resolvedOnce = java.util.Collections.synchronizedSet(mutableSetOf<String>())
private var heartbeat: Job? = null
override fun onBind(intent: Intent?): IBinder? = null
override fun onCreate() {
super.onCreate()
nsd = getSystemService(Context.NSD_SERVICE) as NsdManager
startForeground(1, buildNotification("Starting…"))
startDiscovery()
// Re-assert the endpoint periodically, but do NOT re-resolve mDNS each time:
// resolving adbd's own advertisement provokes it to re-arm the connection, which fires
// Android's "wireless debugging connected" notification — every cycle. Discovery runs
// once; we only re-POST the cached port (cheap, silent).
heartbeat = scope.launch {
while (true) {
delay(60_000)
report()
}
}
Status.set("watching for wireless-debug port…")
}
private fun startDiscovery() {
val listener = object : NsdManager.DiscoveryListener {
override fun onStartDiscoveryFailed(t: String?, code: Int) { Status.set("NSD start failed ($code)") }
override fun onStopDiscoveryFailed(t: String?, code: Int) {}
override fun onDiscoveryStarted(t: String?) {}
override fun onDiscoveryStopped(t: String?) {}
override fun onServiceLost(s: NsdServiceInfo?) {
// adbd stops advertising when Wireless debugging is turned off.
currentPort = -1
s?.serviceName?.let { resolvedOnce.remove(it) } // allow one re-resolve when it returns
val warn = "⚠ Wireless debugging appears OFF (adb mDNS service gone) — re-enable it"
Status.set(warn)
updateNotification(warn)
}
override fun onServiceFound(s: NsdServiceInfo?) {
if (s == null) return
// Resolve ONCE per discovered service instance. Repeatedly resolving adbd's own
// advertisement makes it re-arm the connection and spam the user with
// "wireless debugging connected" notifications.
val key = s.serviceName ?: return
if (!resolvedOnce.add(key)) return
resolve(s)
}
}
discoveryListener = listener
runCatching {
nsd.discoverServices("_adb-tls-connect._tcp", NsdManager.PROTOCOL_DNS_SD, listener)
}.onFailure { Status.set("NSD unavailable: ${it.message}") }
}
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
private fun resolve(info: NsdServiceInfo) {
nsd.resolveService(info, object : NsdManager.ResolveListener {
override fun onResolveFailed(s: NsdServiceInfo?, code: Int) {}
override fun onServiceResolved(s: NsdServiceInfo?) {
s ?: return
// On a shared LAN, NsdManager discovers EVERY device's adb
// advertisement — accept only the one whose host is THIS device's
// own IP, else we'd report a neighbour's port for our IP.
val host = s.host?.hostAddress
val mine = wifiIpv4()
if (host != null && mine != null && host != mine) return
currentPort = s.port
scope.launch { report() }
}
})
}
private fun report() {
val ip = wifiIpv4() ?: run { Status.set("no wlan0 IPv4 (is wifi up?)"); return }
val port = currentPort
if (port <= 0) {
// No adb advertisement: either discovery hasn't landed yet, or (usually) Wireless
// debugging is off. Say so plainly.
val warn = "$ip — no wireless-debug port. Is Wireless debugging ON?"
Status.set(warn); updateNotification(warn)
return
}
val device = android.os.Build.MODEL.replace(Regex("[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]"), "_")
val body = """{"device":"$device","ip":"$ip","port":$port}"""
// Send over a VALIDATED internet network — the wireless-debug wifi is often a restricted
// LAN with no real internet TCP egress, so bind the report to cellular/whatever actually
// reaches the beacon.
val net = internetNetwork()
val ok = runCatching {
val url = URL(BuildConfig.BEACON_URL)
val conn = (net?.openConnection(url) ?: url.openConnection()) as HttpURLConnection
conn.run {
requestMethod = "POST"
connectTimeout = 5000; readTimeout = 5000
doOutput = true
setRequestProperty("Content-Type", "application/json")
setRequestProperty("X-Beacon-Secret", BuildConfig.BEACON_SECRET)
outputStream.use { it.write(body.toByteArray()) }
responseCode == 200
}
}.getOrDefault(false)
val via = if (net != null) "via ${netLabel(net)}" else "via default net"
val line = if (ok) {
"reported [$device] $ip:$port$via\n${BuildConfig.BEACON_URL}"
} else {
"report FAILED for [$device] $ip:$port $via\n→ POST ${BuildConfig.BEACON_URL}"
}
Status.set(line)
updateNotification(if (ok) "reported $ip:$port" else "report failed for $ip:$port")
}
/** A network with validated internet access, preferring cellular (the wireless-debug wifi is
* frequently a restricted LAN that can't reach the beacon over TCP). */
private fun internetNetwork(): android.net.Network? {
val cm = getSystemService(Context.CONNECTIVITY_SERVICE) as android.net.ConnectivityManager
var fallback: android.net.Network? = null
for (n in cm.allNetworks) {
val c = cm.getNetworkCapabilities(n) ?: continue
if (!c.hasCapability(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.NET_CAPABILITY_INTERNET)) continue
if (!c.hasCapability(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.NET_CAPABILITY_VALIDATED)) continue
if (c.hasTransport(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.TRANSPORT_CELLULAR)) return n
fallback = n
}
return fallback
}
private fun netLabel(n: android.net.Network): String {
val cm = getSystemService(Context.CONNECTIVITY_SERVICE) as android.net.ConnectivityManager
val c = cm.getNetworkCapabilities(n) ?: return "net"
return when {
c.hasTransport(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.TRANSPORT_CELLULAR) -> "cellular"
c.hasTransport(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.TRANSPORT_WIFI) -> "wifi"
c.hasTransport(android.net.NetworkCapabilities.TRANSPORT_ETHERNET) -> "ethernet"
else -> "net"
}
}
/** The wlan0 (or first private) IPv4 the PC routes to. */
private fun wifiIpv4(): String? {
return runCatching {
NetworkInterface.getNetworkInterfaces().asSequence()
.filter { it.isUp && !it.isLoopback }
.sortedByDescending { it.name.startsWith("wlan") } // prefer wlan0
.flatMap { it.inetAddresses.asSequence() }
.filterIsInstance<Inet4Address>()
.firstOrNull { it.isSiteLocalAddress }
?.hostAddress
}.getOrNull()
}
private fun buildNotification(text: String): Notification {
val channelId = "beacon"
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.O) {
val nm = getSystemService(NotificationManager::class.java)
nm.createNotificationChannel(
NotificationChannel(channelId, "ADB Beacon", NotificationManager.IMPORTANCE_LOW)
)
}
return Notification.Builder(this, channelId)
.setContentTitle("Echolot ADB Beacon")
.setContentText(text)
.setSmallIcon(android.R.drawable.stat_sys_data_bluetooth)
.setOngoing(true)
.build()
}
private fun updateNotification(text: String) {
getSystemService(NotificationManager::class.java).notify(1, buildNotification(text))
}
override fun onStartCommand(intent: Intent?, flags: Int, startId: Int): Int = START_STICKY
override fun onDestroy() {
discoveryListener?.let { runCatching { nsd.stopServiceDiscovery(it) } }
heartbeat?.cancel()
scope.cancel()
Status.set("stopped")
super.onDestroy()
}
}
/** Tiny shared status the activity polls (keeps the app dependency-free of observers). */
object Status {
@Volatile var line: String = "idle"; private set
fun set(s: String) { line = s }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.adbbeacon
import android.Manifest
import android.content.Intent
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.os.Build
import android.os.Bundle
import android.os.Handler
import android.os.Looper
import android.view.Gravity
import android.widget.Button
import android.widget.LinearLayout
import android.widget.TextView
import androidx.activity.ComponentActivity
import androidx.core.content.ContextCompat
/**
* Minimal control surface for the beacon: Start/Stop the foreground service and show its live
* status. Deliberately plain (no Compose) — it's a dev tool.
*/
class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
private lateinit var status: TextView
private val ui = Handler(Looper.getMainLooper())
override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 33 &&
ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(this, Manifest.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS) != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
) {
requestPermissions(arrayOf(Manifest.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS), 1)
}
val root = LinearLayout(this).apply {
orientation = LinearLayout.VERTICAL
setPadding(48, 64, 48, 48)
}
val title = TextView(this).apply { text = "Echolot ADB Beacon"; textSize = 22f }
val subtitle = TextView(this).apply {
text = "Reports this phone's wireless-debug endpoint to fmr so the PC can keep adb connected.\n\n" +
"Enable Wireless debugging, then Start."
textSize = 13f; setPadding(0, 16, 0, 32)
}
status = TextView(this).apply { text = Status.line; textSize = 14f; gravity = Gravity.START }
val start = Button(this).apply {
text = "Start beacon"
setOnClickListener {
val i = Intent(this@MainActivity, BeaconService::class.java)
ContextCompat.startForegroundService(this@MainActivity, i)
}
}
val stop = Button(this).apply {
text = "Stop beacon"
setOnClickListener { stopService(Intent(this@MainActivity, BeaconService::class.java)) }
}
root.addView(title); root.addView(subtitle)
root.addView(start); root.addView(stop)
root.addView(TextView(this).apply { text = "\nStatus:"; setPadding(0, 32, 0, 8) })
root.addView(status)
setContentView(root)
poll()
}
private fun poll() {
status.text = Status.line
ui.postDelayed({ poll() }, 1000)
}
}
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/build
+91
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
// AGP 9 built-in Kotlin — no kotlin.android here (see core-probe note).
alias(libs.plugins.android.application)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.compose)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
}
// The app's version is SemVer and lives here, once. versionCode is derived from it rather than
// maintained alongside: Play/F-Droid need a monotonically increasing integer, but a second number
// that a human has to remember to bump is a number that eventually disagrees with the first — and
// the version is now load-bearing, since the server decides whether to serve us by it.
//
// major*1_000_000 + minor*10_000 + patch*10 leaves room for 9 patch-level rebuilds (the trailing
// digit) without disturbing the mapping, and stays inside the 2_100_000_000 ceiling until major 2100.
val appVersionName = "0.2.3"
fun versionCodeOf(semver: String): Int {
val (major, minor, patch) = semver.substringBefore('-').split(".").map(String::toInt)
return major * 1_000_000 + minor * 10_000 + patch * 10
}
android {
namespace = "app.echo_lot.app"
compileSdk = 36
defaultConfig {
applicationId = "app.echo_lot.app"
minSdk = 26
targetSdk = 36
versionCode = versionCodeOf(appVersionName)
versionName = appVersionName
// Automation: `adb shell am start -n app.echo_lot.app/.MainActivity --ez autorun true`
// runs a measurement immediately and POSTs the report here (dev collection endpoint).
// Empty: the collection endpoint this pointed at was the adb-beacon receiver, which held
// 0.0.0.0:443 in cleartext. That service is gone and echolot-server owns 443 with TLS, so
// posting plaintext there now fails as "client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server" —
// an alarming error for a debugging convenience that is no longer needed, since autorun
// reports are read straight off the device with `run-as cat`.
//
// Deliberately not repointed at /v1/runs. That is the consent-gated upload, and a
// debugging shortcut must not be able to satisfy it by accident.
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_URL", "\"\"")
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_SECRET", "\"\"")
// The bare SemVer, without the debug build's "-dev" suffix stripped away by the server's
// parser anyway — sent to servers so they can apply their compatibility window.
buildConfigField("String", "APP_SEMVER", "\"$appVersionName\"")
}
buildTypes {
release { isMinifyEnabled = false }
debug {
// The dev build is a separate app: own package (installs alongside a real
// Echolot), own label and a DEV-badged icon (src/debug/res).
applicationIdSuffix = ".dev"
versionNameSuffix = "-dev"
}
}
compileOptions {
sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
}
buildFeatures {
compose = true
buildConfig = true
}
}
dependencies {
implementation(project(":core-measurement"))
implementation(project(":core-protocol"))
implementation(project(":core-engine"))
implementation(project(":core-probe"))
implementation(project(":core-shizuku"))
implementation(project(":core-privacy"))
implementation(project(":core-archive"))
implementation(libs.kotlinx.serialization.json)
implementation(libs.kotlinx.coroutines.android)
implementation(libs.androidx.core.ktx)
implementation(libs.androidx.lifecycle.runtime.ktx)
implementation(libs.androidx.lifecycle.viewmodel.compose)
implementation(libs.androidx.activity.compose)
implementation(platform(libs.androidx.compose.bom))
implementation(libs.androidx.ui)
implementation(libs.androidx.ui.graphics)
implementation(libs.androidx.ui.tooling.preview)
implementation(libs.androidx.material3)
debugImplementation(libs.androidx.ui.tooling)
}
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
Debug foreground: the production mark with a DEV ribbon so the dev build is
unmistakable on the launcher next to a real install. -->
<layer-list xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<item android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
<item android:drawable="@drawable/ic_dev_badge"/>
</layer-list>
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<adaptive-icon xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<background android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_background"/>
<foreground android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground_dev"/>
</adaptive-icon>
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<adaptive-icon xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<background android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_background"/>
<foreground android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground_dev"/>
</adaptive-icon>
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<resources>
<string name="app_name">Echolot DEV</string>
</resources>
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later -->
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools">
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />
<application
android:allowBackup="false"
android:label="@string/app_name"
android:icon="@mipmap/ic_launcher"
android:roundIcon="@mipmap/ic_launcher_round"
android:supportsRtl="true"
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
android:theme="@style/Theme.Echolot">
<activity
android:name=".MainActivity"
android:exported="true"
android:launchMode="singleTask">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
</intent-filter>
<!--
Enrollment bootstrap (probe-protocol.md §2.1): echolot://enroll?v=1&u=…&p=…&t=…
Scanning a QR or tapping a link the operator sent configures the server in one
action, instead of transcribing a URL, a base64 pin and a token by hand — the pin
in particular fails silently when it is wrong by one character.
-->
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="false">
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:scheme="echolot" android:host="enroll" />
</intent-filter>
<!--
Sign-in redirect. The browser hands the authorization code back through this, which
is exactly why the flow uses PKCE: any app may register this scheme, so the code
alone must not be enough to complete a sign-in.
-->
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="false">
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:scheme="echolot" android:host="auth" />
</intent-filter>
</activity>
<provider
android:name="androidx.core.content.FileProvider"
android:authorities="${applicationId}.fileprovider"
android:exported="false"
android:grantUriPermissions="true">
<meta-data
android:name="android.support.FILE_PROVIDER_PATHS"
android:resource="@xml/file_paths" />
</provider>
</application>
</manifest>
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import app.echo_lot.protocol.AuthInfo
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.OidcLogin
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
/**
* Signing in to the configured server's identity provider.
*
* The awkward part of a browser-based sign-in on Android is that the app is not running while it
* happens. Handing control to a browser puts this process in the background, where it may be
* killed at any moment; the callback then arrives at a fresh process with none of the state the
* exchange needs. So the PKCE verifier and state are written to storage before the browser opens,
* not held in memory — an in-memory value works on a developer's device and fails on a phone under
* memory pressure, which is the worst way for this to break.
*
* Nothing from the identity provider is kept afterwards. The ID token proves who is signing in,
* once; the device credential authenticates everything from then on.
*/
class Account(private val settings: Settings) {
private val json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true }
sealed interface SignInStart {
/** Open this in a browser. */
data class Browser(val url: String) : SignInStart
data class Unavailable(val reason: String) : SignInStart
}
/** Fetches the server's auth configuration and builds the authorization URL. */
fun begin(): SignInStart {
if (!settings.serverConfigured) {
return SignInStart.Unavailable(
"Enrol with a server first — sign-in belongs to the server's identity provider."
)
}
val auth = runCatching { client().profile(settings.serverCredential).auth }.getOrNull()
?: return SignInStart.Unavailable("Could not reach the server to ask how to sign in.")
auth.discoveryError?.let {
// The distinction matters: "the operator configured an IdP that is not answering" is
// their problem to fix, and is not the same as "this server has no accounts".
return SignInStart.Unavailable("The server's identity provider is not responding: $it")
}
if (!auth.enabled) {
return SignInStart.Unavailable("This server does not offer accounts.")
}
return try {
val pending = OidcLogin.begin(auth)
// Written before the browser opens, because after that this process may not survive.
settings.pendingVerifier = pending.verifier
settings.pendingState = pending.state
SignInStart.Browser(pending.authorizationUrl)
} catch (t: Throwable) {
SignInStart.Unavailable(t.message ?: "Could not start sign-in.")
}
}
/**
* Completes sign-in from the `echolot://auth` redirect.
*
* Blocking; callers run it off the main thread.
*/
fun complete(callbackUri: String): String {
val verifier = settings.pendingVerifier
val state = settings.pendingState
// Cleared first, whatever happens next: these are single-use, and leaving them behind
// would let a later callback be completed against a flow nobody started.
settings.clearPendingAuth()
if (verifier.isBlank() || state.isBlank()) {
return "That sign-in did not start on this device."
}
return try {
val auth = client().profile(settings.serverCredential).auth
val idToken = OidcLogin.complete(
auth, OidcLogin.Pending("", verifier, state), callbackUri,
)
val reply = client().linkAccount(settings.serverCredential, idToken)
val o = json.parseToJsonElement(reply).jsonObject
val name = o["display_name"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "signed in"
settings.accountName = name
settings.accountId = o["account_id"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: ""
val admin = o["admin"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content == "true"
"Signed in as $name" + if (admin) " (administrator)" else ""
} catch (e: OidcLogin.LoginFailed) {
e.message ?: "Sign-in failed."
} catch (t: Throwable) {
"Sign-in failed: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
}
}
/** Signs out. The device stays enrolled — signing out should not cost an enrolment. */
fun signOut(): String = try {
client().unlinkAccount(settings.serverCredential)
settings.accountName = ""
settings.accountId = ""
"Signed out. This device is still enrolled."
} catch (t: Throwable) {
"Could not sign out: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
}
/** Asks the server who it thinks is signed in, so the UI is not trusting stale local state. */
fun refresh(): String? = runCatching {
val o = json.parseToJsonElement(client().accountStatus(settings.serverCredential)).jsonObject
val signedIn = o["signed_in"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content == "true"
settings.accountName = if (signedIn) {
o["display_name"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: ""
} else {
""
}
settings.accountName.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
}.getOrNull()
private fun client() = ControlClient(
settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin), BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER,
fallbackAddrs = settings.serverAddrList(),
)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.safeDrawingPadding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.lazy.LazyColumn
import androidx.compose.foundation.lazy.items
import androidx.compose.material3.Card
import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.material3.TextButton
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import app.echo_lot.archive.ArchivedRun
import java.time.Instant
import java.time.ZoneId
import java.time.format.DateTimeFormatter
/**
* Archived runs, newest first.
*
* Each row states plainly whether the run left the device, because "is this backed up / did I
* share this?" is the question a history list actually gets asked.
*/
@Composable
fun HistoryScreen(
runs: List<ArchivedRun>,
status: String?,
onOpen: (String) -> Unit,
onUpload: (String) -> Unit,
onDelete: (String) -> Unit,
onBack: () -> Unit,
) {
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().safeDrawingPadding().padding(16.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
TextButton(onClick = onBack) { Text(" Back") }
Text("History", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleLarge)
}
status?.let { Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall) }
if (runs.isEmpty()) {
Text(
"No archived runs yet. Finished runs are kept here automatically unless you turn " +
"archiving off in settings.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
)
return@Column
}
LazyColumn(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
items(runs, key = { it.id }) { r ->
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(12.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(4.dp)) {
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
Text(
r.verdict?.uppercase() ?: "",
color = verdictTint(r.verdict),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium,
)
Text(
" " + humanTime(r.savedAtEpochMs),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
)
}
Text(
"${r.findingCount} finding(s) · ${r.sizeBytes / 1024} kB · " +
"kept complete on this device",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
// The upload line names the level the upload was made at, not the
// archive's. They describe different documents, and showing the archive's
// level here claimed more had left the device than actually did.
Text(
if (r.uploaded) {
"uploaded to ${r.uploadedTo ?: "a server"}" +
(r.uploadedAs?.let { " as $it" } ?: "")
} else {
"on this device only"
},
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = if (r.uploaded) Color(0xFF7FD17F) else Color(0xFFBBBBBB),
)
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(4.dp)) {
TextButton(onClick = { onOpen(r.id) }) { Text("Export") }
TextButton(onClick = { onUpload(r.id) }) {
Text(if (r.uploaded) "Upload again" else "Upload")
}
TextButton(onClick = { onDelete(r.id) }) { Text("Delete") }
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
private fun verdictTint(v: String?): Color = when (v?.lowercase()) {
"green", "ok", "pass" -> Color(0xFF7FD17F)
"yellow", "warn" -> Color(0xFFE0C060)
"red", "fail" -> Color(0xFFE07070)
else -> Color(0xFFBBBBBB)
}
private val stamp: DateTimeFormatter =
DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm").withZone(ZoneId.systemDefault())
private fun humanTime(epochMs: Long): String = stamp.format(Instant.ofEpochMilli(epochMs))
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import android.Manifest
import android.content.Intent
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.os.Build
import android.os.Bundle
import androidx.activity.ComponentActivity
import androidx.activity.compose.setContent
import androidx.activity.result.contract.ActivityResultContracts
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.*
import androidx.compose.foundation.clickable
import androidx.compose.foundation.rememberScrollState
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
import androidx.compose.foundation.verticalScroll
import androidx.compose.material3.*
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.sp
import androidx.core.content.ContextCompat
import androidx.lifecycle.lifecycleScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import androidx.lifecycle.viewmodel.compose.viewModel
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
/** The app's three top-level screens. */
private enum class Screen { RUN, HISTORY, SETTINGS }
class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
private val permissionLauncher =
registerForActivityResult(ActivityResultContracts.RequestMultiplePermissions()) { /* proceed regardless */ }
/**
* The intent currently being acted on, so a deep link that arrives while the app is running
* is seen by the screen the user is already looking at.
*
* The activity is singleTask for the same reason. As a standard activity it stacked a second
* instance per link, each with its own ViewModel: the enrolment then happened in a throwaway
* copy, and pressing back returned to the original screen showing none of it. Silent, and
* indistinguishable from the link simply not working.
*/
private val liveIntent = mutableStateOf<android.content.Intent?>(null)
override fun onNewIntent(intent: android.content.Intent) {
super.onNewIntent(intent)
setIntent(intent)
liveIntent.value = intent
}
override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)
requestRuntimePermissions()
liveIntent.value = intent
setContent {
MaterialTheme(colorScheme = darkColorScheme()) {
Surface(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.background) {
val vm: RunViewModel = viewModel()
// Three flat screens, so a plain state variable beats a navigation library:
// there is no back stack to model beyond "return to the run screen".
var screen by remember { mutableStateOf(Screen.RUN) }
var preview by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
// Automation entry point:
// adb shell am start -n app.echo_lot.app/.MainActivity --ez autorun true
// starts a run immediately and uploads the report, so an unattended
// measurement needs no UI tapping and no adb round-trip to collect.
val autorun = intent?.getBooleanExtra("autorun", false) == true
// An echolot://enroll link (QR scan, or a link the operator sent) opens the
// app straight into settings with the enrollment already done, so the user
// sees the result rather than a form they still have to fill in.
// Both deep links land here. They are told apart by host, so a sign-in
// redirect is never mistaken for an enrolment link — one spends a token, the
// other completes an authorization, and confusing them would fail obscurely.
val incoming = liveIntent.value?.takeIf { it.action == Intent.ACTION_VIEW }?.dataString
val authUri = incoming?.takeIf { it.startsWith("echolot://auth") }
val enrollUri = incoming?.takeIf { it.startsWith("echolot://enroll") }
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(enrollUri) {
if (enrollUri != null) {
vm.enroll(enrollUri)
screen = Screen.SETTINGS
}
}
// Replacing an existing enrollment is asked about, never assumed. Following a
// link from a web page is one tap, and the old credential does not survive it.
vm.state.pendingEnroll?.let { pending ->
androidx.compose.material3.AlertDialog(
onDismissRequest = { vm.cancelEnroll() },
title = {
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
if (pending.sameServer) "Enroll again with this server?"
else "Replace this device's server?"
)
},
text = {
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
// Naming the same URL twice reads as a mistake and buries the
// one consequence that actually applies: the device is issued a
// fresh credential and shows up as a second entry.
if (pending.sameServer) {
"This device is already enrolled with " +
"${pending.currentServer}.\n\n" +
"Enrolling again replaces its credential. The old one " +
"stops working immediately, and the device appears on " +
"the server as a new entry alongside the current one — " +
"which you may want to revoke afterwards.\n\n" +
"Runs already uploaded, and runs stored on this phone, " +
"are not affected."
} else {
"This device is already enrolled with " +
"${pending.currentServer}.\n\n" +
"Enrolling with ${pending.newServer} replaces that. Runs " +
"already uploaded stay where they are, but this device " +
"stops reporting to the old server and appears on the new " +
"one as a new device.\n\n" +
"Runs stored on this phone are not affected."
}
)
},
confirmButton = {
androidx.compose.material3.TextButton(onClick = { vm.confirmEnroll() }) {
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
if (pending.sameServer) "Enroll again" else "Enroll here"
)
}
},
dismissButton = {
androidx.compose.material3.TextButton(onClick = { vm.cancelEnroll() }) {
androidx.compose.material3.Text("Keep current server")
}
},
)
}
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(authUri) {
if (authUri != null) {
vm.completeSignIn(authUri)
screen = Screen.SETTINGS
}
}
// Shizuku can be started, stopped or authorised in its own app, where nothing
// calls back into this process. Asking again each time this screen comes
// forward is what makes the banner right after the user has been away to fix
// it — which is exactly the moment they look at it.
val lifecycleOwner = androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalLifecycleOwner.current
androidx.compose.runtime.DisposableEffect(lifecycleOwner) {
val obs = androidx.lifecycle.LifecycleEventObserver { _, event ->
if (event == androidx.lifecycle.Lifecycle.Event.ON_RESUME) {
vm.refreshShizuku()
}
}
lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.addObserver(obs)
onDispose { lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.removeObserver(obs) }
}
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(autorun) {
if (autorun) vm.run(devUpload = true)
}
// In autorun the app is a batch job: once the run is done AND the upload
// succeeded, show the result briefly, then close so the device is left as it
// was found. On failure it stays open so the error is visible.
val st = vm.state
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(autorun, st.running, st.uploadStatus) {
if (autorun && !st.running && st.document != null &&
st.uploadStatus?.startsWith("uploaded") == true
) {
kotlinx.coroutines.delay(3000)
finish()
}
}
// Without this, the system Back gesture leaves the activity from Settings or
// History instead of returning to the run screen — the screen is a plain state
// variable, so nothing connects it to the back stack. Registered only when
// there is somewhere to go back to, so Back still exits from the run screen.
androidx.activity.compose.BackHandler(enabled = screen != Screen.RUN) {
screen = Screen.RUN
}
when (screen) {
Screen.SETTINGS -> SettingsScreen(
settings = vm.settings,
archivedRuns = vm.archivedRunCount(),
archivedBytes = vm.archivedBytes(),
onApplyRetention = vm::applyRetention,
onDeleteAll = vm::deleteAllRuns,
onPreviewUpload = {
// Straight from the archive: the newest run is the one the user just
// made and the one they are deciding about. Always shows something,
// even when there is nothing to preview yet.
lifecycleScope.launch { preview = vm.previewNewestRun() }
},
onCheckServer = vm::checkServer,
accountName = vm.accountName,
onSignIn = {
vm.beginSignIn { url ->
// A plain VIEW intent rather than a Custom Tab: the browser is
// where the user's existing IdP session already lives, and
// androidx.browser would be a dependency for a rounded corner.
runCatching {
startActivity(Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, android.net.Uri.parse(url)))
}
}
},
onSignOut = vm::signOut,
onEnroll = vm::enroll,
serverStatus = vm.state.archiveStatus,
enrollStatus = vm.state.enrollStatus,
onBack = { screen = Screen.RUN },
)
Screen.HISTORY -> HistoryScreen(
runs = vm.state.history,
status = vm.state.archiveStatus,
onOpen = { id ->
lifecycleScope.launch {
vm.readRun(id)?.let { text ->
startActivity(
Intent.createChooser(
Report.shareJson(this@MainActivity, id, text),
"Export Echolot run",
)
)
}
}
},
onUpload = vm::uploadRun,
onDelete = vm::deleteRun,
onBack = { screen = Screen.RUN },
)
Screen.RUN -> EcholotScreen(
state = vm.state,
onRun = { vm.run() },
onCancel = vm::cancel,
onDeveloperOptions = {
runCatching {
startActivity(
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.developerOptionsIntent()
)
}
},
onShizukuAction = {
// Shizuku can only be started from its own app (the pairing flow lives
// there), so send the user straight to it; if it is already running we
// just need permission.
when (vm.state.shizukuState) {
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.State.NEEDS_PERMISSION ->
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.requestPermission()
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.State.INSTALLED_NOT_RUNNING ->
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.launchIntent(this)
?.let { startActivity(it) }
else -> Unit
}
},
onExport = { doc -> startActivity(Intent.createChooser(Report.share(this, doc), "Export Echolot run")) },
onOpenSettings = { screen = Screen.SETTINGS },
onOpenHistory = { vm.refreshHistory(); screen = Screen.HISTORY },
)
}
preview?.let { text ->
UploadPreviewDialog(text) { preview = null }
}
}
}
}
}
private fun requestRuntimePermissions() {
val perms = mutableListOf(Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION)
val missing = perms.filter {
ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(this, it) != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
}
if (missing.isNotEmpty()) permissionLauncher.launch(missing.toTypedArray())
}
}
private fun verdictColor(v: Verdict): Color = when (v) {
Verdict.GREEN -> Color(0xFF2E7D32)
Verdict.YELLOW -> Color(0xFFF9A825)
Verdict.RED -> Color(0xFFC62828)
Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE -> Color(0xFF616161)
}
private fun statusColor(s: TestStatus): Color = when (s) {
TestStatus.OK -> Color(0xFF66BB6A)
TestStatus.PARTIAL -> Color(0xFFFFB300)
TestStatus.FAILED -> Color(0xFFEF5350)
TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED, TestStatus.SKIPPED -> Color(0xFF9E9E9E)
}
@Composable
private fun EcholotScreen(
state: UiState,
onRun: () -> Unit,
onCancel: () -> Unit,
onShizukuAction: () -> Unit,
onDeveloperOptions: () -> Unit,
onExport: (MeasurementDocument) -> Unit,
onOpenSettings: () -> Unit,
onOpenHistory: () -> Unit,
) {
Column(
Modifier
.fillMaxSize()
// Android 15 draws edge-to-edge by default: without this the title runs under the
// status-bar clock and the camera cutout. safeDrawing covers status/navigation bars
// AND the display cutout, so text never lands where it can't be read.
.safeDrawingPadding()
.padding(16.dp)
.verticalScroll(rememberScrollState()),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp),
) {
Row(Modifier.fillMaxWidth(), verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
Column(Modifier.weight(1f)) {
Text("Echolot", fontSize = 26.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold)
Text("measure, don't guess",
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant, fontSize = 13.sp)
}
TextButton(onClick = onOpenHistory) { Text("History") }
TextButton(onClick = onOpenSettings) { Text("Settings") }
}
// Shell-tier readiness, before the run. Nothing is shown when Shizuku isn't installed —
// only users who actually use it get reminded that it must be running.
state.shizukuNotice?.let { notice ->
Card(
Modifier.fillMaxWidth().let { m ->
if (state.shizukuHint != null) m.clickable { onShizukuAction() } else m
},
colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(
containerColor = if (state.shizukuReady) Color(0xFF14301F) else Color(0xFF3A2E12),
),
) {
Column(Modifier.padding(10.dp)) {
Text(
notice, fontSize = 12.sp,
color = if (state.shizukuReady) Color(0xFF9CCFA8) else Color(0xFFFFD08A),
)
state.shizukuHint?.let {
Text(it, fontSize = 11.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
color = Color(0xFFFFB454))
}
// Wireless debugging must be ON before Shizuku's wireless start works, and
// that screen (unlike Shizuku's pairing activity) is publicly launchable.
if (state.shizukuState ==
app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability.State.INSTALLED_NOT_RUNNING
) {
Text(
"Wireless debugging settings →",
Modifier.padding(top = 6.dp).clickable { onDeveloperOptions() },
fontSize = 11.sp, color = Color(0xFF35E0C4),
)
}
}
}
}
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp), verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
Button(onClick = onRun, enabled = !state.running) {
Text(if (state.running) "Running…" else "Run measurement")
}
if (state.running) {
OutlinedButton(onClick = onCancel) { Text("Cancel") }
}
state.document?.let { doc ->
OutlinedButton(onClick = { onExport(doc) }) { Text("Export JSON") }
}
}
state.archiveStatus?.let {
Text(it, fontSize = 12.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
}
state.uploadStatus?.let {
Text(it, fontSize = 12.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
}
if (state.running) {
Column(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp)) {
val frac = if (state.stepsTotal > 0)
state.stepsDone.toFloat() / state.stepsTotal else 0f
LinearProgressIndicator(
progress = { frac },
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text(
if (state.stepsTotal > 0)
"test ${state.stepsDone + 1} of ${state.stepsTotal}" else "starting",
fontSize = 12.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
)
Text(state.currentStep ?: "", fontSize = 12.sp,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace, modifier = Modifier.weight(1f))
if (state.etaSeconds > 0) {
Text("~${state.etaSeconds}s left", fontSize = 12.sp,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
}
}
}
}
state.document?.let { doc -> Results(doc) }
}
}
@Composable
private fun Results(doc: MeasurementDocument) {
// A constrained run is answered before the lights are: the verdict below is INCONCLUSIVE by
// §7.3, and without this banner "inconclusive" reads as the app failing rather than the OS
// (correctly) refusing to let anything past the VPN be measured.
val constraints = doc.run.constraints
if (constraints.constrained) {
val blocked = constraints.unmeasuredNetworks
.mapNotNull { id -> doc.networks.firstOrNull { it.id == id } }
.joinToString(", ") { it.iface?.takeIf { s -> s.isNotBlank() } ?: it.transport.name.lowercase() }
.ifBlank { "the networks beneath it" }
// Same three-way split as the finding: saying "VPN" when the user just disconnected
// theirs (the wall lingers during teardown) reads as the app being wrong, not the OS.
val (headline, body) = when {
constraints.vpnActive && constraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
"Measured through a VPN" to
("Android does not let apps send on the networks beneath an active VPN, so " +
"$blocked could not be measured — these results describe the tunnel. " +
"Disconnect the VPN and run again to measure the networks themselves.")
constraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
"Some networks could not be measured" to
("Android refused sends on $blocked — the restriction a VPN leaves in place " +
"while it tears down. These networks went unmeasured; wait a few " +
"seconds and run again.")
else ->
"A VPN holds the default route" to
("Default-route results describe the tunnel; per-network measurements " +
"reached the underlying networks.")
}
Card(colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = Color(0xFF3A2E12))) {
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(12.dp)) {
Text(headline, color = Color(0xFFFFD08A), fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold)
Text(body, fontSize = 12.sp, color = Color(0xFFFFD08A))
}
}
}
val summary = doc.summary
if (summary != null) {
Card(colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = verdictColor(summary.overall))) {
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(16.dp)) {
Text("Overall: ${summary.overall}", color = Color.White, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold, fontSize = 18.sp)
}
}
FlowCategories(summary.categories)
}
RouterPanel(doc)
SectionTitle("Networks (${doc.networks.size})")
for (n in doc.networks) {
Text("${n.transport.name.lowercase()} ${n.iface ?: ""}" +
n.link.addresses.joinToString(", ") { "${it.addr}/${it.prefixLen}" },
fontSize = 13.sp, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace)
}
SectionTitle("Tests (${doc.tests.size})")
for (t in doc.tests) {
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(12.dp)) {
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp), verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
Dot(statusColor(t.status))
Text(t.type, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium, modifier = Modifier.weight(1f))
Text(t.status.name, color = statusColor(t.status), fontSize = 12.sp)
}
val ms = (t.endedMonoNs - t.startedMonoNs) / 1_000_000
Text("${t.tier.name.lowercase()} · ${ms} ms", fontSize = 11.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
t.metrics?.let { Text(it.toString(), fontSize = 11.sp, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant) }
}
}
}
if (doc.findings.isNotEmpty()) {
SectionTitle("Findings (${doc.findings.size})")
for (f in doc.findings) {
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(12.dp)) {
Text(f.title, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium)
Text("${f.category.name.lowercase()} · ${f.severity.name.lowercase()}", fontSize = 11.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
Text(f.description, fontSize = 12.sp)
}
}
}
}
}
/**
* Who advertises IPv6 here, and what box is it? Pulled from the link.ra_source evidence and shown
* up front — a rogue/misconfigured RA sender is a top cause of broken IPv6, and "some router" is
* not actionable without an identity.
*/
@Composable
private fun RouterPanel(doc: MeasurementDocument) {
val test = doc.tests.firstOrNull { it.type == TestType.LINK_RA_SOURCE } ?: return
val nets = (test.evidence?.get("networks") as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonArray) ?: return
if (nets.isEmpty()) return
SectionTitle("Router / IPv6 advertiser")
for (el in nets) {
val o = el as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject ?: continue
fun f(k: String): String? =
(o[k] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonPrimitive)?.content?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
val ra = f("ra_source")
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(12.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(2.dp)) {
Text(f("network") ?: "network", fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium)
// The identity line: vendor/model if we could pin it down.
val identity = listOfNotNull(
f("upnp_manufacturer"), f("upnp_model"), f("ra_source_vendor"),
).distinct().joinToString(" · ").ifBlank { null }
identity?.let {
Text(it, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold, color = Color(0xFF35E0C4), fontSize = 15.sp)
}
f("upnp_friendly_name")?.let { Row0("name", it) }
ra?.let { Row0("RA source", it) }
f("ra_source_mac")?.let { Row0("RA source MAC", it) }
f("ra_source_reverse_dns")?.takeIf { it != "(none)" }?.let { Row0("reverse DNS", it) }
f("v4_gateway")?.let { Row0("IPv4 gateway", it) }
f("v4_gateway_reverse_dns")?.takeIf { it != "(none)" }?.let { Row0("gateway rDNS", it) }
f("upnp_server")?.let { Row0("UPnP server", it) }
}
}
}
}
@Composable
private fun Row0(label: String, value: String) {
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text("$label:", fontSize = 12.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
Text(value, fontSize = 12.sp, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace)
}
}
@Composable
private fun FlowCategories(categories: Map<String, CategorySummary>) {
Column(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp)) {
for ((name, cat) in categories) {
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically, horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Dot(verdictColor(cat.verdict))
Text(name, modifier = Modifier.weight(1f))
Text("${cat.testsRun} run" + if (cat.testsFailed > 0) " · ${cat.testsFailed} failed" else "",
fontSize = 11.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
}
}
}
}
@Composable
private fun Dot(color: Color) {
Surface(color = color, shape = RoundedCornerShape(50), modifier = Modifier.size(12.dp)) {}
}
@Composable
private fun SectionTitle(text: String) {
Text(text, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold, fontSize = 15.sp, modifier = Modifier.padding(top = 8.dp))
}
/**
* Shows the exact JSON an upload would send.
*
* This exists because an anonymizer the user cannot inspect is just a promise. Being able to
* read the outgoing document — and find their own SSID absent from it — is what makes the
* privacy setting checkable rather than merely stated.
*/
@Composable
private fun UploadPreviewDialog(text: String, onDismiss: () -> Unit) {
AlertDialog(
onDismissRequest = onDismiss,
confirmButton = { TextButton(onClick = onDismiss) { Text("Close") } },
title = { Text("This is what would be uploaded") },
text = {
Column(Modifier.heightIn(max = 420.dp).verticalScroll(rememberScrollState())) {
Text(text, fontSize = 10.sp, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace)
}
},
)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import android.content.Context
import android.content.Intent
import androidx.core.content.FileProvider
import app.echo_lot.measurement.MeasurementDocument
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import java.io.File
/** Serializes a measurement run to JSON and builds a share intent (measurement-schema.md §2). */
object Report {
private val json = Json { prettyPrint = true; encodeDefaults = true }
fun toJson(doc: MeasurementDocument): String =
json.encodeToString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), doc)
fun share(ctx: Context, doc: MeasurementDocument): Intent =
shareJson(ctx, doc.run.id, toJson(doc))
/**
* Shares an already-serialized run — an archived one, whose bytes must go out exactly as
* stored rather than being re-serialized through the model (which would silently drop
* anything a newer schema version added).
*/
fun shareJson(ctx: Context, runId: String, json: String): Intent {
val dir = File(ctx.cacheDir, "reports").apply { mkdirs() }
val file = File(dir, "echolot-run-$runId.json")
file.writeText(json)
val uri = FileProvider.getUriForFile(ctx, "${ctx.packageName}.fileprovider", file)
return Intent(Intent.ACTION_SEND).apply {
type = "application/json"
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_STREAM, uri)
addFlags(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import app.echo_lot.measurement.MeasurementDocument
import java.net.HttpURLConnection
import java.net.URL
/**
* Dev/automation helper: uploads a finished run to the collection endpoint so an unattended run
* (see MainActivity's `autorun` extra) needs no adb round-trip to retrieve its result. Off unless
* an upload URL is configured. Never throws — a failed upload must not lose the local report.
*/
object ReportUploader {
data class Result(val ok: Boolean, val detail: String)
fun upload(doc: MeasurementDocument): Result {
val url = BuildConfig.REPORT_UPLOAD_URL
if (url.isBlank()) return Result(false, "no upload URL configured")
return try {
val body = Report.toJson(doc).toByteArray()
val conn = (URL(url).openConnection() as HttpURLConnection).apply {
requestMethod = "POST"
connectTimeout = 10_000
readTimeout = 15_000
doOutput = true
setRequestProperty("Content-Type", "application/json")
if (BuildConfig.REPORT_UPLOAD_SECRET.isNotBlank()) {
setRequestProperty("X-Beacon-Secret", BuildConfig.REPORT_UPLOAD_SECRET)
}
}
conn.outputStream.use { it.write(body) }
val code = conn.responseCode
val resp = (if (code in 200..299) conn.inputStream else conn.errorStream)
?.bufferedReader()?.use { it.readText() } ?: ""
conn.disconnect()
Result(code in 200..299, "HTTP $code ${resp.take(120)}")
} catch (t: Throwable) {
Result(false, t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import android.content.Context
import app.echo_lot.archive.ArchivedRun
import app.echo_lot.archive.RunArchive
import app.echo_lot.measurement.MeasurementDocument
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Anonymizer
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Salt
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.UploadRefused
import app.echo_lot.protocol.VersionRefused
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import java.io.File
import java.security.SecureRandom
/**
* Ties together the three things that happen to a finished run: it gets archived, it may get
* anonymized, and it may get uploaded — in that order, and with the archive always holding the
* *unredacted* document.
*
* That ordering is the important decision. The local archive is the user's own data on their own
* device, and redacting it would destroy exactly the detail that makes a week-old run worth
* keeping; the anonymizer exists for the moment data crosses to someone else's machine. So
* redaction happens on the way out, per upload, and the archive is never the lossy copy.
*/
class RunStore(context: Context, private val settings: Settings) {
private val archive = RunArchive(File(context.filesDir, "runs"))
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
fun list(): List<ArchivedRun> = archive.list()
fun read(id: String): String? = archive.read(id)
fun delete(id: String) = archive.delete(id)
fun deleteAll(): Int = archive.deleteAll()
fun totalBytes(): Long = archive.totalBytes()
/** Archives a finished run under the user's retention policy. Null when archiving is off. */
fun archive(doc: MeasurementDocument): ArchivedRun? =
archive.save(Report.toJson(doc), settings.retention())
/** Applies retention now — e.g. after the user tightens the limits in settings. */
fun purgeNow() = archive.purge(settings.retention())
/**
* Produces exactly the bytes an upload would send, so the UI can show the user their own
* document as the server will see it *before* it goes. "Preview what you're about to share"
* is the only honest way to present an anonymizer: its correctness is not something a user
* should have to take on faith.
*/
fun redactedForUpload(docJson: String, level: PrivacyLevel = settings.privacyLevel): String {
val parsed = runCatching { json.parseToJsonElement(docJson).jsonObject }.getOrNull()
?: return docJson
return json.encodeToString(JsonObject.serializer(), Anonymizer(level, salt()).anonymize(parsed))
}
private fun salt(): Salt =
if (settings.stableSalt) Salt.stable(settings.saltSecret())
else Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32).also { SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) })
sealed interface UploadOutcome {
data class Sent(val serverName: String, val detail: String) : UploadOutcome
/** The operator's policy says no. Not retryable, and not the user's fault. */
data class Refused(val reason: String) : UploadOutcome
/**
* The two builds do not go together. Kept apart from [Refused] and [Failed] because the
* remedy is different and specific — install a particular version — and a message that
* says so is worth more than one that says "upload failed".
*/
data class Incompatible(val reason: String) : UploadOutcome
data class Failed(val detail: String) : UploadOutcome
data object NotConfigured : UploadOutcome
}
private fun client() = ControlClient(
settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin), BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER,
fallbackAddrs = settings.serverAddrList(),
)
/** Remembers where the server lives, so a later run can reach it without DNS. */
private fun rememberAddrs(p: app.echo_lot.protocol.Profile) {
val addrs = p.targets.flatMap { listOfNotNull(it.ip4, it.ip6) }
.filter { it.isNotBlank() }
if (addrs.isNotEmpty()) settings.serverAddrs = addrs.joinToString(",")
}
/**
* Checks the configured server without uploading anything: reachable, pinned, compatible, and
* willing to accept runs. Lets the user find out in settings rather than from a failed run.
*/
fun checkServer(): String {
if (!settings.serverConfigured) return "Fill in the server URL, pin and credential first."
return try {
val profile = client().profile(settings.serverCredential)
// Learned here so the next run's canary probe knows what to ask for.
profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(profile)
rememberAddrs(profile)
val compat = Compat.check(profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
val head = "${profile.name} · server ${profile.serverVersion} · " +
"protocol ${profile.compat.protocolVersion.ifBlank { "unstated" }}"
when {
compat.message != null -> head + "\n" + compat.message
else -> {
val uploads = profile.uploads.refusalReason()
?: "uploads accepted (min anonymization: ${profile.uploads.minAnonymization})"
head + "\nCompatible. " + uploads
}
}
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
"This server will not serve this app: ${e.message}"
} catch (t: Throwable) {
"Could not reach the server: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
}
}
/**
* Redeems an enrollment link and stores the resulting server configuration (§2.1).
*
* Everything is written at once or not at all: a half-applied server — say a URL and pin with
* no credential — fails later, somewhere else, with an error that points at the wrong thing.
* Blocking; callers run it off the main thread.
*/
/**
* Renders what the server says about itself, for display.
*
* Only what a person measuring against it would want to check: which addresses the tests will
* actually use, on which ports, and what the server admits it can do. Addresses first, because
* "which address did this result come from" is the question a report leaves open.
*/
private fun describeFacts(p: app.echo_lot.protocol.Profile): String {
val lines = ArrayList<String>()
// "label|value" per line, laid out as real columns by the UI rather than padded with
// spaces here. Space padding only lines up in a monospaced font, which makes the layout
// depend on a typeface choice made somewhere else entirely.
fun row(label: String, value: String) = lines.add("$label|$value")
row("server", "${p.name} · ${p.serverVersion}")
for (t in p.targets) {
t.ip4?.let { row("IPv4", it) }
t.ip6?.let { row("IPv6", it) }
// Marked rather than listed apart: it is the same server, and what matters is being
// able to tell which address a NAT-behaviour result came from.
t.ip4Alt?.let { row("IPv4 alt", it) }
t.ip6Alt?.let { row("IPv6 alt", it) }
row("ports", "udp ${t.udpPort} · tcp ${t.tcpPort} · stun ${t.stunPort}")
}
if (p.canaryZone.isNotBlank()) row("dns zone", p.canaryZone)
if (p.capabilities.isNotEmpty()) row("measures", p.capabilities.joinToString(", "))
return lines.joinToString(System.lineSeparator())
}
fun enroll(link: String, deviceName: String?): String {
val parsed = app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink.parse(link)
?: return "That does not look like an Echolot enrollment link. It should start with " +
"echolot://enroll and carry a URL, a pin and a token."
return try {
val enrolled = parsed.redeem(deviceName, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
val compat = Compat.check(enrolled.profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(enrolled.profile)
rememberAddrs(enrolled.profile)
enrolled.profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
settings.serverUrl = enrolled.controlUrl
settings.serverPublicUrl = enrolled.publicUrl
settings.serverPin = enrolled.pin
settings.serverCredential = enrolled.credential
val head = "Enrolled with ${enrolled.profile.name} " +
"(server ${enrolled.profile.serverVersion})."
if (compat.message != null) head + " " + compat.message else head
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
"That server will not serve this app: ${e.message}"
} catch (t: Throwable) {
// The commonest causes are a spent token and a wrong pin, and they look nothing alike
// in the message — so pass it through rather than flattening it to "enrollment failed".
"Enrollment failed: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
}
}
/**
* Uploads one archived run to the configured server, redacting first.
*
* The server's advertised minimum wins over the user's preference when it is stricter — a
* server may demand more anonymization than the user chose, never less. Blocking; callers
* run it off the main thread.
*/
fun upload(runId: String): UploadOutcome {
if (!settings.serverConfigured) return UploadOutcome.NotConfigured
val docJson = read(runId) ?: return UploadOutcome.Failed("run $runId is not in the archive")
return try {
val client = client()
val profile = client.profile(settings.serverCredential)
profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(profile)
rememberAddrs(profile)
// Compatibility before policy: an incompatible server may well advertise an upload
// policy it would never actually apply to us.
val compat = Compat.check(profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
if (!compat.usable) return UploadOutcome.Incompatible(compat.message ?: "incompatible versions")
profile.uploads.refusalReason()?.let { return UploadOutcome.Refused(it) }
val level = PrivacyLevel.max(
settings.privacyLevel,
PrivacyLevel.fromWire(profile.uploads.minAnonymization),
)
val body = redactedForUpload(docJson, level)
val reply = client.uploadRun(settings.serverCredential, body)
archive.markUploaded(runId, profile.name, level.wire)
// Deliberately not echoing `reply`: it is the server's index entry as raw JSON, and
// it ended up rendered verbatim in the UI. Size and level are what a person wants.
UploadOutcome.Sent(profile.name, "as $level, ${body.toByteArray().size} bytes")
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
UploadOutcome.Incompatible(e.message ?: "the server refused this app's version")
} catch (e: UploadRefused) {
UploadOutcome.Refused(e.message ?: "refused by the server")
} catch (t: Throwable) {
UploadOutcome.Failed(t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import android.app.Application
import android.os.Build
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.lifecycle.AndroidViewModel
import androidx.lifecycle.viewModelScope
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import app.echo_lot.probe.CaptivePortalProbe
import app.echo_lot.probe.DnsCanaryProbe
import app.echo_lot.probe.IcmpProbe
import app.echo_lot.probe.LinkSnapshotProbe
import app.echo_lot.probe.StunProbe
import app.echo_lot.probe.NetworkInventory
import app.echo_lot.probe.Probe
import app.echo_lot.probe.ProbeIds
import app.echo_lot.probe.RouterIdentityProbe
import app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuAvailability
import app.echo_lot.shizuku.ShizukuProbe
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import java.time.Instant
import java.util.UUID
data class UiState(
val running: Boolean = false,
val currentStep: String? = null,
val document: MeasurementDocument? = null,
/** Result line of an automated upload (autorun mode); null when not attempted. */
val uploadStatus: String? = null,
/** Progress: tests finished / total, and a rough ETA from the remaining probes' estimates. */
val stepsDone: Int = 0,
val stepsTotal: Int = 0,
val etaSeconds: Int = 0,
/** Where the finished run went: archived locally, uploaded, or neither (and why). */
val archiveStatus: String? = null,
/** History, newest first. Refreshed after every run and whenever the history screen opens. */
val history: List<app.echo_lot.archive.ArchivedRun> = emptyList(),
/**
* Result of the last enrollment attempt, shown beside the Enroll button.
*
* Separate from [archiveStatus]: they are two different actions with two different results,
* and sharing one line put the answer to "did enrolling work" at the far end of the card,
* below three text fields — or nowhere at all on a fresh install, since that line only
* renders once a run exists.
*/
val enrollStatus: String? = null,
/** An enrollment link waiting on confirmation, because this device is already enrolled. */
val pendingEnroll: PendingEnroll? = null,
/** Shell-tier readiness, shown before a run; null message = say nothing (Shizuku not installed). */
val shizukuNotice: String? = null,
val shizukuReady: Boolean = false,
val shizukuHint: String? = null,
val shizukuState: ShizukuAvailability.State = ShizukuAvailability.State.NOT_INSTALLED,
)
/**
* An enrollment link that would replace an existing one, held until the user says so.
*
* Enrolling is not additive: the new credential replaces the old, and on the previous server this
* device simply stops reporting. Following a link is one tap from a web page, which is not enough
* deliberation to discard a working enrollment by accident.
*/
data class PendingEnroll(val link: String, val currentServer: String, val newServer: String) {
/** Re-enrolling with the server already configured, rather than moving to a different one. */
val sameServer: Boolean get() = currentServer.trimEnd('/') == newServer.trimEnd('/')
}
/**
* Drives one measurement run: device-tier probes (link snapshot, per-network ICMP) always run;
* results assemble into a MeasurementDocument with a §7.3 summary. Lives in a ViewModel so a run
* survives rotation — a dropped run means a lost report. Server-facing tests (core-engine) are a
* follow-up once enrollment UI lands.
*/
class RunViewModel(app: Application) : AndroidViewModel(app) {
var state by mutableStateOf(UiState())
private set
val settings = Settings(app)
private val store = RunStore(app, settings)
private var runJob: kotlinx.coroutines.Job? = null
private val stopShizukuObserver: () -> Unit
init {
// Report shell-tier readiness up front. The binder arrives asynchronously, so this is a
// listener, not a one-shot poll — otherwise a running Shizuku would look "not running"
// for the first moment after launch.
stopShizukuObserver = ShizukuAvailability.observe(app) { st ->
state = state.copy(
shizukuNotice = ShizukuAvailability.describe(st),
shizukuReady = st == ShizukuAvailability.State.READY,
shizukuHint = ShizukuAvailability.actionHint(st),
shizukuState = st,
)
}
}
/**
* Re-reads the shell tier's state, for when it changed somewhere this process cannot see.
*
* Permission can be granted inside Shizuku's own app, and Shizuku can be started or stopped
* there too; none of that calls back here. Asking again on resume is the only way to be right
* after the user has been somewhere else to fix it.
*/
fun refreshShizuku() {
val st = ShizukuAvailability.current(getApplication())
state = state.copy(
shizukuNotice = ShizukuAvailability.describe(st),
shizukuReady = st == ShizukuAvailability.State.READY,
shizukuHint = ShizukuAvailability.actionHint(st),
shizukuState = st,
)
}
override fun onCleared() {
stopShizukuObserver()
super.onCleared()
}
// Results collected so far. A cancelled run must still be able to show what it measured.
private val collected = mutableListOf<Test>()
private var runIds: RunIds = RunIds()
private var runStartWall: String = ""
private var runNetworks: List<app.echo_lot.measurement.Network> = emptyList()
private var runShizukuOk = false
private var runConstraints = Constraints()
/** Two-clock ids: UUIDs + monotonic ns relative to a per-run origin. */
private class RunIds : ProbeIds {
val originNanos = System.nanoTime()
override fun uuid(): String = UUID.randomUUID().toString()
override fun monoNs(): Long = System.nanoTime() - originNanos
}
/**
* Runs one measurement, then archives it and — if the user has turned that on — uploads it.
*
* [devUpload] is the separate autorun/adb path (BuildConfig collection endpoint), kept apart
* from the user-facing upload so a debugging convenience can never be mistaken for, or
* silently satisfy, the consent-gated one.
*/
fun run(devUpload: Boolean = false) {
if (state.running) return
collected.clear()
runConstraints = Constraints()
state = state.copy(running = true, currentStep = "starting", document = null,
uploadStatus = null, archiveStatus = null)
runJob = viewModelScope.launch {
val doc = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { measure() }
step("archiving")
val archived = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.archive(doc) }
var archiveStatus = if (archived != null) {
"archived locally (${store.list().size} runs kept)"
} else {
"not archived — archiving is off in settings"
}
var status: String? = null
if (devUpload) {
state = state.copy(currentStep = "uploading report")
val r = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { ReportUploader.upload(doc) }
status = when {
r.ok -> "uploaded ✓ ${r.detail}"
// Not a failure worth alarming about: the dev collection endpoint is simply
// not configured, and the run is on the device either way.
r.detail.startsWith("no upload URL") -> "run complete — read it with adb"
else -> "upload failed: ${r.detail}"
}
}
if (archived != null && settings.autoUpload) {
state = state.copy(currentStep = "uploading to server")
val outcome = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.upload(archived.id) }
archiveStatus += " · " + describe(outcome)
}
state = UiState(
running = false, currentStep = null, document = doc,
uploadStatus = status, archiveStatus = archiveStatus,
history = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.list() },
)
}
}
private fun describe(o: RunStore.UploadOutcome): String = when (o) {
is RunStore.UploadOutcome.Sent -> "uploaded to ${o.serverName} (${o.detail})"
is RunStore.UploadOutcome.Refused -> "server refused the upload: ${o.reason}"
is RunStore.UploadOutcome.Incompatible -> "version mismatch: ${o.reason}"
is RunStore.UploadOutcome.Failed -> "upload failed: ${o.detail}"
RunStore.UploadOutcome.NotConfigured -> "no server configured, so nothing was uploaded"
}
// ---- history ---------------------------------------------------------------------
fun refreshHistory() {
viewModelScope.launch {
state = state.copy(history = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.list() })
}
}
fun deleteRun(id: String) {
viewModelScope.launch {
withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.delete(id) }
state = state.copy(history = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.list() })
}
}
fun deleteAllRuns() {
viewModelScope.launch {
val n = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.deleteAll() }
state = state.copy(
history = emptyList(),
archiveStatus = "deleted $n archived run(s)",
)
}
}
/** Uploads one already-archived run on demand, regardless of the auto-upload setting. */
fun uploadRun(id: String) {
viewModelScope.launch {
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = "uploading …")
val outcome = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.upload(id) }
state = state.copy(
archiveStatus = describe(outcome),
history = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.list() },
)
}
}
/** The archived document as stored, for export. */
suspend fun readRun(id: String): String? = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.read(id) }
/** The exact bytes an upload would send, for the settings screen's preview. */
suspend fun uploadPreview(id: String): String? = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
store.read(id)?.let { store.redactedForUpload(it) }
}
/**
* Preview of the most recent run, read from the archive rather than from [UiState.history].
*
* The history list is only populated once the History screen has been opened, so a preview
* driven from it did nothing at all on a freshly-opened Settings screen — a button that
* silently does nothing is worse than one that says why.
*/
suspend fun previewNewestRun(): String = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val newest = store.list().firstOrNull()
?: return@withContext "No archived runs yet. Run a measurement first, then this will " +
"show exactly what an upload would send."
store.read(newest.id)?.let { store.redactedForUpload(it) }
?: "That run could not be read back from the archive."
}
fun archivedBytes(): Long = store.totalBytes()
/** Counted from the archive itself, not from [UiState.history], which is empty until the
* history screen has been opened - the two disagreeing read as data loss. */
fun archivedRunCount(): Int = store.list().size
private val account = Account(settings)
/** Name of whoever is signed in on this device, for the settings screen. */
var accountName by mutableStateOf(settings.accountName)
private set
/** Starts sign-in; the caller opens the returned URL in a browser. */
fun beginSignIn(open: (String) -> Unit) {
viewModelScope.launch {
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = "contacting the server …")
when (val r = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { account.begin() }) {
is Account.SignInStart.Browser -> {
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = "continue in your browser …")
open(r.url)
}
is Account.SignInStart.Unavailable ->
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = r.reason)
}
}
}
/** Completes sign-in from the echolot://auth redirect. */
fun completeSignIn(callbackUri: String) {
viewModelScope.launch {
val msg = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { account.complete(callbackUri) }
accountName = settings.accountName
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = msg)
}
}
fun signOut() {
viewModelScope.launch {
val msg = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { account.signOut() }
accountName = settings.accountName
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = msg)
}
}
/** Redeems an enrollment link, from a paste or from an echolot:// deep link. */
fun enroll(link: String, deviceName: String? = android.os.Build.MODEL) {
// Already enrolled? Ask first. The old credential is gone the moment this succeeds, and a
// link followed from a web page is one tap — far too little deliberation for that.
if (settings.serverConfigured) {
val target = app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink.parse(link)?.controlUrl ?: link
state = state.copy(
pendingEnroll = PendingEnroll(
link = link,
// Compared against the link's URL, which names the server publicly — so this
// has to be the public name too. Using the endpoint made re-enrolling with the
// same server look like a move to a different one, because the endpoint and
// the public name are deliberately different strings.
currentServer = settings.serverPublicUrl,
newServer = target,
)
)
return
}
doEnroll(link, deviceName)
}
/** The user confirmed replacing an existing enrollment. */
fun confirmEnroll(deviceName: String? = android.os.Build.MODEL) {
val pending = state.pendingEnroll ?: return
state = state.copy(pendingEnroll = null)
doEnroll(pending.link, deviceName)
}
fun cancelEnroll() {
state = state.copy(
pendingEnroll = null,
enrollStatus = "Kept the existing enrollment; nothing changed.",
)
}
private fun doEnroll(link: String, deviceName: String?) {
viewModelScope.launch {
state = state.copy(enrollStatus = "Enrolling …")
val result = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.enroll(link, deviceName) }
// A new server means a new canary zone; the old one would describe somebody else's
// deployment. Cleared rather than kept, and relearned from the next profile fetch.
settings.canaryZone = ""
state = state.copy(enrollStatus = result)
}
}
/** Settings-screen action: report what the configured server is and whether we can use it. */
fun checkServer() {
viewModelScope.launch {
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = "checking server …")
state = state.copy(archiveStatus = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.checkServer() })
}
}
/** Re-applies retention after the user changes the limits. */
fun applyRetention() {
viewModelScope.launch {
val result = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.purgeNow() }
state = state.copy(
history = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { store.list() },
archiveStatus = if (result.isEmpty) "nothing to purge"
else "purged ${result.removed.size} run(s), freed ${result.freedBytes / 1024} kB",
)
}
}
/**
* Stops an in-flight run and shows what was measured so far. Deliberately does NOT upload:
* a partial run is for the person looking at the screen, not for the record.
*/
fun cancel() {
if (!state.running) return
runJob?.cancel()
val doc = buildDocument(collected.toList())
state = UiState(
running = false, currentStep = null, document = doc,
uploadStatus = "cancelled after ${collected.size} test(s) — shown locally, not uploaded",
archiveStatus = "partial run — not archived",
history = state.history,
)
}
private suspend fun measure(): MeasurementDocument {
val ctx = getApplication<Application>()
val ids = RunIds().also { runIds = it }
val startWall = Instant.now().toString().also { runStartWall = it }
step("reading networks")
val entries = NetworkInventory.snapshot(ctx)
val networks = entries.map { it.model }.also { runNetworks = it }
// What will this run be prevented from measuring? Decided up front, from one throwaway
// bind per network, so the document can say so instead of leaving it to be inferred from
// per-test `attempted: false` breadcrumbs (measurement-schema.md §3 `constraints`).
runConstraints = app.echo_lot.probe.ConstraintDetector.detect(ctx, entries)
val probes: List<Probe> = listOf(
LinkSnapshotProbe(entries),
RouterIdentityProbe(entries),
IcmpProbe(entries, v6 = false),
IcmpProbe(entries, v6 = true),
// Folded from the prober after hardware validation: errqueue traceroute (no root,
// no JNI) and the mDNS service inventory / VLAN-leakage detector.
app.echo_lot.probe.TracerouteProbe(),
app.echo_lot.probe.MdnsInventoryProbe(),
CaptivePortalProbe(entries),
// Canary zone served by the Echolot probe server (probe-protocol §6.1). Hardcoded to
// the reference deployment until profiles/enrollment land in the UI.
// Both target whatever server this device is enrolled with, not the deployment the
// app happened to be developed against. With no server configured they get blank
// strings and report themselves skipped, which is the honest outcome — the
// alternative measures someone else's infrastructure and calls it your network.
// Before the canary: "can this device resolve at all" has to be answered before
// "are the answers being tampered with" means anything.
app.echo_lot.probe.DnsResolverProbe(entries),
DnsCanaryProbe(canaryZone = settings.canaryZone, sessionPrefix = "adhoc"),
StunProbe(serverHost = settings.serverHost()),
// Corroboration for icmp.ping6's silence: a real TCP connection over IPv6. Only its
// failure, on a network that advertises IPv6, justifies calling IPv6 broken.
app.echo_lot.probe.V6ConnectProbe(entries, serverHost = settings.serverHost()),
)
// Plan the run first: the Shizuku battery is counted alongside the app-tier probes so
// the bar reflects the whole run. Estimates prefer what THIS device measured on recent
// runs (Settings EMA); Probe.estimatedMs is only the cold-start seed — a fixed table
// cannot know whether ICMPv6 answers in milliseconds here or waits out its timeout.
fun estimateOf(p: Probe) = settings.learnedDurationMs(p.type) ?: p.estimatedMs
val shizukuEstimateMs = settings.learnedDurationMs(SHIZUKU_DURATION_KEY) ?: 8_000L
val totalSteps = probes.size + 1
var remainingMs = probes.sumOf { estimateOf(it) } + shizukuEstimateMs
state = state.copy(stepsDone = 0, stepsTotal = totalSteps,
etaSeconds = ((remainingMs + 999) / 1000).toInt())
val tests = ArrayList<Test>()
for ((i, p) in probes.withIndex()) {
step(p.type, done = i, total = totalSteps, etaMs = remainingMs)
val result = (
try {
p.run(ctx, ids)
} catch (t: Throwable) {
Test(
id = ids.uuid(), type = p.type, tier = p.tier,
startedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(), endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.FAILED,
error = TestError("uncaught", t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName),
)
}
)
tests.add(result); collected.add(result)
settings.recordDurationMs(p.type, (result.endedMonoNs - result.startedMonoNs) / 1_000_000)
remainingMs -= estimateOf(p)
}
// Shizuku shell tier — self-degrades to UNSUPPORTED when Shizuku isn't running. One
// battery, three tests: the raw captures plus the parsed ra_source/arp_watch views.
step("link.ip_monitor (shizuku)", done = probes.size, total = totalSteps, etaMs = shizukuEstimateMs)
val shizukuT0 = System.nanoTime()
val shizukuTests = try {
ShizukuProbe().run(ctx, ids::uuid, ids::monoNs)
} catch (t: Throwable) {
listOf(Test(
id = ids.uuid(), type = TestType.LINK_IP_MONITOR, tier = Tier.SHIZUKU,
startedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(), endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.FAILED, error = TestError("uncaught", t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName),
))
}
// One key for the whole step: the three tests come out of one shell battery, and the
// bar plans them as one step.
settings.recordDurationMs(SHIZUKU_DURATION_KEY, (System.nanoTime() - shizukuT0) / 1_000_000)
tests.addAll(shizukuTests); collected.addAll(shizukuTests)
// "Shizuku tier ran" is the battery's verdict — the derived tests can be PARTIAL on a
// perfectly healthy shell tier (e.g. an RA-less v4-only link).
runShizukuOk = shizukuTests.any {
it.type == TestType.LINK_IP_MONITOR &&
(it.status == TestStatus.OK || it.status == TestStatus.PARTIAL)
}
return buildDocument(tests)
}
/** Assembles a document from whatever tests are in hand — used for both full and cancelled runs. */
private fun buildDocument(tests: List<Test>): MeasurementDocument {
val findings = deriveFindings(tests, runNetworks)
return MeasurementDocument(
run = Run(
id = runIds.uuid(), trigger = Trigger.MANUAL, startedAt = runStartWall,
endedAt = Instant.now().toString(),
clock = Clock(monoOriginWall = runStartWall),
app = AppInfo(
version = BuildConfig.VERSION_NAME, build = BuildConfig.VERSION_CODE, flavor = "app",
),
device = DeviceInfo(
manufacturer = Build.MANUFACTURER, model = Build.MODEL,
androidSdk = Build.VERSION.SDK_INT, androidRelease = Build.VERSION.RELEASE,
),
tiers = Tiers(app = true, shizuku = runShizukuOk),
constraints = runConstraints,
),
networks = runNetworks,
tests = tests,
findings = findings,
summary = Verdicts.derive(tests, findings, runConstraints),
)
}
/**
* Was IPv6 provisioned on the network a test actually ran over?
*
* This deliberately asks about one network rather than about the device. Answering "does any
* network here have IPv6" produces a real false positive on a phone, and it is not hypothetical:
* an IPv4-only wifi with working cellular alongside it reports "IPv6 is configured, but ICMPv6
* gets no reply" — configured on cellular, pinged over wifi, and the two never met.
*
* A global (non-link-local) address or a v6 default route means the network claims to offer
* IPv6; link-local only does not count, since every interface has one.
*/
private fun ipv6Provisioned(
networks: List<app.echo_lot.measurement.Network>,
networkRef: String?,
): Boolean {
// No reference means the test was not per-network; fall back to the device-wide reading
// rather than silently reporting nothing.
val scope = networks.filter { networkRef == null || it.id == networkRef }
return scope.any { n ->
n.link.addresses.any { a ->
a.addr.contains(':') &&
!a.addr.startsWith("fe80", ignoreCase = true) &&
!a.addr.startsWith("::1")
} || n.link.routes.any { it.dst == "::/0" }
}
}
/**
* Per-network ICMP outcomes, keyed by network id.
*
* Reads the structured evidence the probe records rather than its prose detail — a finding
* that depended on the wording of a human-readable string would break silently the first time
* that wording improved.
*/
/** What one network's ICMP attempt did: whether it ran at all, and whether it was answered. */
private data class IcmpOutcome(val attempted: Boolean, val ok: Boolean)
/**
* Per-network ICMP outcomes, keyed by network id.
*
* Reads the structured evidence the probe records rather than its prose detail — a finding
* that depended on the wording of a human-readable string would break silently the first time
* that wording improved.
*/
private fun icmpResults(t: Test): Map<String, IcmpOutcome> {
val out = HashMap<String, IcmpOutcome>()
val ev = t.evidence ?: return out
for ((_, v) in ev) {
val o = v as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject ?: continue
val ref = (o["network_ref"] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonPrimitive)?.content ?: continue
fun flag(k: String) = (o[k] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonPrimitive)?.content == "true"
out[ref] = IcmpOutcome(attempted = flag("attempted"), ok = flag("ok"))
}
return out
}
/** Human-facing name for the network a test ran over; falls back to something readable. */
private fun ifaceOf(networks: List<app.echo_lot.measurement.Network>, ref: String?): String =
networks.firstOrNull { it.id == ref }?.iface?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() } ?: "this network"
/** Minimal first-pass findings from device-tier evidence; the registry grows with the suite. */
private fun deriveFindings(tests: List<Test>, networks: List<app.echo_lot.measurement.Network>): List<Finding> {
val out = ArrayList<Finding>()
val ids = RunIds()
val linkEvidence = tests.filter { it.type == TestType.LINK_SNAPSHOT }.map { EvidenceRef(it.id) }
// Said as a finding, not only as run.constraints: the constraints block is for machines
// aggregating thousands of runs, this is for the person reading this one. Both must exist —
// a constrained run with a quiet findings list still reads as "nothing wrong here".
if (runConstraints.constrained) {
val blocked = runConstraints.unmeasuredNetworks
.joinToString(", ") { id -> ifaceOf(networks, id) }
.ifBlank { "the underlying networks" }
// Three distinct situations share this finding code, and naming the wrong one costs
// trust: claiming "a VPN is active" right after the user disconnected theirs is how
// this text was first proven wrong on hardware.
val (title, description) = when {
runConstraints.vpnActive && runConstraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
"A VPN is active — $blocked could not be measured" to
("Android refuses to let apps send on the networks beneath an active " +
"VPN (that is how it prevents traffic leaking around the tunnel), " +
"so every per-network test here measured the tunnel or nothing. " +
"Nothing in this run says anything about $blocked. To measure them, " +
"disconnect the VPN and run again.")
runConstraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
"The OS refused sends on $blocked" to
("Android denied this app permission to send on $blocked (EPERM on " +
"bind). That is the restriction a VPN imposes on the networks " +
"beneath it — a tunnel disconnected moments ago can still leave it " +
"in place while it tears down. Nothing in this run says anything " +
"about $blocked; wait a few seconds and run again.")
else ->
"A VPN holds the default route" to
("Everything using the default route in this run describes the tunnel, " +
"not the network it rides on. Per-network measurements were " +
"permitted and did measure the underlying networks.")
}
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED.code,
category = FindingRegistry.MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = title,
description = description,
evidenceRefs = linkEvidence,
)
)
}
val shapes = V6Analysis.classify(networks)
// Named per interface: on a phone several networks are up at once, and "IPv6 is broken" is
// useless when wifi is the broken one and cellular is fine.
for (sh in shapes.filter { it.addressWithoutRoute }) {
val where = if (sh.iface.isBlank()) "This device" else sh.iface
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE.category,
severity = if (sh.tunnel) Severity.INFO else Severity.MEDIUM,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = if (sh.tunnel) {
"IPv6 reaches only the destinations a tunnel routes ($where)"
} else {
"IPv6 address with no default route ($where)"
},
description = "$where has a global IPv6 address but no IPv6 default route, so " +
"IPv6 reaches only destinations covered by a specific route. " +
if (sh.tunnel) {
"A tunnel interface holds those routes, so this looks deliberate. " +
"Worth knowing rather than fixing: applications holding a global " +
"address will still try IPv6 first and stall for anything outside " +
"the tunnel's routes."
} else {
"Nothing is routing the rest, so the network handed out an address it " +
"does not carry traffic for — applications will try IPv6 first " +
"and wait for it to fail."
},
evidenceRefs = linkEvidence,
)
)
}
for (sh in shapes.filter { it.routeWithoutAddress }) {
val where = if (sh.iface.isBlank()) "This network" else sh.iface
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS.category,
severity = Severity.MEDIUM,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "IPv6 router advertised, but no address was configured ($where)",
description = "$where has an IPv6 default route but no global IPv6 address. " +
"The router is advertising itself as an IPv6 gateway while SLAAC produced " +
"no usable address — a missing prefix option, a prefix without the " +
"autonomous flag, or DHCPv6-only addressing that did not complete. Hosts " +
"believe IPv6 is available and pay a connection timeout on every " +
"dual-stack destination before falling back to IPv4, which is felt as " +
"general slowness with no packet loss to explain it.",
evidenceRefs = linkEvidence,
)
)
}
for (t in tests) {
if (t.type == TestType.NET_CAPTIVE_PORTAL) {
val ev = t.evidence?.toString() ?: ""
when {
ev.contains("\"captive_portal\"") -> out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.CAPTIVE_PORTAL.code,
category = FindingRegistry.CAPTIVE_PORTAL.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.CAPTIVE_PORTAL.severity, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "Captive portal intercepting connections",
description = "The generate_204 check returned a redirect or a page instead of HTTP 204 — a captive portal (login/splash page) is intercepting traffic on this network.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
t.status == TestStatus.FAILED -> out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.NO_INTERNET.code,
category = FindingRegistry.NO_INTERNET.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.NO_INTERNET.severity, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "No working internet on any network",
description = "Android's own generate_204 connectivity checks failed on every active network (no HTTP 204) — this device has no validated internet path.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
if (t.type == TestType.DNS_CANARY) {
val ev = t.evidence?.toString() ?: ""
if (ev.contains("MISMATCH")) {
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN.code,
category = FindingRegistry.DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN.severity, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "DNS answers are being rewritten",
description = "A canary reference record returned different RDATA than the spec-defined ground truth — something on the path is rewriting DNS answers (interception, filtering, or a middlebox).",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
} else if (ev.contains("\"reached_authoritative\":false")) {
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE.code,
category = FindingRegistry.DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE.severity, confidence = Confidence.MEDIUM,
title = "Canary queries don't reach the authoritative server",
description = "A per-run nonce name (which cannot be cached) was not answered by the canary server — the resolver is intercepting or failing to reach it.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
if (t.type == TestType.NAT_STUN_5780 && t.status == TestStatus.OK) {
val ev = t.evidence?.toString() ?: ""
if (ev.contains("address/port-dependent (symmetric NAT")) {
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.NAT_SYMMETRIC.code,
category = FindingRegistry.NAT_SYMMETRIC.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.NAT_SYMMETRIC.severity, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "Symmetric NAT — peer-to-peer connections need a relay",
description = "The NAT assigns a different external port per destination (address/port-dependent mapping). Direct peer-to-peer connections (calls, games, file transfer) will usually fail and fall back to relays.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
if (t.type == TestType.DNS_RESOLVER && t.status == TestStatus.OK) {
// One finding per network: on a phone the wifi resolver can be wedged while
// cellular is fine, and "DNS is broken" would be wrong about half the device.
val ev = t.evidence
if (ev != null) {
for ((_, v) in ev) {
val o = v as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject ?: continue
fun str(k: String) =
(o[k] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonPrimitive)?.content
val verdict = str("verdict")
val ref0 = str("network_ref")
val iface0 = networks.firstOrNull { it.id == ref0 }?.iface
?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() } ?: "this network"
if (verdict == "search domain swallows queries") {
// Severity follows the harm, not the shape: the same misconfiguration
// is fatal on a resolver that tries the search form and invisible on
// one that does not, and saying "high" for a network that currently
// resolves fine would be crying wolf.
val breaking = str("system_resolves") != "true"
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED.code,
category = FindingRegistry.DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED.category,
severity = if (breaking) Severity.HIGH else Severity.MEDIUM,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "The network's search domain swallows DNS queries ($iface0)",
description = "This network hands out " +
"${str("search_domains") ?: "a search domain"} as a DNS " +
"search domain, but its server never answers queries under " +
"it — not even to say the name does not exist. Resolvers " +
"append that domain to lookups, so they wait for a reply " +
"that never comes. " +
(if (breaking) {
"That is why names are not resolving on this device."
} else {
"Name resolution still works here, because this " +
"resolver tries the plain name first — another " +
"device on the same network may fail outright."
}) +
" Fix it on the router: either stop advertising the search " +
"domain, or make the server answer for it, including " +
"NXDOMAIN for names it does not have. Note that .local is " +
"reserved for mDNS (RFC 6762) and is widely dropped by " +
"design; home.arpa (RFC 8375) is the name reserved for this.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
continue
}
if (verdict != "server answers, device resolver does not") continue
val ref = str("network_ref")
val where = networks.firstOrNull { it.id == ref }?.iface
?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() } ?: "this network"
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN.code,
category = FindingRegistry.DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "This device cannot resolve names, but the DNS server is fine ($where)",
description = "A DNS query sent straight from this device was " +
"answered by ${str("servers") ?: "the configured server"} with " +
"a valid result, yet asking Android to resolve the same name " +
"fails. Whatever is wrong sits between this device's resolver " +
"and a server that demonstrably works. " +
"Turning wifi off and on, or rejoining the network, clears the " +
"common case. If it survives a restart it is not a stuck " +
"resolver: look for something on this device that filters DNS " +
"— an ad blocker, a private-DNS or VPN app — or a per-device " +
"rule on the router aimed at this client.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
}
if (t.type == TestType.ICMP_PING6) {
// A network with no IPv6 at all is NORMAL — most networks are still IPv4-only, and
// that is not a defect. What IS a defect is IPv6 the network claims to provide (a
// global address or a default route from RA/DHCPv6) that does not work: that causes
// Happy-Eyeballs delays, timeouts and hangs.
//
// Judged per network, from the per-network evidence rather than the aggregate
// status. The aggregate can only say "some network answered", and on a phone with
// wifi and cellular up at once that is how "IPv6 is configured but gets no reply"
// ends up describing a network where IPv6 was never configured in the first place.
val results = icmpResults(t)
// The corroborating witness: did a real TCP connection over IPv6 work on this
// network? Same evidence shape as the ICMP probe, so the same parser reads it.
val v6ConnTest = tests.firstOrNull { it.type == TestType.V6_BROKENNESS }
val v6Conn = v6ConnTest?.let { icmpResults(it) } ?: emptyMap()
var anyV6Network = false
for (n in networks) {
val provisioned = ipv6Provisioned(networks, n.id)
if (provisioned) anyV6Network = true
val r = results[n.id] ?: continue
// Silence is only evidence if something was actually sent. A bind that failed
// with EPERM says the app could not use the interface, which is a fact about
// this app's permissions and says nothing whatsoever about the network.
if (!provisioned || !r.attempted || r.ok) continue
val where = n.iface?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() } ?: "this network"
val conn = v6Conn[n.id]
val evidence = listOfNotNull(
EvidenceRef(t.id), v6ConnTest?.let { EvidenceRef(it.id) },
)
when {
// TCP over IPv6 worked: the silence is filtering, and can be said so.
conn?.ok == true -> out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "ICMPv6 is filtered here — IPv6 itself works ($where)",
description = "$where answered a real TCP connection over IPv6, " +
"so IPv6 works — but ICMPv6 echo got no reply, so something " +
"on this network filters ICMPv6. That is a fault in its own " +
"right even though connections succeed: Path MTU Discovery " +
"depends on ICMPv6, so large packets can vanish rather than " +
"being reported as too big.",
evidenceRefs = evidence,
)
)
// Both transports failed on a network that advertises IPv6: broken, and
// now with the evidence the original v6.broken never had.
conn != null && conn.attempted -> out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.V6_BROKEN.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_BROKEN.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.V6_BROKEN.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "IPv6 is advertised but does not work ($where)",
description = "$where advertises IPv6 (a global address and/or a " +
"default route), but neither ICMPv6 echo nor a TCP connection " +
"over IPv6 got through — two independent transports, both " +
"silent. Applications will try IPv6 first and wait out a " +
"timeout on every dual-stack destination before falling back " +
"to IPv4, felt as everything being slow with no loss to " +
"explain it. The network is announcing a service it does not " +
"deliver; the fix belongs on the router or upstream.",
evidenceRefs = evidence,
)
)
// No corroboration available (no server configured, or the connect never
// got as far as sending): the honest two-explanation reading stands.
else -> out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY.severity,
confidence = Confidence.MEDIUM,
title = "IPv6 is configured, but ICMPv6 gets no reply ($where)",
description = "$where advertises IPv6 (a global address and/or a " +
"default route), but ICMPv6 echo got no reply over it. That has " +
"two explanations which look identical from here: IPv6 is broken, " +
"or ICMPv6 is filtered while IPv6 itself works. Filtering is " +
"common and is a fault in its own right — it breaks Path MTU " +
"Discovery, so large packets vanish rather than being reported as " +
"too big.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
if (!anyV6Network) {
// Said once for the device, not once per interface: "this network is IPv4-only"
// repeated per interface reads as several problems instead of one observation.
out.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = FindingRegistry.V6_NOT_OFFERED.code,
category = FindingRegistry.V6_NOT_OFFERED.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.V6_NOT_OFFERED.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "IPv4-only network (no IPv6 offered)",
description = "No IPv6 address or default route was provisioned on " +
"any active network, so IPv6 tests could not run. This is normal " +
"— many networks are still IPv4-only and it is not a fault.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(t.id)),
)
)
}
}
}
return out
}
private fun step(s: String, done: Int = state.stepsDone, total: Int = state.stepsTotal, etaMs: Long = -1) {
state = state.copy(
currentStep = s, stepsDone = done, stepsTotal = total,
etaSeconds = if (etaMs >= 0) ((etaMs + 999) / 1000).toInt() else state.etaSeconds,
)
}
private companion object {
/** Duration-learning key for the Shizuku step, which is three tests but one battery. */
const val SHIZUKU_DURATION_KEY = "shizuku.battery"
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import android.content.Context
import android.content.SharedPreferences
import app.echo_lot.archive.RetentionPolicy
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
import java.security.SecureRandom
/**
* User settings for archiving, uploading and anonymization.
*
* Defaults are the conservative reading of "an engineer's tool that still respects the person
* holding it": keep history (that is the point of the archive), never upload without being asked,
* and when uploading, strip identifiers unless the user says this is their own server.
*
* SharedPreferences rather than DataStore because these are a dozen scalars read synchronously at
* the start of a run; a coroutine-flow store would add a dependency and a lifecycle for nothing.
*/
class Settings(context: Context) {
private val prefs: SharedPreferences =
context.getSharedPreferences("echolot-settings", Context.MODE_PRIVATE)
// ---- archive ---------------------------------------------------------------------
var archiveEnabled: Boolean
get() = prefs.getBoolean(ARCHIVE_ENABLED, true)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putBoolean(ARCHIVE_ENABLED, v).apply()
/** 0 = no ceiling. */
var maxRuns: Int
get() = prefs.getInt(MAX_RUNS, 100)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putInt(MAX_RUNS, v.coerceAtLeast(0)).apply()
var maxAgeDays: Int
get() = prefs.getInt(MAX_AGE_DAYS, 90)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putInt(MAX_AGE_DAYS, v.coerceAtLeast(0)).apply()
var maxTotalMb: Int
get() = prefs.getInt(MAX_TOTAL_MB, 64)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putInt(MAX_TOTAL_MB, v.coerceAtLeast(0)).apply()
fun retention(): RetentionPolicy = RetentionPolicy(
enabled = archiveEnabled,
maxRuns = maxRuns,
maxAgeDays = maxAgeDays,
maxTotalBytes = maxTotalMb.toLong() * 1024 * 1024,
)
// ---- run-duration learning ---------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Learned duration of one test type on THIS device, or null before the first run.
*
* The static Probe.estimatedMs values are only cold-start seeds: real durations depend on
* the phone and the network it stands in (ICMPv6 answers in milliseconds where IPv6 works
* and waits out full timeouts where it does not), so a fixed table is wrong for almost
* everyone almost always. What was measured last time is the only estimate that tracks
* reality.
*/
fun learnedDurationMs(type: String): Long? =
prefs.getLong("$DURATION_PREFIX$type", -1L).takeIf { it > 0 }
/**
* Feeds one measured duration into the estimate — EMA, 70 % old / 30 % new. Heavy enough
* on history that a single odd run (a captive portal stalling DNS) does not whipsaw the
* bar, light enough that a real change (enrolling with a server un-skips three probes)
* converges within a few runs. Recorded whatever the test's status: a probe that skips in
* 2 ms will keep skipping in 2 ms until circumstances change, and then the EMA follows.
*/
fun recordDurationMs(type: String, ms: Long) {
if (ms < 0) return
val key = "$DURATION_PREFIX$type"
val old = prefs.getLong(key, -1L)
val next = if (old <= 0) ms else (old * 7 + ms * 3) / 10
prefs.edit().putLong(key, next).apply()
}
// ---- upload ----------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Off by default. Measurement data describes the network the user is standing in; sending it
* anywhere is a decision they make, not one they discover after the fact.
*/
var autoUpload: Boolean
get() = prefs.getBoolean(AUTO_UPLOAD, false)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putBoolean(AUTO_UPLOAD, v).apply()
/** Anonymization applied before a run leaves the device. Never applied to the local archive. */
var privacyLevel: PrivacyLevel
get() = PrivacyLevel.fromWire(prefs.getString(PRIVACY_LEVEL, PrivacyLevel.BALANCED.wire))
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(PRIVACY_LEVEL, v.wire).apply()
/**
* Whether pseudonyms stay stable across runs. That makes history diffable ("same SSID as
* last week") and is what someone wants on their own server — but it also produces an
* identifier that links a device's uploads, so it is off unless chosen.
*/
var stableSalt: Boolean
get() = prefs.getBoolean(STABLE_SALT, false)
set(v) = prefs.edit().putBoolean(STABLE_SALT, v).apply()
/**
* The device-local secret behind stable pseudonyms. Generated once, never leaves the device,
* and clearing it (via [resetSalt]) breaks the link to everything uploaded before.
*/
fun saltSecret(): ByteArray {
prefs.getString(SALT_SECRET, null)?.let { return hex(it) }
val fresh = ByteArray(32).also { SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
prefs.edit().putString(SALT_SECRET, fresh.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }).apply()
return fresh
}
fun resetSalt() = prefs.edit().remove(SALT_SECRET).apply()
// ---- server ----------------------------------------------------------------------
var serverUrl: String
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_URL, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_URL, v.trim()).apply()
var serverPin: String
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_PIN, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_PIN, v.trim()).apply()
/**
* The address the operator handed out, for showing to a person.
*
* Separate from [serverUrl], which is the endpoint actually dialled. They differ when the
* server publishes one public name and points devices at another to select its pinned
* certificate — a detail worth keeping out of the user's face but not out of the settings.
*/
var serverPublicUrl: String
get() = (prefs.getString(SERVER_PUBLIC_URL, "") ?: "").ifBlank { serverUrl }
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_PUBLIC_URL, v.trim()).apply()
/**
* What the server said about itself, last time it was asked: addresses, ports, capabilities.
*
* Cached as a rendered block rather than as fields, because it is shown and never acted on —
* these are facts to read, not settings to apply, and storing them as settings would invite
* exactly the confusion of an editable box that changes nothing.
*/
var serverFacts: String
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_FACTS, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_FACTS, v).apply()
/**
* The server's own addresses, learned from its profile, for reaching it when DNS will not.
*
* Only the primaries: the alternate pair exists for NAT behaviour discovery and does not carry
* the control plane, so falling back to one would fail for a second, unrelated reason.
*/
var serverAddrs: String
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_ADDRS, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_ADDRS, v).apply()
fun serverAddrList(): List<String> =
serverAddrs.split(',').map { it.trim() }.filter { it.isNotEmpty() }
var serverCredential: String
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_CRED, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_CRED, v.trim()).apply()
val serverConfigured: Boolean
get() = serverUrl.isNotBlank() && serverPin.isNotBlank() && serverCredential.isNotBlank()
/**
* The DNS zone this server is authoritative for, learned from its profile.
*
* Cached because the canary probe runs at device tier, before anything has talked to the
* server, and a probe that had to make a control-plane call first would fail on exactly the
* networks worth measuring. Empty means "not known yet", and the probe reports itself as
* skipped rather than inventing a zone.
*/
var canaryZone: String
get() = prefs.getString(CANARY_ZONE, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(CANARY_ZONE, v.trim()).apply()
/**
* Host part of the configured server URL, for probes that address it directly (STUN).
*
* Derived rather than stored: a second copy of the server's name is a second thing to keep in
* step, and it would go stale the moment someone re-enrolled against a different server.
*/
fun serverHost(): String = runCatching {
java.net.URI(serverUrl).host?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
}.getOrNull() ?: ""
// ---- account ---------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* The PKCE verifier and state for a sign-in that is out at the browser.
*
* Persisted rather than held in memory because handing control to a browser backgrounds this
* process, and Android may kill it before the callback returns. An in-memory value works on a
* developer's device and fails on a phone under memory pressure.
*/
var pendingVerifier: String
get() = prefs.getString(PENDING_VERIFIER, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(PENDING_VERIFIER, v).apply()
var pendingState: String
get() = prefs.getString(PENDING_STATE, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(PENDING_STATE, v).apply()
fun clearPendingAuth() = prefs.edit().remove(PENDING_VERIFIER).remove(PENDING_STATE).apply()
/** Display name of whoever is signed in on this device; empty when nobody is. */
var accountName: String
get() = prefs.getString(ACCOUNT_NAME, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(ACCOUNT_NAME, v).apply()
var accountId: String
get() = prefs.getString(ACCOUNT_ID, "") ?: ""
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(ACCOUNT_ID, v).apply()
val signedIn: Boolean get() = accountName.isNotBlank()
private fun hex(s: String) = ByteArray(s.length / 2) {
((Character.digit(s[it * 2], 16) shl 4) or Character.digit(s[it * 2 + 1], 16)).toByte()
}
private companion object {
const val ARCHIVE_ENABLED = "archive_enabled"
const val MAX_RUNS = "archive_max_runs"
const val MAX_AGE_DAYS = "archive_max_age_days"
const val MAX_TOTAL_MB = "archive_max_total_mb"
const val AUTO_UPLOAD = "auto_upload"
const val PRIVACY_LEVEL = "privacy_level"
const val STABLE_SALT = "stable_salt"
const val SALT_SECRET = "salt_secret"
const val SERVER_URL = "server_url"
const val SERVER_PIN = "server_pin"
const val SERVER_CRED = "server_credential"
const val SERVER_PUBLIC_URL = "server_public_url"
const val SERVER_FACTS = "server_facts"
const val SERVER_ADDRS = "server_addrs"
const val CANARY_ZONE = "server_canary_zone"
const val PENDING_VERIFIER = "pending_auth_verifier"
const val PENDING_STATE = "pending_auth_state"
const val ACCOUNT_NAME = "account_name"
const val ACCOUNT_ID = "account_id"
const val DURATION_PREFIX = "duration_ms."
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.app
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.safeDrawingPadding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.width
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
import androidx.compose.foundation.rememberScrollState
import androidx.compose.foundation.verticalScroll
import androidx.compose.material3.Button
import androidx.compose.material3.Card
import androidx.compose.material3.FilterChip
import androidx.compose.material3.LocalContentColor
import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
import androidx.compose.material3.OutlinedTextField
import androidx.compose.material3.Surface
import androidx.compose.material3.Switch
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.material3.TextButton
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.sp
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
/**
* Archiving, upload and anonymization settings.
*
* The screen is written to make the consequences legible rather than to look tidy: every toggle
* says what it means for the user's data in a sentence, and the privacy levels are described by
* what survives them, because "balanced" on its own tells nobody anything.
*/
@Composable
fun SettingsScreen(
settings: Settings,
archivedRuns: Int,
archivedBytes: Long,
onApplyRetention: () -> Unit,
onDeleteAll: () -> Unit,
onPreviewUpload: () -> Unit,
onCheckServer: () -> Unit,
accountName: String,
onSignIn: () -> Unit,
onSignOut: () -> Unit,
onEnroll: (String) -> Unit,
serverStatus: String?,
enrollStatus: String?,
onBack: () -> Unit,
) {
// SharedPreferences is not observable, so mirror each value into Compose state and write
// through on change. A dozen scalars; a store with flows would be ceremony for nothing.
var archiveEnabled by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.archiveEnabled) }
var maxRuns by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxRuns.toString()) }
var maxAgeDays by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxAgeDays.toString()) }
var maxTotalMb by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxTotalMb.toString()) }
var autoUpload by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.autoUpload) }
var privacy by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.privacyLevel) }
var stableSalt by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.stableSalt) }
var enrollLink by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
// The public name, which is what the operator handed out and what a person recognises. The
// endpoint actually dialled is shown beneath it when the two differ, rather than hidden — a
// network engineer debugging a connection wants to see where it really goes.
var serverUrl by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverPublicUrl) }
var serverPin by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverPin) }
var serverCred by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverCredential) }
// Enrolling is asynchronous, so these are re-read when its result lands rather than when the
// button is pressed — reading them immediately showed the previous server's values and looked
// exactly like an enrollment that had silently done nothing.
var serverFacts by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverFacts) }
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(enrollStatus, serverStatus) {
serverFacts = settings.serverFacts
serverUrl = settings.serverPublicUrl
serverPin = settings.serverPin
serverCred = settings.serverCredential
}
Column(
Modifier.fillMaxWidth().safeDrawingPadding().verticalScroll(rememberScrollState()).padding(16.dp),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp),
) {
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
TextButton(onClick = onBack) { Text(" Back") }
Text("Settings", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleLarge)
}
// ---- archive ----
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text("Archive", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
Toggle(
label = "Keep finished runs on this device",
detail = "History is what makes a run comparable later. Archived runs are " +
"stored complete and unredacted — anonymization only applies to uploads.",
checked = archiveEnabled,
) { archiveEnabled = it; settings.archiveEnabled = it }
Text(
"Purge automatically when a run exceeds any of these. 0 turns that limit off.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
NumberField("Keep at most (runs)", maxRuns) {
maxRuns = it; settings.maxRuns = it.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
}
NumberField("Delete older than (days)", maxAgeDays) {
maxAgeDays = it; settings.maxAgeDays = it.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
}
NumberField("Keep at most (MB)", maxTotalMb) {
maxTotalMb = it; settings.maxTotalMb = it.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
}
Text(
"$archivedRuns run(s), ${archivedBytes / 1024} kB stored",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Button(onClick = onApplyRetention) { Text("Apply now") }
TextButton(onClick = onDeleteAll) { Text("Delete all runs") }
}
}
}
// ---- privacy ----
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text("What leaves the device", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
Text(
"Applied to uploads only. Measurements, verdicts and finding codes survive " +
"every level — only the parts that identify you or your network change.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
for (level in PrivacyLevel.entries) {
FilterChip(
selected = privacy == level,
onClick = { privacy = level; settings.privacyLevel = level },
label = { Text(level.wire) },
)
}
}
Text(privacyExplanation(privacy), style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
// At FULL nothing is pseudonymized, so a salt has nothing to act on. Shown
// disabled rather than hidden: the setting is still stored and still applies the
// moment the level changes, and a control that vanishes hides that fact.
Toggle(
label = "Stable pseudonyms across runs",
detail = if (privacy == PrivacyLevel.FULL) {
"Not used at this level — nothing is pseudonymized, so there is nothing " +
"to keep stable. Choose balanced or strict to use this."
} else {
"Lets you compare uploaded runs over time (same SSID reads the same " +
"each time). It also links your uploads together, so leave it off on " +
"a server you don't run yourself."
},
checked = stableSalt && privacy != PrivacyLevel.FULL,
enabled = privacy != PrivacyLevel.FULL,
) { stableSalt = it; settings.stableSalt = it }
TextButton(onClick = onPreviewUpload) { Text("Preview what an upload would send") }
}
}
// ---- account ----
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text("Account", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
if (accountName.isNotBlank()) {
Text("Signed in as $accountName", style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium)
Text(
"Runs from every device signed in to this account share one history.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
TextButton(onClick = onSignOut) { Text("Sign out") }
} else {
Text(
"Signing in is optional. It links this device to an account on your " +
"server, so several devices share one history — and some servers only " +
"accept uploads from a signed-in device.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
Button(onClick = onSignIn, enabled = settings.serverConfigured) {
Text("Sign in")
}
if (!settings.serverConfigured) {
Text(
"Enrol with a server first — the account belongs to the server, not " +
"to the app.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
}
}
}
}
// ---- upload ----
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
Text("Upload", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
Toggle(
label = "Upload finished runs automatically",
detail = "Sends each completed run to the server below, anonymized to the " +
"level above. The server may require more anonymization than you chose; " +
"it can never require less.",
checked = autoUpload,
) { autoUpload = it; settings.autoUpload = it }
// Enrollment first, because it is the path that works: one link carries the
// URL, the pin and a single-use token. The three fields below exist for when
// someone has to reconstruct a configuration by hand, not as the normal route.
Text(
"Paste an enrollment link from your server operator, or scan its QR code. " +
"It fills in all three fields below. The link contains a one-time token — " +
"treat it like a password until it is used.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
OutlinedTextField(
value = enrollLink, onValueChange = { enrollLink = it },
label = { Text("echolot://enroll?…") }, singleLine = true,
textStyle = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace),
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
Button(
onClick = {
onEnroll(enrollLink)
enrollLink = "" // spent either way; leaving it around invites a retry
},
enabled = enrollLink.isNotBlank(),
) { Text("Enroll") }
// Beside the button that caused it. Enrolling is asynchronous, so without this the
// only sign of success is three fields quietly changing further down the card.
enrollStatus?.let {
Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
}
OutlinedTextField(
value = serverUrl,
onValueChange = {
serverUrl = it
// Typed by hand there is no discovery to consult, so what was entered is
// both the public name and the endpoint. Setting only one of them would
// leave the app dialling the previous server.
settings.serverUrl = it
settings.serverPublicUrl = it
},
label = { Text("Server URL") }, singleLine = true, modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
// Directly under the field it explains. Anywhere else it reads as a stray sentence
// about some other part of the screen.
if (settings.serverUrl.isNotBlank() && settings.serverUrl != settings.serverPublicUrl) {
Text(
"Connects to ${settings.serverUrl} — this server publishes one name and " +
"points devices at another, so its pinned certificate can share a port " +
"with its web interface.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
)
}
OutlinedTextField(
value = serverPin, onValueChange = { serverPin = it; settings.serverPin = it },
label = { Text("Certificate pin (SPKI, base64)") }, singleLine = true,
textStyle = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace),
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
OutlinedTextField(
value = serverCred,
onValueChange = { serverCred = it; settings.serverCredential = it },
label = { Text("Device credential") }, singleLine = true,
textStyle = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace),
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
Button(onClick = onCheckServer) { Text("Check server") }
Text(
" " + if (settings.serverConfigured) "Configured."
else "Uploads stay off until all three fields are set.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
}
// Version compatibility is checked here rather than discovered mid-run: a server
// that will refuse this build should say so before a measurement is wasted.
serverStatus?.let {
Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
}
// What the server reported, placed under the button that asks it rather than among
// the fields above: these are facts to read, not settings to apply, and an
// editable-looking box that changes nothing is worse than no box at all.
//
// Monospaced so the addresses line up under each other — column alignment is most
// of what makes a list of IPs quicker to read than prose.
if (serverFacts.isNotBlank()) {
Surface(
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.surfaceVariant,
shape = RoundedCornerShape(8.dp),
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
) {
Column(
Modifier.padding(horizontal = 12.dp, vertical = 10.dp),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(2.dp),
) {
Text(
"WHAT THIS SERVER REPORTS",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
)
// Real columns rather than padded text: the label column has a fixed
// width, so values line up whatever the font does, and a long value
// wraps inside its own column instead of under the labels.
for (line in serverFacts.lines()) {
val label = line.substringBefore('|')
val value = line.substringAfter('|', "")
Row(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Text(
label,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
modifier = Modifier.width(72.dp),
)
Text(
value,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
),
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
)
}
}
}
}
}
Text(
"This app is ${BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER} and speaks probe protocol " +
"${app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat.PROTOCOL_VERSION}. It works with servers " +
"${app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat.serverRange}.",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
)
}
}
Spacer(Modifier.height(24.dp))
}
}
private fun privacyExplanation(level: PrivacyLevel): String = when (level) {
PrivacyLevel.FULL ->
"Nothing is removed: SSIDs, MAC addresses, hostnames and discovered neighbours are sent " +
"as measured. Appropriate for a server you run yourself."
PrivacyLevel.BALANCED ->
"Network names and hostnames become pseudonyms, MAC addresses keep only their vendor " +
"prefix, public IP addresses keep only their /16, and discovered neighbours (SSDP, " +
"ARP, nearby networks) are dropped entirely. Private addresses stay readable, since " +
"192.168.1.1 describes the topology and not the person."
PrivacyLevel.STRICT ->
"Only numbers: test results, metrics and finding codes. No network description, no raw " +
"evidence, no finding text. Nothing left can identify a network."
}
@Composable
private fun Toggle(
label: String,
detail: String,
checked: Boolean,
enabled: Boolean = true,
onChange: (Boolean) -> Unit,
) {
Row(Modifier.fillMaxWidth(), verticalAlignment = Alignment.Top) {
Column(Modifier.weight(1f)) {
// Dimmed together with the switch, so "this does nothing right now" reads at a glance
// instead of only on close inspection.
val alpha = if (enabled) 1f else 0.5f
Text(label, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium, color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = alpha))
Text(detail, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall, color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = alpha))
}
Switch(checked = checked, onCheckedChange = onChange, enabled = enabled)
}
}
@Composable
private fun NumberField(label: String, value: String, onChange: (String) -> Unit) {
OutlinedTextField(
value = value,
onValueChange = { s -> onChange(s.filter { it.isDigit() }.take(7)) },
label = { Text(label) },
singleLine = true,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
Adaptive-icon background: the brand "tile" gradient (assets/branding). -->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
xmlns:aapt="http://schemas.android.com/aapt"
android:width="108dp" android:height="108dp"
android:viewportWidth="108" android:viewportHeight="108">
<path android:pathData="M0,0h108v108h-108z">
<aapt:attr name="android:fillColor">
<gradient android:startX="54" android:startY="0" android:endX="54" android:endY="108"
android:type="linear">
<item android:offset="0" android:color="#FF0E2433"/>
<item android:offset="1" android:color="#FF071522"/>
</gradient>
</aapt:attr>
</path>
</vector>
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
Adaptive-icon foreground: the Focus mark (assets/branding/icon-adaptive-foreground.svg),
SVG transform baked in so the art sits inside the 66dp safe circle. -->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
android:width="108dp" android:height="108dp"
android:viewportWidth="108" android:viewportHeight="108">
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<path android:fillColor="#FFFFB454" android:pathData="M50.4,54.0 a3.6,3.6 0 1,0 7.2,0 a3.6,3.6 0 1,0 -7.2,0"/>
<path android:strokeColor="#FF35E0C4" android:strokeWidth="2.8" android:strokeLineCap="round" android:strokeLineJoin="round" android:fillColor="#00000000" android:pathData="M42.0,48.4 V42.0 H48.4"/>
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<adaptive-icon xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<background android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_background"/>
<foreground android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
<monochrome android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
</adaptive-icon>
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<adaptive-icon xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<background android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_background"/>
<foreground android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
<monochrome android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
</adaptive-icon>
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<resources>
<string name="app_name">Echolot</string>
</resources>
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later -->
<resources>
<style name="Theme.Echolot" parent="android:Theme.Material.NoActionBar" />
</resources>
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later -->
<paths>
<cache-path name="reports" path="reports/" />
</paths>
+11
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
alias(libs.plugins.android.application) apply false
alias(libs.plugins.android.library) apply false
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.jvm) apply false
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.android) apply false
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.compose) apply false
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization) apply false
}
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.jvm)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
}
// The on-device run archive: measurement documents on disk, with retention.
// Pure Kotlin/JVM (it takes a directory, not a Context) so the retention rules
// — the part with edge cases — are unit-testable without a device.
dependencies {
implementation(libs.kotlinx.serialization.json)
testImplementation(kotlin("test"))
}
kotlin {
jvmToolchain(21)
compilerOptions { jvmTarget.set(org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget.JVM_17) }
}
java { sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17; targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17 }
tasks.test { useJUnitPlatform() }
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package archive keeps completed measurement runs on the device.
//
// The point of an archive is the second run: "this network was fine on Tuesday" is only
// answerable if Tuesday was kept. But an app that silently accumulates network dumps forever is
// its own privacy problem, so retention is a first-class part of the type rather than a cleanup
// job somebody remembers to write — every save enforces it.
//
// Storage is one JSON file per run plus a small index entry, in a plain directory. Nothing here
// needs a database, and a plain directory is something a user can inspect, copy off, or delete
// with a file manager. Files are written to a temp name and renamed, so a run interrupted mid-
// write never leaves a half-document that reads as real.
package app.echo_lot.archive
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
import java.io.File
/** Index entry for one archived run — enough for a history list without opening the documents. */
@Serializable
data class ArchivedRun(
val id: String,
@SerialName("saved_at_epoch_ms") val savedAtEpochMs: Long,
@SerialName("started_at") val startedAt: String? = null,
val verdict: String? = null,
@SerialName("finding_count") val findingCount: Int = 0,
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Long = 0,
/**
* How the *archived* document is redacted. Always "full" in practice, because the archive
* deliberately keeps the unredacted run - see the package doc. This is not what was uploaded.
*/
val anonymization: String = "full",
/** Whether this run has been accepted by a server, so history can show what is backed up. */
val uploaded: Boolean = false,
@SerialName("uploaded_to") val uploadedTo: String? = null,
/**
* The level the run was *uploaded* at, which is a different document from the archived one.
*
* Kept separately because conflating the two is actively misleading: the history row showed
* the archive's own level ("full") directly beneath "uploaded to fmr", which reads as "the
* complete data was uploaded" when a redacted copy had been sent. A privacy display that
* overstates what left the device is worse than none.
*/
@SerialName("uploaded_as") val uploadedAs: String? = null,
)
/**
* Retention limits. All three are independent ceilings; a run is dropped when it violates any of
* them. Zero disables that limit.
*
* The default keeps a hundred runs or three months, whichever comes first. That is enough to see
* a pattern ("it degrades every evening") without turning the phone into an archive of every
* network its owner ever walked past.
*/
@Serializable
data class RetentionPolicy(
/**
* Whether to archive at all. Separate from the limits because "no limits" (every limit zero)
* and "keep nothing" are opposite intentions, and collapsing them onto the same value is how
* a user who turns all the caps off ends up with an empty history.
*/
val enabled: Boolean = true,
@SerialName("max_runs") val maxRuns: Int = 100,
@SerialName("max_age_days") val maxAgeDays: Int = 90,
@SerialName("max_total_bytes") val maxTotalBytes: Long = 64L * 1024 * 1024,
) {
companion object {
/** Archiving off: runs are shown once and never written. */
val KeepNothing = RetentionPolicy(enabled = false)
/** Archiving on with no ceilings. Every run is kept until the user deletes it. */
val Unlimited = RetentionPolicy(maxRuns = 0, maxAgeDays = 0, maxTotalBytes = 0)
val Default = RetentionPolicy()
}
val keepsAnything: Boolean get() = enabled
}
/** What a purge removed, so the UI can say "dropped 3 old runs" instead of silently deleting. */
data class PurgeResult(val removed: List<String>, val freedBytes: Long) {
val isEmpty: Boolean get() = removed.isEmpty()
}
class RunArchive(private val dir: File, private val now: () -> Long = System::currentTimeMillis) {
private val json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true; encodeDefaults = true }
init {
dir.mkdirs()
}
/**
* Writes one run and applies retention. Returns the index entry, or null when the policy
* keeps nothing at all in which case nothing is written, rather than written and instantly
* deleted (the difference matters on flash storage and to anyone watching the filesystem).
*/
fun save(runJson: String, policy: RetentionPolicy = RetentionPolicy.Default): ArchivedRun? {
if (!policy.keepsAnything) return null
val doc = runCatching { json.parseToJsonElement(runJson).jsonObject }.getOrNull() ?: return null
val meta = indexOf(doc, runJson.toByteArray().size.toLong()) ?: return null
writeAtomically(File(dir, meta.id + EXT), runJson)
writeAtomically(File(dir, meta.id + META_EXT), json.encodeToString(ArchivedRun.serializer(), meta))
purge(policy)
return meta
}
/** History, newest first. */
fun list(): List<ArchivedRun> =
(dir.listFiles { f -> f.name.endsWith(META_EXT) } ?: emptyArray())
.mapNotNull { f ->
runCatching { json.decodeFromString(ArchivedRun.serializer(), f.readText()) }.getOrNull()
}
.sortedByDescending { it.savedAtEpochMs }
fun read(id: String): String? = File(dir, safe(id) + EXT).takeIf { it.isFile }?.readText()
fun delete(id: String): Boolean {
val s = safe(id)
val doc = File(dir, s + EXT).delete()
File(dir, s + META_EXT).delete()
return doc
}
fun deleteAll(): Int = list().count { delete(it.id) }
/** Records that a server accepted this run, so history can distinguish backed-up from local. */
fun markUploaded(id: String, serverName: String, uploadedAs: String? = null) {
val f = File(dir, safe(id) + META_EXT)
val meta = runCatching { json.decodeFromString(ArchivedRun.serializer(), f.readText()) }.getOrNull()
?: return
writeAtomically(
f,
json.encodeToString(
ArchivedRun.serializer(),
meta.copy(uploaded = true, uploadedTo = serverName, uploadedAs = uploadedAs),
),
)
}
fun totalBytes(): Long = list().sumOf { it.sizeBytes }
/**
* Enforces the policy. Age first, then total size, then count: dropping stale runs may already
* satisfy the other two, and it is the limit a user reasons about ("keep three months"), so it
* should not be pre-empted by a size sweep deleting last week instead.
*/
fun purge(policy: RetentionPolicy): PurgeResult {
val removed = ArrayList<String>()
var freed = 0L
fun drop(r: ArchivedRun) {
if (delete(r.id)) {
removed.add(r.id)
freed += r.sizeBytes
}
}
var kept = list()
if (policy.maxAgeDays > 0) {
val cutoff = now() - policy.maxAgeDays * 24L * 60 * 60 * 1000
val (fresh, stale) = kept.partition { it.savedAtEpochMs >= cutoff }
stale.forEach(::drop)
kept = fresh
}
if (policy.maxTotalBytes > 0) {
var total = kept.sumOf { it.sizeBytes }
// Oldest first until we are under the ceiling.
for (r in kept.reversed()) {
if (total <= policy.maxTotalBytes) break
drop(r)
total -= r.sizeBytes
}
kept = kept.filter { it.id !in removed }
}
if (policy.maxRuns > 0 && kept.size > policy.maxRuns) {
kept.drop(policy.maxRuns).forEach(::drop) // list() is newest-first
}
return PurgeResult(removed, freed)
}
// ---- internals ---------------------------------------------------------------------
private fun indexOf(doc: JsonObject, size: Long): ArchivedRun? {
val run = doc["run"]?.jsonObject ?: return null
val id = run["id"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.let(::safe)?.takeIf { it.isNotEmpty() } ?: return null
return ArchivedRun(
id = id,
savedAtEpochMs = now(),
startedAt = run["started_at"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content,
// The schema calls it `overall` (Summary.overall); reading `verdict` here silently
// yielded null for every run, so the history list's most prominent element - the
// coloured verdict - was blank on every row.
verdict = doc["summary"]?.jsonObject?.get("overall")?.jsonPrimitive?.content,
findingCount = (doc["findings"] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonArray)?.size ?: 0,
sizeBytes = size,
anonymization = run["privacy"]?.jsonObject?.get("anonymization")?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "full",
)
}
private fun writeAtomically(target: File, content: String) {
val tmp = File(target.parentFile, target.name + ".tmp")
tmp.writeText(content)
if (!tmp.renameTo(target)) {
target.delete()
tmp.renameTo(target)
}
}
/** Run ids reach the filesystem; keep them to characters that cannot climb out of [dir]. */
private fun safe(id: String): String = buildString {
for (c in id) if (c.isLetterOrDigit() || c == '-' || c == '_') append(c)
}.take(64)
private companion object {
const val EXT = ".json"
const val META_EXT = ".meta.json"
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.archive
import java.io.File
import java.nio.file.Files
import kotlin.test.AfterTest
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
class RunArchiveTest {
private val dir: File = Files.createTempDirectory("echolot-archive").toFile()
private var clock = 1_000_000_000_000L // fixed: retention is time arithmetic, not wall time
private fun archive() = RunArchive(dir) { clock }
@AfterTest fun cleanup() { dir.deleteRecursively() }
private fun doc(id: String, findings: Int = 1, pad: Int = 0): String {
val f = (1..findings).joinToString(",") { """{"id":"f$it"}""" }
return """{"run":{"id":"$id","started_at":"2026-08-01T10:00:00Z","privacy":{"anonymization":"balanced"}},""" +
""""findings":[$f],"summary":{"overall":"warn"},"pad":"${"x".repeat(pad)}"}"""
}
@Test
fun savedRunsComeBackNewestFirst() {
val a = archive()
for (i in 1..3) {
a.save(doc("run-$i"))
clock += 60_000
}
assertEquals(listOf("run-3", "run-2", "run-1"), a.list().map { it.id })
}
@Test
fun theIndexSummarisesTheDocument() {
val meta = assertNotNull(archive().save(doc("run-1", findings = 4)))
assertEquals("warn", meta.verdict)
assertEquals(4, meta.findingCount)
assertEquals("balanced", meta.anonymization)
assertEquals("2026-08-01T10:00:00Z", meta.startedAt)
assertFalse(meta.uploaded)
}
@Test
fun theDocumentComesBackByteForByte() {
val a = archive()
val original = doc("run-1")
a.save(original)
assertEquals(original, a.read("run-1"))
}
@Test
fun countLimitKeepsTheNewest() {
val a = archive()
val policy = RetentionPolicy(maxRuns = 3, maxAgeDays = 0, maxTotalBytes = 0)
for (i in 1..7) {
a.save(doc("run-$i"), policy)
clock += 60_000
}
assertEquals(listOf("run-7", "run-6", "run-5"), a.list().map { it.id })
assertNull(a.read("run-1"), "purged run's document should be gone, not just its index entry")
}
@Test
fun ageLimitDropsRunsPastTheWindow() {
val a = archive()
val policy = RetentionPolicy(maxRuns = 0, maxAgeDays = 7, maxTotalBytes = 0)
a.save(doc("old"), policy)
clock += 30L * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 // a month later
a.save(doc("new"), policy)
assertEquals(listOf("new"), a.list().map { it.id })
}
@Test
fun sizeLimitDropsOldestUntilUnderTheCeiling() {
val a = archive()
val one = doc("x", pad = 900).toByteArray().size.toLong()
val policy = RetentionPolicy(maxRuns = 0, maxAgeDays = 0, maxTotalBytes = one * 2 + 10)
for (i in 1..5) {
a.save(doc("run-$i", pad = 900), policy)
clock += 60_000
}
val kept = a.list()
assertTrue(kept.size <= 2, "size ceiling not enforced: kept ${kept.size}")
assertEquals("run-5", kept.first().id, "the newest run must always survive")
assertTrue(a.totalBytes() <= policy.maxTotalBytes)
}
// A policy that keeps nothing must not write-then-delete: the run should never touch storage.
@Test
fun keepNothingWritesNothing() {
val a = archive()
assertNull(a.save(doc("run-1"), RetentionPolicy.KeepNothing))
assertTrue(a.list().isEmpty())
assertEquals(0, dir.listFiles()?.size ?: 0, "files were written for a keep-nothing policy")
}
// "no ceilings" and "keep nothing" must not be the same policy, however a user arrives at
// one: turning every limit off should keep everything, not wipe the history.
@Test
fun unlimitedKeepsEverythingWhileKeepNothingKeepsNone() {
val a = archive()
for (i in 1..5) {
a.save(doc("run-$i"), RetentionPolicy.Unlimited)
clock += 60_000
}
assertEquals(5, a.list().size)
assertNull(a.save(doc("run-6"), RetentionPolicy.KeepNothing))
assertEquals(5, a.list().size, "keep-nothing must not touch what is already archived")
}
@Test
fun uploadStateIsRecorded() {
val a = archive()
a.save(doc("run-1"))
a.markUploaded("run-1", "fmr", "balanced")
val meta = a.list().single()
assertTrue(meta.uploaded)
assertEquals("fmr", meta.uploadedTo)
assertEquals("run-1", meta.id, "marking upload must not disturb the rest of the entry")
}
// The archive's own level and the level a run was uploaded at describe *different documents*.
// Showing the archive's ("full", because the archive is deliberately unredacted) next to
// "uploaded to fmr" reads as "the complete data was uploaded" when a redacted copy was sent —
// a privacy display that overstates what left the device is worse than none.
@Test
fun theUploadedLevelIsRecordedSeparatelyFromTheArchivedOne() {
val a = archive()
// A real archived document carries no privacy stamp: the anonymizer never runs on the
// archive. The shared doc() fixture has one, which is exactly the unrealism that let this
// confusion through in the first place.
a.save("""{"run":{"id":"run-1"},"findings":[],"summary":{"overall":"green"}}""")
a.markUploaded("run-1", "fmr", "balanced")
val meta = a.list().single()
assertEquals("full", meta.anonymization, "the archived copy is unredacted, by design")
assertEquals("balanced", meta.uploadedAs, "the uploaded copy was redacted, and must say so")
}
// The verdict is read from `summary.overall` — the schema's actual field name. Reading
// `summary.verdict` silently yielded null for every run, so the history list's most prominent
// element was blank on every row while everything else looked fine.
@Test
fun theVerdictComesFromTheSchemasOverallField() {
val a = archive()
a.save("""{"run":{"id":"r1"},"findings":[],"summary":{"overall":"yellow"}}""")
assertEquals("yellow", a.list().single().verdict)
}
@Test
fun deleteRemovesBothFiles() {
val a = archive()
a.save(doc("run-1"))
assertTrue(a.delete("run-1"))
assertTrue(a.list().isEmpty())
assertNull(a.read("run-1"))
assertEquals(0, dir.listFiles()?.size ?: 0)
}
@Test
fun malformedInputIsRejectedRatherThanArchived() {
val a = archive()
assertNull(a.save("not json"))
assertNull(a.save("""{"summary":{"verdict":"ok"}}"""), "a document with no run id has no identity")
assertTrue(a.list().isEmpty())
}
// Run ids come from a document that may have been produced elsewhere; they must not be able
// to write outside the archive directory.
@Test
fun runIdsCannotEscapeTheArchiveDirectory() {
val a = archive()
a.save(doc("../../evil"))
val strays = dir.parentFile.listFiles { f -> f.name.contains("evil") } ?: emptyArray()
assertTrue(strays.isEmpty(), "wrote outside the archive: ${strays.toList()}")
}
@Test
fun purgeReportsWhatItRemoved() {
val a = archive()
for (i in 1..5) {
a.save(doc("run-$i"), RetentionPolicy.Unlimited)
clock += 60_000
}
val result = a.purge(RetentionPolicy(maxRuns = 2, maxAgeDays = 0, maxTotalBytes = 0))
assertEquals(3, result.removed.size)
assertTrue(result.freedBytes > 0)
assertEquals(2, a.list().size)
}
}
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.jvm)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
}
// The measurement run engine: composes core-protocol probes into
// core-measurement documents. Pure Kotlin/JVM, so it is unit-testable and can
// run a full server-facing measurement against a live server.
dependencies {
implementation(project(":core-protocol"))
implementation(project(":core-measurement"))
implementation(project(":core-privacy"))
implementation(libs.kotlinx.serialization.json)
testImplementation(kotlin("test"))
}
kotlin {
jvmToolchain(21)
compilerOptions { jvmTarget.set(org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget.JVM_17) }
}
java { sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17; targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17 }
tasks.test {
useJUnitPlatform()
listOf("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL","ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN","ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED","ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP","ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET","ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI")
.forEach { k -> System.getenv(k)?.let { environment(k, it) } }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
/**
* Splits a round-trip train into its two directions using what the server witnessed.
*
* A round trip can only report that *something* was lost somewhere. That is the least useful form
* of the answer: "3 % loss" sends an engineer looking in both directions at once. The server
* records every packet it received, per sequence number (probe-protocol.md §6), so the two cases
* are actually distinguishable:
*
* - sent, never seen by the server **upstream** loss
* - seen by the server, reply never arrived **downstream** loss
*
* The same records give one-way delay *variation* per direction. Absolute one-way delay would
* need synchronised clocks and we deliberately have none (measurement-schema.md's two-clock rule),
* but the variation does not: (server_rx client_tx) contains an unknown constant clock offset,
* and differencing successive samples cancels it. So jitter is honestly attributable to a
* direction even though latency is not.
*/
object Directional {
/** One probe as the client saw it. [tRxNs] null means no reply came back. */
data class Sample(val seq: Int, val tTxNs: Long, val tRxNs: Long?)
/** One probe as the server saw it: its own receive and transmit stamps, on its own clock. */
data class ServerSighting(val seq: Int, val tRxNs: Long, val tTxNs: Long)
fun analyse(sent: List<Sample>, seen: List<ServerSighting>): DirectionalMetrics {
val byServerSeq = seen.associateBy { it.seq }
// Only sequences we actually sent count. A server record for a sequence we have no note
// of is not evidence about this train — it is a bug or a stray, and silently folding it
// in would produce loss percentages above 100 or below zero.
val relevant = sent.filter { byServerSeq.containsKey(it.seq) }
val nSent = sent.size
val nSeen = relevant.size
val nReplied = sent.count { it.tRxNs != null }
// A reply can only exist if the request arrived, so downstream loss is measured against
// what the server saw, not against what we sent — otherwise upstream loss is counted twice.
val lostUp = nSent - nSeen
val lostDown = (nSeen - nReplied).coerceAtLeast(0)
val upDeltas = relevant.sortedBy { it.seq }
.map { byServerSeq.getValue(it.seq).tRxNs - it.tTxNs }
val downDeltas = sent.filter { it.tRxNs != null && byServerSeq.containsKey(it.seq) }
.sortedBy { it.seq }
.map { it.tRxNs!! - byServerSeq.getValue(it.seq).tTxNs }
return DirectionalMetrics(
sent = nSent,
seenByServer = nSeen,
repliesReceived = nReplied,
lostUpstream = lostUp,
lostDownstream = lostDown,
lossUpstreamPct = pct(lostUp, nSent),
// Denominator is what reached the server: of the packets that got there, how many
// replies came back.
lossDownstreamPct = pct(lostDown, nSeen),
jitterUpstreamMs = jitterMs(upDeltas),
jitterDownstreamMs = jitterMs(downDeltas),
/** True when the server saw nothing at all, which is a different fault from loss. */
noneReachedServer = nSent > 0 && nSeen == 0,
)
}
/**
* Mean absolute difference between consecutive one-way samples (RFC 3393 IPDV, averaged).
*
* Differencing is what makes this legitimate without synchronised clocks: each sample carries
* the same unknown offset between the two clocks, and the difference cancels it. Fewer than
* two samples yields null rather than zero "no jitter" and "not enough data to say" are
* different claims and only one of them is true here.
*/
private fun jitterMs(oneWayNs: List<Long>): Double? {
if (oneWayNs.size < 2) return null
val deltas = oneWayNs.zipWithNext { a, b -> kotlin.math.abs(b - a) }
return round2(deltas.average() / 1_000_000.0)
}
private fun pct(part: Int, whole: Int): Double =
if (whole <= 0) 0.0 else round2(part * 100.0 / whole)
private fun round2(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 100.0) / 100.0
}
/** Directional metrics for train.udp_updown; recomputable from the columnar evidence. */
@Serializable
data class DirectionalMetrics(
val sent: Int,
@SerialName("seen_by_server") val seenByServer: Int,
@SerialName("replies_received") val repliesReceived: Int,
@SerialName("lost_upstream") val lostUpstream: Int,
@SerialName("lost_downstream") val lostDownstream: Int,
@SerialName("loss_upstream_pct") val lossUpstreamPct: Double,
@SerialName("loss_downstream_pct") val lossDownstreamPct: Double,
/** One-way delay variation (RFC 3393), per direction. Null when there were too few samples. */
@SerialName("jitter_upstream_ms") val jitterUpstreamMs: Double? = null,
@SerialName("jitter_downstream_ms") val jitterDownstreamMs: Double? = null,
@SerialName("none_reached_server") val noneReachedServer: Boolean = false,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Wire
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
/**
* The measurements only the far end can make: what the *downstream* path does to traffic the
* client never asked for packet-by-packet.
*
* A client alone can measure a round trip, and it can find the largest packet it can *send*. It
* cannot find the largest packet it can *receive*, or whether the network drops downstream
* packets independently of upstream ones those need a server willing to push, which is why the
* protocol gates them behind an asymmetric grant (probe-protocol.md §3.4).
*
* Three separate facts come out, and keeping them separate is the point:
* - `mtu.pmtud_down` the largest datagram that arrives *unfragmented*. This is the number
* that matters for anything setting DF, and it is only meaningful because the server sets DF.
* - `mtu.frag_delivery` whether larger datagrams arrive once the network is allowed to
* fragment them. A path can be fine for one and broken for the other; conflating them is how
* you get "MTU is 4000" on a link that drops every DF packet over 1400.
* - `train.udp_downstream` loss, reordering and arrival spacing in the download direction.
*/
class DownstreamMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
/** How long to wait for a granted burst after the server accepts the action. */
private val collectWindowMs = 4_000L
/**
* Shorter, but long enough to cover the first_last mode's deliberate 250 ms hold plus a
* reassembly. A fragment burst is one datagram: it is here quickly or not at all.
*/
private val fragWindowMs = 1_500L
/**
* Asks the server to send one deliberately-fragmented datagram per ordering, and reports
* which orderings survive the path.
*
* Kernel fragmentation always emits fragments in order, first one first, so an oversized
* datagram can only answer "do fragments get through at all". The interesting fault is about
* ordering: only the *first* fragment carries the UDP ports, so a stateful firewall that has
* not seen it has nothing to match the rest against, and many drop them. That failure is
* invisible to every in-order test and shows up in the field as "large DNS answers fail here"
* or "the tunnel breaks when the MTU drops".
*/
fun fragmentOrdering(
credential: String,
sessionId: String,
control: ControlClient,
probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String,
sizeBytes: Int = 2000,
fragBytes: Int = 576,
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
val delivered = LinkedHashMap<String, Boolean>()
val fragmentCounts = LinkedHashMap<String, Int>()
var unsupported = false
for (mode in FRAG_MODES) {
val reply = runCatching {
control.action(
credential, sessionId,
"""{"action":"frag_send","size_bytes":$sizeBytes,"mode":"$mode","frag_bytes":$fragBytes}""",
)
}
if (reply.isFailure) {
// A server without a raw socket says so; that is a missing capability, not a
// property of the network, and must not be recorded as a failed delivery.
unsupported = true
break
}
parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "fragments")?.let { fragmentCounts[mode] = it }
// The burst is already on the wire when the action returns (it is sent
// synchronously), so anything that survived is either here or lost.
val got = probe.collectGranted(fragWindowMs).any { it.type == Wire.TYPE_FRAG_DATA }
delivered[mode] = got
}
if (unsupported) {
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
error = TestError("no_raw_socket", "this server cannot craft fragments"),
) to emptyList()
}
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
FragOrderingMetrics(
sizeBytes = sizeBytes,
fragBytes = fragBytes,
fragmentsPerBurst = fragmentCounts,
deliveredByMode = delivered,
inOrderDelivered = delivered[FRAG_IN_ORDER] == true,
reorderedDelivered = delivered[FRAG_REVERSED] == true,
delayedFirstDelivered = delivered[FRAG_FIRST_LAST] == true,
),
) as JsonObject
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
val inOrder = delivered[FRAG_IN_ORDER] == true
val reversed = delivered[FRAG_REVERSED] == true
val firstLast = delivered[FRAG_FIRST_LAST] == true
if (!inOrder) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED, testId,
"IP fragments do not reach this device",
"A fragmented datagram sent in the normal order never arrived. Anything that " +
"relies on fragmentation — large DNS answers over UDP, some VPN traffic — " +
"will fail here rather than slow down.",
),
)
} else if (!reversed || !firstLast) {
// The precise and useful finding: fragments work, but only if they arrive tidily.
val which = buildList {
if (!reversed) add("out of order")
if (!firstLast) add("with the first fragment delayed")
}.joinToString(" or ")
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE, testId,
"Fragments are dropped when they arrive $which",
"In-order fragments are delivered, but the same datagram sent $which is not. " +
"Something on the path only reassembles when the first fragment (the one " +
"carrying the UDP ports) arrives first — typical of a stateful firewall " +
"or NAT. It works until the network reorders, then fails intermittently, " +
"which is the hardest kind of fault to chase.",
),
)
}
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = if (inOrder) TestStatus.OK else TestStatus.PARTIAL,
metrics = metrics,
) to findings
}
/**
* Runs all three against an already-primed session.
*
* [session] must already have sent at least one ECHO: the grant is bound to the source the
* server has actually observed, so an unprimed session gets a 409 rather than a grant. That
* is the anti-amplification rule doing its job, not an error to work around.
*/
fun run(
credential: String,
sessionId: String,
control: ControlClient,
probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String,
sizes: List<Int> = DEFAULT_SIZES,
trainCount: Int = 100,
trainSizeBytes: Int = 300,
trainIntervalUs: Int = 3_000,
// DSCP to mark the train with (0-63), or -1 to leave packets unmarked. Pairing a marked
// downtrain with the server-observed DSCP of an upstream train is the two-direction
// sec.dscp_ecn_survival measurement.
trainDscp: Int = -1,
): Pair<List<Test>, List<Finding>> {
val tests = ArrayList<Test>()
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
val df = bigSend(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, sizes, df = true)
val frag = bigSend(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, sizes, df = false)
val train = downTrain(
credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, trainCount, trainSizeBytes,
trainIntervalUs, trainDscp,
)
tests.add(df.test); tests.add(frag.test); tests.add(train.test)
// Fragment ordering only makes sense once we know fragments arrive at all; when they do
// not, the ordering variants would all report "not delivered" and read as three faults
// instead of one.
if (frag.largestDelivered != null) {
val (fragTest, fragFindings) =
fragmentOrdering(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef)
tests.add(fragTest)
findings.addAll(fragFindings)
}
// A downstream MTU below the classic 1500-byte Ethernet payload is worth saying out loud:
// it is the usual cause of "small requests work, large responses hang".
val pathMtu = df.largestDelivered
if (pathMtu != null && pathMtu > 0) {
val ipMtu = pathMtu + IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4
if (ipMtu < 1500) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM, df.test.id,
"Downstream path MTU is $ipMtu bytes, below 1500",
"The largest datagram that reached this device without fragmenting was " +
"$pathMtu bytes of payload ($ipMtu on the wire). Tunnels (PPPoE, VPN, " +
"IPv6-in-IPv4) commonly do this; it is only a fault when something " +
"on the path also blocks the ICMP messages that let senders discover it.",
),
)
}
// The dangerous combination: unfragmented large packets vanish AND fragments do too,
// so a sender that never gets told will retransmit into a black hole.
val fragLargest = frag.largestDelivered ?: 0
if (fragLargest <= pathMtu && sizes.any { it > pathMtu }) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE, frag.test.id,
"Datagrams above $pathMtu bytes are dropped downstream, fragmented or not",
"Nothing larger than $pathMtu bytes arrived, even when the network was " +
"free to fragment it. Traffic that relies on large responses will " +
"stall rather than fail cleanly.",
),
)
}
}
if (train.received == 0) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED, train.test.id,
"No server-initiated packets arrived",
"The server sent ${train.sent} packets toward this device and none arrived, " +
"while the round-trip echo worked. Something on the path forwards replies " +
"but drops traffic the device did not individually solicit.",
),
)
} else if (train.lossPct >= 5.0) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.LOSS_DOWNSTREAM, train.test.id,
"Downstream loss of ${round1(train.lossPct)}%",
"${train.sent - train.received} of ${train.sent} packets sent toward this " +
"device were lost. Downstream loss is invisible to a round-trip test, " +
"which reports only that *something* was lost somewhere.",
),
)
}
if (train.reordered > 0) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.DOWNSTREAM_REORDER, train.test.id,
"${train.reordered} downstream packet(s) arrived out of order",
"Packets arrived in a different order than they were sent. Usually per-packet " +
"load balancing across links; harmless for most traffic, not for all of it.",
),
)
}
return tests to findings
}
// ---- big_send ---------------------------------------------------------------------
private class SizeResult(val test: Test, val largestDelivered: Int?)
private fun bigSend(
credential: String, sessionId: String, control: ControlClient, probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String, sizes: List<Int>, df: Boolean,
): SizeResult {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
val requested = sizes.joinToString(",")
val reply = runCatching {
control.action(
credential, sessionId,
"""{"action":"big_send","df":$df,"sizes_bytes":[$requested]}""",
)
}
if (reply.isFailure) {
return SizeResult(
Test(
id = testId, type = if (df) TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN else TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY,
sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "big_send refused"),
),
null,
)
}
// The server tells us which sizes it actually put on the wire. With DF it refuses
// anything above its own egress MTU, and treating those as "lost downstream" would
// blame the client's network for our own limit.
val accepted = parseIntArray(reply.getOrNull(), "sizes_bytes").ifEmpty { sizes }
val serverMaxDf = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "max_df_bytes")
val arrived = probe.collectGranted(collectWindowMs)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }
.map { it.sizeBytes }
.distinct()
.sorted()
val largest = arrived.maxOrNull()
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
BigSendMetrics(
requestedBytes = sizes,
sentBytes = accepted,
deliveredBytes = arrived,
largestDeliveredBytes = largest,
dontFragment = df,
serverMaxDfBytes = serverMaxDf,
// Only meaningful for the DF run; the IP-level MTU is the payload plus headers.
pathMtuBytes = if (df && largest != null) largest + IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4 else null,
),
) as JsonObject
val status = when {
arrived.isEmpty() -> TestStatus.FAILED
arrived.size < accepted.size -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
else -> TestStatus.OK
}
return SizeResult(
Test(
id = testId, type = if (df) TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN else TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY,
sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = status, metrics = metrics,
),
largest,
)
}
// ---- downtrain --------------------------------------------------------------------
private class TrainResult(
val test: Test, val sent: Int, val received: Int, val lossPct: Double, val reordered: Int,
)
private fun downTrain(
credential: String, sessionId: String, control: ControlClient, probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String, count: Int, sizeBytes: Int, intervalUs: Int, dscp: Int = -1,
): TrainResult {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
// dscp is only sent when requested: an older server rejects unknown-value problems
// louder than absent keys, and unmarked is the correct default for a plain loss train.
val dscpField = if (dscp in 0..63) ""","dscp":$dscp""" else ""
val reply = runCatching {
control.action(
credential, sessionId,
"""{"action":"downtrain","count":$count,"size_bytes":$sizeBytes,""" +
""""interval_us":$intervalUs$dscpField}""",
)
}
if (reply.isFailure) {
return TrainResult(
Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM, sessionRef = sessionRef,
tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "downtrain refused"),
),
0, 0, 0.0, 0,
)
}
val sent = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "count") ?: count
val got = probe.collectGranted(collectWindowMs).filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_DOWNTRAIN_DATA }
val received = got.size
val lossPct = if (sent == 0) 0.0 else (sent - received) * 100.0 / sent
// Reordering: a packet whose sequence is below the highest already seen. Counting
// inversions rather than "not sorted" keeps one late packet from being reported as
// dozens of reorder events.
var highest = -1
var reordered = 0
for (p in got) {
if (p.seq < highest) reordered++ else highest = p.seq
}
// Columnar evidence per the schema: what arrived, when, and how big — so every metric
// above is recomputable by a reader who does not trust our arithmetic.
val evidence = TrainEvidence(
epochMonoNs = started,
seq = got.map { it.seq },
tTxNs = got.map { null },
tRxNs = got.map { it.tRxNs },
sizeBytes = got.map { it.sizeBytes },
).toEvidence()
val interArrival = got.zipWithNext { a, b -> (b.tRxNs - a.tRxNs) / 1_000_000.0 }
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
DownTrainMetrics(
sent = sent, received = received, lossPct = round1(lossPct),
reorderedPackets = reordered,
sizeBytes = sizeBytes,
interArrivalMsAvg = interArrival.average().takeIf { interArrival.isNotEmpty() }?.let(::round1),
interArrivalMsMax = interArrival.maxOrNull()?.let(::round1),
sendIntervalUs = intervalUs,
dscpRequested = dscp.takeIf { it in 0..63 },
// The server says whether it could actually mark (dscp_applied); recorded so a
// survival comparison never blames the path for a marking the sender skipped.
dscpApplied = reply.getOrNull()?.let {
Regex("\"dscp_applied\"\\s*:\\s*(true|false)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toBoolean()
},
),
) as JsonObject
val status = when {
received == 0 -> TestStatus.FAILED
received < sent -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
else -> TestStatus.OK
}
return TrainResult(
Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = status, evidence = evidence, metrics = metrics,
),
sent, received, lossPct, reordered,
)
}
// ---- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
*
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
*/
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
)
/** Minimal scalar extraction from the action reply; the shape is small and server-owned. */
private fun parseInt(body: String?, key: String): Int? =
body?.let { Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*(-?\\d+)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toIntOrNull() }
private fun parseIntArray(body: String?, key: String): List<Int> =
body?.let { b ->
Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*\\[([^\\]]*)\\]").find(b)?.groupValues?.get(1)
?.split(",")?.mapNotNull { it.trim().toIntOrNull() }
} ?: emptyList()
private companion object {
/** IPv4 (20) + UDP (8). The v6 case is 48; reported per-family once v6 sessions land. */
const val IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4 = 28
const val FRAG_IN_ORDER = "in_order"
const val FRAG_REVERSED = "reversed"
const val FRAG_FIRST_LAST = "first_last"
val FRAG_MODES = listOf(FRAG_IN_ORDER, FRAG_REVERSED, FRAG_FIRST_LAST)
/** Straddles the usual suspects: 1500 Ethernet, 1492 PPPoE, 1400-ish tunnels. */
val DEFAULT_SIZES = listOf(600, 1200, 1372, 1400, 1450, 1472, 1500, 2000, 4000)
fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
}
}
/** Metrics for mtu.pmtud_down / mtu.frag_delivery. */
@Serializable
data class BigSendMetrics(
@SerialName("requested_bytes") val requestedBytes: List<Int>,
@SerialName("sent_bytes") val sentBytes: List<Int>,
@SerialName("delivered_bytes") val deliveredBytes: List<Int>,
@SerialName("largest_delivered_bytes") val largestDeliveredBytes: Int? = null,
@SerialName("dont_fragment") val dontFragment: Boolean,
/** The server's own DF ceiling; sizes above it were never sent and are not path evidence. */
@SerialName("server_max_df_bytes") val serverMaxDfBytes: Int? = null,
@SerialName("path_mtu_bytes") val pathMtuBytes: Int? = null,
)
/** Metrics for mtu.frag_ordering. */
@Serializable
data class FragOrderingMetrics(
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Int,
@SerialName("frag_bytes") val fragBytes: Int,
@SerialName("fragments_per_burst") val fragmentsPerBurst: Map<String, Int>,
@SerialName("delivered_by_mode") val deliveredByMode: Map<String, Boolean>,
@SerialName("in_order_delivered") val inOrderDelivered: Boolean,
@SerialName("reordered_delivered") val reorderedDelivered: Boolean,
@SerialName("delayed_first_delivered") val delayedFirstDelivered: Boolean,
)
/** Metrics for train.udp_downstream. */
@Serializable
data class DownTrainMetrics(
val sent: Int,
val received: Int,
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double,
@SerialName("reordered_packets") val reorderedPackets: Int,
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Int,
@SerialName("inter_arrival_ms_avg") val interArrivalMsAvg: Double? = null,
@SerialName("inter_arrival_ms_max") val interArrivalMsMax: Double? = null,
@SerialName("send_interval_us") val sendIntervalUs: Int,
@SerialName("dscp_requested") val dscpRequested: Int? = null,
@SerialName("dscp_applied") val dscpApplied: Boolean? = null,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package engine composes core-protocol probes into core-measurement documents — the run engine
// the app drives. This file covers the server-facing vertical (control plane + UDP data plane);
// device-tier probes (link snapshot, Shizuku, local discovery) plug in from the Android modules.
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonArray
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
import kotlinx.serialization.json.intOrNull
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
import kotlinx.serialization.json.longOrNull
/**
* Runs the server-facing measurements against one target and assembles a [MeasurementDocument]:
* an ECHO train (RTT distribution, loss, and NAT-rebinding detection from the server's observed
* source port) as `train.udp_updown`. Everything is real evidence with recomputable metrics, and
* findings are derived deterministically. IDs/timestamps are injected so the engine stays pure
* (no clocks/UUIDs of its own) and unit-testable.
*/
class ServerMeasurement(
private val ids: IdSource,
private val app: AppInfo,
private val device: DeviceInfo,
) {
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
data class Config(
val controlUrl: String,
val pins: Set<String>,
val credential: String,
val target: String,
val udpHost: String,
val udpPort: Int,
val echoCount: Int = 20,
val echoPaddingBytes: Int = 64,
/**
* Whether to ask the server to push traffic back (downstream MTU and downstream train).
* Costs a few hundred kB of download and needs a server that advertises the grants, so
* it is a flag rather than an assumption.
*/
val downstream: Boolean = true,
/**
* Throughput moves real data a 5-second run at 50 Mbps is about 30 MB so it is off
* unless asked for. On a metered mobile connection that is the user's money, and a
* measurement tool that spends it without being told to is not one people keep installed.
*/
val throughput: Boolean = false,
@Suppress("unused") val throughputSeconds: Int = 5,
@Suppress("unused") val throughputKbps: Int = 50_000,
)
fun run(cfg: Config): MeasurementDocument {
val runId = ids.uuid()
val startWall = ids.nowWall()
val startMono = ids.monoNs()
val control = ControlClient(cfg.controlUrl, cfg.pins)
val profile = control.profile(cfg.credential)
val session = control.createSession(cfg.credential, cfg.target)
val serverSession = ServerSession(
id = "sess-1",
profileName = profile.name,
controlUrl = cfg.controlUrl,
serverVersion = profile.serverVersion,
capabilities = profile.capabilities,
sessionId = session.sessionId,
target = SessionTarget(ip4 = cfg.udpHost, udpPort = cfg.udpPort),
)
val tests = ArrayList<Test>()
val allFindings = ArrayList<Finding>()
// One ProbeSession for the whole run. A second one would open a new socket and restart
// the sequence counter, which the server's anti-replay window correctly rejects — so the
// re-primed source is never recorded and every granted send goes to the old, closed port.
// Session identity lives on the server; the socket must live as long as it does.
ProbeSession(cfg.credential, session, cfg.udpHost, cfg.udpPort).use { ps ->
val (test, findings) = echoTrain(cfg, ps, startMono, control, session.sessionId)
tests.add(test)
allFindings.addAll(findings)
// The upstream train needs no grant and no capability beyond udp-probe itself; a
// server that predates trains simply never answers the report request, which the
// measurement reports as exactly that ambiguity rather than as network loss.
val (utTest, utFindings) = UpstreamTrainMeasurement(ids)
.run(ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
tests.add(utTest)
allFindings.addAll(utFindings)
// Downstream needs a session the server has already seen traffic from — the echo
// train just provided that — and a server that advertises the grants. Skipped
// quietly against an older server rather than reported as a failure of the network.
if (cfg.downstream && profile.supports("downtrain") && profile.supports("big-send")) {
val (dsTests, dsFindings) = DownstreamMeasurement(ids)
.run(cfg.credential, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
tests.addAll(dsTests)
allFindings.addAll(dsFindings)
}
if (cfg.throughput && profile.supports("throughput")) {
val (tpTest, tpFindings) = ThroughputMeasurement(ids).run(
cfg.credential, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
durationS = cfg.throughputSeconds, kbps = cfg.throughputKbps,
)
tests.add(tpTest)
allFindings.addAll(tpFindings)
}
}
control.deleteSession(cfg.credential, session.sessionId)
val summary = Verdicts.derive(tests, allFindings)
return MeasurementDocument(
run = Run(
id = runId, trigger = Trigger.MANUAL, startedAt = startWall, endedAt = ids.nowWall(),
clock = Clock(monoOriginWall = startWall),
app = app, device = device,
tiers = Tiers(app = true),
),
serverSessions = listOf(serverSession),
tests = tests,
findings = allFindings,
summary = summary,
)
}
private fun echoTrain(
cfg: Config, ps: ProbeSession, startMono: Long,
control: ControlClient? = null, sessionId: String? = null,
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val seqs = ArrayList<Int>()
val tTx = ArrayList<Long?>()
val tRx = ArrayList<Long?>()
val sizes = ArrayList<Int>()
val rtts = ArrayList<Double>()
val observedPorts = LinkedHashSet<Int>()
// Wire sequence numbers, kept so the server's observations can be correlated packet by
// packet. They are not 0..n-1: the counter is shared with every other packet type on the
// session, so "the nth echo" is not "sequence n".
val wireSeqs = ArrayList<Int>()
for (i in 0 until cfg.echoCount) {
val txMono = ids.monoNs() - startMono
val r = ps.echo(cfg.echoPaddingBytes)
wireSeqs.add(ps.lastSeq)
seqs.add(i)
tTx.add(txMono)
sizes.add(Wire_HEADER + cfg.echoPaddingBytes)
if (r != null) {
tRx.add(ids.monoNs() - startMono)
rtts.add(r.rttMs)
r.observation?.observedPort?.let { observedPorts.add(it) }
} else {
tRx.add(null)
}
}
// Ask the server what it actually received. This is what turns "3 % loss somewhere" into
// "3 % loss upstream" - the least useful form of the answer into a usable one.
val directional: DirectionalMetrics? =
if (control != null && sessionId != null) {
runCatching {
val samples = wireSeqs.indices.map {
Directional.Sample(wireSeqs[it], tTx[it] ?: 0L, tRx[it])
}
Directional.analyse(samples, serverSightings(control, cfg, sessionId))
}.getOrNull() // an older server without the endpoint simply yields no split
} else {
null
}
val sent = cfg.echoCount
val received = rtts.size
val lossPct = if (sent == 0) 0.0 else (sent - received) * 100.0 / sent
val natRebinding = observedPorts.size > 1
val evidence: JsonObject = TrainEvidence(
epochMonoNs = startMono, seq = seqs, tTxNs = tTx, tRxNs = tRx, sizeBytes = sizes,
).toEvidence()
val directionalJson = directional?.let {
json.encodeToJsonElement(DirectionalMetrics.serializer(), it) as JsonObject
}
val metrics: JsonObject = json.encodeToJsonElement(
EchoMetrics(
sent = sent, received = received, lossPct = round1(lossPct),
rttMsMin = rtts.minOrNull()?.let(::round1),
rttMsAvg = rtts.average().takeIf { received > 0 }?.let(::round1),
rttMsMax = rtts.maxOrNull()?.let(::round1),
observedPorts = observedPorts.toList(),
natRebindingDetected = natRebinding,
)
).let { base -> JsonObject((base as JsonObject) + (directionalJson ?: JsonObject(emptyMap()))) }
val status = when {
received == 0 -> TestStatus.FAILED
received < sent -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
else -> TestStatus.OK
}
val test = Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, sessionRef = "sess-1", tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = startMono, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(), status = status,
evidence = evidence, metrics = metrics,
)
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
if (received == 0) {
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE, testId,
"No UDP echo replies from the server",
"Every ECHO probe to the server's UDP data plane was lost — the path blocks or drops the session's UDP traffic."))
} else if (lossPct >= 20.0) {
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_LOSS, testId,
"High UDP loss to the server (${round1(lossPct)}%)",
"A large fraction of ECHO probes were lost, indicating an unreliable UDP path."))
}
// Naming the direction is the entire value of the split, so the findings do.
directional?.let { d ->
when {
d.noneReachedServer && received == 0 -> findings.add(
finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM, testId,
"Nothing reached the server",
"The server received none of the ${d.sent} probes, so the traffic is being " +
"dropped on the way out, not on the way back. A firewall or NAT on " +
"this side of the path is the place to look."),
)
d.lossUpstreamPct >= 2.0 -> findings.add(
finding(FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM, testId,
"${d.lossUpstreamPct} % of probes were lost on the way to the server",
"${d.lostUpstream} of ${d.sent} probes never reached the server. The " +
"return path is not implicated: replies came back for everything that " +
"arrived."),
)
}
if (d.lossDownstreamPct >= 2.0) {
findings.add(
finding(FindingRegistry.LOSS_DOWNSTREAM, testId,
"${d.lossDownstreamPct} % of replies were lost on the way back",
"The server received ${d.seenByServer} probes and answered them, but " +
"${d.lostDownstream} of those replies never arrived. The outbound path " +
"is fine; the fault is on the return leg."),
)
}
}
if (natRebinding) {
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.NAT_UDP_REBINDING, testId,
"NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow",
"The server observed more than one source port for this session (${observedPorts.joinToString()}), i.e. a NAT with a short UDP mapping or per-packet remapping."))
}
return test to findings
}
/**
* The server's per-packet record of this session's echoes (spec section 6). Filtered to
* ECHO_REQ, because the observation list also holds MTU probes and anything else we sent -
* counting those as train packets would invent loss that is not there.
*/
private fun serverSightings(
control: ControlClient, cfg: Config, sessionId: String,
): List<Directional.ServerSighting> {
val body = control.observations(cfg.credential, sessionId)
val packets = Json.parseToJsonElement(body).jsonObject["udp"]
?.jsonObject?.get("packets") as? JsonArray ?: return emptyList()
return packets.mapNotNull { el ->
val o = el as? JsonObject ?: return@mapNotNull null
val type = o["type"]?.jsonPrimitive?.intOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null
if (type != ECHO_REQ_TYPE) return@mapNotNull null
Directional.ServerSighting(
seq = o["seq"]?.jsonPrimitive?.intOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
tRxNs = o["t_rx_ns"]?.jsonPrimitive?.longOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
tTxNs = o["t_tx_ns"]?.jsonPrimitive?.longOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
)
}
}
/**
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
*
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
*/
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
)
private companion object {
const val Wire_HEADER = 32
const val ECHO_REQ_TYPE = 0x01
fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import java.time.Instant
import java.util.UUID
/**
* Clock/ID source, injected so the engine has no hidden nondeterminism and stays unit-testable.
* The default uses wall + monotonic clocks and random UUIDs; tests supply deterministic ones.
*/
interface IdSource {
fun uuid(): String
fun monoNs(): Long
fun nowWall(): String
}
class SystemIdSource : IdSource {
override fun uuid(): String = UUID.randomUUID().toString()
override fun monoNs(): Long = System.nanoTime()
override fun nowWall(): String = Instant.now().toString()
}
/** Metrics for train.udp_updown; recomputable from the columnar evidence. */
@Serializable
data class EchoMetrics(
val sent: Int,
val received: Int,
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double,
@SerialName("rtt_ms_min") val rttMsMin: Double? = null,
@SerialName("rtt_ms_avg") val rttMsAvg: Double? = null,
@SerialName("rtt_ms_max") val rttMsMax: Double? = null,
@SerialName("observed_ports") val observedPorts: List<Int> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("nat_rebinding_detected") val natRebindingDetected: Boolean = false,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Wire
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonArray
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
/**
* Downstream throughput: the server sends at a paced rate for a bounded time and the client
* measures what arrives (`perf.throughput_udp`).
*
* The number this produces is only meaningful with a qualifier attached, and getting that
* qualifier right is most of the work here. A throughput test reports the *smallest* limit on the
* path, and the sender's own ceiling is one of the candidates: if the server was asked for 50 Mbps
* and 50 Mbps arrived, the network was never the constraint and "50 Mbps" says nothing about it.
* Reporting that as a capacity measurement would be a confident lie, so the result always carries
* [ThroughputMetrics.limitedBy] and a finding is only raised when the network is actually
* implicated.
*
* Comparing against the *sender's* count rather than the requested rate is the other half: the
* server reports how much it actually put on the wire, and the gap between that and what arrived
* is the loss. A receiver alone cannot tell "the network dropped it" from "the sender never sent
* it", and guessing turns a healthy server-side limit into a phantom network fault.
*/
class ThroughputMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
fun run(
credential: String,
sessionId: String,
control: ControlClient,
probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String,
durationS: Int = 5,
kbps: Int = 50_000,
sizeBytes: Int = 1200,
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
val reply = runCatching {
control.action(
credential, sessionId,
"""{"action":"throughput","direction":"down","duration_s":$durationS,""" +
""""kbps":$kbps,"size_bytes":$sizeBytes}""",
)
}
if (reply.isFailure) {
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "throughput refused"),
) to emptyList()
}
// The server may have shortened the run to fit its own byte budget; listen for what it
// actually promised, not for what we asked.
val plannedMs = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "duration_ms") ?: (durationS * 1000)
// A margin past the planned end so the tail of the run is not counted as loss: packets
// still in flight when we stop listening were not dropped, they were merely late.
val received = probe.collectGranted(plannedMs + 1_500L)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_THROUGHPUT_DATA }
val bytes = received.sumOf { it.sizeBytes.toLong() }
val spanNs = if (received.size >= 2) {
received.maxOf { it.tRxNs } - received.minOf { it.tRxNs }
} else {
0L
}
// Measured over the arrival span rather than our listening window, which includes the
// request round trip and the trailing margin and would understate the rate.
val receivedKbps = if (spanNs > 0) (bytes * 8 * 1_000_000 / spanNs).toInt() else 0
val sender = senderReport(control, credential, sessionId)
val sentPackets = sender?.packets ?: 0
val lossPct = if (sentPackets > 0) {
round2((sentPackets - received.size).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sentPackets)
} else {
null
}
// Only a run the *clock* ended measured the network. One stopped by our own byte budget
// or rate ceiling measured this server.
val limitedBy = sender?.limitedBy ?: "unknown"
val networkLimited = limitedBy == "duration" &&
sender != null && receivedKbps > 0 && receivedKbps < sender.kbps * 9 / 10
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
ThroughputMetrics(
requestedKbps = kbps,
plannedDurationMs = plannedMs,
packetsReceived = received.size,
bytesReceived = bytes,
receivedKbps = receivedKbps,
senderPackets = sender?.packets,
senderBytes = sender?.bytes,
senderKbps = sender?.kbps,
lossPct = lossPct,
limitedBy = limitedBy,
measuresNetwork = networkLimited,
),
) as JsonObject
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
when {
sender == null -> Unit // no sender report: nothing can be concluded, so nothing is
received.isEmpty() -> findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, testId,
"No throughput traffic arrived",
"The server sent ${sender.packets} packets and none arrived. This is a " +
"connectivity fault rather than a slow link.",
),
)
networkLimited -> findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED, testId,
"Downstream throughput ${receivedKbps / 1000} Mbit/s, below the " +
"${sender.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s offered",
"The server sent at ${sender.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s for the full run and " +
"${receivedKbps / 1000} Mbit/s arrived" +
(lossPct?.let { ", losing $it % of packets" } ?: "") +
". The path could not carry what was offered.",
),
)
}
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = if (received.isEmpty()) TestStatus.FAILED else TestStatus.OK,
metrics = metrics,
) to findings
}
/**
* Upstream throughput: the client sends, the server counts.
*
* The mirror image of the downstream case, and it needs no grant the client is generating
* its own traffic, so there is no amplification to gate. What it does need is the server's
* count: only the far end knows how much arrived, and without that number a sender can
* measure how fast it can *transmit*, which is not the same question and is usually just the
* speed of the local NIC.
*/
fun runUpstream(
credential: String,
sessionId: String,
control: ControlClient,
probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String,
durationS: Int = 5,
kbps: Int = 20_000,
sizeBytes: Int = 1200,
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
// Zeroes the server's counter so this run measures itself rather than inheriting the
// packets of an earlier one on the same session.
val reply = runCatching {
control.action(credential, sessionId, """{"action":"throughput","direction":"up"}""")
}
if (reply.isFailure) {
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "refused"),
) to emptyList()
}
val sent = probe.sendThroughput(durationS * 1000L, kbps, sizeBytes)
// A moment for the tail of the run to arrive; counting still-in-flight packets as lost
// would inflate the loss figure by whatever the path's delay happens to be.
Thread.sleep(500)
val seen = upstreamCount(control, credential, sessionId)
val lossPct = if (sent.packets > 0 && seen != null) {
round2((sent.packets - seen.packets).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sent.packets)
} else {
null
}
// The receiver's rate is the measurement. The sender's is what we managed to emit, which
// is a property of this phone and its radio, not of the network.
val achievedKbps = seen?.kbps ?: 0
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
UpstreamThroughputMetrics(
requestedKbps = kbps,
sentPackets = sent.packets,
sentBytes = sent.bytes,
sentKbps = sent.kbps,
receivedPackets = seen?.packets,
receivedBytes = seen?.bytes,
receivedKbps = achievedKbps,
lossPct = lossPct,
// Same honesty rule as downstream: if what arrived matches what we offered, the
// path was never the constraint and this number says nothing about it.
measuresNetwork = seen != null && achievedKbps > 0 && achievedKbps < sent.kbps * 9 / 10,
),
) as JsonObject
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
if (seen != null && seen.packets == 0 && sent.packets > 0) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, testId,
"No upstream traffic reached the server",
"This device sent ${sent.packets} packets and the server received none. " +
"That is a connectivity fault on the outbound path rather than a slow link.",
),
)
} else if (lossPct != null && lossPct >= 2.0) {
findings.add(
finding(
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED, testId,
"Upstream loss of $lossPct % at ${sent.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s",
"The server received ${seen?.packets} of the ${sent.packets} packets this " +
"device sent. The outbound path could not carry what was offered.",
),
)
}
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = if (seen == null || seen.packets == 0) TestStatus.FAILED else TestStatus.OK,
metrics = metrics,
) to findings
}
private data class UpstreamCount(val packets: Int, val bytes: Long, val kbps: Int)
/** The server's tally for this session's upstream run. */
private fun upstreamCount(
control: ControlClient, credential: String, sessionId: String,
): UpstreamCount? = runCatching {
val o = Json.parseToJsonElement(control.observations(credential, sessionId))
.jsonObject["throughput_up"]?.jsonObject ?: return null
UpstreamCount(
packets = o["packets"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
bytes = o["bytes"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toLongOrNull() ?: 0,
kbps = o["kbps"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
)
}.getOrNull()
private data class SenderReport(
val packets: Int, val bytes: Long, val kbps: Int, val limitedBy: String,
)
/** The server's own account of the run, from the observations API. */
private fun senderReport(
control: ControlClient, credential: String, sessionId: String,
): SenderReport? = runCatching {
val arr = Json.parseToJsonElement(control.observations(credential, sessionId))
.jsonObject["throughput"]?.jsonArray ?: return null
val last = arr.lastOrNull()?.jsonObject ?: return null
SenderReport(
packets = last["packets"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
bytes = last["bytes"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toLongOrNull() ?: 0,
kbps = last["kbps"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
limitedBy = last["limited_by"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "unknown",
)
}.getOrNull()
private fun parseInt(body: String?, key: String): Int? =
body?.let { Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*(-?\\d+)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toIntOrNull() }
/**
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
*
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
*/
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
)
private fun round2(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 100.0) / 100.0
}
/** Metrics for perf.throughput_udp in the upstream direction. */
@Serializable
data class UpstreamThroughputMetrics(
val direction: String = "up",
@SerialName("requested_kbps") val requestedKbps: Int,
@SerialName("sent_packets") val sentPackets: Int,
@SerialName("sent_bytes") val sentBytes: Long,
/** What this device managed to emit — a property of the phone and its radio, not the path. */
@SerialName("sent_kbps") val sentKbps: Int,
@SerialName("received_packets") val receivedPackets: Int? = null,
@SerialName("received_bytes") val receivedBytes: Long? = null,
/** What arrived, measured by the only party that can measure it. This is the result. */
@SerialName("received_kbps") val receivedKbps: Int,
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double? = null,
@SerialName("measures_network") val measuresNetwork: Boolean,
)
/** Metrics for perf.throughput_udp. */
@Serializable
data class ThroughputMetrics(
val direction: String = "down",
@SerialName("requested_kbps") val requestedKbps: Int,
@SerialName("planned_duration_ms") val plannedDurationMs: Int,
@SerialName("packets_received") val packetsReceived: Int,
@SerialName("bytes_received") val bytesReceived: Long,
@SerialName("received_kbps") val receivedKbps: Int,
@SerialName("sender_packets") val senderPackets: Int? = null,
@SerialName("sender_bytes") val senderBytes: Long? = null,
@SerialName("sender_kbps") val senderKbps: Int? = null,
/** Against the sender's count, so a server-side limit is never counted as network loss. */
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double? = null,
/** What ended the run: duration | budget | rate | send_error | unknown. */
@SerialName("limited_by") val limitedBy: String,
/**
* Whether this number says anything about the network. False when the sender's own ceiling
* was the binding constraint in which case the rate is a property of the test, not the path.
*/
@SerialName("measures_network") val measuresNetwork: Boolean,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
/**
* train.udp_updown the client sends a paced train (types 0x03), then asks the server what
* arrived (0x04 0x05) and lines both views up per sequence number.
*
* This is the measurement a round trip cannot make: an echo run only says "lost somewhere", the
* train's two ledgers say lost on the way OUT, specifically, because the server's report names
* exactly which sequence numbers reached it. The downstream direction has its own test
* (train.udp_downstream) under a grant; this one needs none, since the client generates all the
* traffic itself.
*
* The evidence is the schema's columnar TrainEvidence: one index per sent packet, with the
* server-side columns null where a packet never arrived. Server timestamps are on the server's
* own clock only differences within that clock mean anything unless time.server_offset maps
* them (two-clock rule).
*/
class UpstreamTrainMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
fun run(
probe: ProbeSession,
sessionRef: String,
count: Int = 200,
sizeBytes: Int = 200,
interPacketMs: Long = 5,
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
val testId = ids.uuid()
val started = ids.monoNs()
// The id only needs to be unique within this session; a clash across sessions is
// meaningless because trains are buffered per session on the server.
val trainId = (System.nanoTime() and 0x7FFFFFFF).toInt()
val sent = probe.sendTrain(trainId, count, sizeBytes, interPacketMs)
// Let the tail arrive before asking for the ledger; packets still in flight when the
// report is cut would read as upstream loss.
Thread.sleep(300)
val report = probe.trainReport(trainId)
if (report == null) {
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, sessionRef = sessionRef,
tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = TestStatus.FAILED,
// Honest ambiguity: an old server drops 0x04 silently, and a lost report looks
// identical from here. Neither says anything about the train itself.
error = TestError(
"no_report",
"no train report arrived — the report was lost, or the server predates trains",
),
) to emptyList()
}
val bySeq = report.rows.associateBy { it.seq }
fun col255(v: Int): Int? = v.takeIf { it != 255 } // 255 = "not observed" on the wire
val evidence = TrainEvidence(
epochMonoNs = started,
seq = sent.map { it.seq },
tTxNs = sent.map { it.tTxNs },
tSrvRxNs = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.tRxNs },
tRxNs = sent.map { null }, // upstream only: nothing comes back per packet
sizeBytes = sent.map { it.sizeBytes },
ttlSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.ttl) } },
dscpSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.dscp) } },
ecnSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.ecn) } },
evidenceTruncated = report.truncated,
).toEvidence()
// Loss against the server's total count, not its row list: rows past the server's buffer
// cap are counted but not kept, and treating them as lost would invent loss exactly on
// the biggest trains.
val lossPct = if (sent.isEmpty()) 0.0 else {
(sent.size - report.received).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sent.size
}
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
UpstreamTrainMetrics(
sent = sent.size,
receivedByServer = report.received,
lossPct = round1(lossPct),
reportPartsExpected = report.partsExpected,
reportPartsReceived = report.partsReceived,
truncated = report.truncated,
),
) as JsonObject
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
if (sent.isNotEmpty() && report.received == 0) {
findings.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.code,
category = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "The server received none of ${sent.size} upstream packets",
description = "Every train packet vanished on the way out, while the " +
"report request's reply made it back — the outbound path drops this " +
"traffic, the return path works.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
),
)
} else if (lossPct >= 2.0) {
findings.add(
Finding(
id = ids.uuid(),
code = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.code,
category = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.category,
severity = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.severity,
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "Upstream loss of ${round1(lossPct)} %",
description = "The server received ${report.received} of the ${sent.size} " +
"packets this device sent, and its per-sequence ledger names the " +
"missing ones. This is outbound loss specifically; the return path " +
"delivered the report.",
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
),
)
}
val status = when {
report.received == 0 && sent.isNotEmpty() -> TestStatus.FAILED
report.partsReceived < report.partsExpected -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
else -> TestStatus.OK
}
return Test(
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
status = status, evidence = evidence, metrics = metrics,
) to findings
}
private fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
}
/** Metrics for train.udp_updown. */
@Serializable
data class UpstreamTrainMetrics(
val sent: Int,
/** The server's total count — includes packets past its row buffer (counted, not listed). */
@SerialName("received_by_server") val receivedByServer: Int,
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double,
@SerialName("report_parts_expected") val reportPartsExpected: Int,
@SerialName("report_parts_received") val reportPartsReceived: Int,
/** The server's row buffer overflowed: rows are a sample, the count is still complete. */
val truncated: Boolean,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.engine.Directional.Sample
import app.echo_lot.engine.Directional.ServerSighting
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* The arithmetic that turns "3 % loss somewhere" into "3 % loss upstream". Getting a denominator
* wrong here does not crash anything it produces a plausible number pointing at the wrong half
* of the network, which is worse than no number at all. Hence a test per claim.
*/
class DirectionalTest {
/** A clean train: every packet sent, seen and answered. Server clock offset by a constant. */
private fun clean(n: Int, offsetNs: Long = 5_000_000_000L): Pair<List<Sample>, List<ServerSighting>> {
val sent = (1..n).map { Sample(it, tTxNs = it * 10_000_000L, tRxNs = it * 10_000_000L + 4_000_000L) }
val seen = (1..n).map {
ServerSighting(it, tRxNs = offsetNs + it * 10_000_000L + 2_000_000L,
tTxNs = offsetNs + it * 10_000_000L + 2_100_000L)
}
return sent to seen
}
@Test
fun aCleanTrainReportsNoLossInEitherDirection() {
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen)
assertEquals(10, m.sent)
assertEquals(10, m.seenByServer)
assertEquals(10, m.repliesReceived)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
assertFalse(m.noneReachedServer)
}
// The whole point: a packet the server never saw was lost on the way there.
@Test
fun packetsTheServerNeverSawAreUpstreamLoss() {
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen.filter { it.seq !in setOf(3, 7) })
assertEquals(2, m.lostUpstream)
assertEquals(0, m.lostDownstream)
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "a packet that never arrived cannot be lost coming back")
}
@Test
fun repliesThatNeverArrivedAreDownstreamLoss() {
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
val withHoles = sent.map { if (it.seq in setOf(2, 5)) it.copy(tRxNs = null) else it }
val m = Directional.analyse(withHoles, seen)
assertEquals(0, m.lostUpstream)
assertEquals(2, m.lostDownstream)
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
}
// Downstream loss is measured against what actually reached the server. Using "sent" as the
// denominator would count every upstream loss a second time and overstate the return path.
@Test
fun downstreamLossIsRelativeToWhatReachedTheServer() {
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
// 5 lost on the way there; of the 5 that arrived, 1 reply is lost coming back.
val seenPartial = seen.filter { it.seq > 5 }
val withHole = sent.map {
when {
it.seq <= 5 -> it.copy(tRxNs = null) // never got there, so never came back
it.seq == 6 -> it.copy(tRxNs = null) // arrived, reply lost
else -> it
}
}
val m = Directional.analyse(withHole, seenPartial)
assertEquals(5, m.lostUpstream)
assertEquals(50.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertEquals(1, m.lostDownstream)
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "1 of the 5 that arrived, not 1 of 10")
}
@Test
fun aServerThatSawNothingIsCalledOutSeparately() {
val (sent, _) = clean(6)
val m = Directional.analyse(sent.map { it.copy(tRxNs = null) }, emptyList())
assertTrue(m.noneReachedServer)
assertEquals(100.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "with nothing arriving there is no return path to blame")
}
// Jitter is legitimate without synchronised clocks because the offset cancels when successive
// one-way samples are differenced. This pins that: a huge constant offset must not show up.
@Test
fun jitterIsUnaffectedByTheClockOffsetBetweenTheTwoMachines() {
val (sent, near) = clean(10, offsetNs = 0)
val (_, far) = clean(10, offsetNs = 9_999_999_999L)
val a = Directional.analyse(sent, near)
val b = Directional.analyse(sent, far)
assertEquals(a.jitterUpstreamMs, b.jitterUpstreamMs,
"a constant clock offset must cancel when consecutive samples are differenced")
assertEquals(0.0, assertNotNull(a.jitterUpstreamMs), "an evenly spaced train has no jitter")
}
@Test
fun jitterReflectsUnevenArrival() {
val sent = listOf(
Sample(1, 0, 10_000_000),
Sample(2, 10_000_000, 20_000_000),
Sample(3, 20_000_000, 30_000_000),
)
// Server receive times drift: +2ms, +7ms, +3ms relative to send.
val seen = listOf(
ServerSighting(1, 2_000_000, 2_100_000),
ServerSighting(2, 17_000_000, 17_100_000),
ServerSighting(3, 23_000_000, 23_100_000),
)
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen)
// one-way samples: 2ms, 7ms, 3ms → |7-2| and |3-7| → mean 4.5ms
assertEquals(4.5, assertNotNull(m.jitterUpstreamMs))
}
// "No jitter" and "not enough data to say" are different claims, and only one is true here.
@Test
fun tooFewSamplesReportsNoJitterRatherThanZero() {
val m = Directional.analyse(
listOf(Sample(1, 0, 10_000_000)),
listOf(ServerSighting(1, 2_000_000, 2_100_000)),
)
assertNull(m.jitterUpstreamMs)
assertNull(m.jitterDownstreamMs)
}
// A server record for a sequence we never sent is not evidence about this train; folding it
// in would yield loss percentages outside 0100.
@Test
fun strayServerRecordsAreIgnored() {
val (sent, seen) = clean(5)
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen + ServerSighting(99, 1, 2) + ServerSighting(100, 3, 4))
assertEquals(5, m.seenByServer)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertTrue(m.lossDownstreamPct in 0.0..100.0)
}
@Test
fun anEmptyTrainDoesNotDivideByZero() {
val m = Directional.analyse(emptyList(), emptyList())
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
assertFalse(m.noneReachedServer, "nothing sent is not the same as nothing arriving")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.VersionRefused
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
import kotlin.test.fail
/**
* Checks the version gate against a LIVE server the half that unit tests cannot reach, because
* the whole point is that two independently-built artifacts agree. Self-skips without
* ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*/
class LiveCompatTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private fun clientAs(version: String) = ControlClient(url!!, setOf(pin!!), version)
@Test
fun theServerAdvertisesAndEnforcesItsWindow() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null) {
println("LiveCompatTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
// The profile must state the window — without it the app cannot pre-empt a refusal.
val profile = clientAs("0.2.0").profile(cred)
println("server ${profile.serverVersion} protocol=${profile.compat.protocolVersion} " +
"accepts app [${profile.compat.appMin}, ${profile.compat.appMax})")
assertTrue(profile.compat.protocolVersion.isNotBlank(), "profile omits protocol_version")
assertTrue(profile.compat.appMin.isNotBlank(), "profile omits app_min")
// This build must be inside it, or every other live test here is meaningless.
val verdict = Compat.check(profile, "0.2.0")
assertEquals(Compat.Verdict.OK, verdict.verdict, verdict.message ?: "")
// The profile stays reachable for a version the server would otherwise refuse: that is
// how a refused client discovers what it needs.
val ancient = clientAs("0.1.0")
val stillReadable = ancient.profile(cred)
assertEquals(profile.serverVersion, stillReadable.serverVersion,
"the profile endpoint must never be gated on app version")
// And a gated endpoint refuses it, with a message naming the window.
try {
ancient.createSession(cred, System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr")
fail("server accepted a session from an out-of-window app")
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
val msg = assertNotNull(e.message)
println("refused as expected: $msg")
assertTrue(msg.contains("0.1.0"), "refusal should name the offending version: $msg")
assertTrue(msg.contains(profile.compat.appMin), "refusal should name the window: $msg")
}
// Too new is refused the same way — the window is a range, not a floor.
try {
clientAs("99.0.0").createSession(cred, System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr")
fail("server accepted a session from an app above its window")
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
println("too-new refused as expected: ${e.message}")
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestType
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Runs DownstreamMeasurement against a LIVE server and checks the *documents* it produces, not
* just that packets moved: the tests must carry recomputable metrics and land on the right test
* types, because that is what an archived run is read back as. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*/
class LiveDownstreamTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
@JTest
fun producesDownstreamTestsAndFindings() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveDownstreamTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin))
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
val (tests, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
ps.echo() // prime: the grant binds to the source the server has actually observed
DownstreamMeasurement(SystemIdSource())
.run(cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
for (t in tests) println("${t.type} status=${t.status} metrics=${t.metrics}")
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
// Assert on what is present, not on how many: adding a measurement should not be a
// test edit. (It was, once — hence the note.)
assertTrue(tests.size >= 3, "expected at least the three downstream tests, got ${tests.size}")
val byType = tests.associateBy { it.type }
val pmtud = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN], "no mtu.pmtud_down test")
assertTrue(pmtud.status == TestStatus.OK || pmtud.status == TestStatus.PARTIAL,
"DF probe did not deliver anything: ${pmtud.status}")
val pathMtu = pmtud.metrics?.get("path_mtu_bytes")?.toString()?.toIntOrNull()
assertNotNull(pathMtu, "pmtud_down must report a path MTU")
assertTrue(pathMtu in 576..9000, "implausible downstream path MTU: $pathMtu")
println("downstream path MTU = $pathMtu bytes")
val frag = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY], "no mtu.frag_delivery test")
assertNotNull(frag.metrics?.get("largest_delivered_bytes"))
// Fragment ordering runs only when fragments arrive at all, and only against a server
// that can craft them — so it is checked when present rather than required.
byType[TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING]?.let { fo ->
val m = fo.metrics?.toString() ?: ""
println("fragment ordering: ${fo.status} $m")
if (fo.status != TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED) {
assertTrue(m.contains("in_order"), "no per-ordering result: $m")
assertTrue(m.contains("reversed"), "reversed ordering was never attempted: $m")
}
}
val train = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM], "no downstream train")
assertNotNull(train.evidence, "a train without columnar evidence is not recomputable")
val received = train.metrics?.get("received")?.toString()?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
assertTrue(received > 0, "no downstream train packets arrived")
println("downstream train: $received received, loss=${train.metrics?.get("loss_pct")}, " +
"reordered=${train.metrics?.get("reordered_packets")}")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
import kotlin.test.fail
/**
* Enrolls against a LIVE server using the link the server itself minted (probe-protocol.md §2.1).
*
* This is the test that matters for enrollment, because the failure mode it guards against is a
* *disagreement* between two programs: the Go side assembles the link, the Kotlin side takes it
* apart, and if they differ by one percent-encoding the pin is wrong by one character which
* does not fail loudly, it fails as an inscrutable TLS error days later. A unit test on either
* side alone cannot see that.
*
* Needs ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI (minted over SSH by scripts/test-fmr.sh); self-skips without it.
*/
class LiveEnrollmentTest {
private val enrollUri = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI")
@Test
fun enrollsFromTheServersOwnLink() {
if (enrollUri.isNullOrBlank()) {
println("LiveEnrollmentTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI)"); return
}
println("link: ${enrollUri.take(60)}")
val link = assertNotNull(
EnrollmentLink.parse(enrollUri),
"the client could not parse a link the server produced — the two sides disagree",
)
println("parsed: url=${link.controlUrl} pin=${link.pin.take(12)}… token=${link.token.take(8)}")
// Redeeming applies the pin to the very request that spends the token, so a wrong pin
// fails here at the handshake rather than after the token is gone.
val enrolled = link.redeem(deviceName = "live-test", appVersion = "0.2.0")
assertTrue(enrolled.credential.isNotBlank(), "no credential came back")
assertTrue(enrolled.deviceId.isNotBlank(), "no device id came back")
println("enrolled: device=${enrolled.deviceId} server=${enrolled.profile.name} " +
"${enrolled.profile.serverVersion}")
// The credential must actually work, and the pin from the link must be the one that
// verifies the server — that is the whole claim the link is making.
assertEquals(link.controlUrl, enrolled.controlUrl)
assertTrue(enrolled.profile.capabilities.contains("udp-probe"),
"profile fetched with the new credential looks wrong: ${enrolled.profile.capabilities}")
// Single-use: a token that still works after redemption is a token an attacker can reuse.
try {
link.redeem(deviceName = "should-not-happen", appVersion = "0.2.0")
fail("the enrollment token was accepted twice — it must be single-use")
} catch (t: Throwable) {
println("second redemption correctly refused: ${t.message?.take(120)}")
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Wire
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Exercises the server's §5 granted sends against a LIVE server: downtrain (downstream loss /
* ordering) and big_send (downstream MTU). Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*
* This is the direction a client cannot measure alone only the far end can push large or
* numerous packets toward it so it is also the direction that needs the anti-amplification
* grant, and this test is the proof that the grant path works end to end.
*/
class LiveGrantedTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
@Test
fun downstreamTrainAndBigSend() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveGrantedTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin))
val profile = control.profile(cred)
println("capabilities: ${profile.capabilities}")
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
// The grant is bound to the OBSERVED data-plane source, so we must be seen first.
val echo = ps.echo()
println("primed with echo rtt=${echo?.rttMs}")
// --- downtrain: 50 packets of 300 bytes, 5ms apart ---
val dtResp = control.action(
cred, session.sessionId,
"""{"action":"downtrain","count":50,"size_bytes":300,"interval_us":5000}""",
)
println("downtrain accepted: ${dtResp.take(160)}")
val down = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_DOWNTRAIN_DATA }
val seqs = down.map { it.seq }.toSet()
println("downtrain received ${down.size}/50 packets, distinct seqs=${seqs.size}, " +
"sizes=${down.map { it.sizeBytes }.distinct()}")
assertTrue(down.isNotEmpty(), "no DOWNTRAIN_DATA arrived — granted send path is broken")
// --- big_send with DF: the largest size that arrives is the downstream path MTU ---
val sizes = listOf(600, 1200, 1400, 1472, 1500, 2000, 4000)
val dfResp = control.action(
cred, session.sessionId,
"""{"action":"big_send","df":true,"sizes_bytes":${sizes}}""",
)
println("big_send(df) accepted: ${dfResp.take(200)}")
val dfArrived = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }.map { it.sizeBytes }.sorted()
println("big_send(df) arrived: $dfArrived")
assertTrue(dfArrived.isNotEmpty(), "no unfragmented BIG_SEND packets arrived")
val pathMtu = dfArrived.max()
// --- and without DF, to see whether fragments get through above that ---
val fragResp = control.action(
cred, session.sessionId,
"""{"action":"big_send","df":false,"sizes_bytes":${sizes}}""",
)
println("big_send(frag) accepted: ${fragResp.take(200)}")
val fragArrived = ps.collectGranted(windowMs = 4000)
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }.map { it.sizeBytes }.sorted()
println("big_send(frag) arrived: $fragArrived")
// The distinction the DF flag exists for: fragmented delivery may exceed the
// unfragmented path MTU, and reporting the former as the latter would be a lie.
println("downstream path MTU (payload bytes) = $pathMtu; " +
"largest fragmented delivery = ${fragArrived.maxOrNull()}")
assertTrue((fragArrived.maxOrNull() ?: 0) >= pathMtu,
"fragmented delivery should reach at least as far as unfragmented")
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Runs the full server-facing engine against a live server and validates the produced
* MeasurementDocument. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_* (same contract as core-protocol's live
* test). This is the whole vertical: protocol client engine schema document verdict.
*/
class LiveMeasurementTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
@Test
fun producesValidDocumentFromLiveServer() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveMeasurementTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)")
return
}
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
val engine = ServerMeasurement(
ids = SystemIdSource(),
app = AppInfo(version = "0.1.0", build = 1, flavor = "test"),
device = DeviceInfo("test", "jvm", 0, "n/a"),
)
val doc = engine.run(
ServerMeasurement.Config(
controlUrl = url, pins = setOf(pin), credential = cred,
target = target, udpHost = host, udpPort = port, echoCount = 20,
)
)
// The document must round-trip and carry the expected structure.
val encoded = Json { encodeDefaults = true }.encodeToString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), doc)
println("document (${encoded.length} bytes): overall=${doc.summary?.overall}")
assertEquals(1, doc.serverSessions.size)
assertTrue(doc.serverSessions[0].capabilities.contains("udp-probe"))
// A full run is the echo train plus the three downstream tests; assert on the one this
// test is about rather than on the count, so adding a measurement is not a test edit.
for (t in doc.tests) println(" ${t.type}${t.status}")
for (f in doc.findings) println(" finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
val test = doc.tests.first { it.type == TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN }
assertTrue(test.status == TestStatus.OK || test.status == TestStatus.PARTIAL,
"expected replies from live server, got ${test.status}")
val metrics = Json.parseToJsonElement(test.metrics.toString())
println("metrics: $metrics")
assertTrue(metrics.toString().contains("rtt_ms_avg"))
// The directional split is the point of asking the server what it saw: without it a
// lossy path is reported as "loss" with no direction, which sends an engineer looking
// in both at once. Correlation is by wire sequence number, so a mismatch here means the
// two sides disagree about which packet is which.
val m = metrics.toString()
assertTrue(m.contains("seen_by_server"), "no directional split in the metrics: $m")
val seen = Regex(""""seen_by_server":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
assertNotNull(seen, "seen_by_server missing")
assertEquals(20, seen, "the server should have seen every probe on a healthy path")
assertTrue(m.contains("jitter_upstream_ms"), "no per-direction jitter: $m")
println("directional: $m")
assertTrue(doc.summary != null)
// A healthy local->fmr path should be green (no loss, no rebinding) or yellow.
println("summary: ${doc.summary}")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Downstream throughput against a LIVE server. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*
* The assertions are about *honesty* rather than speed: a rate is only a measurement if the run
* was ended by the clock and the sender's own count backs it up. A test that just asserted "some
* Mbps arrived" would pass equally well against a broken implementation.
*/
class LiveThroughputTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
@Test
fun measuresDownstreamRateAndSaysWhatLimitedIt() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveThroughputTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
ps.echo() // prime: the grant binds to the observed source
ThroughputMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).run(
cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
durationS = 3, kbps = 20_000,
)
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
println("throughput: ${test.status} $m")
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "no throughput traffic arrived: $m")
// The sender's own count must be present — without it, loss cannot be attributed and the
// number is not a measurement.
assertTrue(m.contains("sender_packets"), "no sender report to compare against: $m")
assertTrue(m.contains("limited_by"), "the result must say what ended the run: $m")
val received = Regex(""""received_kbps":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
assertNotNull(received)
assertTrue(received > 0, "measured 0 kbps: $m")
println("received ${received / 1000} Mbit/s")
// A run this short and this far below the ceiling should end on the clock. Anything else
// means the grant was the constraint, and then the rate says nothing about the path.
assertTrue(m.contains(""""limited_by":"duration""""),
"the run did not end on the clock, so the rate measures the server, not the path: $m")
}
// Upstream is the direction only the far end can measure. The assertion that matters is that
// the server's count is present and plausible against what we sent — a test that only checked
// "we transmitted some Mbps" would pass against a server that counted nothing at all.
@Test
fun measuresUpstreamAgainstTheServersCount() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveThroughputTest(up) skipped"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
ps.echo()
ThroughputMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).runUpstream(
cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
durationS = 3, kbps = 10_000,
)
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
println("upstream: ${test.status} $m")
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "the server counted nothing: $m")
val recv = Regex(""""received_packets":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
val sent = Regex(""""sent_packets":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
assertNotNull(recv); assertNotNull(sent)
assertTrue(sent > 100, "barely anything was sent, so the rate means nothing: $m")
assertTrue(recv > 0, "the server received none of $sent packets: $m")
// The counts should be close on a healthy path; wildly different means the two sides are
// counting different things rather than the network losing packets.
assertTrue(recv <= sent, "the server counted MORE than we sent — the counter is not being reset")
println("sent $sent, server saw $recv")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Anonymizer
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Salt
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.UploadRefused
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Drives the upload path against a LIVE server: anonymize, upload, list, fetch back, delete.
*
* The point is not that the HTTP works it is that what comes *back off the server* has been
* stripped. Uploading and then re-reading the stored document is the only check that proves the
* anonymizer ran on the bytes that actually left, rather than on a copy. Self-skips without
* ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*/
class LiveUploadTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val json = Json { prettyPrint = false }
private fun sampleRun(id: String) = """
{
"schema": "echolot/measurement",
"run": {
"id": "$id", "trigger": "manual", "started_at": "2026-08-01T10:00:00Z",
"notes": "kitchen table",
"device": {"manufacturer": "OnePlus", "model": "CPH2747"}
},
"networks": [{
"id": "net-1", "ssid": "Rambossek WLAN", "bssid": "78:9a:18:aa:bb:cc",
"gateway_ip4": "192.168.1.1", "public_ip4": "203.0.113.77",
"ssdp_responders": [{"friendly_name": "Living Room TV"}]
}],
"tests": [{"id": "t1", "type": "train.udp_updown", "status": "ok",
"metrics": {"rtt_ms_avg": 12.4, "loss_pct": 0.0}}],
"findings": [{"id": "f1", "code": "nat.udp_rebinding", "severity": "medium"}],
"summary": {"verdict": "warn"}
}
""".trimIndent()
@Test
fun uploadRoundTrip() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null) {
println("LiveUploadTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin))
val profile = control.profile(cred)
val policy = profile.uploads
println("upload policy: mode=${policy.mode} min_anon=${policy.minAnonymization} " +
"max_bytes=${policy.maxBytes} retention_days=${policy.retentionDays}")
val runId = "livetest-" + System.nanoTime().toString().takeLast(10)
val level = PrivacyLevel.max(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, PrivacyLevel.fromWire(policy.minAnonymization))
val redacted = json.encodeToString(
JsonObject.serializer(),
Anonymizer(level, Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { 9 }))
.anonymize(json.parseToJsonElement(sampleRun(runId)).jsonObject),
)
assertFalse(redacted.contains("Rambossek"), "the anonymizer did not strip the SSID before upload")
if (!policy.accepted) {
// A server configured to refuse must refuse — that is the behaviour worth asserting.
try {
control.uploadRun(cred, redacted)
throw AssertionError("server advertises mode=${policy.mode} but accepted an upload")
} catch (e: UploadRefused) {
println("upload correctly refused: ${e.message?.take(140)}")
return
}
}
val created = control.uploadRun(cred, redacted)
println("stored: ${created.take(200)}")
val listed = control.listRuns(cred)
assertTrue(listed.contains(runId), "uploaded run is missing from the server's list")
val fetched = control.getRun(cred, runId)
assertFalse(fetched.contains("Rambossek"), "the SSID is sitting on the server")
assertFalse(fetched.contains("Living Room TV"), "an SSDP neighbour name is sitting on the server")
assertFalse(fetched.contains("kitchen table"), "a free-text note is sitting on the server")
assertTrue(fetched.contains("nat.udp_rebinding"), "the finding code should survive — it is the point")
assertTrue(fetched.contains("12.4"), "metrics should survive anonymization")
println("round trip verified: identifiers stripped, measurements intact")
control.deleteRun(cred, runId)
assertFalse(control.listRuns(cred).contains(runId), "delete did not remove the run")
println("deleted")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.engine
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* Upstream train (types 0x03-0x05) against a LIVE server. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
*
* What is asserted is the ledger property: the server's report must account for what was sent,
* per sequence number, because directional loss attribution is the entire reason trains exist
* a test that only checked "a report came back" would pass against a server that counts nothing.
*/
class LiveUpstreamTrainTest {
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
@Test
fun serverLedgerAccountsForTheTrain() {
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
println("LiveUpstreamTrainTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
}
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
ps.echo() // prime the session so its source is known
UpstreamTrainMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).run(
ps, sessionRef = "sess-1", count = 120, sizeBytes = 200, interPacketMs = 3,
)
}
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
println("updown: ${test.status} $m")
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "train report incomplete or absent: $m")
val sent = Regex(""""sent":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
val received = Regex(""""received_by_server":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
assertNotNull(sent); assertNotNull(received)
assertTrue(sent > 0, "nothing was sent: $m")
// Over a working path the ledger must be near-complete; a lossy wifi may drop a few, but
// a server that fails to count would show up as massive phantom loss here.
assertTrue(received >= sent * 9 / 10, "server counted $received of $sent: $m")
// The columnar evidence must carry a server timestamp for arrived packets — that column
// is what one-way delay math consumes after timesync.
val ev = assertNotNull(test.evidence).toString()
assertTrue(ev.contains("t_srv_rx_ns"), "no server rx column in evidence")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.jvm)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
}
// Pure Kotlin/JVM: the client half of probe-protocol.md. No Android deps, so
// the Android app modules can depend on it and it stays unit-testable (incl.
// live integration tests) on any JDK. Crypto, HTTP and UDP come from the JDK
// (javax.crypto, java.net.http, java.net) — only JSON needs a library.
dependencies {
implementation(libs.kotlinx.serialization.json)
testImplementation(kotlin("test"))
}
kotlin {
// Build with the available JDK (Android Studio's JBR is 21) but emit
// Java-17 bytecode so the Android app modules can consume this library.
jvmToolchain(21)
compilerOptions {
jvmTarget.set(org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget.JVM_17)
}
}
java {
sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
}
tasks.test {
useJUnitPlatform()
}
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package measurement models one measurement run (measurement-schema.md) — the archived,
// diffable, exportable unit. Design rules honored in the types: observation/interpretation
// separated (tests[] vs findings[]), two clocks (wall RFC3339 for humans, *_mono_ns for math),
// units in field names, columnar trains. params/evidence/metrics are per-test-type, so they are
// carried as JsonObject (the probe engine fills them; consumers ignore unknown fields).
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
@Serializable
data class MeasurementDocument(
val schema: String = "echolot/measurement",
@SerialName("schema_version") val schemaVersion: String = "1.0.0",
val run: Run,
val networks: List<Network> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("server_sessions") val serverSessions: List<ServerSession> = emptyList(),
val tests: List<Test> = emptyList(),
val findings: List<Finding> = emptyList(),
val summary: Summary? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Run(
val id: String, // UUIDv7
val trigger: Trigger,
@SerialName("started_at") val startedAt: String, // RFC3339 UTC, human correlation only
@SerialName("ended_at") val endedAt: String? = null,
val clock: Clock,
val app: AppInfo,
val device: DeviceInfo,
val tiers: Tiers,
@SerialName("profiles_used") val profilesUsed: List<String> = emptyList(),
val constraints: Constraints = Constraints(),
val notes: String? = null,
)
/**
* What limited this run the counterpart to [Tiers], which records what was available.
*
* A constrained run is not a failed run, and it is not a normal one either. Without this, a run
* taken through a VPN looks exactly like a clean run of a healthy network: the same shape, the
* same green verdict, and no way for a reader or a server aggregating thousands of these to
* know that almost nothing was actually measured.
*/
@Serializable
data class Constraints(
/** A VPN held the default route while this ran. */
@SerialName("vpn_active") val vpnActive: Boolean = false,
/**
* Per-network probing was refused by the OS.
*
* Android blocks `Network.bindSocket()` on the underlying networks whenever a VPN is up, to
* stop apps leaking around the tunnel. Every per-network test then measures nothing, so any
* conclusion drawn about the wifi or cellular link underneath is unfounded.
*/
@SerialName("per_network_blocked") val perNetworkBlocked: Boolean = false,
/** Networks that could not be measured, by id. */
@SerialName("unmeasured_networks") val unmeasuredNetworks: List<String> = emptyList(),
) {
/** True when this run's results mean something different from an unconstrained one. */
val constrained: Boolean get() = vpnActive || perNetworkBlocked
}
@Serializable
enum class Trigger {
@SerialName("manual") MANUAL,
@SerialName("scheduled") SCHEDULED,
@SerialName("monitor") MONITOR,
@SerialName("peer") PEER,
}
/** The two-clock anchor: mono_origin_wall maps the monotonic epoch to a wall time for humans;
* all math uses *_mono_ns relative to that monotonic origin. */
@Serializable
data class Clock(
@SerialName("mono_origin_wall") val monoOriginWall: String,
@SerialName("ntp_offset_ms") val ntpOffsetMs: Double? = null,
@SerialName("ntp_offset_source") val ntpOffsetSource: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class AppInfo(
val version: String,
val build: Int,
val git: String? = null,
val flavor: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class DeviceInfo(
val manufacturer: String,
val model: String,
@SerialName("android_sdk") val androidSdk: Int,
@SerialName("android_release") val androidRelease: String,
@SerialName("security_patch") val securityPatch: String? = null,
)
/** What each tier was *available*; each test records what it *used*. */
@Serializable
data class Tiers(
val app: Boolean = true,
val shizuku: Boolean = false,
val root: Boolean = false,
)
@Serializable
data class ServerSession(
val id: String,
@SerialName("profile_id") val profileId: String? = null,
@SerialName("profile_name") val profileName: String? = null,
@SerialName("control_url") val controlUrl: String,
@SerialName("server_version") val serverVersion: String? = null,
val capabilities: List<String> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("session_id") val sessionId: String,
val target: SessionTarget,
)
@Serializable
data class SessionTarget(
val ip4: String? = null,
val ip6: String? = null,
@SerialName("udp_port") val udpPort: Int = 0,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
/**
* Typed builders for the per-test-type evidence shapes the schema fixes (§6.2/§6.3/§6.4). Probe
* code fills these and folds them into [Test.evidence] via [toEvidence]; keeping them typed here
* means the columnar/traceroute/resolver contracts live in one place.
*/
@PublishedApi
internal val evidenceJson = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
/** Serialize any typed evidence object into the JsonObject the Test envelope carries. */
inline fun <reified T> T.toEvidence(): JsonObject =
evidenceJson.encodeToJsonElement(this) as JsonObject
/**
* Packet-train evidence (§6.2): columnar parallel arrays, one index per probe packet. Missing
* observations are null at that index a 10k-packet train stays in the hundreds of kB. Server
* columns use the server session epoch; only differences within one clock are meaningful unless a
* time.server_offset test maps them.
*/
@Serializable
data class TrainEvidence(
@SerialName("epoch_mono_ns") val epochMonoNs: Long,
val seq: List<Int>,
@SerialName("t_tx_ns") val tTxNs: List<Long?>,
@SerialName("t_srv_rx_ns") val tSrvRxNs: List<Long?> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("t_srv_tx_ns") val tSrvTxNs: List<Long?> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("t_rx_ns") val tRxNs: List<Long?>,
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: List<Int>,
@SerialName("dscp_sent") val dscpSent: Int? = null,
@SerialName("dscp_seen_by_server") val dscpSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("ecn_sent") val ecnSent: Int? = null,
@SerialName("ecn_seen_by_server") val ecnSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("ttl_seen_by_server") val ttlSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("evidence_truncated") val evidenceTruncated: Boolean = false,
)
/** Traceroute evidence (§6.3): fixed-tuple flow + per-TTL probe replies. */
@Serializable
data class TracerouteEvidence(val flow: Flow, val hops: List<Hop>)
@Serializable
data class Flow(
@SerialName("src_port") val srcPort: Int,
@SerialName("dst_port") val dstPort: Int,
@SerialName("fixed_tuple") val fixedTuple: Boolean = true,
)
@Serializable
data class Hop(val ttl: Int, val probes: List<HopProbe>)
@Serializable
data class HopProbe(
@SerialName("reply_from") val replyFrom: String? = null,
@SerialName("rtt_ns") val rttNs: Long? = null,
val icmp: String? = null,
@SerialName("reply_ttl") val replyTtl: Int? = null,
)
/** Resolver under test (§6.4); every dns.* test carries this in params. */
@Serializable
data class ResolverSpec(
val source: ResolverSource,
val address: String? = null,
val port: Int = 53,
val transport: String, // do53-udp | do53-tcp | dot | doh
@SerialName("doh_url") val dohUrl: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
enum class ResolverSource {
@SerialName("system") SYSTEM,
@SerialName("manual") MANUAL,
@SerialName("server-recursive") SERVER_RECURSIVE,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
/** Interpretation with references back to evidence (measurement-schema.md §7.1). A finding with
* no evidence_refs is invalid every finding must be re-derivable from the evidence alone. */
@Serializable
data class Finding(
val id: String, // UUIDv7
val code: String, // stable registry (findings-registry.md), lint-rule style
val category: Category,
val severity: Severity,
val confidence: Confidence,
@SerialName("network_ref") val networkRef: String? = null,
val title: String,
val description: String,
@SerialName("evidence_refs") val evidenceRefs: List<EvidenceRef>,
val recommendation: String? = null,
) {
init {
require(evidenceRefs.isNotEmpty()) { "a finding must reference at least one piece of evidence" }
}
}
@Serializable
data class EvidenceRef(val test: String, val pointer: String? = null)
/** Fixed §7.2 categories; each maps to one traffic light. */
@Serializable
enum class Category {
@SerialName("connectivity") CONNECTIVITY,
@SerialName("dns") DNS,
@SerialName("nat") NAT,
@SerialName("mtu") MTU,
@SerialName("ipv6") IPV6,
@SerialName("security") SECURITY,
@SerialName("performance") PERFORMANCE,
@SerialName("local") LOCAL,
@SerialName("wifi") WIFI,
}
/** Ordered worst→best via [rank]; drives the §7.3 light mapping. */
@Serializable
enum class Severity(val rank: Int) {
@SerialName("critical") CRITICAL(4),
@SerialName("high") HIGH(3),
@SerialName("medium") MEDIUM(2),
@SerialName("low") LOW(1),
@SerialName("info") INFO(0);
/** §7.3: critical|high → red, medium|low → yellow, info → green. */
fun toLight(): Verdict = when (this) {
CRITICAL, HIGH -> Verdict.RED
MEDIUM, LOW -> Verdict.YELLOW
INFO -> Verdict.GREEN
}
}
@Serializable
enum class Confidence {
@SerialName("high") HIGH,
@SerialName("medium") MEDIUM,
@SerialName("low") LOW,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
/**
* The registry of finding codes (measurement-schema.md §9, open item 1).
*
* A finding code is the stable, machine-readable half of a result: the prose changes, the code is
* what a dashboard groups by and what someone greps a year of archived runs for. That only holds
* if a code means exactly one thing forever which is not something ad-hoc string literals at
* fifteen call sites can promise.
*
* The failure this exists to prevent had already happened by the time it was written. Two
* independently-added emitters produced `connectivity.downstream_loss` and
* `connectivity.loss_downstream` for the same concept, and nothing anywhere objected. Anyone
* aggregating either one would have silently seen half their data.
*
* So codes are declared here as typed specs, each carrying its category and default severity, and
* emitters reference the spec rather than retyping the string. That makes a typo a compile error,
* and makes it impossible for two call sites to disagree about which category a finding belongs
* to a disagreement that would otherwise split one fault across two verdict lights.
*/
data class FindingSpec(
val code: String,
val category: Category,
/** Severity when nothing about the specific run argues otherwise; emitters may escalate. */
val severity: Severity,
/** One line: what this finding asserts. Present tense, no hedging. */
val meaning: String,
/**
* What the finding rules *out*, where that is the useful half. "Loss upstream" is worth much
* more when it also says the return path is fine, because that halves where to look next.
*/
val rulesOut: String? = null,
)
object FindingRegistry {
// ---- connectivity ----------------------------------------------------------------
// Renamed from nat.* before anything shipped: neither of these is about NAT, and the
// prefix is what decides which category - and therefore which verdict light - a finding
// rolls up into. A nat.* code landing under connectivity would be a permanent puzzle.
val UDP_UNREACHABLE = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.udp_unreachable", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
"No UDP echo replies came back from the server at all.",
)
val UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.udp_unreachable_upstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
"The server received none of the probes, so traffic is dropped on the way out.",
rulesOut = "The return path: nothing arrived to be replied to.",
)
val UDP_LOSS = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.udp_loss", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
"A large fraction of round-trip probes were lost, direction unknown.",
)
val LOSS_UPSTREAM = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.loss_upstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
"Probes were lost on the way to the server.",
rulesOut = "The return path: replies came back for everything that arrived.",
)
/**
* The single code for "lost on the return path", whichever measurement found it.
*
* Two emitters had independently invented `connectivity.downstream_loss` and
* `connectivity.loss_downstream` for this, and nothing objected. Anyone aggregating either
* one would have silently seen half their data. Paired with [LOSS_UPSTREAM] so the two
* directions read as a set.
*/
val LOSS_DOWNSTREAM = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.loss_downstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
"Packets were lost on the way back from the server.",
rulesOut = "The outbound path: the server received what it was answering.",
)
val DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.downstream_blocked", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
"Server-initiated packets never arrive, although round trips work.",
rulesOut = "Basic reachability: the path forwards replies, just not unsolicited traffic.",
)
val DOWNSTREAM_REORDER = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.downstream_reorder", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.LOW,
"Downstream packets arrive in a different order than they were sent.",
)
// MEDIUM, not HIGH: a captive portal is a condition to report, not necessarily a fault - on
// hotel or cafe wifi it is exactly what should be there, and logging in clears it. NO_INTERNET
// is the HIGH one, because nothing the user does locally fixes that. The registry first said
// HIGH; the probe emitting it had always said MEDIUM, and the probe was the considered value.
val CAPTIVE_PORTAL = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.captive_portal", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
"A captive portal is intercepting connectivity checks.",
)
val NO_INTERNET = FindingSpec(
"connectivity.no_internet", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
"Android's own connectivity checks fail on this network.",
)
// ---- mtu -------------------------------------------------------------------------
val MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM = FindingSpec(
"mtu.reduced_downstream", Category.MTU, Severity.LOW,
"The downstream path MTU is below the usual 1500 bytes.",
)
val MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE = FindingSpec(
"mtu.downstream_blackhole", Category.MTU, Severity.MEDIUM,
"Datagrams above the path MTU are dropped downstream, fragmented or not.",
)
val FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED = FindingSpec(
"mtu.fragments_blocked", Category.MTU, Severity.MEDIUM,
"IP fragments do not reach this device even when sent in order.",
)
val FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE = FindingSpec(
"mtu.fragment_reorder_sensitive", Category.MTU, Severity.LOW,
"Fragments are delivered in order but dropped when reordered or delayed.",
rulesOut = "Fragmentation itself: in-order fragments arrive fine.",
)
// ---- nat -------------------------------------------------------------------------
val NAT_UDP_REBINDING = FindingSpec(
"nat.udp_rebinding", Category.NAT, Severity.MEDIUM,
"A NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow.",
)
val NAT_SYMMETRIC = FindingSpec(
"nat.symmetric", Category.NAT, Severity.MEDIUM,
"The NAT assigns a different external port per destination.",
)
// ---- perf ------------------------------------------------------------------------
val THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY = FindingSpec(
"perf.throughput_no_delivery", Category.PERFORMANCE, Severity.HIGH,
"No throughput traffic arrived, although the server sent it.",
)
val THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED = FindingSpec(
"perf.throughput_below_offered", Category.PERFORMANCE, Severity.LOW,
"Less throughput arrived than the server sent for the whole run.",
)
// ---- dns -------------------------------------------------------------------------
val DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN = FindingSpec(
"dns.answer_rewritten", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
"A resolver returned an answer that differs from the authoritative record.",
)
val DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE = FindingSpec(
"dns.authoritative_unreachable", Category.DNS, Severity.MEDIUM,
"The canary zone's authoritative server could not be reached.",
)
// ---- v6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Prefix is `v6.`, matching the test-type registry (v6.brokenness, v6.happy_eyeballs, ...).
// These were `ipv6.*` while declaring Category.IPV6, but the prefix map only knows "v6", so
// they silently rolled up under connectivity: the third instance of a prefix disagreeing with
// its category and quietly moving a fault to a different verdict light.
/**
* Renamed from `v6.broken`, which claimed more than the evidence supports.
*
* The only signal behind it is ICMPv6 echo getting no reply and ICMPv6 echo is widely
* filtered on networks where IPv6 otherwise works perfectly. A phone that reported this while
* happily loading an IPv6-only site over TCP is what caught it. From here the two cases look
* identical, so the finding now says what was observed and names both explanations rather than
* picking one.
*
* It is worth reporting either way: filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU Discovery, which is its
* own fault even when IPv6 works.
*/
/**
* A global IPv6 address with no default route.
*
* This is the structural version of the same complaint, and it is worth far more than the
* ICMP one because it admits no other explanation: the device has an address it cannot route
* with. Nothing is filtered, nothing is inferred the routing table says so directly, and it
* is already in the link snapshot.
*
* Not always a fault. A VPN that installs host routes to specific destinations produces
* exactly this shape on purpose, and it works. What makes it worth reporting either way is
* that applications cannot tell: having a global address, they will try IPv6 first and stall
* for every destination the routes do not cover.
*/
/**
* An IPv6 default route with no global address to use it from the mirror of
* [V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE], and the more common misconfiguration of the two.
*
* The router is sending RAs that name it as a default gateway, but SLAAC produced no address:
* no prefix information option, or a prefix without the autonomous flag, or DHCPv6-only
* addressing the device did not complete. The network is announcing IPv6 service it does not
* actually deliver.
*
* This is worth flagging above the ICMP signal because it is both certain and consequential.
* Hosts see router advertisements, believe IPv6 is available, and pay a connection-attempt
* timeout on every dual-stack destination before falling back to IPv4 the classic "the
* internet feels slow" complaint with no packet loss anywhere to explain it.
*/
val V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS = FindingSpec(
"v6.route_without_address", Category.IPV6, Severity.MEDIUM,
"The network advertises an IPv6 default route but the device has no global IPv6 address.",
rulesOut = "A working IPv6 setup: SLAAC did not produce a usable address on this link.",
)
/**
* A VPN prevented the underlying networks from being measured.
*
* Reported rather than worked around: Android refuses `Network.bindSocket()` on the networks
* beneath a VPN precisely so apps cannot leak around the tunnel, and that is correct
* behaviour. What is not acceptable is a run that quietly measures nothing and calls the
* result healthy, so this says plainly which networks went unmeasured and why.
*/
/**
* The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve through it.
*
* Worth separating from every other DNS failure because the remedy is somewhere else entirely.
* A name that will not resolve looks identical to a user whatever the cause, and the two causes
* pull in opposite directions: a server that does not answer means the network is broken and
* the router is the thing to examine, while a server that answers a direct query on a device
* that still cannot resolve means the platform resolver has wedged fixed by toggling wifi,
* and nothing to do with the network at all.
*
* Proven rather than inferred: the probe sends its own UDP query, bypassing the component under
* suspicion, and compares that against what the platform returns for the same name.
*/
/**
* The network hands out a search domain its DNS server will not answer for.
*
* A resolver appends search domains to lookups, so every name a client asks about can stall on
* a domain the server ignores. The failure mode is silence rather than a negative answer, and
* silence is indistinguishable from packet loss: clients retry instead of moving on, and some
* give up on the lookup entirely. That makes it look like the device is broken when the
* network is.
*
* Whether it bites depends on the resolver some try the bare name first and never notice
* which is why two devices on the same network can disagree about whether DNS works.
*/
val DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED = FindingSpec(
"dns.search_domain_unanswered", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
"The network advertises a DNS search domain that its own server does not answer for.",
rulesOut = "A fault on this device: the same server answers ordinary names normally.",
)
val DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN = FindingSpec(
"dns.system_resolver_broken", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
"The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve names through it.",
rulesOut = "A network fault: the server replied to a query sent from this device.",
)
val MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED = FindingSpec(
"measurement.vpn_constrained", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.INFO,
"A VPN was active, so the networks underneath it could not be measured.",
rulesOut = "Nothing — this run says little about the underlying network either way.",
)
val V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE = FindingSpec(
"v6.no_default_route", Category.IPV6, Severity.MEDIUM,
"The device has a global IPv6 address but no IPv6 default route.",
rulesOut = "Guesswork: this is read from the routing table, not inferred from silence.",
)
val V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY = FindingSpec(
"v6.no_icmp_reply", Category.IPV6, Severity.LOW,
"IPv6 is configured but ICMPv6 echo gets no reply.",
rulesOut = "Nothing on its own: IPv6 may work fine with ICMP filtered.",
)
/**
* IPv6 is advertised and does not work the claim `v6.broken` originally made on ICMP
* silence alone, now reinstated because it can finally be backed: it is only emitted when a
* real IPv6 TCP connection (v6.brokenness) failed on the same network whose ICMPv6 went
* unanswered. Two independent transports failing on a network that advertises IPv6 is what
* "broken" actually means; either signal alone still gets [V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY].
*/
val V6_BROKEN = FindingSpec(
"v6.broken", Category.IPV6, Severity.HIGH,
"IPv6 is advertised on this network but carries no traffic.",
rulesOut = "ICMP filtering as the benign explanation: a TCP connection over IPv6 failed too.",
)
/**
* INFO deliberately, and it needs to stay that way.
*
* Most networks still do not offer IPv6, and that is not a fault. Reporting it as a warning
* lights a yellow verdict on a perfectly healthy network, which teaches people to ignore the
* light the one thing a diagnostic must never do.
*/
val V6_NOT_OFFERED = FindingSpec(
"v6.not_offered", Category.IPV6, Severity.INFO,
"This network does not offer IPv6.",
)
/** Every registered finding, in declaration order. */
val all: List<FindingSpec> = listOf(
UDP_UNREACHABLE, UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM, UDP_LOSS, LOSS_UPSTREAM, LOSS_DOWNSTREAM,
DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED, DOWNSTREAM_REORDER, CAPTIVE_PORTAL, NO_INTERNET,
MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM, MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE, FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED,
FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE,
NAT_UDP_REBINDING, NAT_SYMMETRIC,
THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED,
DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN, DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE,
DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED, DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN, MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED,
V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE, V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS, V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY, V6_BROKEN, V6_NOT_OFFERED,
)
private val byCode: Map<String, FindingSpec> = all.associateBy { it.code }
fun byCode(code: String): FindingSpec? = byCode[code]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
/** One Android Network in play (measurement-schema.md §4). Shizuku-tier fields (route proto,
* lifetimes) are absent at app tier absence means "not observed", never "not present". */
@Serializable
data class Network(
val id: String,
val transport: Transport,
@SerialName("interface") val iface: String? = null,
val link: Link,
val wifi: Wifi? = null,
val cellular: Cellular? = null,
val changes: List<NetworkChange> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("system_verdict") val systemVerdict: SystemVerdict? = null,
)
/**
* What Android itself concluded about a network, as opposed to what we measured.
*
* Recorded because it is the verdict the user can see the "no internet" warning in the status
* bar and because it is free: the platform has already done the work by the time a run starts.
*
* Its real value is disagreement. When Android says a network is unusable and our own probes reach
* the internet regardless, the fault is in the device rather than the network, and that distinction
* is the difference between "fix your router" and "toggle your wifi". Neither number alone can say
* that; only the two together.
*/
@Serializable
data class SystemVerdict(
/** Android's own connectivity check passed. Null when the platform did not say. */
val validated: Boolean? = null,
/** Android believes a captive portal is intercepting this network. */
@SerialName("captive_portal") val captivePortal: Boolean? = null,
/** Some traffic works and some does not — Android's own hedge. */
@SerialName("partial_connectivity") val partialConnectivity: Boolean? = null,
)
@Serializable
enum class Transport {
@SerialName("wifi") WIFI,
@SerialName("cellular") CELLULAR,
@SerialName("ethernet") ETHERNET,
@SerialName("vpn") VPN,
@SerialName("other") OTHER,
}
@Serializable
data class Link(
val mtu: Int? = null,
val addresses: List<Address> = emptyList(),
val routes: List<Route> = emptyList(),
val dns: DnsConfig? = null,
val dhcp: Dhcp? = null,
@SerialName("captive_portal") val captivePortal: CaptivePortal? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Address(
val addr: String, // ip4 | ip6 (logical type, §8)
@SerialName("prefix_len") val prefixLen: Int,
val scope: String? = null,
val flags: List<String> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("valid_lft_s") val validLftS: Long? = null,
@SerialName("pref_lft_s") val prefLftS: Long? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Route(
val dst: String,
val gateway: String? = null,
val iface: String? = null,
val proto: RouteProto? = null, // shizuku tier; null = not observed
@SerialName("expires_s") val expiresS: Long? = null,
)
@Serializable
enum class RouteProto {
@SerialName("dhcp") DHCP,
@SerialName("ra") RA,
@SerialName("static") STATIC,
@SerialName("unknown") UNKNOWN,
}
@Serializable
data class DnsConfig(
val servers: List<String> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("private_dns_mode") val privateDnsMode: String? = null,
@SerialName("private_dns_hostname") val privateDnsHostname: String? = null,
@SerialName("search_domains") val searchDomains: List<String> = emptyList(),
@SerialName("nat64_prefix") val nat64Prefix: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Dhcp(val server: String? = null, @SerialName("lease_s") val leaseS: Long? = null)
@Serializable
data class CaptivePortal(
val detected: Boolean = false,
@SerialName("api_url") val apiUrl: String? = null,
@SerialName("venue_url") val venueUrl: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Wifi(
val ssid: String? = null, // ssid (logical type)
val bssid: String? = null, // bssid (logical type)
@SerialName("rssi_dbm") val rssiDbm: Int? = null,
@SerialName("link_speed_mbps") val linkSpeedMbps: Int? = null,
@SerialName("frequency_mhz") val frequencyMhz: Int? = null,
@SerialName("channel_width_mhz") val channelWidthMhz: Int? = null,
val standard: String? = null,
val security: String? = null,
@SerialName("mac_randomization") val macRandomization: Boolean? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class Cellular(
val rat: String? = null,
val operator: String? = null,
val band: String? = null,
)
@Serializable
data class NetworkChange(
@SerialName("at_mono_ns") val atMonoNs: Long,
val kind: String, // lost | gained | link_changed
val detail: JsonObject? = null,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
@Serializable
enum class Verdict {
@SerialName("green") GREEN,
@SerialName("yellow") YELLOW,
@SerialName("red") RED,
@SerialName("inconclusive") INCONCLUSIVE,
}
@Serializable
data class Summary(
val overall: Verdict,
val categories: Map<String, CategorySummary>,
)
@Serializable
data class CategorySummary(
val verdict: Verdict,
@SerialName("worst_finding") val worstFinding: String? = null,
@SerialName("tests_run") val testsRun: Int,
@SerialName("tests_failed") val testsFailed: Int,
)
/**
* Deterministic verdict derivation, fixed by measurement-schema.md §7.3:
*
* - A category's verdict = the light of its worst-severity finding
* (critical|high red, medium|low yellow, info/none green).
* - A category is `inconclusive` when > 50% of its tests are failed/unsupported.
* - Overall = the worst category light; `inconclusive` only when ALL categories are.
* - A run whose per-network probing was blocked is `inconclusive` outright, whatever the
* categories say. The lights describe what the tests found; when the OS refused to let the
* tests run, a green light would describe nothing at all.
*
* The mapping test-type category comes from [TestType.category]. Only categories that have
* findings or tests appear in the summary.
*/
object Verdicts {
private fun isInconclusiveTest(s: TestStatus) =
s == TestStatus.FAILED || s == TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>): Summary =
derive(tests, findings, Constraints())
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>, constraints: Constraints): Summary {
val testsByCat = tests.groupBy { TestType.category(it.type) }
val findingsByCat = findings.groupBy { it.category }
val categories = (testsByCat.keys + findingsByCat.keys)
val perCat = LinkedHashMap<String, CategorySummary>()
for (cat in Category.entries) {
if (cat !in categories) continue
val catTests = testsByCat[cat].orEmpty()
val catFindings = findingsByCat[cat].orEmpty()
val failed = catTests.count { isInconclusiveTest(it.status) }
val inconclusive = catTests.isNotEmpty() && failed * 2 > catTests.size
val worst = catFindings.maxByOrNull { it.severity.rank }
val verdict = when {
inconclusive -> Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
worst == null -> Verdict.GREEN
else -> worst.severity.toLight()
}
perCat[serialName(cat)] = CategorySummary(
verdict = verdict,
worstFinding = worst?.id,
testsRun = catTests.size,
testsFailed = failed,
)
}
// A run that could not measure the networks it was asked about has not found them
// healthy; it has found out nothing. Reporting that as green is the single most
// misleading thing this function could do, so the constraint outranks the lights.
val overall = if (constraints.perNetworkBlocked) {
Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
} else {
deriveOverall(perCat.values)
}
return Summary(overall = overall, categories = perCat)
}
/** Overall = worst light; inconclusive only if every category is inconclusive. */
private fun deriveOverall(cats: Collection<CategorySummary>): Verdict {
if (cats.isEmpty()) return Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
if (cats.all { it.verdict == Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE }) return Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
val rank = mapOf(Verdict.GREEN to 0, Verdict.YELLOW to 1, Verdict.RED to 2)
// Non-inconclusive categories decide the overall light.
return cats.filter { it.verdict != Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE }
.maxByOrNull { rank.getValue(it.verdict) }!!.verdict
}
private fun serialName(cat: Category): String = cat.name.lowercase()
}
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
/** The generic test envelope (measurement-schema.md §6). params must fully reproduce the test;
* evidence is append-only raw truth; metrics must be recomputable from evidence. All three are
* per-test-type JSON, so they are carried as JsonObject. */
@Serializable
data class Test(
val id: String, // UUIDv7
val type: String, // TestType registry (§6.1)
@SerialName("network_ref") val networkRef: String? = null,
@SerialName("session_ref") val sessionRef: String? = null, // null for local-only tests
val tier: Tier,
@SerialName("started_mono_ns") val startedMonoNs: Long,
@SerialName("ended_mono_ns") val endedMonoNs: Long,
val status: TestStatus,
val error: TestError? = null,
val params: JsonObject? = null,
val evidence: JsonObject? = null,
val metrics: JsonObject? = null,
)
@Serializable
enum class Tier {
@SerialName("app") APP,
@SerialName("shizuku") SHIZUKU,
@SerialName("root") ROOT,
}
@Serializable
enum class TestStatus {
@SerialName("ok") OK,
@SerialName("failed") FAILED,
@SerialName("unsupported") UNSUPPORTED,
@SerialName("skipped") SKIPPED,
@SerialName("partial") PARTIAL,
}
@Serializable
data class TestError(val code: String, val detail: String? = null)
/**
* The v1 test-type registry (§6.1). String constants (dotted, family-first) so probe code and the
* server's measurement-schema test-type registry stay aligned. [category] maps a type to one of
* the fixed §7.2 categories for verdict rollup.
*/
object TestType {
// link
const val LINK_SNAPSHOT = "link.snapshot"
const val LINK_DHCP_RENEWAL_WATCH = "link.dhcp_renewal_watch"
const val LINK_IP_MONITOR = "link.ip_monitor"
/** Who advertises IPv6 on this link (+ gateway identity). Registry addition, v1.1. */
const val LINK_RA_SOURCE = "link.ra_source"
// net — connectivity validation (reproduces Android's NetworkMonitor generate_204 checks)
const val NET_CAPTIVE_PORTAL = "net.captive_portal"
// icmp
const val ICMP_PING4 = "icmp.ping4"
const val ICMP_PING6 = "icmp.ping6"
// trace
const val TRACEROUTE_UDP4 = "traceroute.udp4"
const val TRACEROUTE_UDP6 = "traceroute.udp6"
const val TRACEROUTE_ICMP4 = "traceroute.icmp4"
const val TRACEROUTE_ICMP6 = "traceroute.icmp6"
// train
const val TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN = "train.udp_updown"
/** Server-to-client train under a §3.4 grant: the direction a round trip cannot separate. */
const val TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM = "train.udp_downstream"
// mtu
const val MTU_PMTUD_UP = "mtu.pmtud_up"
const val MTU_PMTUD_DOWN = "mtu.pmtud_down"
const val MTU_BLACKHOLE = "mtu.blackhole"
const val MTU_MSS_OBSERVED = "mtu.mss_observed"
const val MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY = "mtu.frag_delivery"
/** Whether fragments survive arriving out of order, not merely whether they survive. */
const val MTU_FRAG_ORDERING = "mtu.frag_ordering"
// nat
const val NAT_STUN_5780 = "nat.stun_5780"
const val NAT_MAPPING_LIFETIME_UDP = "nat.mapping_lifetime_udp"
const val NAT_MAPPING_LIFETIME_TCP = "nat.mapping_lifetime_tcp"
const val NAT_HAIRPIN = "nat.hairpin"
const val NAT_CONNECT_BACK = "nat.connect_back"
const val NAT_CGNAT_DETECT = "nat.cgnat_detect"
// dns
const val DNS_RESOLVER_INVENTORY = "dns.resolver_inventory"
const val DNS_CANARY = "dns.canary"
/**
* Does this device's own resolver work, as distinct from the network's DNS.
*
* Registry addition, v1.1. Kept apart from [DNS_CANARY], which asks whether answers are being
* tampered with; this asks whether answers arrive at all, and where the failure sits.
*/
const val DNS_RESOLVER = "dns.resolver"
const val DNS_INTERCEPTION = "dns.interception"
const val DNS_TTL_INTEGRITY = "dns.ttl_integrity"
const val DNS_ANSWER_INTEGRITY = "dns.answer_integrity"
const val DNS_DNSSEC = "dns.dnssec"
const val DNS_NXDOMAIN_WILDCARD = "dns.nxdomain_wildcard"
const val DNS_REBIND_FILTER = "dns.rebind_filter"
const val DNS_AAAA_FILTER = "dns.aaaa_filter"
const val DNS_DNS64 = "dns.dns64"
const val DNS_COMPARE = "dns.compare"
// sec
const val SEC_TLS_REFERENCE = "sec.tls_reference"
const val SEC_CLIENTHELLO_ECHO = "sec.clienthello_echo"
const val SEC_HTTP_ECHO = "sec.http_echo"
const val SEC_SNI_FILTER = "sec.sni_filter"
const val SEC_DSCP_ECN_SURVIVAL = "sec.dscp_ecn_survival"
const val SEC_ARP_WATCH = "sec.arp_watch"
// port
const val PORT_REACH_SWEEP = "port.reach_sweep"
const val PORT_UDP_USABILITY = "port.udp_usability"
// perf
const val PERF_THROUGHPUT_TCP = "perf.throughput_tcp"
const val PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP = "perf.throughput_udp"
const val PERF_BUFFERBLOAT = "perf.bufferbloat"
const val PERF_RRC_LATENCY = "perf.rrc_latency"
// v6
const val V6_DUALSTACK_COMPARE = "v6.dualstack_compare"
const val V6_HAPPY_EYEBALLS = "v6.happy_eyeballs"
const val V6_BROKENNESS = "v6.brokenness"
const val V6_NAT64_CLAT = "v6.nat64_clat"
// wifi
const val WIFI_ENVIRONMENT_SCAN = "wifi.environment_scan"
const val WIFI_ROAM_LOG = "wifi.roam_log"
const val WIFI_SIGNAL_LOG = "wifi.signal_log"
// local
const val LOCAL_MDNS_INVENTORY = "local.mdns_inventory"
const val LOCAL_SSDP_INVENTORY = "local.ssdp_inventory"
const val LOCAL_LLMNR_INVENTORY = "local.llmnr_inventory"
const val LOCAL_GATEWAY_SERVICES = "local.gateway_services"
const val LOCAL_NTP = "local.ntp"
// peer
const val PEER_REACHABILITY = "peer.reachability"
const val PEER_ISOLATION = "peer.isolation"
const val PEER_MULTICAST = "peer.multicast"
const val PEER_LAN_TRAIN = "peer.lan_train"
const val PEER_LEASE_DIFF = "peer.lease_diff"
// time
const val TIME_SERVER_OFFSET = "time.server_offset"
/** Maps a dotted test type to its §7.2 category for verdict rollup. */
fun category(type: String): Category = when (type.substringBefore('.')) {
"link", "icmp", "trace", "traceroute", "train", "port", "time", "net" -> Category.CONNECTIVITY
"dns" -> Category.DNS
"nat" -> Category.NAT
"mtu" -> Category.MTU
"v6" -> Category.IPV6
"sec" -> Category.SECURITY
"perf" -> Category.PERFORMANCE
"local", "peer" -> Category.LOCAL
"wifi" -> Category.WIFI
else -> Category.CONNECTIVITY
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
/**
* The two ways a network can be half-configured for IPv6, read from the link snapshot.
*
* Pure model logic rather than something a ViewModel does, because "is this network's IPv6
* broken, and in which direction" is exactly the kind of judgement that should be checkable
* against a captured routing table without a phone in the loop.
*/
object V6Analysis {
/** Linux tunnel interfaces: WireGuard/Netbird (tun*, wg*), plus the usual VPN names. */
private val TUNNEL_IFACE = Regex("""^(tun|tap|wg|ppp|ipsec|utun)\d*$""")
/** What one network's IPv6 configuration looks like. */
data class Shape(
val iface: String,
/** A global address with no ::/0 route: an address the device cannot route with. */
val addressWithoutRoute: Boolean,
/** A ::/0 route with no global address: a route the device cannot source from. */
val routeWithoutAddress: Boolean,
/** The routes belong to a tunnel, so a partial view of IPv6 is likely deliberate. */
val tunnel: Boolean,
)
/**
* Classifies each network's IPv6 configuration.
*
* Both shapes are read straight from the link snapshot rather than inferred from silence, so
* unlike an ICMP signal there is no competing explanation for what was observed and both
* matter for the same reason: an application cannot tell in advance, so it tries IPv6 first
* and waits.
*
* They differ in what they mean. An address with no route is what a VPN installing host routes
* to specific destinations produces on purpose, and it works; calling that a fault would be the
* "lack of IPv6 is a yellow condition" mistake in a new costume, so a tunnel downgrades it to
* information. A route with no address is the opposite: the router advertised itself as a
* default gateway but SLAAC produced nothing usable, so the network is announcing IPv6 service
* it does not deliver. That one is a real misconfiguration however it arises.
*/
fun classify(networks: List<Network>): List<Shape> = networks.map { n ->
val globalV6 = n.link.addresses.any { isGlobalV6(it.addr) }
val v6Routes = n.link.routes.filter { it.dst.contains(':') }
val hasDefault = v6Routes.any { it.dst == "::/0" }
Shape(
iface = n.iface ?: v6Routes.firstOrNull()?.iface.orEmpty(),
addressWithoutRoute = globalV6 && !hasDefault,
routeWithoutAddress = hasDefault && !globalV6,
// Android labels the transport itself, which beats guessing from a name; the regex
// stays as a backstop for tunnels Android does not own (a userspace WireGuard, say,
// or anything seen through the shell tier).
tunnel = n.transport == Transport.VPN ||
v6Routes.any { TUNNEL_IFACE.containsMatchIn(it.iface.orEmpty()) },
)
}
/**
* Whether an address is IPv6 and usable as a source for off-link traffic.
*
* ULAs count. A ULA is not globally routable, but it is a global-*scope* address the stack
* will happily select as a source, which is the property that matters here an overlay
* network handing out fc00::/7 addresses is providing working IPv6 to the destinations it
* carries, and treating that as "no address" would misreport every VPN as broken.
*/
private fun isGlobalV6(addr: String): Boolean {
if (!addr.contains(':')) return false
val a = addr.substringBefore('%').lowercase() // strip any zone index
return !a.startsWith("fe80") && a != "::1" && a != "::"
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import java.io.File
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
import kotlin.test.fail
/**
* Keeps the finding registry honest.
*
* The interesting test is the last one: it reads `docs/findings-registry.md` and fails when the
* document and the code disagree. Documentation that drifts from its implementation is worse than
* none, because it still looks authoritative and a finding registry is precisely the artifact
* other people build tooling against.
*/
class FindingRegistryTest {
@Test
fun codesAreUnique() {
val dupes = FindingRegistry.all.groupBy { it.code }.filterValues { it.size > 1 }.keys
assertTrue(dupes.isEmpty(), "duplicate finding codes: $dupes")
}
@Test
fun everyDeclaredSpecIsInTheAllList() {
// Reflection over the object's properties: a spec that is declared but left out of `all`
// is invisible to the doc check and to any consumer enumerating the registry.
val declared = FindingRegistry::class.java.declaredMethods
.filter { it.parameterCount == 0 && it.returnType == FindingSpec::class.java }
.mapNotNull { runCatching { it.invoke(FindingRegistry) as FindingSpec }.getOrNull() }
.map { it.code }
.toSet()
val listed = FindingRegistry.all.map { it.code }.toSet()
assertEquals(declared, listed, "declared specs and the `all` list disagree")
}
// The prefix decides the category, and the category decides which verdict light the finding
// rolls up into. A code whose prefix disagrees with its category silently moves a fault to a
// different light — the exact bug that got two codes renamed out of nat.*.
@Test
fun everyPrefixMatchesItsCategory() {
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
val fromPrefix = TestType.category(spec.code)
assertEquals(
fromPrefix, spec.category,
"${spec.code} is declared as ${spec.category} but its prefix maps to $fromPrefix",
)
}
}
@Test
fun codesFollowTheNamingConvention() {
val shape = Regex("^[a-z0-9]+\\.[a-z0-9_]+$")
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
assertTrue(shape.matches(spec.code), "malformed code: ${spec.code}")
assertTrue(spec.meaning.isNotBlank(), "${spec.code} has no meaning")
assertTrue(
spec.meaning.trimEnd().endsWith("."),
"${spec.code}'s meaning should be a sentence: '${spec.meaning}'",
)
}
}
// Two near-identical codes are how one fault ends up split across two dashboards. This is a
// blunt check — it will not catch every synonym — but it catches the shape that already
// happened: the same words in a different order.
@Test
fun noTwoCodesAreAnagramsOfEachOther() {
val normalised = FindingRegistry.all.associate { spec ->
spec.code to spec.code.substringAfter('.').split('_').sorted().joinToString("_")
}
val clashes = normalised.entries.groupBy { it.value }.filterValues { it.size > 1 }
if (clashes.isNotEmpty()) {
fail("codes differing only in word order: ${clashes.values.map { g -> g.map { it.key } }}")
}
}
@Test
fun theDocumentAndTheRegistryAgree() {
val doc = findDoc() ?: run {
println("findings-registry.md not found from ${File(".").absolutePath} — skipping")
return
}
val text = doc.readText()
// Only table rows count as "documented". Prose may legitimately mention a code that no
// longer exists — the rules section explains why two were merged — and treating that as
// a registry entry would force the document to forget its own history.
val documented = text.lines()
.filter { it.trimStart().startsWith("|") }
.flatMap { row -> Regex("`([a-z0-9]+\\.[a-z0-9_]+)`").findAll(row).map { it.groupValues[1] } }
.toSet()
val registered = FindingRegistry.all.map { it.code }.toSet()
val missingFromDoc = registered - documented
val missingFromCode = documented - registered
assertTrue(
missingFromDoc.isEmpty(),
"these codes exist in FindingRegistry but not in docs/findings-registry.md: $missingFromDoc",
)
assertTrue(
missingFromCode.isEmpty(),
"docs/findings-registry.md documents codes that no longer exist: $missingFromCode",
)
// And the severities must match, or the document is describing a different system.
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
val row = text.lines().firstOrNull {
it.trimStart().startsWith("|") && it.contains("`${spec.code}`")
} ?: continue
val severity = spec.severity.name.lowercase()
assertTrue(
row.contains("| $severity |"),
"${spec.code} is ${severity} in code but the doc row says otherwise: $row",
)
}
}
/** Walks up from the test's working directory to find the repo's docs/ folder. */
private fun findDoc(): File? {
var dir: File? = File(".").absoluteFile
repeat(6) {
val candidate = File(dir, "docs/findings-registry.md")
if (candidate.isFile) return candidate
dir = dir?.parentFile
}
return null
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
class SerializationTest {
private val json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true; encodeDefaults = true }
@JTest
fun documentRoundTrips() {
val doc = MeasurementDocument(
run = Run(
id = "0198c5f2-0000-7000-8000-000000000000",
trigger = Trigger.MANUAL,
startedAt = "2026-07-31T14:03:21.114Z",
clock = Clock(monoOriginWall = "2026-07-31T14:03:21.114Z"),
app = AppInfo(version = "0.1.0", build = 1),
device = DeviceInfo("OnePlus", "CPH2747", 36, "16"),
tiers = Tiers(app = true, shizuku = true),
),
networks = listOf(
Network(
id = "net-1", transport = Transport.WIFI, iface = "wlan0",
link = Link(mtu = 1500, addresses = listOf(Address("192.0.2.23", 24, "global"))),
wifi = Wifi(ssid = "example", rssiDbm = -54),
),
),
tests = listOf(
Test(
id = "t-1", type = TestType.ICMP_PING4, networkRef = "net-1", tier = Tier.APP,
startedMonoNs = 0, endedMonoNs = 38_000_000, status = TestStatus.OK,
evidence = TrainEvidence(
epochMonoNs = 0, seq = listOf(0, 1), tTxNs = listOf(0L, 20_000_000L),
tRxNs = listOf(16_500_000L, null), sizeBytes = listOf(64, 64),
).toEvidence(),
),
),
)
val encoded = json.encodeToString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), doc)
val decoded = json.decodeFromString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), encoded)
assertEquals(doc.run.id, decoded.run.id)
assertEquals(Transport.WIFI, decoded.networks[0].transport)
assertEquals(TestType.ICMP_PING4, decoded.tests[0].type)
// snake_case field names on the wire
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"schema_version\""))
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"mono_origin_wall\""))
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"t_tx_ns\""))
// null preserved at train index 1
assertTrue(encoded.contains("[16500000,null]"))
}
@JTest
fun findingRequiresEvidence() {
try {
Finding(
id = "f-1", code = "x", category = Category.DNS, severity = Severity.INFO,
confidence = Confidence.LOW, title = "t", description = "d", evidenceRefs = emptyList(),
)
throw AssertionError("expected IllegalArgumentException for empty evidence_refs")
} catch (e: IllegalArgumentException) {
// expected — a finding with no evidence is invalid (§7.1)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* The fixtures here are a real device's routing table, transcribed from `dumpsys connectivity`
* on a OnePlus 15 with a Netbird tunnel up: wifi advertising a default route it cannot source
* from, cellular working properly, and a VPN carrying host routes to two destinations.
*
* Using a captured table rather than invented ones matters, because the bug this guards against
* is not "the boolean logic is wrong" it is "the shapes I imagined are not the shapes real
* networks produce".
*/
class V6AnalysisTest {
private fun net(
id: String,
transport: Transport,
iface: String,
addrs: List<String>,
routes: List<Pair<String, String>>,
) = Network(
id = id,
transport = transport,
iface = iface,
link = Link(
addresses = addrs.map { Address(addr = it.substringBefore('/'), prefixLen = 64) },
routes = routes.map { (dst, dev) -> Route(dst = dst, iface = dev) },
),
)
/** wlan0: an IPv6 default route via a link-local gateway, but SLAAC produced no address. */
private val wifi = net(
"w", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
addrs = listOf("fe80::bcf6:edff:fe67:b139", "10.13.102.122"),
routes = listOf(
"fe80::/64" to "wlan0",
"::/0" to "wlan0",
"0.0.0.0/0" to "wlan0",
),
)
/** rmnet_data1: a properly configured cellular link — global address and a default route. */
private val cellular = net(
"c", Transport.CELLULAR, "rmnet_data1",
addrs = listOf("2001:4bb8:46a:e724:289d:87ff:feb6:ebd3"),
routes = listOf("::/0" to "rmnet_data1", "2001:4bb8:46a:e724::/64" to "rmnet_data1"),
)
/** tun1: Netbird, with a ULA and host routes to exactly two destinations. */
private val vpn = net(
"v", Transport.VPN, "tun1",
addrs = listOf("100.64.158.131", "fdfd:c4fe:c4fe:c4fe:1f3c:98a0:dd66:ac7"),
routes = listOf(
"2001:1ad0:c4fe:6767::2/128" to "tun1",
"2001:1ad0:c4fe:a::136/128" to "tun1",
"fdfd:c4fe:c4fe:c4fe::/64" to "tun1",
),
)
@Test
fun `wifi advertising a route it cannot source from is reported`() {
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(wifi)).single()
assertTrue(s.routeWithoutAddress, "::/0 with only a link-local address is the RA-without-SLAAC case")
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
assertFalse(s.tunnel, "wifi is not a tunnel")
assertEquals("wlan0", s.iface)
}
@Test
fun `a properly configured link produces no finding`() {
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(cellular)).single()
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
}
@Test
fun `a tunnel with host routes is deliberate, not broken`() {
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(vpn)).single()
assertTrue(s.addressWithoutRoute, "a ULA and no ::/0 is an address with nothing to route it")
assertTrue(s.tunnel, "so it must be reported as information, not as a fault")
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
}
@Test
fun `each network is judged on its own`() {
// The whole point of per-network classification: "IPv6 is broken" is useless advice when
// wifi is the broken one and cellular is fine.
val shapes = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(wifi, cellular, vpn)).associateBy { it.iface }
assertTrue(shapes.getValue("wlan0").routeWithoutAddress)
assertFalse(shapes.getValue("rmnet_data1").routeWithoutAddress)
assertFalse(shapes.getValue("rmnet_data1").addressWithoutRoute)
assertTrue(shapes.getValue("tun1").addressWithoutRoute)
}
@Test
fun `a link-local-only network with no v6 route says nothing either way`() {
// Plain IPv4-only wifi: no IPv6 offered at all. That is v6.not_offered's business, and
// reporting it here as well would double up on a network that is merely legacy, not broken.
val v4only = net(
"4", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
addrs = listOf("fe80::1", "192.168.1.5"),
routes = listOf("0.0.0.0/0" to "wlan0"),
)
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(v4only)).single()
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
}
@Test
fun `a zone index does not hide a link-local address`() {
val zoned = net(
"z", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
addrs = listOf("fe80::1%wlan0"),
routes = listOf("::/0" to "wlan0"),
)
assertTrue(V6Analysis.classify(listOf(zoned)).single().routeWithoutAddress)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.measurement
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
class VerdictsTest {
private fun test(type: String, status: TestStatus, id: String = type): Test =
Test(id = id, type = type, tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = 0, endedMonoNs = 1, status = status)
private fun finding(cat: Category, sev: Severity, id: String = "f-$cat-$sev"): Finding =
Finding(
id = id, code = "x.$cat", category = cat, severity = sev, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
title = "t", description = "d", evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef("some-test")),
)
@JTest
fun categoryLightFromWorstSeverity() {
val tests = listOf(test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.OK))
val findings = listOf(
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.LOW),
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH), // worst → red
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.INFO),
)
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, findings)
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
assertEquals("f-DNS-HIGH", s.categories["dns"]!!.worstFinding)
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.overall)
}
@JTest
fun noFindingsIsGreen() {
val s = Verdicts.derive(listOf(test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK)), emptyList())
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.categories["mtu"]!!.verdict)
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.overall)
}
@JTest
fun mediumAndLowAreYellow() {
val s = Verdicts.derive(
listOf(test(TestType.SEC_HTTP_ECHO, TestStatus.OK)),
listOf(finding(Category.SECURITY, Severity.MEDIUM)),
)
assertEquals(Verdict.YELLOW, s.categories["security"]!!.verdict)
}
@JTest
fun majorityFailedIsInconclusive() {
// 2 of 3 dns tests failed → > 50% → inconclusive, even with a finding present.
val tests = listOf(
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.FAILED, "a"),
test(TestType.DNS_TTL_INTEGRITY, TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED, "b"),
test(TestType.DNS_COMPARE, TestStatus.OK, "c"),
)
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, listOf(finding(Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH)))
assertEquals(Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
assertEquals(2, s.categories["dns"]!!.testsFailed)
assertEquals(3, s.categories["dns"]!!.testsRun)
}
@JTest
fun exactlyHalfFailedIsNotInconclusive() {
// 1 of 2 failed → not > 50% → the finding decides.
val tests = listOf(
test(TestType.NAT_HAIRPIN, TestStatus.FAILED, "a"),
test(TestType.NAT_CONNECT_BACK, TestStatus.OK, "b"),
)
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, listOf(finding(Category.NAT, Severity.CRITICAL)))
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.categories["nat"]!!.verdict)
}
@JTest
fun overallIsWorstCategory() {
val tests = listOf(
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.OK, "d"),
test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK, "m"),
)
val findings = listOf(
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.MEDIUM), // yellow
finding(Category.MTU, Severity.CRITICAL), // red
)
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, findings)
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.overall)
}
@JTest
fun overallInconclusiveOnlyWhenAllAre() {
val tests = listOf(
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.FAILED, "d"), // dns inconclusive
test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK, "m"), // mtu green
)
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, emptyList())
assertEquals(Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.categories["mtu"]!!.verdict)
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.overall) // not all inconclusive → mtu decides
}
@JTest
fun categoryMappingCoversFamilies() {
assertEquals(Category.CONNECTIVITY, TestType.category(TestType.TRACEROUTE_UDP4))
assertEquals(Category.IPV6, TestType.category(TestType.V6_BROKENNESS))
assertEquals(Category.LOCAL, TestType.category(TestType.PEER_MULTICAST))
assertEquals(Category.PERFORMANCE, TestType.category(TestType.PERF_BUFFERBLOAT))
assertEquals(Category.CONNECTIVITY, TestType.category(TestType.TIME_SERVER_OFFSET))
}
}
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
plugins {
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.jvm)
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
}
// The anonymizer (measurement-schema.md §8). Pure Kotlin/JVM and deliberately
// dependency-free beyond JSON: it must be trivially auditable, because a bug
// here leaks a user's network onto someone else's server.
dependencies {
implementation(libs.kotlinx.serialization.json)
testImplementation(kotlin("test"))
}
kotlin {
jvmToolchain(21)
compilerOptions { jvmTarget.set(org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget.JVM_17) }
}
java { sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17; targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17 }
tasks.test {
useJUnitPlatform()
// Opt-in: point this at a captured run to check the anonymizer against real data.
System.getenv("ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN")?.let { environment("ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN", it) }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package privacy implements the anonymization contract of measurement-schema.md §8.
//
// The threat model is specific. An engineer running their own server wants the full document —
// SSIDs and MACs are what make a run useful a week later. Someone measuring against a stranger's
// server wants the numbers to survive and the identifiers not to. So this is a *transform*, not a
// filter: the output is still a valid measurement document with the same tests, metrics and
// findings; only the identifying scalars change, and consistently, so "same SSID as last run" is
// still answerable from pseudonyms alone.
//
// Two properties are load-bearing and are what the tests pin:
// - Consistency within a document: one input value always maps to one pseudonym, so
// correlations inside a run survive.
// - No consistency *across* documents unless the user asks for it: the salt is per-run by
// default, so pseudonyms cannot be used to track a device between uploads. A stable salt is
// opt-in (`Salt.stable`) for people diffing their own history on their own server.
package app.echo_lot.privacy
import kotlinx.serialization.json.*
import java.security.MessageDigest
import java.util.Locale
/** How much to strip. Ordered: FULL < BALANCED < STRICT. Wire values match the server's. */
enum class PrivacyLevel(val wire: String) {
/** Nothing removed. The right choice for your own server. */
FULL("full"),
/**
* Identifiers pseudonymized, neighbour inventory dropped. Topology and timing survive:
* you can still see that the gateway is a MikroTik at a /24 boundary with 3 % loss, but not
* which MikroTik, on which SSID, next to whose Chromecast.
*/
BALANCED("balanced"),
/**
* Numbers only: tests keep their metrics and status, evidence is dropped, findings keep their
* codes and severities but lose descriptions (which quote real names). What is left cannot
* identify a network, and is still enough for aggregate "how common is this fault" work.
*/
STRICT("strict");
companion object {
fun fromWire(s: String?): PrivacyLevel =
entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == s?.lowercase(Locale.ROOT) } ?: FULL
/** The stricter of two levels — used to honour a server's minimum. */
fun max(a: PrivacyLevel, b: PrivacyLevel): PrivacyLevel = if (a.ordinal >= b.ordinal) a else b
}
}
/**
* The pseudonymization salt. Per-run by default: a fresh random salt means the same SSID uploaded
* twice yields two different pseudonyms, so an upload endpoint cannot link runs to a device.
* A stable salt trades that away for cross-run diffing and is only appropriate on a server you
* own the app makes that an explicit choice, not a default.
*/
class Salt private constructor(internal val bytes: ByteArray, val stable: Boolean) {
companion object {
fun perRun(random: ByteArray): Salt = Salt(random.copyOf(), stable = false)
fun stable(secret: ByteArray): Salt = Salt(secret.copyOf(), stable = true)
}
}
/**
* Transforms a measurement document to [level].
*
* Field classification is by JSON key name, because the schema names things consistently
* (`ssid`, `bssid`, `mac`, `ip4`, `ip6`, `fqdn`, ) and a name-driven pass is auditable by
* reading one table. Anything unrecognized is treated as identifying when it is a string inside
* a known-sensitive container, and left alone otherwise see [Classification].
*/
class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
private val cache = HashMap<String, String>()
fun anonymize(doc: JsonObject): JsonObject {
if (level == PrivacyLevel.FULL) return stamp(doc)
val walked = walkObject(doc, path = emptyList())
val out = if (level == PrivacyLevel.STRICT) strip(walked) else walked
return stamp(out)
}
/** Records what was done, so a reader of the archived/uploaded document is never guessing. */
private fun stamp(doc: JsonObject): JsonObject {
val run = doc["run"]?.jsonObject ?: return doc
val privacy = buildJsonObject {
put("anonymization", level.wire)
put("salt", if (salt.stable) "stable" else "per_run")
}
return JsonObject(doc + ("run" to JsonObject(run + ("privacy" to privacy))))
}
// ---- the tree walk -------------------------------------------------------------------
private fun walkObject(obj: JsonObject, path: List<String>): JsonObject = buildJsonObject {
for ((k, v) in obj) {
val childPath = path + k
when {
Classification.dropAtBalanced(childPath) -> Unit // omit entirely
else -> put(k, walk(k, v, childPath))
}
}
}
private fun walk(key: String, v: JsonElement, path: List<String>): JsonElement = when (v) {
is JsonObject -> walkObject(v, path)
is JsonArray -> JsonArray(v.map { walk(key, it, path) })
is JsonPrimitive ->
if (v.isString) {
// Name first (it is precise), then shape (it is exhaustive). A field nobody
// classified must not be a field that leaks.
val type = Classification.typeOf(key, path) ?: Classification.inferFromValue(v.content)
JsonPrimitive(transform(type, v.content))
} else {
v
}
}
private fun transform(type: LogicalType?, value: String): String = when (type) {
// Unclassified strings still get their *embedded* identifiers scrubbed. A whole-value
// check cannot see them: raw shell output is one long string that is neither a MAC nor an
// address, so it sailed through both the name table and the shape check carrying every
// MAC on the user's LAN.
null -> scrubEmbedded(value)
LogicalType.SSID -> pseudo("ssid", value) { "net-" + it.take(6) }
LogicalType.MAC, LogicalType.BSSID -> macPreservingOui(value)
LogicalType.IP4 -> ip4(value)
LogicalType.IP6 -> ip6(value)
LogicalType.FQDN -> fqdn(value)
LogicalType.OPAQUE_ID -> "redacted"
LogicalType.FREETEXT -> "[removed: may contain identifying text]"
}
/**
* Replaces addresses and MACs found *inside* a longer string.
*
* Shizuku probes embed raw command output verbatim `ip neigh`, `ip route`, `dumpsys` which
* is genuinely valuable evidence and also a complete inventory of every device on the user's
* network, with hardware addresses. measurement-schema.md §9 flagged these as "hard to
* anonymize" and proposed dropping them from exports.
*
* Scrubbing beats dropping: the output stays readable and auditable you can still see the
* shape of the neighbour table and how many hosts there were while the identifiers become
* the same pseudonyms used everywhere else in the document. So a MAC appearing both in a
* parsed field and in a raw dump still reads as one device.
*
* Only addresses and MACs are touched, for the same reason as [Classification.inferFromValue]:
* they are the patterns that cannot be mistaken for something else in free text.
*/
private fun scrubEmbedded(value: String): String {
// Cheap bail-out: the overwhelming majority of strings are short and contain neither.
if (value.length < 7 || (!value.contains(':') && !value.contains('.'))) return value
// One pass, not three. Sequential passes re-process their own output: after a MAC became
// 78:9a:18:xx:yy:zz the IPv6 pattern matched it — six hex groups separated by colons is
// exactly an address — and mangled the vendor prefix that the MAC rule had just taken
// care to preserve. Ordered alternation resolves each position once, MAC first.
return EMBEDDED.replace(value) { m ->
when {
m.groups[1] != null -> macPreservingOui(m.value)
m.groups[2] != null -> ip6(m.value)
else -> ip4(m.value)
}
}
}
// ---- per-type transforms -------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Keeps the OUI (which vendor) and pseudonymizes the NIC part (which unit). Vendor is the
* diagnostically valuable half "the RA comes from a MikroTik" survives, "…from THAT
* MikroTik" does not.
*/
private fun macPreservingOui(value: String): String {
val sep = if (value.contains('-')) '-' else ':'
val parts = value.split(sep)
if (parts.size != 6 || parts.any { it.length != 2 }) return pseudo("mac", value) { "mac-" + it.take(8) }
val nic = pseudo("mac", value) { it }
return (parts.take(3) + listOf(nic.substring(0, 2), nic.substring(2, 4), nic.substring(4, 6)))
.joinToString(sep.toString())
.lowercase(Locale.ROOT)
}
/**
* Prefix-preserving within the same class, with reserved ranges kept verbatim: RFC1918 and
* CGNAT addresses say something about the topology and nothing about the person, and a run
* where 192.168.1.1 became a random public address would be actively misleading to read.
* Public addresses keep only their /16 so the network is still locatable at ISP granularity.
*/
private fun ip4(value: String): String {
// A route destination carries a prefix length; pseudonymize the address and put it back,
// or "0.0.0.0/0" turns into nonsense and the routing table becomes unreadable.
value.substringAfter('/', "").takeIf { it.isNotEmpty() && value.contains('/') }?.let { len ->
return ip4(value.substringBefore('/')) + "/" + len
}
val o = value.split(".")
if (o.size != 4 || o.any { it.toIntOrNull() == null }) return value
val n = o.map { it.toInt() }
val reserved = n[0] == 10 ||
(n[0] == 172 && n[1] in 16..31) ||
(n[0] == 192 && n[1] == 168) ||
(n[0] == 169 && n[1] == 254) ||
(n[0] == 100 && n[1] in 64..127) ||
n[0] == 127 || n[0] == 0 || n[0] >= 224
if (reserved) return value
val h = pseudo("ip4", value) { it }
return "${n[0]}.${n[1]}.${h.substring(0, 2).toInt(16)}.${h.substring(2, 4).toInt(16)}"
}
/**
* IPv6 keeps the scope and the first 32 bits (so 2001:db8: still reads as global unicast in
* the same allocation) and pseudonymizes the rest the interface identifier is the part that
* is a device fingerprint, especially with EUI-64.
*/
private fun ip6(value: String): String {
// Dotted quads reach here through the family-agnostic field names (addr, gateway, dst);
// hand them to the IPv4 path rather than mangling them as if they were v6.
if (value.count { it == ':' } < 2) return ip4(value)
if (value.contains('/')) {
return ip6(value.substringBefore('/')) + "/" + value.substringAfter('/')
}
val v = value.lowercase(Locale.ROOT)
// The unspecified address and the default route are not identities; mangling them would
// make a routing table unreadable for no privacy gain.
if (v == "::1" || v == "::" || v.startsWith("fe80:") || v.startsWith("ff")) return v
// Unique local addresses (fc00::/7) need the *whole* prefix replaced, not the tail.
//
// They look like the v6 equivalent of RFC1918, and the first instinct is to keep them for
// the same reason: private, topological, says nothing about anyone. That reasoning does
// not carry over. An RFC1918 prefix is shared by millions of networks and identifies
// none of them; a ULA global ID is 40 *random* bits, unique to one network by
// construction (RFC 4193). It is a network fingerprint. Passing the leading groups
// through - which is what the general path does - leaked 32 of those 40 bits.
//
// The prefix is pseudonymized as a unit, so two addresses on the same ULA subnet still
// land on the same pseudonymous prefix. "These hosts are on one network" survives;
// "this is *that* network" does not.
if (v.startsWith("fc") || v.startsWith("fd")) {
val groups = v.substringBefore('%').split(":")
val prefix = pseudo("ula-prefix", groups.take(3).joinToString(":")) { it }
val host = pseudo("ula-host", v) { it }
return "fd${prefix.substring(0, 2)}:${prefix.substring(2, 6)}:${prefix.substring(6, 10)}" +
"::${host.substring(0, 4)}"
}
val groups = v.substringBefore('%').split(":")
if (groups.size < 3) return v
val h = pseudo("ip6", value) { it }
return "${groups[0]}:${groups[1]}:${h.substring(0, 4)}:${h.substring(4, 8)}::${h.substring(8, 12)}"
}
/**
* Per-label pseudonyms with the public suffix kept, so "it resolved somewhere under .local"
* or "…under example.com" survives without naming the host. The suffix list is deliberately
* short: guessing wrong keeps *more* pseudonymized, never less.
*/
private fun fqdn(value: String): String {
if (value.isEmpty()) return value
val trailing = value.endsWith(".")
val labels = value.trimEnd('.').split(".")
if (labels.size == 1) return pseudo("fqdn", value) { "host-" + it.take(6) }
val keep = if (labels.last() in publicSuffixes) 1 else 0
val head = labels.dropLast(keep).map { l -> pseudo("label", l) { "l-" + it.take(6) } }
return (head + labels.takeLast(keep)).joinToString(".") + if (trailing) "." else ""
}
// ---- STRICT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* STRICT keeps the shape of the document and the numbers, and nothing that quotes the
* network back. Evidence goes (trains carry addresses and hostnames), finding prose goes
* (it interpolates real names), networks go entirely.
*/
private fun strip(doc: JsonObject): JsonObject = buildJsonObject {
for ((k, v) in doc) {
when (k) {
"networks", "server_sessions" -> Unit
"tests" -> put(k, JsonArray((v as? JsonArray ?: JsonArray(emptyList())).map { t ->
val o = t.jsonObject
JsonObject(o.filterKeys { it != "evidence" && it != "params" })
}))
"findings" -> put(k, JsonArray((v as? JsonArray ?: JsonArray(emptyList())).map { f ->
val o = f.jsonObject
JsonObject(o.filterKeys { it != "description" && it != "title" && it != "evidence_refs" })
}))
"run" -> put(k, JsonObject(v.jsonObject.filterKeys { it != "notes" }))
else -> put(k, v)
}
}
}
// ---- pseudonym machinery ---------------------------------------------------------------
/** Deterministic per (domain, value, salt); memoized so one value maps to one pseudonym. */
private fun pseudo(domain: String, value: String, shape: (String) -> String): String =
cache.getOrPut("$domain\u0000$value") {
val md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
md.update(salt.bytes)
md.update(domain.toByteArray())
md.update(0)
md.update(value.lowercase(Locale.ROOT).toByteArray())
shape(md.digest().joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) })
}
private companion object {
/**
* MAC | IPv6 | IPv4, in that order alternation is ordered, so a MAC-shaped token is
* claimed by the MAC rule before the IPv6 rule can see it.
*
* The patterns are deliberately conservative. A missed address is scrubbed by another
* rule or not at all; an over-eager one mangles timestamps, version strings and log
* prefixes, corrupting evidence to protect nothing.
*/
val EMBEDDED = Regex(
// Raw strings: a regex written with escaped escapes is a regex nobody can check.
"""(\b[0-9a-fA-F]{2}(?:[:-][0-9a-fA-F]{2}){5}\b)""" +
"""|(\b(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){2,7}(?::|[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4})(?:[0-9a-fA-F:]*))""" +
"""|(\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b)"""
)
val publicSuffixes = setOf(
"local", "lan", "home", "internal", "arpa",
"com", "net", "org", "io", "app", "dev", "at", "de", "eu", "uk",
)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.privacy
/** The logical types of measurement-schema.md §8. */
enum class LogicalType { IP4, IP6, MAC, BSSID, SSID, FQDN, OPAQUE_ID, FREETEXT }
/**
* Which fields hold which logical type, and which whole subtrees are dropped below FULL.
*
* This is a table on purpose. The alternative annotating the Kotlin models and reflecting over
* them spreads the answer across every module and makes "what exactly gets uploaded?" a
* question you answer by reading the whole app. Here it is one file a reviewer can check against
* the spec in a sitting, and a new field that nobody classified stays visible in the output
* rather than being silently mangled.
*
* The bias is toward over-classifying: a metric wrongly pseudonymized is a bug someone reports;
* an SSID wrongly kept is a leak nobody notices.
*/
object Classification {
private val byKey: Map<String, LogicalType> = buildMap {
listOf(
"ip4", "ipv4", "gateway_ip4", "dns_ip4", "src_ip4", "dst_ip4", "public_ip4",
"observed_ip4", "hop_ip4", "answer_ip4", "address_ip4", "server_ip4",
).forEach { put(it, LogicalType.IP4) }
listOf(
"ip6", "ipv6", "gateway_ip6", "dns_ip6", "src_ip6", "dst_ip6", "public_ip6",
"observed_ip6", "hop_ip6", "answer_ip6", "address_ip6", "server_ip6",
"link_local", "ra_source", "prefix",
).forEach { put(it, LogicalType.IP6) }
// Family-agnostic address fields — the names the models actually use (Address.addr,
// Route.gateway, Route.dst, DnsConfig.servers). Their absence here was a real leak: the
// device's own global IPv6 address went out verbatim at the level whose description
// promises addresses are pseudonymized. Typed IP6 because the transform detects the
// family from the value, falling through to the IPv4 path for a dotted quad.
listOf(
"addr", "address", "gateway", "dst", "src", "servers", "server", "resolver",
"next_hop", "via", "public_ip", "observed_ip",
).forEach { put(it, LogicalType.IP6) }
listOf("mac", "hw_addr", "gateway_mac", "router_mac", "sender_mac", "peer_mac")
.forEach { put(it, LogicalType.MAC) }
listOf("bssid", "ap_mac").forEach { put(it, LogicalType.BSSID) }
listOf("ssid", "network_name", "wifi_ssid").forEach { put(it, LogicalType.SSID) }
listOf(
"fqdn", "hostname", "host", "name", "reverse_dns", "ptr", "domain", "query_name",
"friendly_name", "server_name", "sni", "cname", "search_domain", "device_name",
// Plural and prefixed variants the models actually use.
"search_domains", "private_dns_hostname", "domains", "hostnames",
).forEach { put(it, LogicalType.FQDN) }
listOf("session_id", "credential", "token", "device_id", "android_id", "serial", "imsi", "iccid")
.forEach { put(it, LogicalType.OPAQUE_ID) }
listOf("notes", "detail", "raw", "excerpt", "location", "model_description")
.forEach { put(it, LogicalType.FREETEXT) }
}
/**
* Whole subtrees that BALANCED removes rather than pseudonymizes.
*
* Neighbour inventories (SSDP/UPnP responders, ARP tables, discovered peers) are the clearest
* case: they describe other people's devices, they are a household fingerprint even with the
* names hashed, and no metric depends on them. Dropping beats mangling.
*/
private val droppedPaths: List<List<String>> = listOf(
listOf("networks", "neighbors"),
listOf("networks", "arp"),
listOf("networks", "wifi", "scan_results"),
listOf("run", "device", "security_patch"),
)
/** Key suffixes whose whole value is a neighbour inventory wherever they appear. */
private val droppedKeys = setOf(
"ssdp_responders", "upnp", "neighbors", "arp_table", "scan_results",
"nearby_networks", "peers", "raw_dump", "dumpsys",
)
fun typeOf(key: String, path: List<String>): LogicalType? {
byKey[key]?.let { return it }
// Inside a discovery/neighbour container every string is someone's device name until
// proven otherwise, so classify unknown strings there as free text rather than passing
// them through.
if (path.any { it in droppedKeys }) return LogicalType.FREETEXT
return null
}
/**
* Last-resort classification from the *value*, when the field name is unrecognised.
*
* A name table can only protect fields somebody remembered to add, which is the wrong
* property for a privacy control: the dangerous field is the one nobody thought of. This
* exists because that failed once already `addresses[].addr` holds the device's own global
* IPv6 address, the table had never heard of the name, and it went out verbatim.
*
* Only addresses and MACs are inferred, because only those have shapes that cannot be
* mistaken for something else. Hostnames deliberately are not: `train.udp_updown` is
* indistinguishable from a domain by shape, and mangling a test type would corrupt the
* document to protect nothing.
*/
fun inferFromValue(value: String): LogicalType? {
val v = value.trim()
if (v.isEmpty() || v.length > 64) return null
if (looksLikeMac(v)) return LogicalType.MAC
if (looksLikeIp6(v)) return LogicalType.IP6
if (looksLikeIp4(v)) return LogicalType.IP4
return null
}
private fun isHex(c: Char) = c in '0'..'9' || c in 'a'..'f' || c in 'A'..'F'
private fun looksLikeMac(v: String): Boolean {
val parts = v.split(':', '-')
return parts.size == 6 && parts.all { p -> p.length == 2 && p.all(::isHex) }
}
private fun looksLikeIp4(v: String): Boolean {
val parts = v.substringBefore('/').split('.')
return parts.size == 4 && parts.all { p ->
p.isNotEmpty() && p.length <= 3 && p.all(Char::isDigit) && p.toInt() <= 255
}
}
private fun looksLikeIp6(v: String): Boolean {
val core = v.substringBefore('/').substringBefore('%')
// Two colons minimum, so a time or a MAC fragment does not qualify, and nothing but the
// characters an address may contain.
return core.count { it == ':' } >= 2 && core.all { it == ':' || isHex(it) }
}
fun dropAtBalanced(path: List<String>): Boolean {
if (path.isNotEmpty() && path.last() in droppedKeys) return true
return droppedPaths.any { dropped -> dropped.all { path.contains(it) } }
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.privacy
import kotlinx.serialization.json.*
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertNotEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNull
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* These tests are the audit of the anonymizer: each one states a property someone's privacy
* depends on, so a regression here fails loudly rather than quietly leaking.
*/
class AnonymizerTest {
private val json = Json { prettyPrint = false }
private val salt = Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { it.toByte() })
private fun sample(): JsonObject = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""
{
"schema": "echolot/measurement",
"run": {
"id": "0190-run", "trigger": "manual", "notes": "at Anna's flat",
"device": {"manufacturer": "OnePlus", "model": "CPH2747", "security_patch": "2026-06-05"}
},
"networks": [{
"id": "net-1", "ssid": "Rambossek WLAN", "bssid": "78:9a:18:aa:bb:cc",
"gateway_ip4": "192.168.1.1", "public_ip4": "89.185.109.150",
"gateway_ip6": "2001:1ad0:c4fe:6767::1", "link_local": "fe80::7a9a:18ff:feaa:bbcc",
"neighbors": [{"name": "Anna's Chromecast", "mac": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff"}],
"ssdp_responders": [{"friendly_name": "Living Room TV", "location": "http://192.168.1.44:8060/"}]
}],
"tests": [{
"id": "t1", "type": "train.udp_updown", "status": "ok",
"metrics": {"rtt_ms_avg": 12.4, "loss_pct": 0.0},
"evidence": {"seq": [0,1,2], "t_rx_ns": [1,2,3]}
}],
"findings": [{
"id": "f1", "code": "nat.udp_rebinding", "severity": "medium",
"title": "NAT remapped the port", "description": "server saw 89.185.109.150:41000"
}],
"summary": {"verdict": "warn"}
}
""".trimIndent(),
).jsonObject
private fun anon(level: PrivacyLevel, doc: JsonObject = sample()) = Anonymizer(level, salt).anonymize(doc)
private fun flat(e: JsonElement): String = e.toString()
@Test
fun fullLeavesTheDocumentAloneButRecordsThat() {
val out = anon(PrivacyLevel.FULL)
assertEquals("Rambossek WLAN", out["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["ssid"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
assertEquals("full", out["run"]!!.jsonObject["privacy"]!!.jsonObject["anonymization"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
}
@Test
fun balancedRemovesTheSsidAndTheNotes() {
val text = flat(anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED))
assertFalse(text.contains("Rambossek"), "SSID survived: $text")
assertFalse(text.contains("Anna"), "free-text note or neighbour name survived: $text")
}
@Test
fun balancedDropsNeighbourInventoriesEntirely() {
val net = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject
assertNull(net["neighbors"], "neighbour list should be dropped, not pseudonymized")
assertNull(net["ssdp_responders"], "SSDP responders should be dropped, not pseudonymized")
}
@Test
fun balancedKeepsTheVendorHalfOfAMac() {
val bssid = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["bssid"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content
assertTrue(bssid.startsWith("78:9a:18"), "OUI should survive so the vendor is still known: $bssid")
assertFalse(bssid.endsWith("aa:bb:cc"), "NIC part should be pseudonymized: $bssid")
}
@Test
fun privateAddressesAreKeptVerbatimAndPublicOnesAreNot() {
val net = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject
assertEquals("192.168.1.1", net["gateway_ip4"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content,
"RFC1918 says nothing about the user and everything about the topology")
assertNotEquals("89.185.109.150", net["public_ip4"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
assertTrue(net["public_ip4"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content.startsWith("89.185."),
"the /16 should survive for ISP-level context")
}
@Test
fun linkLocalIsKeptButGlobalV6IsNot() {
val net = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject
assertEquals("fe80::7a9a:18ff:feaa:bbcc", net["link_local"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
assertNotEquals("2001:1ad0:c4fe:6767::1", net["gateway_ip6"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
}
@Test
fun metricsAndVerdictsAreNeverTouched() {
for (level in PrivacyLevel.entries) {
val out = anon(level)
val t = out["tests"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject
assertEquals(12.4, t["metrics"]!!.jsonObject["rtt_ms_avg"]!!.jsonPrimitive.double, 1e-9,
"$level changed a metric")
assertEquals("ok", t["status"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
assertEquals("warn", out["summary"]!!.jsonObject["verdict"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
}
}
@Test
fun findingCodesSurviveEveryLevelSoAggregationStillWorks() {
for (level in PrivacyLevel.entries) {
val f = anon(level)["findings"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject
assertEquals("nat.udp_rebinding", f["code"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content, "$level lost the finding code")
assertEquals("medium", f["severity"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
}
}
@Test
fun strictDropsEvidenceAndProse() {
val out = anon(PrivacyLevel.STRICT)
assertNull(out["networks"], "STRICT should not describe the network at all")
assertNull(out["tests"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["evidence"])
assertNull(out["findings"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["description"])
assertFalse(flat(out).contains("89.185.109.150"), "an address leaked through finding prose")
}
@Test
fun pseudonymsAreConsistentWithinADocument() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"ssid":"Home"},{"ssid":"Home"},{"ssid":"Other"}]}"""
).jsonObject
val nets = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, doc)["networks"]!!.jsonArray
val a = nets[0].jsonObject["ssid"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content
val b = nets[1].jsonObject["ssid"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content
val c = nets[2].jsonObject["ssid"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content
assertEquals(a, b, "the same SSID must map to the same pseudonym inside one run")
assertNotEquals(a, c, "different SSIDs must not collide")
}
@Test
fun perRunSaltsDoNotLinkTwoUploadsOfTheSameNetwork() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement("""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"ssid":"Home"}]}""").jsonObject
val one = Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { 1 })).anonymize(doc)
val two = Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { 2 })).anonymize(doc)
assertNotEquals(
one["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["ssid"],
two["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["ssid"],
"a per-run salt must not produce a cross-run tracking identifier",
)
}
@Test
fun aStableSaltDoesLinkThemBecauseThatIsWhatItIsFor() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement("""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"ssid":"Home"}]}""").jsonObject
val secret = ByteArray(32) { 7 }
val one = Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, Salt.stable(secret)).anonymize(doc)
val two = Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, Salt.stable(secret)).anonymize(doc)
assertEquals(
one["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["ssid"],
two["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["ssid"],
)
assertEquals("stable", one["run"]!!.jsonObject["privacy"]!!.jsonObject["salt"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content)
}
@Test
fun theDeclaredLevelMatchesWhatWasApplied() {
for (level in PrivacyLevel.entries) {
assertEquals(
level.wire,
anon(level)["run"]!!.jsonObject["privacy"]!!.jsonObject["anonymization"]!!.jsonPrimitive.content,
)
}
}
@Test
fun serverMinimumWins() {
assertEquals(PrivacyLevel.STRICT, PrivacyLevel.max(PrivacyLevel.FULL, PrivacyLevel.STRICT))
assertEquals(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, PrivacyLevel.max(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, PrivacyLevel.FULL))
assertEquals(PrivacyLevel.FULL, PrivacyLevel.fromWire("nonsense"))
}
// A ULA looks like the v6 RFC1918 and is not. Its global ID is 40 random bits, unique to one
// network by construction (RFC 4193), so the prefix IS the identifier - unlike 192.168.x,
// which millions of networks share. Passing the leading groups through leaked most of it.
@Test
fun ulaPrefixesArePseudonymizedWhole() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"link":{"dns":{"servers":["fda1:3fb1:ff92:6696::2662"]}}}]}"""
).jsonObject
val out = flat(anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, doc))
assertFalse(out.contains("fda1"), "the ULA global ID survived: $out")
assertFalse(out.contains("3fb1"), "part of the ULA global ID survived: $out")
assertTrue(out.contains("fd"), "the result should still read as a ULA: $out")
}
// Pseudonymizing the prefix as a unit keeps the one fact that is diagnostically useful:
// whether two addresses sit on the same network.
@Test
fun addressesOnOneUlaSubnetStayRelated() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"link":{"dns":{"servers":[
"fda1:3fb1:ff92:6696::1","fda1:3fb1:ff92:6696::2","fdff:9999:8888:7777::1"]}}}]}"""
).jsonObject
val servers = anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, doc)["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["link"]!!
.jsonObject["dns"]!!.jsonObject["servers"]!!.jsonArray.map { it.jsonPrimitive.content }
val prefixOf = { s: String -> s.substringBeforeLast("::") }
assertEquals(prefixOf(servers[0]), prefixOf(servers[1]),
"two addresses on one ULA subnet should share a pseudonymous prefix")
assertNotEquals(prefixOf(servers[0]), prefixOf(servers[2]),
"a different ULA network must not collide with the first")
}
// RFC1918 stays readable, and this is the contrast that justifies it: a shared, meaningless
// prefix is topology; a unique random one is identity.
@Test
fun rfc1918StaysReadableUnlikeUla() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},"networks":[{"link":{"dns":{"servers":["192.168.1.1","10.13.102.1"]}}}]}"""
).jsonObject
val out = flat(anon(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, doc))
assertTrue(out.contains("192.168.1.1"), "RFC1918 should survive: $out")
assertTrue(out.contains("10.13.102.1"), "RFC1918 should survive: $out")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package app.echo_lot.privacy
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonArray
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
/**
* The blunt instrument: build a document with identifying values in every place one can actually
* occur, anonymize it, and assert none of them survive.
*
* [AnonymizerTest] checks that the fields the classification table knows about are handled
* correctly. This checks the other half the fields it does *not* know about. A per-field test
* can only fail for a field someone remembered to write a case for, which is exactly the wrong
* property for a privacy check: the dangerous field is the one nobody thought of.
*
* Concretely, this is written the way it is because the schema's own field names disagree with
* the classifier's. `Address.addr` carries an IP and is documented as such in
* measurement-schema.md §8, but the classifier keys on names like `ip4` and `gateway_ip4` and had
* never heard of `addr`.
*/
class LeakTest {
private val json = Json { prettyPrint = false }
private val salt = Salt.perRun(ByteArray(32) { 3 })
/**
* Every string here is something that identifies a person, a household or a device, placed
* where the real models actually put it (`core-measurement`'s Network/Link/Address/DnsConfig).
*/
private val secrets = listOf(
"Rambossek WLAN", // ssid
"78:9a:18:aa:bb:cc", // bssid
"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:11", // gateway mac
"2001:1ad0:c4fe:6767::150", // global v6 address on the interface
"2a02:1748:dead:beef::1", // v6 default gateway
"203.0.113.77", // public v4
"nas.rambossek.lan", // private-dns hostname
"rambossek.lan", // search domain
"Anna's Chromecast", // neighbour name
"kitchen table", // free-text note
)
private fun document(): String = """
{
"schema": "echolot/measurement",
"run": {
"id": "run-1", "trigger": "manual", "notes": "${secrets[9]}",
"device": {"manufacturer": "OnePlus", "model": "CPH2747"}
},
"networks": [{
"id": "net-1", "transport": "wifi",
"link": {
"mtu": 1500,
"addresses": [
{"addr": "${secrets[3]}", "prefix_len": 64, "scope": "global"},
{"addr": "192.168.1.44", "prefix_len": 24, "scope": "global"}
],
"routes": [
{"dst": "::/0", "gateway": "${secrets[4]}", "iface": "wlan0"},
{"dst": "0.0.0.0/0", "gateway": "192.168.1.1", "iface": "wlan0"}
],
"dns": {
"servers": ["${secrets[5]}", "192.168.1.1"],
"private_dns_hostname": "${secrets[6]}",
"search_domains": ["${secrets[7]}"]
}
},
"wifi": {"ssid": "${secrets[0]}", "bssid": "${secrets[1]}"},
"neighbors": [{"name": "${secrets[8]}", "mac": "${secrets[2]}"}]
}],
"tests": [{"id": "t1", "type": "train.udp_updown", "status": "ok",
"metrics": {"rtt_ms_avg": 12.4}}],
"findings": [],
"summary": {"verdict": "ok"}
}
""".trimIndent()
private fun anonymized(level: PrivacyLevel): String =
json.encodeToString(
kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject.serializer(),
Anonymizer(level, salt).anonymize(json.parseToJsonElement(document()).jsonObject),
)
@Test
fun nothingIdentifyingSurvivesBalanced() {
val out = anonymized(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)
val leaked = secrets.filter { out.contains(it) }
assertTrue(
leaked.isEmpty(),
"these identifying values were uploaded verbatim at BALANCED: $leaked\n\n$out",
)
}
@Test
fun nothingIdentifyingSurvivesStrict() {
val out = anonymized(PrivacyLevel.STRICT)
val leaked = secrets.filter { out.contains(it) }
assertTrue(leaked.isEmpty(), "leaked at STRICT: $leaked\n\n$out")
}
// Private addresses are kept on purpose — they describe the topology and not the person — so
// this pins that the leak test above is not passing by accident of over-redaction.
@Test
fun privateAddressesAreStillReadable() {
val out = anonymized(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED)
assertTrue(out.contains("192.168.1.1"), "RFC1918 gateway should survive: $out")
assertTrue(out.contains("192.168.1.44"), "RFC1918 interface address should survive: $out")
}
/**
* Raw shell output embeds a complete inventory of the local network, and neither the field-name
* table nor the whole-value shape check can see it: `ip_neigh` is one long string that is
* itself neither a MAC nor an address.
*
* This is not hypothetical. The blob below is (abridged) real output that reached the server
* at the `balanced` level from a test device, carrying the hardware address of every host on
* the network. measurement-schema.md §9 had flagged raw dumps as "hard to anonymize"; nothing
* enforced it.
*/
@Test
fun identifiersInsideRawShellOutputAreScrubbed() {
// Joined rather than written with escapes, so the fixture stays readable and there is no
// chance of an escape being mangled on its way into the JSON below.
val dump = listOf(
"uid=2000",
"10.13.102.5 dev wlan0 lladdr 90:09:d0:1a:83:e4 REACHABLE",
"10.13.102.1 dev wlan0 lladdr 78:9a:18:54:b8:f9 REACHABLE",
"10.13.102.111 dev wlan0 lladdr dc:a2:66:08:69:95 STALE",
"2001:4bb8:46a:e724:289d:87ff:feb6:ebd3 dev wlan0 lladdr b8:be:f4:bc:ca:cf STALE",
).joinToString(" | ")
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},"tests":[{"id":"t","type":"link.ip_monitor",
"evidence":{"ip_neigh":"$dump"}}]}"""
).jsonObject
val out = json.encodeToString(
kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject.serializer(),
Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, salt).anonymize(doc),
)
for (mac in listOf("90:09:d0:1a:83:e4", "78:9a:18:54:b8:f9", "dc:a2:66:08:69:95", "b8:be:f4:bc:ca:cf")) {
assertFalse(out.contains(mac), "a neighbour's MAC survived inside the raw dump: $mac")
}
assertFalse(out.contains("2001:4bb8:46a:e724:289d:87ff:feb6:ebd3"),
"a global IPv6 survived inside the raw dump")
// Scrubbed, not dropped: the evidence must still be readable, or the raw dump stops being
// evidence at all. Structure, hostnames of the fields, and RFC1918 addresses stay.
assertTrue(out.contains("REACHABLE") && out.contains("STALE"), "the dump lost its structure")
assertTrue(out.contains("10.13.102.1"), "RFC1918 addresses should stay readable: $out")
assertTrue(out.contains("78:9a:18"), "the vendor prefix should survive for identification")
}
// A MAC in a raw dump and the same MAC in a parsed field must land on the same pseudonym, or
// the document stops being internally consistent and one device reads as two.
@Test
fun theSameIdentifierMatchesAcrossParsedAndRawFields() {
val doc = json.parseToJsonElement(
"""{"run":{"id":"r"},
"networks":[{"wifi":{"bssid":"78:9a:18:54:b8:f9"}}],
"tests":[{"id":"t","evidence":{"ip_neigh":"gw dev wlan0 lladdr 78:9a:18:54:b8:f9 REACHABLE"}}]}"""
).jsonObject
val out = Anonymizer(PrivacyLevel.BALANCED, salt).anonymize(doc)
val parsed = out["networks"]!!.jsonArray[0].jsonObject["wifi"]!!.jsonObject["bssid"]!!
.jsonPrimitive.content
val raw = json.encodeToString(kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject.serializer(), out)
assertTrue(raw.contains(parsed),
"the parsed BSSID pseudonym ($parsed) does not appear in the scrubbed dump")
}
}

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