Compare commits
87
Commits
@@ -15,7 +15,13 @@
|
||||
# container registry (docker login → unauthorized).
|
||||
# Create: user Settings → Applications → Generate token.
|
||||
# REGISTRY_USER optional; defaults to the pushing actor's username.
|
||||
# The release job needs only the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN.
|
||||
# RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY base64 ed25519 seed that signs SHA256SUMS. Self-updating
|
||||
# servers verify the signature against the public key baked
|
||||
# into the binary (selfupdate.DefaultPublicKeyB64) and REFUSE
|
||||
# unsigned releases, so this job hard-fails without it —
|
||||
# a release nobody can install is better failed loudly here.
|
||||
# Mint a pair with: go run ./cmd/release-sign -gen
|
||||
# The release job otherwise needs only the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN.
|
||||
|
||||
name: server-release
|
||||
on:
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +50,18 @@ jobs:
|
||||
done
|
||||
(cd ../dist && sha256sum * > SHA256SUMS)
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Sign SHA256SUMS
|
||||
working-directory: server
|
||||
env:
|
||||
RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
[ -n "$RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY" ] || { echo "::error::secret RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY is missing — self-updating servers refuse unsigned releases, so publishing one would strand the fleet. Add it under Settings → Actions → Secrets."; exit 1; }
|
||||
go run ./cmd/release-sign ../dist/SHA256SUMS
|
||||
# Verify with the key baked into the binary we just built — catches a
|
||||
# secret that does not match DefaultPublicKeyB64 before it ships.
|
||||
PUB=$(grep -o 'DefaultPublicKeyB64 = "[^"]*"' internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go | cut -d'"' -f2)
|
||||
go run ./cmd/release-sign -verify -pub "$PUB" ../dist/SHA256SUMS
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create release + attach binaries
|
||||
env:
|
||||
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,3 +43,6 @@ web/.wrangler/
|
||||
|
||||
# Eclipse/JDT output from the VSCodium Java extension — not a build artifact we own
|
||||
echolot-app/*/bin/
|
||||
|
||||
# Kotlin compiler scratch/error logs
|
||||
echolot-app/.kotlin/
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,10 +32,25 @@ Keep prober result IDs aligned with the measurement-schema test-type registry.
|
||||
|
||||
## Versioning
|
||||
|
||||
Prefer **patch** bumps (`server-v0.3.1`) for additive/incremental work; reserve **minor** bumps
|
||||
for real milestones. Don't burn through minor versions. Tags are namespaced: `server-v*` for the
|
||||
Go server, `v*` for the app. Pushing a `server-v*` tag runs CI → binaries + Gitea release +
|
||||
registry image; the server on fmr can `--self-update` from those releases.
|
||||
Both artifacts are **SemVer**. Prefer **patch** bumps (`server-v0.3.1`) for additive/incremental
|
||||
work; reserve **minor** bumps for real milestones. Don't burn through minor versions. Tags are
|
||||
namespaced: `server-v*` for the Go server, `v*` for the app. Pushing a `server-v*` tag runs CI →
|
||||
binaries + Gitea release + registry image; the server on fmr can `--self-update` from those
|
||||
releases.
|
||||
|
||||
The app's version lives once, as `appVersionName` in `app/build.gradle.kts`; **`versionCode` is
|
||||
derived from it** (`major*1e6 + minor*1e4 + patch*10`). Never set it by hand — a second number a
|
||||
human has to remember to bump eventually disagrees with the first.
|
||||
|
||||
**Versions are load-bearing** (probe-protocol.md §8): the server refuses apps outside its window
|
||||
with `426`, and the app refuses servers outside its own. Two axes, kept separate:
|
||||
- `protocol_version` — *can* they talk. The correctness axis; below 1.0.0 the **minor** is the
|
||||
breaking axis.
|
||||
- release-version window — *may* they, per policy. `[min, max)`, bounds at breaking boundaries so
|
||||
a patch never strands a fleet. Client bounds: `Compat.kt`. Server: `ECHOLOT_MIN/MAX_APP_VERSION`.
|
||||
|
||||
Raise a minimum only when older peers are actively harmful, and say why in the constant's comment.
|
||||
`GET /v1/profile` must stay ungated — it is how a refused client learns what it needs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Layout
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +67,29 @@ echolot-prober/ the capability prober (self-contained Gradle buil
|
||||
ui/ProberScreen.kt result cards colored by verdict
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Client modules (echolot-app/)
|
||||
|
||||
Pure Kotlin/JVM where possible, so the interesting logic is unit-testable without a device and can
|
||||
be exercised against the live server from the PC:
|
||||
|
||||
- `core-protocol` — control plane (pinned TLS) + ELT1 UDP data plane. **One `ProbeSession` per
|
||||
server session, for its whole lifetime**: a second one restarts sequence numbers, the server's
|
||||
anti-replay window discards every packet, and granted sends then target the closed socket.
|
||||
- `core-measurement` — the schema types. `core-engine` — composes probes into documents.
|
||||
- `core-privacy` — the §8 anonymizer (`full` / `balanced` / `strict`). Field classification lives
|
||||
in one table (`Classification.kt`); keep it there rather than annotating models.
|
||||
- `core-archive` — on-device run storage + retention. `enabled` is separate from the three
|
||||
ceilings: all-zeros means "no limits", not "keep nothing".
|
||||
|
||||
**The local archive keeps the unredacted document; anonymization happens per upload, on the way
|
||||
out.** Never redact what is stored locally.
|
||||
|
||||
### Live testing without a device
|
||||
`echolot-app/scripts/test-fmr.sh [gradle-task] [test-filter]` mints an enrollment token over SSH,
|
||||
enrolls, computes the SPKI pin from the served cert and runs a `Live*Test` against fmr. This covers
|
||||
the whole server-facing vertical (granted sends, downstream MTU, uploads) with no phone involved —
|
||||
use it before asking the user to test on hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conventions
|
||||
|
||||
- Every probe returns a `ProbeResult` — never throws to the caller (MainActivity wraps anyway).
|
||||
@@ -107,6 +145,23 @@ First build downloads AGP/Compose/Shizuku from Google Maven + Maven Central.
|
||||
Shizuku, **toggle Wireless debugging off/on** — Shizuku keeps running (separate process), a fresh
|
||||
port + mDNS record appear, and the beacon/connector recover. Plan the Shizuku-tier dev loop
|
||||
around this (or USB, if ever available).
|
||||
- **A poisoned Gradle *build cache* entry can silently drop a whole module from the APK.**
|
||||
Symptom: the app dies with `ClassNotFoundException` for a class that plainly exists, while the
|
||||
build is green and `./gradlew :app:dependencies` lists the module on `debugRuntimeClasspath`.
|
||||
The module's own jar is correct; its code simply never reaches AGP's intermediates. `clean`,
|
||||
`rm -rf */build` and `--rerun-tasks` all fail to fix it, because **none of them touch the build
|
||||
cache** — look for `compileKotlin FROM-CACHE` in the log. Fix: rebuild with `--no-build-cache`.
|
||||
Verify by grepping the APK's dex for a string literal that only that module defines; grepping for
|
||||
a *class name* proves nothing, because callers carry the name as a reference whether or not the
|
||||
class is packaged:
|
||||
`unzip -o -q app-debug.apk "classes*.dex" && grep -a "pin-sha256:" *.dex`
|
||||
Suspect this whenever a runtime failure contradicts a successful build.
|
||||
- **Empty-jar race with the IDE.** VSCodium's Java/Kotlin extension runs its own Gradle daemon on
|
||||
the same project; when it overlaps a CLI build, a module's `build/libs/*.jar` can end up
|
||||
containing only a manifest, and Gradle then considers `jar` up-to-date. Dependent modules fail
|
||||
with "Unresolved reference" on symbols that plainly exist. Fix: `rm -f <module>/build/libs/*.jar`
|
||||
and re-run the `jar` task. Suspect this whenever a reference resolves in one module but not in
|
||||
its consumer.
|
||||
- As of the AGP 9.2.0 / Gradle 9.6.0 / Kotlin 2.2.10 bump, JDK 17+ (including 25) works —
|
||||
AGP 9 requires Gradle 9.1.0+ and Kotlin 2.2.10+ as its minimum KGP version. On machines with
|
||||
Android Studio, its `jbr` directory works as `JAVA_HOME`.
|
||||
@@ -118,3 +173,11 @@ First build downloads AGP/Compose/Shizuku from Google Maven + Maven Central.
|
||||
are SUPPORTED on both known devices via `Os.recvmsg` + `StructMsghdr` reflection.
|
||||
3. Fold the confirmed capabilities + Shizuku dump-format samples back into the production
|
||||
`core-probe` / `core-shizuku` modules.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enrolling a device with a server
|
||||
|
||||
`echolot-app/scripts/enroll-link.sh [note]` mints a §2.1 bootstrap link on fmr over SSH and prints
|
||||
it (plus a QR if `qrencode` is installed, plus the `adb shell am start -a …VIEW -d '<uri>'` command
|
||||
when a device is attached). The link carries a single-use token — treat it as a secret until spent.
|
||||
Never hand-assemble one: the base64 pin needs percent-encoding, and a pin wrong by one character
|
||||
fails as an inscrutable TLS error rather than as a bad pin.
|
||||
|
||||
+947
-3
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ Two collection-loop gotchas found while driving the phone over USB:
|
||||
2. ~~If `trace.errqueue_reachable` = PARTIAL, add a C-over-JNI errqueue shim.~~ **Retired** —
|
||||
SUPPORTED on both known devices; `traceroute.udp4` reads real hops via `Os.recvmsg` +
|
||||
`StructMsghdr` reflection, so no `:native` module is needed.
|
||||
3. Start the Go server skeleton (enrollment + profile + sessions + UDP echo with observation
|
||||
blocks + canary-DNS reference records) per probe-protocol.md.
|
||||
3. ~~Start the Go server skeleton per probe-protocol.md.~~ **Shipped** — live on fmr since
|
||||
v0.2.0 (2026-07-31); see the server sections below.
|
||||
4. Fold confirmed capabilities into the production `core-probe` / `core-shizuku` modules.
|
||||
|
||||
## Production probe server — LIVE on dedicated VM "fmr" (2026-07-31)
|
||||
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ SSH only — verified untouched by the daemon (explicit multi-address binds, no
|
||||
Control: fmr-1:8443 (SPKI pin `zRV9qkiLnRexAeh4RrSfJzbPWO+U/2Oj2/NVM/KfXlg=`, verified
|
||||
externally over v4+v6). UDP data plane on all four service addresses :8442 — the second IP is
|
||||
the stun-5780 substrate. Daily randomized self-update timer installed (checksum-verified
|
||||
against SHA256SUMS; signature verification still TODO before treating the source as untrusted).
|
||||
against SHA256SUMS; signature verification landed 2026-08-02 — see "Release signing" below).
|
||||
Host config in `/etc/echolot-server.env`. SSH access for sessions: `ssh claude-echolot`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Server v0.3.0 — STUN + TCP echo + observations + actions (2026-07-31)
|
||||
@@ -543,3 +543,947 @@ Best available behavior, now implemented: the banner still opens Shizuku, but th
|
||||
exact steps there ("Pairing", then "Start"), and a second tap target opens **Developer options**
|
||||
(`Settings.ACTION_APPLICATION_DEVELOPMENT_SETTINGS` — public and exported) since Wireless
|
||||
debugging must be enabled first for Shizuku's wireless start to work at all.
|
||||
|
||||
### Downstream measurements: asymmetric grants, DF-mode big_send (server-v0.4.0 … v0.4.2, 2026-08-01)
|
||||
The client can measure a round trip and the largest packet it can *send*. It cannot measure the
|
||||
largest packet it can *receive*, or downstream-only loss — those need the server to push, which is
|
||||
exactly what §3.4 gates behind an asymmetric grant. Implemented and verified live from the PC:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`session.Grant`** — created per action, bound at creation to the session's *observed*
|
||||
data-plane source (no grant without a verified destination), clamped to server limits, with a
|
||||
byte budget, an average-rate ceiling and an expiry. Unit-tested for each of those refusals.
|
||||
- **`downtrain`** — N packets of size S every I µs; the client derives downstream loss,
|
||||
reordering and inter-arrival spacing.
|
||||
- **`big_send`** — one datagram per requested size. **DF is on by default**, so the largest size
|
||||
that arrives *is* the downstream path MTU. Without DF the kernel fragments and the result only
|
||||
says whether fragments get through — a different fact, and the reason the schema has both
|
||||
`mtu.pmtud_down` and `mtu.frag_delivery`. Sizes above the server's own egress MTU (from the
|
||||
startup self-test) are refused up front and reported as `max_df_bytes`, so an absence caused by
|
||||
our kernel is never read as a limit of the client's path.
|
||||
|
||||
Live from the PC against fmr: downstream path MTU **1500** (1472 payload, DF), fragmented delivery
|
||||
up to **4000**, downstream train **100/100, 0 % loss, 0 reordered**, inter-arrival 3.3 ms for a
|
||||
3000 µs send interval.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Two bugs this shook out, both invisible in a single-homed lab
|
||||
1. **Granted sends went out from the wrong local address** (fixed in server-v0.4.2). fmr binds two
|
||||
IPv4 addresses; `connFor` returned whichever socket of the right family came first in the bind
|
||||
list. A train for a session established on `.150` left from `.151` and every packet was dropped
|
||||
by the client's NAT, which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump showed all 50 leaving, the
|
||||
client saw none — reported as *100 % downstream loss*, a confident measurement of something
|
||||
that never happened. Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their
|
||||
traffic and granted sends go back through that socket; `connfor_test.go` pins both that and the
|
||||
family fallback.
|
||||
2. **A second `ProbeSession` on one server session is silently dead.** Sequence numbers restart at
|
||||
zero client-side while the server's anti-replay window keeps counting, so every packet is
|
||||
discarded as a replay — and because the server then never records the new source, the grant
|
||||
still targets the closed socket. `ServerMeasurement` now uses one ProbeSession for the whole
|
||||
run; `ProbeSession`'s doc comment states the constraint.
|
||||
|
||||
### Run archive, anonymizer and uploads (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Three pieces, deliberately separate:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`core-archive`** — one JSON file per run plus an index entry, in a plain directory the user can
|
||||
inspect or delete with a file manager. Retention (max runs / max age / max total bytes) is
|
||||
enforced on every save rather than by a sweeper. `enabled` is a separate flag from the three
|
||||
ceilings because "no limits" and "keep nothing" are opposite intentions; collapsing them onto
|
||||
all-zeros is how a user who turns the caps off ends up with an empty history. 13 tests.
|
||||
- **`core-privacy`** — the schema §8 anonymizer, three levels. `full` (your own server) changes
|
||||
nothing; `balanced` pseudonymizes SSIDs/hostnames, keeps the OUI half of a MAC and the /16 of a
|
||||
public IP, keeps RFC1918 verbatim (it describes topology, not a person), and *drops* neighbour
|
||||
inventories (SSDP/ARP/scan results) rather than mangling them; `strict` keeps only metrics,
|
||||
statuses and finding codes. Pseudonyms are consistent within a document and — by default — not
|
||||
across documents, so an upload endpoint cannot link a device's runs; a stable salt is opt-in for
|
||||
people diffing their own history. Classification is one readable table, not annotations spread
|
||||
across modules. 14 tests, each pinning a property someone's privacy depends on.
|
||||
- **Server-side upload policy** — `off | anonymous | account`, plus max size, retention days, max
|
||||
runs per device, and the *least* anonymization accepted. The profile advertises all of it so the
|
||||
app presents the choice honestly instead of discovering the rules by being rejected. `account`
|
||||
refuses today rather than falling back to anonymous: picking the strict setting before OIDC
|
||||
lands must not silently mean the loose one.
|
||||
|
||||
**The archive holds the unredacted document; redaction happens on the way out, per upload.** The
|
||||
local archive is the user's own data on their own device, and redacting it would destroy exactly
|
||||
the detail that makes a week-old run worth keeping.
|
||||
|
||||
App-side: settings screen (archive limits, privacy level with a plain-language description of what
|
||||
each keeps, auto-upload off by default, server URL/pin/credential), history screen showing whether
|
||||
each run left the device, and a **preview of the exact bytes an upload would send** — an anonymizer
|
||||
the user cannot inspect is only a promise.
|
||||
|
||||
Live round trip against fmr: uploaded a run, listed it, fetched it back and asserted the SSID, the
|
||||
SSDP neighbour name and the free-text note are absent from what the server stores while the
|
||||
finding code and the metrics survive, then deleted it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Still open
|
||||
- `mtu.pmtud_up` (DF + errqueue), `frag_send`, `throughput`, TRAIN_REPORT retrieval.
|
||||
- Enrollment UI in the app (server URL/pin/credential are typed in by hand today).
|
||||
- Accounts/OIDC on the server, which is what `uploads=account` is waiting for.
|
||||
- Nothing in this entry has been exercised on a phone yet — all of it was verified from the PC
|
||||
against the live server. On-device verification is the next step.
|
||||
|
||||
### SemVer compatibility windows between app and server (server-v0.5.0 … v0.5.2, 2026-08-01)
|
||||
Both artifacts are SemVer, and each now declares — and enforces — which peer versions it will talk
|
||||
to. Spec: `docs/probe-protocol.md` §8.
|
||||
|
||||
**Two axes, deliberately not conflated.** Release versions are a *proxy* for what actually has to
|
||||
match, so the real thing is checked first:
|
||||
- `protocol_version` — **can** these builds talk. Advertised in the profile; a peer in a different
|
||||
breaking series is refused whatever its release version says. Below 1.0.0 the **minor** is the
|
||||
breaking axis (SemVer §4).
|
||||
- release-version window — **may** they, per policy. `[min, max)`, min inclusive, max exclusive,
|
||||
because the useful bound is always "the version that broke it".
|
||||
|
||||
Bounds sit at breaking boundaries, not at releases, so shipping a patch never requires editing a
|
||||
range. The app requires server `>= 0.4.2` for a stated reason, not caution: earlier multi-homed
|
||||
servers mis-addressed granted sends and the client measured 100 % downstream loss that never
|
||||
happened. Operators override the server side with `ECHOLOT_MIN_APP_VERSION` /
|
||||
`ECHOLOT_MAX_APP_VERSION`; a malformed bound is fatal at startup rather than ignored, so a typo
|
||||
cannot silently disable a restriction.
|
||||
|
||||
Three rules that shaped the implementation:
|
||||
1. **`GET /v1/profile` is never gated.** It is where a refused client learns which version it needs;
|
||||
gating it leaves the user with a network error instead of an answer.
|
||||
2. **An unparseable or absent version is `unknown`, and is allowed.** Dev builds report `dev`, and a
|
||||
client too old to send the header cannot be identified anyway.
|
||||
3. **Refusal is 426 with a body naming both versions and the window**, surfaced client-side as a
|
||||
distinct `VersionRefused` rather than folded into "network error".
|
||||
|
||||
The app's `versionCode` is now derived from its SemVer (`major*1e6 + minor*1e4 + patch*10`) instead
|
||||
of being a second number to remember.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified live against fmr (`LiveCompatTest`): profile advertises the window and stays readable for a
|
||||
refused version; 0.1.0 and 99.0.0 are both refused with actionable messages; 0.2.0 and a missing
|
||||
header are both served.
|
||||
|
||||
One user-visible bug caught in the process: Go's JSON encoder HTML-escapes `<`, `>` and `&` by
|
||||
default, so the refusal reached the client as `needs \u003e= 0.2.0`. Disabled at the encoder (this
|
||||
is an API, not a page), and the client now *parses* the error field instead of pattern-matching it,
|
||||
so it survives whatever a future encoder decides to escape.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enrollment: the server mints the bootstrap link (server-v0.5.3 … v0.5.4, 2026-08-01)
|
||||
Until now a device was configured by hand-typing a control URL, a base64 SPKI pin and a
|
||||
credential. That is the step that goes wrong, and it goes wrong quietly: a pin off by one
|
||||
character does not fail loudly, it just never matches, and surfaces days later as an inscrutable
|
||||
TLS error.
|
||||
|
||||
`POST /admin/enroll-tokens` now returns the whole §2.1 bootstrap link alongside the token, because
|
||||
the server is the only party holding all three parts at once. The app takes it from a paste or an
|
||||
`echolot://enroll` deep link (so a QR scan configures a server in one action) and writes URL, pin
|
||||
and credential **together or not at all** — a half-applied server fails later, somewhere else,
|
||||
with an error pointing at the wrong thing.
|
||||
|
||||
The control URL comes from `ECHOLOT_PUBLIC_URL` (set on fmr to `https://fmr-1.echo-lot.app:8443`),
|
||||
falling back to the first control listen address; a wildcard bind warns rather than emitting a
|
||||
link to `0.0.0.0`.
|
||||
|
||||
**The encoding trap, which is the whole reason this is tested across both languages.** The pin is
|
||||
base64, so it contains `+`, `/` and `=` — each of which means something else in a query string. An
|
||||
unencoded `+` decodes to a space, leaving the pin wrong by exactly one character. Base64 has no
|
||||
spaces, so the parser restores them; that cannot damage a correctly-encoded pin and it rescues
|
||||
every hand-assembled link. `LiveEnrollmentTest` redeems a link the *server* produced, which is the
|
||||
only way to catch a disagreement between the Go assembler and the Kotlin parser — a unit test on
|
||||
either side alone cannot see it. It also asserts the token is refused the second time.
|
||||
|
||||
Also fixed a spec divergence found while reading §2.1: the spec names the field
|
||||
`device_credential`, the first implementation shipped `credential`. The server now sends both and
|
||||
the client prefers the spec's; the alias goes once nothing reads it.
|
||||
|
||||
Two process notes from this round:
|
||||
- An edit to the admin handler silently failed to apply and the endpoint kept returning just the
|
||||
token. Caught by deploying and *looking at the response*, not by trusting a green build.
|
||||
- The live suite is now six tests (`LiveServerTest`, `LiveMeasurement`, `LiveGranted`,
|
||||
`LiveUpload`, `LiveCompat`, `LiveEnrollment`), all green against fmr from the PC with no device.
|
||||
|
||||
### Directional loss: which way is the packet loss? (2026-08-01)
|
||||
A round trip can only report that *something* was lost somewhere, which is the least useful form
|
||||
of the answer — "3 % loss" sends an engineer looking in both directions at once. The server
|
||||
already records every packet it received per sequence number (§6), so the two cases are actually
|
||||
distinguishable, and `train.udp_updown` now reports them separately:
|
||||
|
||||
- sent, never seen by the server → **upstream** loss
|
||||
- seen by the server, reply never arrived → **downstream** loss
|
||||
|
||||
Findings name the direction and say what is *not* implicated, which is half the value:
|
||||
`connectivity.loss_upstream` ("the return path is not implicated: replies came back for everything
|
||||
that arrived"), `connectivity.loss_downstream`, `nat.udp_unreachable_upstream`.
|
||||
|
||||
Two things the implementation gets deliberately right:
|
||||
- **Downstream loss is measured against what reached the server**, not against what was sent.
|
||||
Using "sent" as the denominator counts every upstream loss a second time and overstates the
|
||||
return path. Pinned by a test with loss in both directions at once.
|
||||
- **Per-direction jitter without synchronised clocks.** Absolute one-way delay would need clock
|
||||
sync and we deliberately have none (the two-clock rule). But `server_rx − client_tx` carries a
|
||||
constant unknown offset, and differencing successive samples cancels it — so RFC 3393 one-way
|
||||
delay variation *is* honestly attributable to a direction even though latency is not. A test
|
||||
pins that a 10-second clock offset changes nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Correlation is by **wire sequence number**, which is not the loop index: the counter is shared
|
||||
with every other packet type on the session, so "the nth echo" is not "sequence n". `ProbeSession`
|
||||
now exposes `lastSeq`, including for a probe that was lost — a lost packet still has a sequence
|
||||
number, and that number is exactly what tells you which way it was lost.
|
||||
|
||||
Live against fmr: 20/20 both ways, and jitter of **0.08 ms upstream vs 0.85 ms downstream** — a
|
||||
tenfold asymmetry that a round-trip measurement cannot see at all.
|
||||
|
||||
10 unit tests on the arithmetic (a wrong denominator here does not crash, it produces a plausible
|
||||
number pointing at the wrong half of the network) plus the live correlation check.
|
||||
|
||||
### frag_send: crafted IP fragments, so *ordering* is testable (server-v0.6.0, 2026-08-01)
|
||||
`big_send` with `df=false` answers one question — do fragments get through. It cannot answer the
|
||||
more interesting one, because the kernel always emits fragments in order, first one first.
|
||||
|
||||
The classic middlebox fault is exactly about that ordering. Only the **first** fragment carries the
|
||||
UDP header, and therefore the ports; a stateful firewall or NAT that has not seen it has no flow to
|
||||
match the rest against, and many simply drop them. That is invisible to every in-order test, and in
|
||||
the field it looks like "large DNS answers fail on this network" or "the tunnel breaks when the MTU
|
||||
drops" — it works until the network reorders, then fails intermittently, which is the hardest kind
|
||||
of fault to chase.
|
||||
|
||||
So the server builds the fragments itself (raw socket, `IP_HDRINCL`) and controls their order:
|
||||
`in_order` (baseline), `reversed` (last fragment first), `first_last` (first fragment held back
|
||||
250 ms). The datagram is assembled and **signed whole** before being cut up, so what the client
|
||||
reassembles is indistinguishable from an ordinary packet — otherwise the test would be measuring
|
||||
our sender rather than the path. New test type `mtu.frag_ordering`; findings
|
||||
`mtu.fragments_blocked` and `mtu.fragment_reorder_sensitive`.
|
||||
|
||||
Two details that would otherwise produce confidently wrong answers:
|
||||
- **The UDP checksum is computed, not left zero.** Zero is legal in IPv4 and would be less code,
|
||||
but zero-checksum datagrams are dropped by some middleboxes — and that drop would be recorded as
|
||||
a fragmentation failure, which is the wrong conclusion entirely.
|
||||
- **Fragment offsets are in 8-byte units**, so non-final fragments are rounded down to a multiple
|
||||
of 8. A 100-byte fragment is not an error; it is a datagram no host will ever reassemble.
|
||||
|
||||
`frag-send` is advertised only when a raw socket can actually be opened — checked by opening one,
|
||||
because a permission model has more ways to say no (userns, seccomp, LSM) than a capability bit has
|
||||
to say yes. fmr runs as root with `cap_net_raw` in its bounding set, so it is available there.
|
||||
|
||||
Fragment ordering runs only after `mtu.frag_delivery` shows fragments arrive at all; otherwise the
|
||||
three orderings would each report "not delivered" and read as three faults instead of one.
|
||||
|
||||
The header arithmetic is unit-tested (reassembly coverage with no gaps or double-delivery, MF
|
||||
flags, shared IP ID, 8-byte offsets, checksum verification over odd and even lengths). Because the
|
||||
code is `//go:build linux`, the tests are **cross-compiled and run on fmr** — there is no Go
|
||||
toolchain there, so `go test -c` plus scp is the loop.
|
||||
|
||||
Live against fmr: 4 fragments per burst, and all three orderings reassembled — a healthy path, and
|
||||
the baseline against which a mobile network will be interesting.
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing state (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Six live tests against fmr, all green, no device involved: `LiveServerTest`, `LiveMeasurement`,
|
||||
`LiveGranted`, `LiveDownstream`, `LiveUpload`, `LiveCompat`, `LiveEnrollment`. Plus 74 client unit
|
||||
tests and the full Go suite. Everything in the last several entries is verified from the PC; the
|
||||
app's UI (settings, history, deep-link enrollment) and `mtu.pmtud_up` remain device-only.
|
||||
|
||||
### throughput: a rate, plus the qualifier that makes it a measurement (server-v0.6.1 … v0.6.2)
|
||||
A throughput test reports the *smallest* limit on the path — and the sender's own ceiling is one of
|
||||
the candidates. If the server is asked for 50 Mbps and 50 Mbps arrives, the network was never the
|
||||
constraint and "50 Mbps" says nothing about it. So `perf.throughput_udp` always carries
|
||||
`limited_by` (duration | budget | rate | send_error) and `measures_network`, and a finding is
|
||||
raised only when the path is actually implicated. The live run against fmr reports 20 Mbit/s with
|
||||
`measures_network: false`, which is the correct and useful answer.
|
||||
|
||||
Loss is computed against the **sender's own count**, fetched from the observations API, not against
|
||||
the requested rate. A receiver alone cannot tell "the network dropped it" from "the sender never
|
||||
sent it", and guessing turns a healthy server-side limit into a phantom network fault. The server
|
||||
keeps one summary per action rather than per-packet records — a ten-second run at 50 Mbps is half a
|
||||
million packets, and a struct each would turn a measurement into memory exhaustion.
|
||||
|
||||
Sending is **paced**, on an absolute schedule. Unpaced would measure the server's NIC and the first
|
||||
queue it meets, then collapse into loss that reads as a network fault; sleep-per-packet would
|
||||
accumulate scheduler error and drift the rate down over a ten-second run.
|
||||
|
||||
Throughput gets its own grant budget sized from the request, so every *other* action stays bounded
|
||||
at 8 MiB. When the byte cap binds before the clock does, the **duration is shortened and reported**
|
||||
rather than the run being truncated: promising thirty seconds and delivering twenty-one is the same
|
||||
information with a surprise attached, and it keeps "the clock ended the run" as the normal case —
|
||||
the only case where the rate is a clean property of the path. That behaviour came out of a test
|
||||
that failed honestly (30 s at 100 Mbps needs 375 MB against a 256 MB cap).
|
||||
|
||||
It is **opt-in** in the run config, default off. A 5-second run at 50 Mbps moves ~30 MB; on a
|
||||
metered mobile connection that is the user's money, and a tool that spends it without being asked
|
||||
is not one people keep installed.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The bug the live test found
|
||||
The first live run delivered 104 packets and stopped after 50 ms. The grant's rate check exempted
|
||||
the first 50 ms entirely, meaning to be lenient at startup — the effect was the opposite. A sender
|
||||
could dump an unbounded burst into that free window, and the instant the check switched on it
|
||||
compared those bytes against 50 ms worth of allowance and refused everything until real time caught
|
||||
up. **Every short test passed** (downtrain sends 50 packets, big_send seven); every sustained send
|
||||
died fifty milliseconds in.
|
||||
|
||||
Replaced with a token bucket (`allowance = burst + rate × elapsed`), which is smooth from t=0.
|
||||
The burst is 100 ms of the allowed rate, floored at one ordinary datagram — deliberately one, since
|
||||
at 8 kbps a 64 KB floor is sixty-four seconds' worth, exactly the instant dump the ceiling exists to
|
||||
prevent. The pre-existing rate test caught that when I first tried the generous floor, and it was
|
||||
right to. Second half of the same bug: callers treated *any* refusal as terminal, so `TryAllow` now
|
||||
says why — a sender paces through a transient "too fast just now" and still stops dead on a spent
|
||||
budget or an expired grant. Both halves are pinned by regression tests.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings registry (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Closes open item 1 of measurement-schema.md §9. A finding code is the stable, machine-readable half
|
||||
of a result — what a dashboard groups by and what someone greps a year of archived runs for — and
|
||||
that only holds if a code means exactly one thing forever. Ad-hoc string literals at fifteen call
|
||||
sites cannot promise that, and by the time the registry was written the failure had already
|
||||
happened.
|
||||
|
||||
**Two emitters had independently produced `connectivity.downstream_loss` and
|
||||
`connectivity.loss_downstream` for the same claim**, and nothing anywhere objected. Anyone
|
||||
aggregating either one would have silently seen half their data. Merged into
|
||||
`connectivity.loss_downstream`, paired with `loss_upstream` so the two directions read as a set.
|
||||
|
||||
**Two codes were also renamed out of `nat.*`.** `nat.udp_unreachable` is not about NAT — it means
|
||||
no replies came back — but the prefix determines the category, and the category determines which
|
||||
verdict light the finding rolls up into (§7.3). A `nat.*` code landing under *connectivity* is not
|
||||
a naming quibble; it changes which light turns red. Cheap to fix now, a breaking change later.
|
||||
|
||||
Codes are now declared as typed `FindingSpec`s carrying their category and default severity, and
|
||||
emitters reference the spec instead of retyping the string — so a typo is a compile error and two
|
||||
call sites cannot disagree about a finding's category.
|
||||
|
||||
`docs/findings-registry.md` is the contract, and a test reads it: it fails when the document and
|
||||
the registry have codes the other lacks, or when a severity differs. Documentation that drifts from
|
||||
its implementation is worse than none, because it still looks authoritative. The check scopes
|
||||
itself to table rows, so the prose can keep explaining which codes were retired and why.
|
||||
|
||||
Six tests: uniqueness, declared-vs-listed, prefix↔category agreement, naming convention, a
|
||||
word-order-anagram check (the shape the duplication actually took), and the document agreement.
|
||||
|
||||
### A real privacy leak, found by starting on the machine-readable schema (2026-08-01)
|
||||
The intent was `measurement.schema.json` (§8's promised companion). The first step — checking
|
||||
whether the anonymizer actually covers the fields the schema declares as sensitive — found that it
|
||||
did not, so that became the work.
|
||||
|
||||
**At the `balanced` level, five identifying values were being uploaded verbatim:**
|
||||
|
||||
| value | field | why it matters |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `2001:…::150` | `networks[].link.addresses[].addr` | the device's own global IPv6 address — a strong, geolocatable device identifier |
|
||||
| `2a02:…::1` | `networks[].link.routes[].gateway` | identifies the ISP allocation |
|
||||
| `203.0.113.77` | `networks[].link.dns.servers[]` | the configured resolver |
|
||||
| `nas.example.lan` | `private_dns_hostname` | an internal hostname |
|
||||
| `example.lan` | `search_domains[]` | the internal domain |
|
||||
|
||||
The settings screen describes that level as pseudonymizing addresses. It was not.
|
||||
|
||||
**Root cause:** classification keyed on field *names*, and the schema's actual names (`addr`,
|
||||
`gateway`, `dst`, `servers`, `search_domains`, `private_dns_hostname`) had never been added to the
|
||||
table. Not a subtle bug — just an unfalsifiable design. The existing tests all passed, because each
|
||||
one checked a field somebody had remembered to write a case for.
|
||||
|
||||
**Two fixes, one of them structural:**
|
||||
1. The missing names were added.
|
||||
2. More importantly, a **shape-based backstop**: when a field name is unrecognised, the *value* is
|
||||
inspected, and anything shaped like an IPv4/IPv6 address or a MAC is treated as one. A name
|
||||
table can only protect fields someone thought of, which is precisely the wrong property for a
|
||||
privacy control. Hostnames are deliberately *not* inferred by shape — `train.udp_updown` is
|
||||
indistinguishable from a domain, and mangling a test type would corrupt the document to protect
|
||||
nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
`LeakTest` is the new guard and is written to fail for fields nobody has considered: it plants
|
||||
identifying values wherever one can actually occur and asserts none survive, rather than checking
|
||||
a list of known cases. It also pins that RFC1918 addresses still come through readable, so the
|
||||
test cannot pass by over-redacting everything.
|
||||
|
||||
Route prefixes and the unspecified address needed care in the transform: `0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`
|
||||
must stay themselves, or a routing table becomes unreadable for no privacy gain.
|
||||
|
||||
**Still outstanding:** `measurement.schema.json` itself. Worth noting what this episode implies for
|
||||
it — much of a document's payload lives in `evidence`/`metrics`/`params`, which are per-test-type
|
||||
`JsonObject` by design and therefore *outside* any schema. A schema-driven anonymizer would have
|
||||
less coverage there than the name-plus-shape one now does, so the schema should be built for
|
||||
validation and external tooling, not as a replacement for the classifier.
|
||||
|
||||
### ULA prefixes are pseudonymized whole (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Spotted in a real uploaded run from the phone: the server had
|
||||
`fda1:3fb1:ff92:6696::2662` for a DNS server. The general IPv6 path preserves the leading two
|
||||
groups (deliberately — for a global address that keeps the ISP allocation, which is the
|
||||
diagnostically useful part), and for a ULA that passed through **32 of the 40 random bits** of the
|
||||
global ID.
|
||||
|
||||
ULA looks like the v6 equivalent of RFC1918 and the instinct is to treat it the same. That
|
||||
reasoning does not carry over, and the difference is the whole point: an RFC1918 prefix is shared
|
||||
by millions of networks and identifies none of them, while a ULA global ID is random and unique to
|
||||
one network by construction (RFC 4193). The prefix *is* the identifier — it is a network
|
||||
fingerprint that was surviving redaction.
|
||||
|
||||
Now pseudonymized as a unit, so two addresses on the same ULA subnet still land on the same
|
||||
pseudonymous prefix: "these hosts are on one network" survives, "this is *that* network" does not.
|
||||
Three tests, one of which uses the exact value observed on the wire.
|
||||
|
||||
Worth recording as a reasoning trap: I had originally raised this as "ULA should probably be kept
|
||||
verbatim, like RFC1918, for consistency". The surface analogy pointed the wrong way, and the
|
||||
correct answer was the opposite.
|
||||
|
||||
### Registry adopted everywhere; v6 findings renamed; Back works (2026-08-01)
|
||||
The findings registry was only adopted in `core-engine`. The app module still emitted seven codes
|
||||
as raw strings, so the registry test passed while codes existed outside it — including
|
||||
`ipv6.broken`, which fired on a real network and was in no registry at all.
|
||||
|
||||
All seven now reference registry entries for code, category and severity, so those three cannot
|
||||
disagree at a call site. A grep for `code = "…"` across the app, engine and probe modules returns
|
||||
nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
**`ipv6.*` → `v6.*`.** The third instance of rule 1: they declared `Category.IPV6` while the prefix
|
||||
map only knows `v6`, so `TestType.category("ipv6.broken")` fell through to *connectivity* and the
|
||||
finding rolled up under the wrong verdict light. The test-type registry already used `v6.`.
|
||||
|
||||
Two severities reconciled while merging:
|
||||
- `connectivity.captive_portal` is **medium**, not high. The registry had guessed high; the probe
|
||||
that emits it had always said medium, and the probe was the considered value — a captive portal
|
||||
on hotel wifi is what should be there, and logging in clears it. `connectivity.no_internet` is
|
||||
the high one, because nothing the user does locally fixes that.
|
||||
- `v6.not_offered` is **info, and the registry says it must stay info**. Most networks still do not
|
||||
offer IPv6 and that is not a fault; a warning here lights a yellow verdict on a healthy network,
|
||||
which teaches people to ignore the light.
|
||||
|
||||
Also: a `BackHandler` now returns from Settings/History to the run screen. The screen was a plain
|
||||
state variable with nothing connecting it to the back stack, so the system Back gesture left the
|
||||
app entirely. Enabled only when there is somewhere to go back to, so Back still exits from the run
|
||||
screen.
|
||||
|
||||
### Upstream throughput (server-v0.6.3, 2026-08-01)
|
||||
The mirror of the downstream case: the client generates the traffic and the server counts it. No
|
||||
grant is involved — the client is sending its own packets, so there is nothing to amplify — but it
|
||||
does need the server's tally, because **only the far end knows how much arrived**. Without that
|
||||
number a sender measures how fast it can *transmit*, which is usually just the speed of the local
|
||||
NIC and is a different question from the one being asked.
|
||||
|
||||
`TYPE_THROUGHPUT_UP` (0x0F) is counted and deliberately **never answered**: a reply would double
|
||||
the traffic and drag the return path into a measurement that is specifically about the outbound
|
||||
one.
|
||||
|
||||
The tally is a counter, not a list, and short-circuits **before** the observation log. A
|
||||
five-second run at 20 Mbps is around ten thousand packets; one struct each would turn a
|
||||
measurement into an allocation storm on a shared server, and nothing needs the per-packet detail
|
||||
since the client holds the send-side record. The gap between the two counts is the loss.
|
||||
|
||||
`direction=up` on the throughput action sends nothing — it zeroes the counter, so a second run in
|
||||
one session measures itself rather than inheriting the first one's packets. The live test asserts
|
||||
`received <= sent`, which is what catches a counter that was never reset.
|
||||
|
||||
Live against fmr: **3125 sent, 3125 counted, 0 % loss, 10.0 Mbit/s** at a 10 Mbit/s request, with
|
||||
`measures_network: false` — correct, since what arrived matched what was offered, so the path was
|
||||
never the constraint.
|
||||
|
||||
### Raw shell dumps leaked the whole LAN (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Found by running the Shizuku shell tier for the first time. The tier works — `tiers.shizuku: true`,
|
||||
`exec_path: UserService` (so the UserService binds on the OnePlus, as recorded), `runs_as
|
||||
shell(2000)`, 7/7 commands — and the run promptly uploaded **every MAC address on the local
|
||||
network** to fmr at the `balanced` level: router, phones, whatever else was on the wifi. Fourteen
|
||||
of them.
|
||||
|
||||
The probes embed raw command output verbatim (`ip neigh`, `ip route`, `id`), which is genuinely
|
||||
good evidence and also a complete household device inventory. The anonymizer could not see it:
|
||||
classification is by field name and by whole-value shape, and `ip_neigh` is one long string that is
|
||||
itself neither a MAC nor an address. measurement-schema.md §9 item 2 had flagged raw dumps as "hard
|
||||
to anonymize" and proposed dropping them from exports; nothing enforced either.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scrubbing beats dropping.** Identifiers inside any unclassified string are now replaced in place,
|
||||
using the same pseudonyms as everywhere else — so a MAC that appears both in a parsed field and in
|
||||
a raw dump still reads as one device. The dump stays readable and auditable: you can still see the
|
||||
neighbour table's shape, the host count, RFC1918 addresses and vendor prefixes. Dropping the
|
||||
evidence would have protected the same data while destroying the reason for collecting it.
|
||||
|
||||
Two implementation notes worth keeping:
|
||||
- **One pass, not three.** Sequential passes re-process their own output: once a MAC became
|
||||
`78:9a:18:xx:yy:zz`, the IPv6 pattern matched it — six hex groups separated by colons *is* an
|
||||
address — and destroyed the vendor prefix the MAC rule had just preserved. Ordered alternation
|
||||
resolves each position once, MAC first.
|
||||
- The patterns are conservative on purpose. A missed address gets caught by another rule or not at
|
||||
all; an over-eager one mangles timestamps and version strings, corrupting evidence to protect
|
||||
nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
`RealDocumentTest` runs the anonymizer over a captured run when `ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN` points at one,
|
||||
and fails on any MAC that survives. It self-skips otherwise, so no one's network is committed to the
|
||||
repo. Against the actual leaked document: **14 MACs in, 0 surviving.**
|
||||
|
||||
Also fixed: the Settings *Preview what an upload would send* button did nothing. It read
|
||||
`UiState.history`, which is empty until the History screen has been opened — the same root cause as
|
||||
the "0 run(s)" count. It now reads the archive directly, and says so when there is nothing to
|
||||
preview rather than silently ignoring the tap.
|
||||
|
||||
### Security: the admin listener was publicly exposed for ~15 minutes (2026-08-01)
|
||||
Moving the admin listener to `[::2]:443` for the UI exposed `/admin/enroll-tokens` and
|
||||
`/admin/selftest` to the internet **with no authentication**. Anyone who could reach
|
||||
`fmr.echo-lot.app` could mint enrolment tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
The listener was designed localhost-only — its own flag help says *"keep localhost"* — and that
|
||||
assumption travelled with it when the address changed. The compounding error: `checkAdminExposure`,
|
||||
added the same day, verifies **encryption** and says nothing about **authentication**. It passed,
|
||||
and a green light on an adjacent property is worse than no check, because it invites you to stop
|
||||
looking.
|
||||
|
||||
Closed by returning to loopback (the TLS and ACME work is retained, just not exposed). All 68 device
|
||||
enrolments matched the timestamps of test runs, so there is no evidence of abuse — but the window
|
||||
existed on a freshly published hostname and absence cannot be proven. 39 unused enrolment tokens
|
||||
were purged, since any could have been minted by someone else and they cost nothing to replace, and
|
||||
63 test devices removed.
|
||||
|
||||
**The admin listener does not become reachable again until it authenticates.** That reorders the UI
|
||||
work: auth on the listener first, everything else after.
|
||||
|
||||
### Open: encrypted uploads, where the operator cannot read the data
|
||||
Not built. Recorded because the shape is decided by a few early choices, and the current design
|
||||
happens to leave the door open.
|
||||
|
||||
The goal: hand someone an account, let them upload, and be unable to read what they uploaded.
|
||||
|
||||
Sketch: a random per-account **master key**, generated on the first device and wrapped under a
|
||||
key derived from a passphrase (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 — stdlib on both sides). The wrapped key is
|
||||
stored server-side as an opaque blob, so a new device signs in, fetches it, and unwraps locally;
|
||||
the server never sees either key. Runs are encrypted client-side with AES-256-GCM, fresh nonce per
|
||||
run. All of this is stdlib in Go and `javax.crypto` in Kotlin — no dependency either side.
|
||||
|
||||
Four consequences that decide whether it is worth it:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **What stays readable determines what the UI can do.** The server builds its index by *parsing*
|
||||
the document — verdict, finding count, started_at. An opaque payload means the client supplies
|
||||
that metadata or the index disappears, and with it retention-by-verdict and any "runs with
|
||||
findings" view. The honest version supplies only run id, timestamp and size, and moves the rest
|
||||
client-side.
|
||||
2. **Lose the passphrase, lose the data.** That is the feature working, and also the support
|
||||
burden. It needs a recovery code printed at setup, not a reset flow — there is nothing to reset.
|
||||
3. **Metadata is not hidden.** The operator still sees which account uploaded, when, how often and
|
||||
how large. "Cannot see it" is about content, not existence, and saying otherwise would oversell.
|
||||
4. **It makes `min_anonymization` unenforceable** — a server cannot check a level it cannot read.
|
||||
That is not a conflict so much as a redundancy: the anonymization floor exists to protect the
|
||||
user from the operator, and encryption does that better. The two should not both be demanded of
|
||||
one upload.
|
||||
|
||||
What keeps this possible: uploads are already stored byte-for-byte as received, and every index
|
||||
field is derived in one function (`runs.Put`). The thing to avoid is admin features that *require*
|
||||
reading content — those would have to be unbuilt later.
|
||||
|
||||
### App sign-in, and an undisclosed dependency it surfaced (2026-08-01)
|
||||
The app can now sign in to the server's identity provider: authorization code with PKCE, a
|
||||
`Sign in` card in settings, and the `echolot://auth` redirect handled alongside the enrolment one
|
||||
(told apart by host, since one spends a token and the other completes an authorization).
|
||||
|
||||
The detail that decides whether this works on a real phone: **the PKCE verifier is written to
|
||||
storage before the browser opens**, not held in memory. Handing control to a browser backgrounds
|
||||
the process and Android may kill it; the callback then arrives at a fresh process. An in-memory
|
||||
verifier works on a developer's device and fails under memory pressure, which is the worst way for
|
||||
a sign-in to break.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing from the IdP is retained. The ID token proves who is signing in, once, and the device
|
||||
credential authenticates everything after — no access tokens stored, no refresh tokens rotated.
|
||||
|
||||
**A server remains entirely optional.** All eight probes are device-tier; `serverConfigured` gates
|
||||
only upload and the account. But answering that question exposed something worth fixing: two probes
|
||||
hardcode the reference deployment —
|
||||
|
||||
```kotlin
|
||||
DnsCanaryProbe(canaryZone = "c.echo-lot.app", ...) // "Hardcoded to the reference deployment"
|
||||
StunProbe(serverHost = "fmr-1.echo-lot.app")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
so a user with no server of their own still sends DNS and STUN traffic to fmr without being told.
|
||||
For a tool that goes to this much trouble over what leaves the device, an undisclosed dependency on
|
||||
a third party's infrastructure is the wrong default. It should prefer the configured server, and be
|
||||
explicit when there is none. **Closed** — both probes take the enrolled server from settings
|
||||
(canary zone learned from the profile, cleared on re-enroll) and report themselves SKIPPED with
|
||||
the reason when none is configured.
|
||||
|
||||
### v6.broken was a false positive waiting to happen (2026-08-01)
|
||||
A phone could not open `https://fmr.echo-lot.app` while loading the same server by IP literal
|
||||
perfectly well. Two things came out of chasing it.
|
||||
|
||||
**The admin UI is IPv6-only, by consequence rather than intent.** `fmr.echo-lot.app` has an AAAA
|
||||
and no A record — verified identical at Cloudflare, Google and Quad9, so DNS itself is healthy.
|
||||
That follows from reserving all four measurement addresses for testing, which left only `::2` for
|
||||
management, and `::2` has no IPv4 counterpart. Any client without working IPv6 sees an unreachable
|
||||
admin interface — a poor property for the interface you reach *from the networks you are debugging*.
|
||||
|
||||
**And the app's own `v6.broken` finding was unsound.** It fired on exactly one signal — ICMPv6 echo
|
||||
getting no reply — with `Confidence.HIGH`. ICMPv6 echo is widely filtered on networks where IPv6
|
||||
works fine, which is precisely what that phone demonstrated: no ICMPv6 replies, working IPv6 TCP.
|
||||
The finding asserted a cause it had no evidence for, which is the same class of error as the
|
||||
multi-homed `100 % downstream loss` earlier: a confident measurement of something that was not
|
||||
happening.
|
||||
|
||||
Now `v6.no_icmp_reply`, severity low, confidence medium, and the text names *both* explanations
|
||||
instead of choosing one. It is still worth reporting, because filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU
|
||||
Discovery — large packets vanish rather than being reported as too big — which is a real fault even
|
||||
when IPv6 works.
|
||||
|
||||
The proper fix is corroboration: attempt a real IPv6 connection and only call it broken when that
|
||||
fails too. That needs a target, which runs into the hardcoded-reference-deployment issue already
|
||||
open above. **Both closed 2026-08-02** — see "Corroborated IPv6 findings" below.
|
||||
|
||||
## Per-network probing is blocked while a VPN is up (2026-08-01)
|
||||
|
||||
`Network.bindSocket()` fails with `EPERM` for every underlying network when a VPN holds the
|
||||
default route — verified on the OnePlus 15 with Netbird active: `Binding socket to network 101
|
||||
failed: EPERM` for both cellular and wifi. This is Android preventing VPN leaks, not a bug to work
|
||||
around, and it means the whole per-network measurement approach is unavailable to any user with a
|
||||
VPN connected. Worth deciding deliberately rather than discovering per report:
|
||||
|
||||
- The run currently succeeds and simply measures nothing per network. Honest, but silent — the
|
||||
document records `attempted: false` and the UI says green.
|
||||
- A user with a corporate VPN permanently on would get a green run that measured almost nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Options are to detect the VPN and say so plainly ("this network cannot be measured while a VPN is
|
||||
active"), to measure the tunnel itself as the network under test, or both. **Decided and built
|
||||
2026-08-02**: say so plainly, everywhere the run is read — see "Constrained runs" below.
|
||||
|
||||
Related: `icmp.ping6` now records `attempted` alongside `ok` per network, because collapsing them
|
||||
made the app report "IPv6 is configured, but ICMPv6 gets no reply" about an interface it had never
|
||||
succeeded in sending on — a claim about the user's carrier with no evidence behind it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Reserved measurement addresses, and the web UI on both families (2026-08-01)
|
||||
|
||||
fmr has two IPv4 (.150/.151) and three IPv6 (::150/::151/::2) addresses. `.150`/`::150` now carry
|
||||
the services; `.151`/`::151` are reserved for measurement, declared in `ECHOLOT_RESERVED_ADDRS`.
|
||||
|
||||
Reserved does **not** mean silent. The UDP data plane, the canary DNS and STUN's RFC 5780 alternate
|
||||
all belong there — reserving an address and then forbidding the measurements that need it would
|
||||
defeat the purpose. What must never appear is a service, and above all not ports 80 or 443: a
|
||||
handshake completing on a port known not to be listening is what proves interception, and that
|
||||
proof survives exactly as long as nothing binds those ports. `config.CheckReserved` enforces it at
|
||||
startup, refusing wildcard binds outright (every listener defaults to `:port`, so the next one added
|
||||
will claim reserved addresses without anyone deciding to).
|
||||
|
||||
The first version of the guard was too strict and the live config caught it: it would have refused
|
||||
the existing UDP and DNS binds on `.151`. The rule is about services and web ports, not about
|
||||
listening at all.
|
||||
|
||||
**The adb-beacon receiver was wildcard-bound to `0.0.0.0:443`**, occupying port 443 on every IPv4
|
||||
address including the reserved one — so the IPv4 interception test had been compromised for as long
|
||||
as it had been running, silently. It is now `systemctl disable --now echolot-adb-beacon`; restore
|
||||
with `systemctl enable --now`. Note what this implies: the guard covers this server's own listeners,
|
||||
and a stray process outside its config can still pollute a reserved address. A startup probe that
|
||||
*verifies* 80/443 are actually free on the reserved addresses would be a stronger guarantee than
|
||||
checking our own configuration — built 2026-08-02 (`selftest.ReservedWebPortsFree`, fatal at
|
||||
startup when anything is listening there).
|
||||
|
||||
The admin UI and the ACME responder now take comma-separated addresses like every other listener;
|
||||
they were single-address, which is why the UI could only ever live on `::2`. It serves on `.150:443` and
|
||||
`[::150]:443`; sshd on `.150:2322` and `[::150]:2322`.
|
||||
|
||||
`::2` is gone entirely — unbound, then removed from `/etc/systemd/network/ext.network`. The
|
||||
transition kept it bound throughout and dropped it only after the CNAME landed, because removing it
|
||||
first would have broken both the UI and ACME renewal for the very name the certificate is issued
|
||||
to. Listeners came off before the address did, in that order, or the services would have failed to
|
||||
bind on restart.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified after a full reboot: `fmr.echo-lot.app` answers 200 over both families, `.151`/`::151` are
|
||||
closed on 80 and 443, canary DNS is still up on `.151`, and neither `::2` nor the beacon returns.
|
||||
(`echolot-server` is `After=network-online.target` with `Restart=on-failure`, which is what makes
|
||||
binding specific addresses safe across a boot — a wildcard bind would not have needed it, and that
|
||||
is the trade for the reserved addresses being meaningful.)
|
||||
|
||||
The point of all this: `fmr.echo-lot.app` gained an A record, so the server stopped being reachable
|
||||
only over IPv6 — which is what made it unreachable from a phone with no working IPv6, presenting as
|
||||
"this host does not exist" in two different browsers.
|
||||
|
||||
### If the beacon comes back, it belongs in the web UI
|
||||
|
||||
Not as a separate listener. The receiver being its own Python service on `0.0.0.0:443` is exactly
|
||||
what silently compromised the reserved address, and a second process racing for a port is a
|
||||
recurring problem rather than a one-off: whoever loses the race simply fails to start, and on a
|
||||
reboot which one that is comes down to unit ordering.
|
||||
|
||||
Folding it in costs little and settles several things at once. It would be two routes on the admin
|
||||
UI (`POST` the observed adb port, `GET /apk` for the staged build), behind the TLS the UI already
|
||||
terminates and the certificate it already renews, with no extra port and no wildcard. It also gets
|
||||
authentication for free — the current receiver accepts a port report from anyone who can reach it,
|
||||
which is tolerable for a dev tool on a trusted network and not something to keep once it lives
|
||||
beside an admin session.
|
||||
|
||||
The one thing that changes on the device side is that the POST becomes HTTPS. That is a real
|
||||
certificate rather than a self-signed one, so it costs a URL scheme rather than any trust plumbing.
|
||||
|
||||
## The control plane shares port 443 (2026-08-01)
|
||||
|
||||
`fmr-1.echo-lot.app:443` is the control plane, `fmr.echo-lot.app:443` the admin UI, both on
|
||||
`.150`/`::150`, one listener, selected by SNI for the certificate and by `Host` for the handler.
|
||||
|
||||
The reason is not tidiness, it is reachability. Captive portals, hotel wifi and corporate firewalls
|
||||
routinely permit only 80 and 443 — which is exactly the population of networks this tool exists to
|
||||
diagnose. A control plane on 8443 is unreachable precisely when it matters most, and it fails as
|
||||
"cannot reach server", which tells the user nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
They cannot share a certificate, which is why this needs two names. The control plane is trusted by
|
||||
SPKI pin and so uses a long-lived self-signed certificate; a browser needs one a CA vouches for.
|
||||
One name on one port is one certificate, so the port can only be shared by splitting the names.
|
||||
Pinning the Let's Encrypt key instead was considered and rejected: it survives renewal only while
|
||||
key reuse holds, so a routine key rotation would brick the whole fleet.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified per SNI on 443: `fmr.echo-lot.app` serves `issuer=Let's Encrypt`, `fmr-1.echo-lot.app`
|
||||
serves the self-signed cert whose pin is unchanged (`zRV9…Xlg=`), `/v1/profile` answers 401 on the
|
||||
control name and 303 to the login page on the UI name.
|
||||
|
||||
**8443 stays open.** Devices enrolled before this carry that URL in their settings, and closing it
|
||||
for the sake of a port number would strand every one of them. It can go once no enrolled device
|
||||
still points at it — not before.
|
||||
|
||||
The rule from the naming change still binds: `fmr` may be a CNAME to exactly one host and never a
|
||||
multi-address record, because a pinned client that reaches a different key does not fail over.
|
||||
|
||||
## Constrained runs: a VPN'd run now says so, everywhere (2026-08-02, app 0.2.1)
|
||||
|
||||
The measurement schema gained a top-level `constraints` block (§3) and the app now fills it.
|
||||
`ConstraintDetector` (core-probe) runs before any probe: one throwaway `Network.bindSocket()` per
|
||||
non-VPN network, plus a transport check for an active VPN. The result lands in three places, and
|
||||
all three are deliberate:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`run.constraints`** — for machines. A server aggregating thousands of runs can now separate
|
||||
"measured a healthy network" from "measured almost nothing through a tunnel"; the shapes were
|
||||
identical before.
|
||||
- **A `measurement.vpn_constrained` finding** — for the person reading this run, naming the
|
||||
interfaces that went unmeasured. A constrained run with a quiet findings list still reads as
|
||||
"nothing wrong here".
|
||||
- **The §7.3 verdict** — `Verdicts.derive` takes the constraints and returns INCONCLUSIVE
|
||||
outright for a per-network-blocked run, whatever the category lights say; the run screen shows
|
||||
an amber "Measured through a VPN" banner above the verdict so INCONCLUSIVE reads as the OS
|
||||
refusing, not the app failing.
|
||||
|
||||
Detection is one bind per network rather than parsing per-test `attempted:false` breadcrumbs, so
|
||||
it cannot drift when probe evidence formats change.
|
||||
|
||||
## Corroborated IPv6 findings: v6.broken is back, with evidence (2026-08-02, app 0.2.1)
|
||||
|
||||
The new `V6ConnectProbe` (test type `v6.brokenness`) attempts a real TCP connection over IPv6 to
|
||||
the configured server's :443, per network that *claims* IPv6 (global address or v6 default
|
||||
route) — IPv4-only networks are not attempted, since their failure is by design and would
|
||||
manufacture the exact false positive this exists to kill. The finding derivation is now three-way:
|
||||
|
||||
- ICMPv6 silent, TCP works → `v6.no_icmp_reply` at **high** confidence, retitled "ICMPv6 is
|
||||
filtered here — IPv6 itself works" (still reported: filtered ICMPv6 breaks PMTUD).
|
||||
- ICMPv6 silent, TCP fails too → **`v6.broken`** (high severity, reinstated in the registry +
|
||||
findings-registry.md): two independent transports silent on a network advertising IPv6.
|
||||
- No corroboration (no server configured, or the connect never got as far as sending) → the
|
||||
two-explanation `v6.no_icmp_reply` at medium confidence, unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
Like STUN and the canary, the probe SKIPs honestly when no server is configured — corroboration
|
||||
is a benefit of enrollment, not a reason to borrow fmr.
|
||||
|
||||
## Server: reserved 80/443 verified against the OS, and signed releases (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
**Reserved-address startup probe.** `serve()` now proves 80/443 are actually free on every
|
||||
`ECHOLOT_RESERVED_ADDRS` address before starting: a throwaway bind per port
|
||||
(`selftest.ReservedWebPortsFree`), fatal on EADDRINUSE with the offending address named — the
|
||||
check `CheckReserved` cannot do, because a stray process outside our config (the adb-beacon
|
||||
receiver on `0.0.0.0:443` was exactly that) is invisible to configuration checks. Bind errors
|
||||
that are not "in use" (typo'd address, address not on this host) warn instead of refusing —
|
||||
they are config problems, not pollution.
|
||||
|
||||
**Release signing.** Self-update now trusts a signature, not a host. CI signs `SHA256SUMS` with
|
||||
an ed25519 key (`relsign` package, `cmd/release-sign`) and the updater refuses any release whose
|
||||
`SHA256SUMS.sig` is missing or does not verify against the public key baked into the binary
|
||||
(`selfupdate.DefaultPublicKeyB64`; operators with their own pipeline override via
|
||||
`ECHOLOT_SELF_UPDATE_PUBKEY`). The private key exists in exactly two places: the Gitea Actions
|
||||
secret `RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY`, and the offline original on the dev PC at
|
||||
`~/.echolot/release-signing-key`. It is deliberately NOT on fmr and NOT in the repo — a
|
||||
compromised release host can withhold updates but no longer inject one. CI hard-fails when the
|
||||
secret is missing (an unsigned release would strand every verifying server) and cross-checks the
|
||||
signature against the key in the source it just built.
|
||||
|
||||
**ACTION REQUIRED before the next `server-v*` tag:** add the Gitea repo secret
|
||||
`RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY` (Settings → Actions → Secrets) with the contents of
|
||||
`~/.echolot/release-signing-key` from the dev PC. Ordering is safe: the currently deployed
|
||||
v0.3.x updater does not verify, so it will happily install the first signed release; every
|
||||
release after that is verified. **Done 2026-08-02** — the secret is in place. (The "v0.3.x"
|
||||
above should read "the currently deployed release": deployments had moved on to v0.9.x by the
|
||||
time signing landed; the point — the deployed updater predates verification and will accept the
|
||||
first signed release — is unchanged.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Prober fold: traceroute.udp4 and the mDNS inventory go production (2026-08-02, app 0.2.2)
|
||||
|
||||
The two highest-value validated capabilities moved from the prober into `core-probe`:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`traceroute.udp4`** (`TracerouteProbe`): UDP traceroute reading ICMP time-exceeded off the
|
||||
socket error queue via `Os.recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE)` through the reflection facade — no root, no
|
||||
raw socket, no JNI, ~250 ms for six hops. Emits the schema's `TracerouteEvidence` (rtt in ns).
|
||||
`OsAbi` came with it, including the measured fact that `Os.getsockoptInt` exists on neither
|
||||
known device, so PMTU must always be read from the errqueue (`ee_info`), never
|
||||
`getsockopt(IP_MTU)`. The load-bearing line survived the port: EAGAIN out of the reflected
|
||||
`recvmsg` means "queue empty", not failure.
|
||||
- **`local.mdns_inventory`** (`MdnsInventoryProbe`): MulticastLock + NSD discovery, the service
|
||||
inventory that doubles as the VLAN-leakage detector. Both hardware lessons kept: the
|
||||
`_services._dns-sd._udp.` meta-query returns 0 beside live services on both devices (so the
|
||||
concrete types are the measurement and the meta-query result is itself evidence), and the
|
||||
listen window is 10 s because 4 s missed services.
|
||||
|
||||
Still to fold, in order: the Shizuku dump *parsers* (the raw `link.ip_monitor` captures already
|
||||
hold two divergent vendor formats that could feed `link.ra_source` and `sec.arp_watch`);
|
||||
`multinetwork.request_and_bind` (extend ConstraintDetector to *request* transports rather than
|
||||
only probing present ones); `peer.ble_advertise` (needs three new permissions and a peer mode to
|
||||
exist first).
|
||||
|
||||
## Server v0.9.2: trains, real TTL/DSCP/ECN, rate limits (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
The spec-vs-implementation gap audit closed its top items; protocol_version 1.0.0 → 1.0.1
|
||||
(additive — below 1.0.0 the minor is the breaking axis, and nothing here breaks an old client):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Upstream trains** (§3.2, types 0x03/0x04/0x05): per-train bounded columnar buffer (8192
|
||||
rows, head kept on overflow with `Truncated` set — mirrors the schema's `evidence_truncated`
|
||||
honesty), TRAIN_REPORT split across ≤1200-byte datagrams, grant-free with the §3.4 argument
|
||||
spelled out (a 17-byte report row answers a ≥36-byte HMAC-valid packet). Unknown train id
|
||||
gets a zero-row report: "nothing arrived" is an answer. Also surfaced as `udp.trains` in the
|
||||
observations API.
|
||||
- **Real TTL/DSCP/ECN observation** (§3.3): the read loop is `ReadMsgUDPAddrPort` with
|
||||
IP_RECVTTL/IP_RECVTOS/IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT/IPV6_RECVTCLASS cmsgs on Linux; `0xFF` stays the
|
||||
"not observed" sentinel elsewhere. This unblocks `sec.dscp_ecn_survival` both directions,
|
||||
paired with the new `dscp` parameter on `downtrain` (validated 0–63, refused not clamped,
|
||||
`dscp_applied` in the response).
|
||||
- **Rate limiting** (§2.5, was entirely absent): token buckets keyed per credential AND per
|
||||
source IP; 429 + Retry-After on session/action creation (`/v1/profile` stays ungated), silent
|
||||
drop on the data plane — charged after the HMAC gate so a spoofed flood cannot drain a
|
||||
victim's budget, before the replay window so a dropped seq stays usable. UDP ceilings default
|
||||
above the largest legitimate run (a 200 Mbps throughput test), because a rate limit that
|
||||
clips a real measurement produces a confidently wrong number.
|
||||
- **`action_id` in every granted packet** (§5/§9): payload bytes [8:16] across all granted
|
||||
types, so overlapping actions are attributable. Verified the deployed Kotlin client parses
|
||||
only ECHO_RESP and MTU_ACK payloads, so the reshuffle strands nobody.
|
||||
- **Canary log retention**: the stated 24 h privacy default is now enforced
|
||||
(`ECHOLOT_DNS_LOG_RETENTION_H`), where before the log was time-unbounded.
|
||||
- **`POST /admin/enroll-tokens`** now answers the spec's JSON shape under content negotiation;
|
||||
the README's curl works as documented.
|
||||
- Spec §2.3 registry gained `downtrain` and `tcp-echo`, which the server had been advertising
|
||||
as strings a conformant client must ignore.
|
||||
|
||||
Client-side counterparts still to build: sending 0x03 trains + parsing 0x05 reports
|
||||
(`train.udp_updown`), and passing `dscp` on downtrain actions.
|
||||
|
||||
## ⚠ Version lineage broken: fmr runs v0.11.2, the repo's tags stop at v0.9.x (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
Discovered while preparing to self-update fmr to the freshly released server-v0.9.2:
|
||||
**fmr runs v0.11.2** (binary installed 2026-08-02 08:51), but this repo's remote has tags only
|
||||
up to `server-v0.9.1`, master fast-forwarded cleanly from this machine, there is no v0.10/v0.11
|
||||
release in Gitea, no source checkout or Go toolchain on fmr, and no deploy script in this repo
|
||||
that stamps versions. Conclusion: v0.11.2 was cross-built from a clone whose commits were never
|
||||
pushed — presumably another dev machine.
|
||||
|
||||
Consequences until resolved:
|
||||
- **Do NOT run `--self-update` on fmr.** Gitea's `/releases/latest` is the *newest-created*
|
||||
release, which is now `server-v0.9.2` — semantically older than the deployed binary; the
|
||||
updater compares strings, not SemVer, and would happily "update" v0.11.2 down to it. No
|
||||
automatic risk exists (fmr has no update timer installed, only the cert timer), but a manual
|
||||
run would downgrade.
|
||||
- The next real release must be tagged **above v0.11.2** (e.g. `server-v0.11.3` or `v0.12.0`)
|
||||
*after* the missing commits are pushed, so "latest" becomes truly latest again.
|
||||
- The unpushed v0.10–v0.11 work needs to be found and pushed from whichever machine built it,
|
||||
or the deployed binary's provenance re-established some other way, before the release channel
|
||||
can be trusted again.
|
||||
|
||||
**Resolved same day.** The binary itself settled it: `go version -m` on the deployed executable
|
||||
shows `vcs.revision=d5b1bab` — a commit on this repo's master — built 2026-08-02 08:36 UTC with a
|
||||
hand-stamped `-X main.Version=v0.11.2` and a dirty tree (`vcs.modified=true`, the then-uncommitted
|
||||
schema doc). An earlier session stamped release numbers ahead of the tag line; no code was ever
|
||||
missing. Current master is tagged and released as **server-v0.11.3** (signed), restoring a
|
||||
monotonic, tag-backed lineage above the deployed number. The rule going forward: **the version a
|
||||
binary is stamped with must be a pushed `server-v*` tag** — an ad-hoc stamp above the tag line
|
||||
poisons `/releases/latest` for the string-comparing updater the moment anyone tags honestly again.
|
||||
The stale `server-v0.9.2` release (same code lineage, wrong number, created during the confusion)
|
||||
remains in Gitea but is harmless now that v0.11.3 outranks it as latest.
|
||||
|
||||
## LLDP and CDP are root-tier, and that is a hard boundary (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
Asked for alongside SSDP in long mode; they belong to a different tier and no amount of app-side
|
||||
cleverness moves them. LLDP is an EtherType `0x88CC` frame to `01:80:C2:00:00:0E`; CDP is an
|
||||
LLC/SNAP frame to `01:00:0C:CC:CC:CC`. Neither is IP, so neither is ever delivered to a socket an
|
||||
app can open — receiving them needs `AF_PACKET` with `CAP_NET_RAW`, which is root. Shizuku does
|
||||
not bridge this either: the ADB shell user (uid 2000) has no `CAP_NET_RAW`, and stock devices do
|
||||
not ship `tcpdump`. Android's unprivileged ICMP sockets are what make `icmp.ping4` work without
|
||||
root; there is no equivalent back door for raw L2 receive.
|
||||
|
||||
Worth building in the root module when it lands, because the payoff is large: LLDP names the
|
||||
switch, the port and the VLAN a device is attached to, which is the best available answer to
|
||||
"where in this building am I actually plugged in", and CDP does the same on Cisco gear. Until
|
||||
then they are recorded as absent capabilities rather than left to look unimplemented.
|
||||
|
||||
What IS reachable at app tier, and what long mode now listens for instead: SSDP (passive NOTIFY
|
||||
plus periodic M-SEARCH), LLMNR, NetBIOS-NS and WS-Discovery — all IP multicast/broadcast, all
|
||||
sockets an app may open. The security reading matters as much as the inventory: LLMNR and
|
||||
NetBIOS-NS being live on a segment is a finding in itself, since both are trivially spoofable.
|
||||
|
||||
**One of those four cannot run at app tier either, and says so.** `local.netbios_inventory`
|
||||
reports `unsupported` with the bind error attached: UDP 137 is below 1024, and Android reserves
|
||||
privileged ports exactly like any other Linux. The decoder, the evidence shape and the registry
|
||||
id are built and tested, waiting for the Shizuku tier to supply a socket. Recorded as a result
|
||||
rather than dropped, so nobody later reads its absence as an oversight.
|
||||
|
||||
Two deliberate restraints in that work, both worth keeping: no active WS-Discovery Probe (an
|
||||
M-SEARCH is traffic every SSDP device expects constantly, whereas a WSD Probe from an unknown
|
||||
host announces *this* device to the segment), and no NBSTAT sweep (that is host scanning, not
|
||||
measurement — the app listens to what a network broadcasts, it does not interrogate its
|
||||
neighbours). The parsers are also hardened against the input they will actually meet: a DNS
|
||||
compression pointer is refused rather than followed (the classic parser hang), and the WSD
|
||||
extractor is string-based on purpose, tested against an entity bomb and 20 000-deep nesting.
|
||||
|
||||
## Design note: what BLE between two devices is actually for (2026-08-02, not built)
|
||||
|
||||
Two or more phones running Echolot, talking over Bluetooth LE. The schema already anticipates
|
||||
this — `Trigger.PEER` and the whole `peer.*` test family (`peer.reachability`, `peer.isolation`,
|
||||
`peer.multicast`, `peer.lan_train`, `peer.lease_diff`) are in the registry, unused — and the
|
||||
prober measured `peer.ble_advertise` **SUPPORTED on both known devices**, so the mechanism is
|
||||
proven; what has been missing is a reason that beats "use the server".
|
||||
|
||||
**The reason is that BLE is out-of-band.** Everything else this app does depends on the network
|
||||
under test being at least partly functional. A second device reachable over a radio that shares
|
||||
nothing with the wifi turns several measurements from ambiguous into conclusive:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Client isolation becomes measurable at all.** Today, "I sent a packet to the peer and heard
|
||||
nothing" cannot distinguish AP client isolation from the peer being asleep, gone, or on a
|
||||
different VLAN — the failure mode is silence, and silence has too many parents. With BLE the
|
||||
peer confirms out-of-band that it was listening on address X at time T, so silence over IP
|
||||
becomes *proof* of isolation rather than a guess. This is the single strongest argument for
|
||||
the feature, and it mirrors the rule this project keeps rediscovering: a measurement that
|
||||
cannot separate "nothing happened" from "nothing was tried" is not a measurement.
|
||||
2. **Differential diagnosis: the network or this phone?** Two devices on the same SSID, one
|
||||
resolving DNS and one not, settles in seconds what a single device cannot settle at all —
|
||||
and it is the same distinction `system_verdict` exists to draw, only with a second opinion
|
||||
instead of Android's. Natural finding: *this device fails where a peer on the same link
|
||||
succeeds* → look at the device (private DNS, ad blocker, per-client router rule, MAC
|
||||
randomization), not the router.
|
||||
3. **Two DHCP servers on one L2**, the classic invisible fault: peers compare lease source,
|
||||
subnet and gateway (`peer.lease_diff`). Disagreement is conclusive and needs no server.
|
||||
4. **Coverage and roaming**, later: several devices sampling RSSI in different rooms, exchanging
|
||||
summaries over BLE, gives a picture no single device standing in one place can produce.
|
||||
|
||||
**What crosses the link is a summary, never the document.** A measurement document describes
|
||||
someone's home network in detail; broadcasting it to whoever is nearby would betray the whole
|
||||
posture of §8. The peer payload should be: a *hashed* network identity (so two devices can agree
|
||||
they are on the same L2 without either putting the SSID/BSSID on the air in the clear), the §7.3
|
||||
category verdicts, the finding codes, and an IP endpoint plus a one-shot nonce for the LAN tests.
|
||||
Findings and verdicts are already the interpretation layer — exactly the right granularity to
|
||||
share.
|
||||
|
||||
**Privacy constraints, which are not optional here.** A BLE advertiser is a tracking beacon: it
|
||||
must be user-initiated, time-boxed to the run, carry no identifier that is stable across runs
|
||||
(the resolvable-private-address default plus a per-session ephemeral id), and pair by a code the
|
||||
two humans can see. "Discoverable by default" would make this app a worse citizen than the
|
||||
networks it audits.
|
||||
|
||||
**Deliberately not doing:** clock synchronisation over BLE. GATT latency is jitter measured in
|
||||
tens of milliseconds, which is the same order as the one-way delays worth measuring; peers should
|
||||
sync against the server's `time.server_offset` and use BLE only to correlate run ids. Nor should
|
||||
BLE become a transport for uploads — it is a *comparison* channel.
|
||||
|
||||
Staging when it happens: `peer.isolation` first (highest value, needs only advertise + connect +
|
||||
a nonce exchange), then `peer.lease_diff` (pure summary comparison, no extra plumbing), then the
|
||||
rest. Needs `BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE/CONNECT/SCAN` in the manifest, which the app does not yet
|
||||
request.
|
||||
|
||||
## v0.11.3 live on fmr; trains validated end to end (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
Deployed via `--self-update` (the pre-signing v0.11.2 updater accepted the first signed release,
|
||||
as planned; every later update verifies). Startup clean on the real host — the reserved-port
|
||||
check passed against the OS, self-test green, capabilities unchanged plus the new machinery.
|
||||
|
||||
**`train.udp_updown` validated against production**: `LiveUpstreamTrainTest` from this PC sent
|
||||
120 packets; the server's ledger counted 120, both columnar report parts arrived, loss 0.0 %,
|
||||
`truncated=false`. The 0x03/0x04/0x05 path works, client and server, over the real internet.
|
||||
|
||||
Two operational bugs surfaced doing it:
|
||||
- **CLI-minted tokens are lost while the daemon runs.** `devices.json` is loaded once at startup
|
||||
and held in memory; `--mint-enroll-token` writes to disk, the running daemon never re-reads,
|
||||
answers "unknown token", and clobbers the token on its next write. `enroll-link.sh` has only
|
||||
ever worked by timing luck. Workaround used: mint, `systemctl restart echolot-server`, then
|
||||
redeem. Real fix belongs server-side (re-read on miss, or route the CLI mint through the
|
||||
running daemon).
|
||||
- **`test-fmr.sh` still mints against `127.0.0.1:8444`**, which no longer exists (the admin API
|
||||
moved to authenticated :443). Needs the same CLI-mint flow enroll-link.sh uses — plus the
|
||||
restart caveat above until that bug is fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
|
||||
<!--
|
||||
SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-4.0
|
||||
-->
|
||||
|
||||
# Echolot findings registry
|
||||
|
||||
Closes open item 1 of `measurement-schema.md` §9.
|
||||
|
||||
A **finding code** is the stable, machine-readable half of a result. The prose around it changes
|
||||
freely; the code is what a dashboard groups by, what a diff between two runs keys on, and what
|
||||
someone greps a year of archived runs for. That only works if a code means exactly one thing,
|
||||
forever.
|
||||
|
||||
This document is the contract. It is kept in step with
|
||||
`echolot-app/core-measurement/.../FindingRegistry.kt` by a test that fails when either side has a
|
||||
code the other does not — a registry that drifts from its documentation is worse than none,
|
||||
because it looks authoritative.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rules
|
||||
|
||||
1. **The prefix determines the category**, and the category determines which verdict light the
|
||||
finding rolls up into (§7.3). A `nat.*` code appearing under *connectivity* is not a naming
|
||||
quibble; it changes which light turns red. Two codes were renamed from `nat.*` to
|
||||
`connectivity.*` for exactly this reason.
|
||||
2. **One code per concept.** Two emitters independently produced `connectivity.downstream_loss`
|
||||
and `connectivity.loss_downstream` for the same claim before this registry existed. Anyone
|
||||
aggregating either would have silently seen half their data.
|
||||
3. **Codes are declared, not typed.** Emitters reference a `FindingSpec`, so a typo is a compile
|
||||
error and no two call sites can disagree about a finding's category or default severity.
|
||||
4. **Severity in the registry is the default.** An emitter may escalate for a specific run; it may
|
||||
not quietly reclassify the finding in general.
|
||||
5. **Say what is ruled out**, where that is the useful half. "Loss upstream" is worth far more
|
||||
when it also states that the return path is clean, because that halves where to look next.
|
||||
6. **Renaming a code is a breaking change** once runs are archived at scale. Before 1.0 it is
|
||||
cheap; after, it needs an alias and a deprecation window.
|
||||
|
||||
## Registry
|
||||
|
||||
### connectivity
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `connectivity.udp_unreachable` | high | No UDP echo replies came back from the server at all. | — |
|
||||
| `connectivity.udp_unreachable_upstream` | high | The server received none of the probes, so traffic is dropped on the way out. | The return path: nothing arrived to be replied to. |
|
||||
| `connectivity.udp_loss` | medium | A large fraction of round-trip probes were lost, direction unknown. | — |
|
||||
| `connectivity.loss_upstream` | medium | Probes were lost on the way to the server. | The return path: replies came back for everything that arrived. |
|
||||
| `connectivity.loss_downstream` | medium | Packets were lost on the way back from the server. | The outbound path: the server received what it was answering. |
|
||||
| `connectivity.downstream_blocked` | high | Server-initiated packets never arrive, although round trips work. | Basic reachability: the path forwards replies, just not unsolicited traffic. |
|
||||
| `connectivity.downstream_reorder` | low | Downstream packets arrive in a different order than they were sent. | — |
|
||||
| `connectivity.captive_portal` | medium | A captive portal is intercepting connectivity checks. | — |
|
||||
| `connectivity.no_internet` | high | Android's own connectivity checks fail on this network. | — |
|
||||
| `connectivity.link_flapping` | medium | A network dropped and came back one or more times during the run. | A momentary probe failure: the drop was watched happening, not inferred from silence. |
|
||||
|
||||
`connectivity.link_flapping` is only reachable from a **long run** (`run.mode: "long"`,
|
||||
measurement-schema §3). It is derived from `networks[].changes[]` rather than from any test's
|
||||
evidence, because no one-shot probe can produce it: the probes before and after a four-second drop
|
||||
both succeed. The emitter escalates to *high* from three completed drop-and-return cycles, and
|
||||
requires the cycle to complete — a network switched off partway through a run is not flapping.
|
||||
|
||||
### mtu
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `mtu.reduced_downstream` | low | The downstream path MTU is below the usual 1500 bytes. | — |
|
||||
| `mtu.downstream_blackhole` | medium | Datagrams above the path MTU are dropped downstream, fragmented or not. | — |
|
||||
| `mtu.fragments_blocked` | medium | IP fragments do not reach this device even when sent in order. | — |
|
||||
| `mtu.fragment_reorder_sensitive` | low | Fragments are delivered in order but dropped when reordered or delayed. | Fragmentation itself: in-order fragments arrive fine. |
|
||||
|
||||
### nat
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `nat.udp_rebinding` | medium | A NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow. | — |
|
||||
| `nat.symmetric` | medium | The NAT assigns a different external port per destination. | — |
|
||||
|
||||
### perf
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `perf.throughput_no_delivery` | high | No throughput traffic arrived, although the server sent it. | — |
|
||||
| `perf.throughput_below_offered` | low | Less throughput arrived than the server sent for the whole run. | — |
|
||||
|
||||
### dns
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `dns.answer_rewritten` | high | A resolver returned an answer that differs from the authoritative record. | — |
|
||||
| `dns.authoritative_unreachable` | medium | The canary zone's authoritative server could not be reached. | — |
|
||||
|
||||
### v6
|
||||
|
||||
The prefix is `v6.`, matching the test-type registry (`v6.brokenness`, `v6.happy_eyeballs`, …).
|
||||
These were `ipv6.*` while declaring `Category.IPV6`; since the prefix map only knows `v6`, they
|
||||
rolled up under *connectivity* instead — the third occurrence of rule 1 being broken.
|
||||
|
||||
| code | severity | means | rules out |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `dns.search_domain_unanswered` | high | The network advertises a DNS search domain that its own server does not answer for. | A fault on this device: the same server answers ordinary names normally. |
|
||||
| `dns.system_resolver_broken` | high | The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve names through it. | A network fault: the server replied to a query sent from this device. |
|
||||
| `measurement.vpn_constrained` | info | A VPN was active, so the networks underneath it could not be measured. | Nothing — this run says little about the underlying network either way. |
|
||||
| `v6.no_default_route` | medium | The device has a global IPv6 address but no IPv6 default route. | Guesswork: this is read from the routing table, not inferred from silence. |
|
||||
| `v6.route_without_address` | medium | The network advertises an IPv6 default route but the device has no global IPv6 address. | A working IPv6 setup: SLAAC did not produce a usable address on this link. |
|
||||
| `v6.no_icmp_reply` | low | IPv6 is configured but ICMPv6 echo gets no reply. | Nothing on its own: IPv6 may work fine with ICMP filtered. |
|
||||
| `v6.broken` | high | IPv6 is advertised on this network but carries no traffic. | ICMP filtering as the benign explanation: a TCP connection over IPv6 failed too. |
|
||||
| `v6.not_offered` | info | This network does not offer IPv6. | — |
|
||||
|
||||
`v6.no_icmp_reply` was `v6.broken` until a phone reported it while loading an IPv6-only site over
|
||||
TCP perfectly well. The only evidence behind it is ICMPv6 echo, which is widely filtered on
|
||||
networks where IPv6 works — so the finding now states what was observed and names both
|
||||
explanations instead of choosing one. It is still worth reporting: filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU
|
||||
Discovery.
|
||||
|
||||
`v6.broken` returned once that corroboration existed: the `v6.brokenness` test attempts a real TCP
|
||||
connection over IPv6 to the configured server, and only when *both* transports fail on a network
|
||||
that advertises IPv6 is the brokenness claim made — at high severity, because every dual-stack
|
||||
destination pays a timeout before falling back to IPv4. When the TCP connect *succeeds*,
|
||||
`v6.no_icmp_reply` is emitted at high confidence instead, now able to say plainly that ICMPv6 is
|
||||
filtered while IPv6 works. With no server configured there is no corroboration target and the
|
||||
two-explanation `v6.no_icmp_reply` stands unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
`v6.not_offered` is **info and must stay info**. Most networks still do not offer IPv6 and that is
|
||||
not a fault; reporting it as a warning lights a yellow verdict on a healthy network, which teaches
|
||||
people to ignore the light — the one thing a diagnostic must never do.
|
||||
|
||||
## Adding a finding
|
||||
|
||||
1. Add a `FindingSpec` to `FindingRegistry`, and to its `all` list.
|
||||
2. Add the row here, under the section its prefix names.
|
||||
3. Emit it with `finding(FindingRegistry.YOUR_CODE, …)`.
|
||||
|
||||
The registry test checks 1 and 2 agree, that every prefix maps to the category it claims, and that
|
||||
no two entries share a code.
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Export encoding: UTF-8 JSON, gzip for files (`.echolot.json.gz`), share intent u
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "0198c5f2-...-uuidv7",
|
||||
"trigger": "manual | scheduled | monitor | peer",
|
||||
"mode": "short | long",
|
||||
"started_at": "2026-07-29T14:03:21.114Z",
|
||||
"ended_at": "2026-07-29T14:07:44.902Z",
|
||||
"clock": {
|
||||
@@ -52,12 +53,47 @@ Export encoding: UTF-8 JSON, gzip for files (`.echolot.json.gz`), share intent u
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tiers": { "app": true, "shizuku": true, "root": false },
|
||||
"profiles_used": ["profile-uuid", ...],
|
||||
"constraints": {
|
||||
"vpn_active": true,
|
||||
"per_network_blocked": true,
|
||||
"unmeasured_networks": ["net-0", "net-1"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notes": "free-text user annotation"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`tiers` records what was *available*; each test records what it *used*.
|
||||
|
||||
`mode` records how long the run watched, and it exists because **it changes what a reader may
|
||||
conclude from absence**. A `short` run is a sequence of one-shot probes — each looks at the network
|
||||
for a second or two and moves on — which characterises the network's *configuration* well and is
|
||||
structurally blind to anything intermittent. A `long` run starts continuous listeners at t=0, runs
|
||||
the same battery beside them, and keeps sampling until its window closes; the window's length is
|
||||
recorded in the `params` of the tests the listeners produce, not here.
|
||||
|
||||
The consequence is asymmetric and matters more than the field looks. A finding is worth the same in
|
||||
either mode: a drop that was observed, was observed. Silence is not. "No link changes were seen" is
|
||||
evidence of a stable link after five minutes of watching and is evidence of nothing at all after a
|
||||
thirty-second run, in which a link could drop and return between two consecutive probes without
|
||||
leaving a mark anywhere in the document. Consumers — a diff between two runs, a dashboard counting
|
||||
how often a fault occurs, a person reading one report — must therefore not treat the absence of a
|
||||
time-dependent finding in a `short` run as its refutation, and must not compare the two modes as if
|
||||
they had asked the same question. `connectivity.link_flapping` is the first finding that only a
|
||||
`long` run can reach; `networks[].changes[]` (§4) is likewise populated only by a long run's
|
||||
listener, and an empty `changes[]` in a short run means "not watched", never "nothing happened".
|
||||
|
||||
Absent `mode` means `short`: it was added after the first documents were written, and every one of
|
||||
them was a battery of one-shot probes.
|
||||
|
||||
`constraints` records what was *prevented*. A constrained run is neither a failed run nor a normal
|
||||
one, and the distinction has to survive into the data: a run taken through a VPN has the same shape
|
||||
and the same green verdict as a clean run of a healthy network, so without this a reader — or a
|
||||
server aggregating thousands of them — cannot tell that almost nothing was measured. The known case
|
||||
is `per_network_blocked`: Android refuses `Network.bindSocket()` on the underlying networks while a
|
||||
VPN holds the default route, so every per-network test measures the tunnel or nothing at all, and
|
||||
any conclusion about the link underneath is unfounded. Consumers should treat findings from a
|
||||
constrained run as scoped to what was actually reachable, and `unmeasured_networks` names the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. `networks[]` — one entry per Android `Network` in play
|
||||
|
||||
A run may exercise several networks simultaneously (Wi-Fi + cellular + USB ethernet). Everything is a snapshot at run start; a `changes[]` list captures mid-run deltas.
|
||||
@@ -97,12 +133,24 @@ A run may exercise several networks simultaneously (Wi-Fi + cellular + USB ether
|
||||
"changes": [
|
||||
{ "at_mono_ns": 91000000000, "kind": "lost | gained | link_changed",
|
||||
"detail": { /* new link snapshot or diff */ } }
|
||||
]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"app_usable": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`routes[].proto` and lifetime fields are Shizuku-tier data (`ip route`/`ip addr`); app-tier snapshots leave them absent — absence means "not observed", never "not present".
|
||||
|
||||
`app_usable` records whether an ordinary app may send on this network at all. Android lists the
|
||||
carrier's special-purpose networks — IMS/VoLTE, MMS, XCAP — alongside the real ones, and they
|
||||
carry neither `INTERNET` nor `NOT_RESTRICTED`; binding to one needs
|
||||
`CONNECTIVITY_USE_RESTRICTED_NETWORKS`, which is signature-level and unobtainable for a normal
|
||||
app. Those networks are therefore permanently unmeasurable, and that is a property of Android's
|
||||
permission model rather than of the link. They stay in `networks[]` because they are genuinely
|
||||
present — an interface silently missing from the inventory is its own kind of lie — but a
|
||||
consumer must not read the absence of tests against them as a fault, and they are **not**
|
||||
`constraints.unmeasured_networks` (§3): nothing was prevented, the run was never entitled to
|
||||
measure them.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. `server_sessions[]`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
@@ -269,7 +317,7 @@ The JSON Schema (machine-readable companion, `measurement.schema.json`, generate
|
||||
|
||||
| type | example fields | v2 anonymizer transform |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `ip4`, `ip6` | addresses, routes, hops, DNS answers | prefix-preserving pseudonymization, consistent per document; well-known/reserved ranges kept verbatim |
|
||||
| `ip4`, `ip6` | addresses, routes, hops, DNS answers | prefix-preserving pseudonymization, consistent per document; well-known/reserved ranges kept verbatim. **Exception: ULA (`fc00::/7`) has its whole prefix pseudonymized as a unit.** It resembles RFC1918 but is not analogous: a ULA global ID is 40 random bits, unique to one network by construction (RFC 4193), so the prefix *is* the identifier, whereas `192.168.0.0/16` is shared by millions of networks and identifies none. Pseudonymizing it as a unit keeps "these hosts are on one subnet" while dropping "this is that subnet". |
|
||||
| `mac`, `bssid` | wifi, arp_watch | OUI kept, NIC part pseudonymized |
|
||||
| `fqdn` | DNS names, reverse lookups | per-label pseudonyms, public-suffix kept |
|
||||
| `ssid` | wifi | pseudonym |
|
||||
@@ -279,7 +327,8 @@ Free-text fields (`notes`, `error.detail`, dump excerpts from Shizuku parsers) c
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Open items
|
||||
|
||||
1. Findings registry document — start alongside the first implemented tests.
|
||||
1. ~~Findings registry document~~ — done: `findings-registry.md`, kept in step with
|
||||
`FindingRegistry.kt` by a test that fails when the two disagree.
|
||||
2. Whether Shizuku raw-dump excerpts (dumpsys/ip output) are embedded in `evidence` verbatim (auditable, but large and hard to anonymize) or parsed-only with an optional "attach raw dumps" toggle. Proposal: toggle, default on for local archive, default off for export.
|
||||
3. Peer-mode documents: each device produces its own run; the coordinator embeds the peer's findings summary and cross-references by `run.id`. Full merge format deferred.
|
||||
4. Size guardrails: soft cap 20 MB uncompressed per run; trains beyond that downsample evidence (keep aggregates + first/last N + all anomalies) and record `"evidence_truncated": true`.
|
||||
|
||||
+122
-6
@@ -24,11 +24,34 @@ echolot://enroll?v=1&u=<control-URL, urlencoded>&p=pin-sha256:<b64 SPKI hash>&t=
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
POST /v1/enroll Authorization: Bearer <enrollment-token>
|
||||
→ 200 { "device_credential": "<random 256-bit, b64url>",
|
||||
"device_id": "uuid",
|
||||
"profile": { ... §2.2 ... } }
|
||||
→ 201 { "device_credential": "<random 256-bit, b64url>",
|
||||
"device_id": "uuid" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The **server assembles the bootstrap link**, because it is the only party holding all three parts
|
||||
at once, and the part an operator gets wrong by hand is the base64 pin — which does not fail
|
||||
loudly, it just never matches, and surfaces later as an inscrutable TLS error:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
POST /admin/enroll-tokens
|
||||
→ { "token": "…", "expires_in_s": 86400,
|
||||
"enroll_uri": "echolot://enroll?v=1&u=…&p=…&t=…" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The control URL in the link comes from `ECHOLOT_PUBLIC_URL`, falling back to the first control
|
||||
listen address. A wildcard bind has no single right answer, so it warns rather than guessing.
|
||||
|
||||
Encoding notes that matter in practice:
|
||||
- `u`, `p` and `t` are **percent-encoded**. The pin is base64, so it contains `+`, `/` and `=`,
|
||||
every one of which means something else in a query string.
|
||||
- A `+` that was *not* encoded decodes to a space. Base64 contains no spaces, so a parser SHOULD
|
||||
restore them — the alternative is a pin wrong by one character and a failure that points nowhere
|
||||
near the cause.
|
||||
- The control URL MUST be `https://`. The pin only protects a TLS connection; a cleartext URL
|
||||
would hand the token to anyone on the path.
|
||||
- **The link is a secret** while it is live: it carries a bearer token, so anyone who sees it
|
||||
before the device does can enroll instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Enrollment tokens are single-use with expiry, created in the admin UI, scoped `enroll`. The device credential is a long-lived bearer secret, scoped `run-tests`; it is also the HKDF input for session keys. Revocation = deleting the device in the admin UI.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Profile
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +84,12 @@ The app re-fetches the profile at the start of every run (falling back to the ca
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Capabilities (v1 registry)
|
||||
|
||||
`udp-probe`, `stun-basic`, `stun-5780`, `canary-dns`, `recursive-dns`, `connect-back`, `delayed-echo`, `big-send`, `frag-send`, `tls-echo`, `http-echo`, `throughput`, `ntp`. A server omits what it can't offer (e.g. `stun-5780` without a second IP degrades to `stun-basic`). Clients must skip, and record as `unsupported`, any test whose capability is absent. Unknown capability strings are ignored.
|
||||
`udp-probe`, `stun-basic`, `stun-5780`, `canary-dns`, `recursive-dns`, `connect-back`, `delayed-echo`, `big-send`, `frag-send`, `tls-echo`, `http-echo`, `throughput`, `ntp`, plus:
|
||||
|
||||
- `downtrain` — server-sent downstream trains via the §5 `downtrain` action. Upstream trains need no capability of their own: they are plain client-sent data-plane packets and ride `udp-probe`.
|
||||
- `tcp-echo` — the plain-TCP echo endpoint (§4); `tls-echo` is its ALPN variant on the same port.
|
||||
|
||||
A server omits what it can't offer (e.g. `stun-5780` without a second IP degrades to `stun-basic`). Clients must skip, and record as `unsupported`, any test whose capability is absent. Unknown capability strings are ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Sessions
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +116,31 @@ DELETE /v1/sessions/{id}
|
||||
|
||||
Per-credential and per-source-IP token buckets on: session creation, actions, UDP packets, bytes. `429` on control plane; silent drop on data plane (probes must tolerate loss anyway). All reflected/generated traffic goes **only** to the session's observed source address (or, for connect-back, the source address of the session-creating request). Data-plane responses to unauthenticated packets are never larger than the request (§3.4).
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 `GET /v1/discover` — where the control plane lives
|
||||
|
||||
Unauthenticated, and says almost nothing: the control-plane URL and the server's display name.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "control_url": "https://probe.example.net", "name": "example" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It exists so an enrollment link can carry the name a person recognises while the app still connects
|
||||
to the name that selects the pinned certificate. When a server shares port 443 between its admin UI
|
||||
and its control plane, those must be different hostnames — one port and one name is one certificate,
|
||||
and the two need different ones (a browser-trusted certificate, and a long-lived self-signed one the
|
||||
client pins). Without discovery, the difference leaks into every enrollment link an operator hands
|
||||
out.
|
||||
|
||||
**It hands out an address, never a pin.** The pin travels in the link itself. Serving it here would
|
||||
reduce pinning to whatever the certificate authorities are worth, and pinning exists precisely to
|
||||
survive one the operator does not control — a root injected by corporate device management, for
|
||||
instance, which is unremarkable on the networks this tool is pointed at. Because the pin is
|
||||
pre-shared, an intercepted discovery response can only send a device to the wrong host, where the
|
||||
pin will not match: an outage, not a compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
Clients treat it as optional. A server that does not answer, or a link that already names the
|
||||
control endpoint, works unchanged — enrollment must not begin failing because a lookup did.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. UDP probe protocol
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Packet header (fixed 32 bytes, network byte order)
|
||||
@@ -192,14 +245,77 @@ Note: exact RDATA constants to be frozen in the implementation's `dns_reference.
|
||||
|
||||
Same daemon, separate listener (default localhost-only): health + self-test (are both IPs live, is the canary zone delegated correctly, is UDP reachable from outside — tested via a public echolot "mirror" if configured), enrollment token management (create/expire/scope), device list + revocation, retention settings, QR rendering (client-side JS). Out of scope for this spec beyond the endpoints above.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Cross-references to the measurement schema
|
||||
## 8. Version compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
Both artifacts are versioned with **SemVer**: the Go server (`server-vX.Y.Z` tags) and the Android
|
||||
app (`versionName`; `versionCode` is derived from it, never maintained separately). Two independent
|
||||
things are checked, and conflating them is the mistake this section exists to prevent.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1 Protocol version — *can* these builds talk?
|
||||
|
||||
`protocol_version` is the version of **this document**. It is advertised in the profile
|
||||
(`compat.protocol_version`) and is the correctness axis: a peer in a different breaking series
|
||||
cannot be talked to, whatever its release version says. Below `1.0.0` the **minor** is the breaking
|
||||
axis (SemVer §4); at and above it, the major is. A patch bump of the protocol never splits a fleet.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.2 Release-version window — *should* they, per policy?
|
||||
|
||||
Each side declares the range of peer release versions it will work with, as `[min, max)` —
|
||||
**minimum inclusive, maximum exclusive**, because the useful bound is always "the version that
|
||||
broke it" and writing that literally is unambiguous. An empty maximum means unbounded.
|
||||
|
||||
The server advertises its window and enforces it:
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
"compat": {
|
||||
"protocol_version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"schema_version": "1.0.0",
|
||||
"app_min": "0.2.0",
|
||||
"app_max": "1.0.0" // exclusive; "" = no upper bound
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Operators override it with `ECHOLOT_MIN_APP_VERSION` / `ECHOLOT_MAX_APP_VERSION` (or
|
||||
`--min-app-version` / `--max-app-version`). A malformed bound is **fatal at startup**, not ignored:
|
||||
a typo must not silently disable a restriction the operator meant to set.
|
||||
|
||||
The app sends its version on every control-plane request:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
X-Echolot-App-Version: 0.2.0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
and carries its own bounds for the server (`MIN_SERVER` / `MAX_SERVER` in `Compat.kt`). It checks
|
||||
the profile in **both** directions — is the server in our range, and are we in the server's — so a
|
||||
mismatch is reported before a run starts rather than discovered halfway through one.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.3 Rules
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`GET /v1/profile` is never gated.** It is where a refused client learns which version it needs.
|
||||
Gating it leaves the user with a network error instead of an answer, defeating the check.
|
||||
2. **Refusal is `426 Upgrade Required`**, with a body naming both versions and the accepted window:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "error": "app 0.1.0 is older than this build supports (needs >= 0.2.0, < 1.0.0). Update the app.",
|
||||
"app_version": "0.1.0", "accepts_app": ">= 0.2.0, < 1.0.0",
|
||||
"server_version": "0.5.0", "protocol_version": "1.0.0" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
3. **An unparseable or absent version is `unknown`, and is allowed.** Development builds report
|
||||
`dev`, and a client too old to send the header cannot be identified anyway. The check exists to
|
||||
turn confusing failures into clear ones; refusing what it cannot identify does the opposite.
|
||||
4. **Bounds move at breaking boundaries, not at releases.** Shipping a patch must never require
|
||||
editing a range. A minimum is raised only when older peers are actually harmful — e.g. the app
|
||||
requires server `>= 0.4.2` because earlier multi-homed servers sent granted traffic from an
|
||||
address the session never used, which the client measured as 100 % downstream loss. A
|
||||
confidently wrong measurement is worse than a refused one.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Cross-references to the measurement schema
|
||||
|
||||
- Observation-block fields (§3.3) appear as `*_seen_by_server` columns in `train` evidence (schema §6.2).
|
||||
- `TIMESYNC` (§3.2) produces the `time.server_offset` test; without it, cross-clock fields must not be compared (schema §6.2 note).
|
||||
- Capability strings (§2.3) are copied verbatim into `server_sessions[].capabilities` (schema §5); tests skipped for missing capability get `status: "unsupported"`.
|
||||
- `session_id` maps to `server_sessions[].session_id`; `action_id`s appear in test `params`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Open items
|
||||
## 10. Open items
|
||||
|
||||
1. Whether TRAIN_REPORT should also stream during long trains (partial reports every N packets) for live UI feedback — leaning yes, same type with a `flags` bit.
|
||||
2. Throughput methodology (fixed streams vs BBR-style ramp) — decide with `perf.*` test design.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ plugins {
|
||||
alias(libs.plugins.kotlin.serialization)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The app's version is SemVer and lives here, once. versionCode is derived from it rather than
|
||||
// maintained alongside: Play/F-Droid need a monotonically increasing integer, but a second number
|
||||
// that a human has to remember to bump is a number that eventually disagrees with the first — and
|
||||
// the version is now load-bearing, since the server decides whether to serve us by it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// major*1_000_000 + minor*10_000 + patch*10 leaves room for 9 patch-level rebuilds (the trailing
|
||||
// digit) without disturbing the mapping, and stays inside the 2_100_000_000 ceiling until major 2100.
|
||||
val appVersionName = "0.3.0"
|
||||
|
||||
fun versionCodeOf(semver: String): Int {
|
||||
val (major, minor, patch) = semver.substringBefore('-').split(".").map(String::toInt)
|
||||
return major * 1_000_000 + minor * 10_000 + patch * 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
android {
|
||||
namespace = "app.echo_lot.app"
|
||||
compileSdk = 36
|
||||
@@ -16,12 +30,23 @@ android {
|
||||
applicationId = "app.echo_lot.app"
|
||||
minSdk = 26
|
||||
targetSdk = 36
|
||||
versionCode = 2
|
||||
versionName = "0.2.0"
|
||||
versionCode = versionCodeOf(appVersionName)
|
||||
versionName = appVersionName
|
||||
// Automation: `adb shell am start -n app.echo_lot.app/.MainActivity --ez autorun true`
|
||||
// runs a measurement immediately and POSTs the report here (dev collection endpoint).
|
||||
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_URL", "\"http://89.185.109.150:443/report\"")
|
||||
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_SECRET", "\"D4OmG5gGJsElqVVbtYIZbR\"")
|
||||
// Empty: the collection endpoint this pointed at was the adb-beacon receiver, which held
|
||||
// 0.0.0.0:443 in cleartext. That service is gone and echolot-server owns 443 with TLS, so
|
||||
// posting plaintext there now fails as "client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server" —
|
||||
// an alarming error for a debugging convenience that is no longer needed, since autorun
|
||||
// reports are read straight off the device with `run-as cat`.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Deliberately not repointed at /v1/runs. That is the consent-gated upload, and a
|
||||
// debugging shortcut must not be able to satisfy it by accident.
|
||||
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_URL", "\"\"")
|
||||
buildConfigField("String", "REPORT_UPLOAD_SECRET", "\"\"")
|
||||
// The bare SemVer, without the debug build's "-dev" suffix stripped away by the server's
|
||||
// parser anyway — sent to servers so they can apply their compatibility window.
|
||||
buildConfigField("String", "APP_SEMVER", "\"$appVersionName\"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
buildTypes {
|
||||
release { isMinifyEnabled = false }
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,17 @@
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE" />
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE" />
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />
|
||||
<!--
|
||||
The adb relay (AdbRelayService) only. It runs in the foreground because it must keep
|
||||
watching while the tablet sits unattended with its screen off, and dataSync is the type
|
||||
that describes it: it carries an observation off the LAN, nothing more. Android 15 caps
|
||||
dataSync at a few hours a day, which is acceptable for a tool that is switched on for a
|
||||
debugging session rather than left running forever.
|
||||
-->
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE" />
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC" />
|
||||
<!-- Only so the relay's ongoing status is visible; the service runs either way. -->
|
||||
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS" />
|
||||
|
||||
<application
|
||||
android:allowBackup="false"
|
||||
@@ -22,13 +33,46 @@
|
||||
|
||||
<activity
|
||||
android:name=".MainActivity"
|
||||
android:exported="true">
|
||||
android:exported="true"
|
||||
android:launchMode="singleTask">
|
||||
<intent-filter>
|
||||
<action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
|
||||
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
|
||||
</intent-filter>
|
||||
<!--
|
||||
Enrollment bootstrap (probe-protocol.md §2.1): echolot://enroll?v=1&u=…&p=…&t=…
|
||||
Scanning a QR or tapping a link the operator sent configures the server in one
|
||||
action, instead of transcribing a URL, a base64 pin and a token by hand — the pin
|
||||
in particular fails silently when it is wrong by one character.
|
||||
-->
|
||||
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="false">
|
||||
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
|
||||
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
|
||||
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
|
||||
<data android:scheme="echolot" android:host="enroll" />
|
||||
</intent-filter>
|
||||
<!--
|
||||
Sign-in redirect. The browser hands the authorization code back through this, which
|
||||
is exactly why the flow uses PKCE: any app may register this scheme, so the code
|
||||
alone must not be enough to complete a sign-in.
|
||||
-->
|
||||
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="false">
|
||||
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
|
||||
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
|
||||
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
|
||||
<data android:scheme="echolot" android:host="auth" />
|
||||
</intent-filter>
|
||||
</activity>
|
||||
|
||||
<!--
|
||||
Not exported: nothing outside this app has any business starting a relay that reports
|
||||
where this device can be reached.
|
||||
-->
|
||||
<service
|
||||
android:name=".AdbRelayService"
|
||||
android:exported="false"
|
||||
android:foregroundServiceType="dataSync" />
|
||||
|
||||
<provider
|
||||
android:name="androidx.core.content.FileProvider"
|
||||
android:authorities="${applicationId}.fileprovider"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.app
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.AuthInfo
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.OidcLogin
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Signing in to the configured server's identity provider.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The awkward part of a browser-based sign-in on Android is that the app is not running while it
|
||||
* happens. Handing control to a browser puts this process in the background, where it may be
|
||||
* killed at any moment; the callback then arrives at a fresh process with none of the state the
|
||||
* exchange needs. So the PKCE verifier and state are written to storage before the browser opens,
|
||||
* not held in memory — an in-memory value works on a developer's device and fails on a phone under
|
||||
* memory pressure, which is the worst way for this to break.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Nothing from the identity provider is kept afterwards. The ID token proves who is signing in,
|
||||
* once; the device credential authenticates everything from then on.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class Account(private val settings: Settings) {
|
||||
|
||||
private val json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true }
|
||||
|
||||
sealed interface SignInStart {
|
||||
/** Open this in a browser. */
|
||||
data class Browser(val url: String) : SignInStart
|
||||
data class Unavailable(val reason: String) : SignInStart
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Fetches the server's auth configuration and builds the authorization URL. */
|
||||
fun begin(): SignInStart {
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) {
|
||||
return SignInStart.Unavailable(
|
||||
"Enrol with a server first — sign-in belongs to the server's identity provider."
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val auth = runCatching { client().profile(settings.serverCredential).auth }.getOrNull()
|
||||
?: return SignInStart.Unavailable("Could not reach the server to ask how to sign in.")
|
||||
|
||||
auth.discoveryError?.let {
|
||||
// The distinction matters: "the operator configured an IdP that is not answering" is
|
||||
// their problem to fix, and is not the same as "this server has no accounts".
|
||||
return SignInStart.Unavailable("The server's identity provider is not responding: $it")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!auth.enabled) {
|
||||
return SignInStart.Unavailable("This server does not offer accounts.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val pending = OidcLogin.begin(auth)
|
||||
// Written before the browser opens, because after that this process may not survive.
|
||||
settings.pendingVerifier = pending.verifier
|
||||
settings.pendingState = pending.state
|
||||
SignInStart.Browser(pending.authorizationUrl)
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
SignInStart.Unavailable(t.message ?: "Could not start sign-in.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Completes sign-in from the `echolot://auth` redirect.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Blocking; callers run it off the main thread.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun complete(callbackUri: String): String {
|
||||
val verifier = settings.pendingVerifier
|
||||
val state = settings.pendingState
|
||||
// Cleared first, whatever happens next: these are single-use, and leaving them behind
|
||||
// would let a later callback be completed against a flow nobody started.
|
||||
settings.clearPendingAuth()
|
||||
|
||||
if (verifier.isBlank() || state.isBlank()) {
|
||||
return "That sign-in did not start on this device."
|
||||
}
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val auth = client().profile(settings.serverCredential).auth
|
||||
val idToken = OidcLogin.complete(
|
||||
auth, OidcLogin.Pending("", verifier, state), callbackUri,
|
||||
)
|
||||
val reply = client().linkAccount(settings.serverCredential, idToken)
|
||||
val o = json.parseToJsonElement(reply).jsonObject
|
||||
val name = o["display_name"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "signed in"
|
||||
settings.accountName = name
|
||||
settings.accountId = o["account_id"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: ""
|
||||
val admin = o["admin"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content == "true"
|
||||
"Signed in as $name" + if (admin) " (administrator)" else ""
|
||||
} catch (e: OidcLogin.LoginFailed) {
|
||||
e.message ?: "Sign-in failed."
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
"Sign-in failed: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Signs out. The device stays enrolled — signing out should not cost an enrolment. */
|
||||
fun signOut(): String = try {
|
||||
client().unlinkAccount(settings.serverCredential)
|
||||
settings.accountName = ""
|
||||
settings.accountId = ""
|
||||
"Signed out. This device is still enrolled."
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
"Could not sign out: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Asks the server who it thinks is signed in, so the UI is not trusting stale local state. */
|
||||
fun refresh(): String? = runCatching {
|
||||
val o = json.parseToJsonElement(client().accountStatus(settings.serverCredential)).jsonObject
|
||||
val signedIn = o["signed_in"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content == "true"
|
||||
settings.accountName = if (signedIn) {
|
||||
o["display_name"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: ""
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
""
|
||||
}
|
||||
settings.accountName.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
private fun client() = ControlClient(
|
||||
settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin), BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER,
|
||||
fallbackAddrs = settings.serverAddrList(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.app
|
||||
|
||||
import android.content.Context
|
||||
import android.net.nsd.NsdManager
|
||||
import android.net.nsd.NsdServiceInfo
|
||||
import android.net.wifi.WifiManager
|
||||
import java.net.Inet4Address
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Watches adbd's own mDNS advertisement on this device and reports the endpoint to the server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This replaces the retired Python adb-beacon, and exists for one reason: **mDNS does not cross
|
||||
* subnets**. A developer on another network cannot see `_adb-tls-connect._tcp` at all, while the
|
||||
* wireless-debug port rotates every few minutes — so the port has to be carried out of the LAN by
|
||||
* something sitting inside it. That is this. A tablet parked on the test network relays; the
|
||||
* developer reads the endpoint back from the server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Two hard-won rules from the beacon, both load-bearing:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - **Resolve each service instance exactly ONCE.** Resolving adbd's advertisement makes adbd
|
||||
* re-arm its connection and post a "wireless debugging connected" notification; re-resolving on
|
||||
* every heartbeat turns that into a stream of them. The guard is cleared only when the service
|
||||
* is *lost*, which is also what catches rotation: the new advertisement is a new instance, gets
|
||||
* resolved once, and is reported within seconds.
|
||||
* - **Do not run this on the OnePlus.** On network churn that device drops and re-publishes its
|
||||
* advertisement repeatedly, so lost/found cycles keep clearing the guard and each resolve
|
||||
* re-arms adbd. Guarding reduces but cannot eliminate the noise; the Lenovo tablet is the
|
||||
* intended host, which is also why relaying is a mode rather than something always on.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class AdbRelay(
|
||||
private val ctx: Context,
|
||||
private val onEvent: (String) -> Unit,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
private val nsd = ctx.getSystemService(NsdManager::class.java)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Instances already resolved, by service name — the re-arm guard described above. */
|
||||
private val resolved = HashSet<String>()
|
||||
|
||||
/** Last endpoint reported, so the heartbeat re-posts from cache instead of re-resolving. */
|
||||
@Volatile var lastEndpoint: Endpoint? = null
|
||||
private set
|
||||
|
||||
data class Endpoint(val host: String, val port: Int, val serviceName: String)
|
||||
|
||||
private var listener: NsdManager.DiscoveryListener? = null
|
||||
|
||||
fun start() {
|
||||
if (nsd == null) {
|
||||
onEvent("mDNS unavailable on this device")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (listener != null) return
|
||||
val l = object : NsdManager.DiscoveryListener {
|
||||
override fun onStartDiscoveryFailed(type: String?, code: Int) {
|
||||
onEvent("discovery failed to start (code $code)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
override fun onStopDiscoveryFailed(type: String?, code: Int) {}
|
||||
override fun onDiscoveryStarted(type: String?) {
|
||||
onEvent("watching for adbd on this network")
|
||||
}
|
||||
override fun onDiscoveryStopped(type: String?) {}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onServiceFound(info: NsdServiceInfo?) {
|
||||
val name = info?.serviceName ?: return
|
||||
// The guard: one resolve per instance, ever. adbd re-arms on every resolve.
|
||||
if (!resolved.add(name)) return
|
||||
resolve(info)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onServiceLost(info: NsdServiceInfo?) {
|
||||
// Rotation: the old instance is gone, so allow the replacement to be resolved.
|
||||
info?.serviceName?.let { resolved.remove(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
listener = l
|
||||
runCatching { nsd.discoverServices(ADB_SERVICE, NsdManager.PROTOCOL_DNS_SD, l) }
|
||||
.onFailure { onEvent("could not start discovery: ${it.message}") }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun stop() {
|
||||
listener?.let { l -> runCatching { nsd?.stopServiceDiscovery(l) } }
|
||||
listener = null
|
||||
resolved.clear()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Suppress("DEPRECATION") // the callback-based resolve is the one that exists across our minSdk
|
||||
private fun resolve(info: NsdServiceInfo) {
|
||||
val cb = object : NsdManager.ResolveListener {
|
||||
override fun onResolveFailed(i: NsdServiceInfo?, code: Int) {
|
||||
// Let a failed instance be retried: the guard exists to stop *successful*
|
||||
// re-resolution, not to give up on a transient failure.
|
||||
i?.serviceName?.let { resolved.remove(it) }
|
||||
onEvent("resolve failed (code $code)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onServiceResolved(i: NsdServiceInfo?) {
|
||||
val host = i?.host?.hostAddress ?: return
|
||||
// adbd advertises on every address it listens on, including link-local v6. The
|
||||
// reachable one from a developer's subnet is the routable v4 address, and it is
|
||||
// also the only one worth relaying — a link-local address means nothing off-link.
|
||||
if (i.host !is Inet4Address) return
|
||||
// Only this device's own advertisement: on a shared network several phones may
|
||||
// have wireless debugging on, and relaying a neighbour's port would send a
|
||||
// developer to the wrong device.
|
||||
if (host != localIp()) return
|
||||
lastEndpoint = Endpoint(host, i.port, i.serviceName ?: "adb")
|
||||
onEvent("found adbd at $host:${i.port}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
runCatching { nsd?.resolveService(info, cb) }
|
||||
.onFailure {
|
||||
resolved.remove(info.serviceName)
|
||||
onEvent("resolve threw: ${it.message}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** This device's own IPv4 address on the wifi it is relaying from. */
|
||||
private fun localIp(): String? = runCatching {
|
||||
val wifi = ctx.getSystemService(WifiManager::class.java) ?: return null
|
||||
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
|
||||
val ip = wifi.connectionInfo.ipAddress
|
||||
if (ip == 0) return null
|
||||
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
|
||||
String.format(
|
||||
"%d.%d.%d.%d",
|
||||
ip and 0xff, ip shr 8 and 0xff, ip shr 16 and 0xff, ip shr 24 and 0xff,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
private companion object {
|
||||
const val ADB_SERVICE = "_adb-tls-connect._tcp"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.app
|
||||
|
||||
import android.app.Notification
|
||||
import android.app.NotificationChannel
|
||||
import android.app.NotificationManager
|
||||
import android.app.Service
|
||||
import android.content.Context
|
||||
import android.content.Intent
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.os.IBinder
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.SupervisorJob
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.cancel
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
|
||||
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Keeps [AdbRelay] running and posts what it finds to the enrolled server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A foreground service because the whole point is to be useful while nobody is looking at the
|
||||
* tablet: a background process is frozen within minutes of the screen going off, and a relay that
|
||||
* stops relaying the moment it is left alone would be worse than none — it would be trusted right
|
||||
* up until the moment it went quiet.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The heartbeat re-posts the CACHED endpoint and never re-resolves. Resolving adbd's advertisement
|
||||
* makes adbd re-arm its connection and raise a "wireless debugging connected" notification, so a
|
||||
* heartbeat that re-resolved would turn a background convenience into a stream of notifications on
|
||||
* a device sitting on a shelf. Rotation is still caught, because losing the old advertisement
|
||||
* clears the resolve guard in [AdbRelay] and the replacement is resolved once, within seconds.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class AdbRelayService : Service() {
|
||||
|
||||
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.IO)
|
||||
private var relay: AdbRelay? = null
|
||||
|
||||
@Volatile private var status: String = "starting"
|
||||
@Volatile private var lastPosted: String? = null
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onBind(intent: Intent?): IBinder? = null
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onCreate() {
|
||||
super.onCreate()
|
||||
startForeground(NOTIFICATION_ID, notification("starting"))
|
||||
val settings = Settings(this)
|
||||
val r = AdbRelay(this) { msg ->
|
||||
status = msg
|
||||
notify(msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
relay = r
|
||||
r.start()
|
||||
|
||||
scope.launch {
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
val ep = r.lastEndpoint
|
||||
if (ep != null) {
|
||||
val wire = "${ep.host}:${ep.port}"
|
||||
// Re-post on a heartbeat even when unchanged: the server stamps a received-at
|
||||
// time, and a developer needs to tell "this endpoint is current" from "this
|
||||
// endpoint is what the tablet saw before it went out of range".
|
||||
val result = post(settings, ep)
|
||||
status = if (result == null) {
|
||||
lastPosted = wire
|
||||
"reported $wire"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"found $wire, but reporting failed: $result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
notify(status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
delay(HEARTBEAT_MS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Posts one endpoint; returns null on success or a short reason on failure. */
|
||||
private suspend fun post(settings: Settings, ep: AdbRelay.Endpoint): String? =
|
||||
withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) return@withContext "no server enrolled"
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
ControlClient(settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin), BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
|
||||
.reportAdbEndpoint(
|
||||
credential = settings.serverCredential,
|
||||
host = ep.host,
|
||||
port = ep.port,
|
||||
deviceName = Build.MODEL,
|
||||
note = "echolot relay",
|
||||
)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}.getOrElse { it.message?.take(120) ?: it.javaClass.simpleName }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onStartCommand(intent: Intent?, flags: Int, startId: Int): Int {
|
||||
// Restarted by the system if it is killed: a relay that quietly does not come back after
|
||||
// a low-memory kill is the failure mode this exists to avoid.
|
||||
return START_STICKY
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onDestroy() {
|
||||
relay?.stop()
|
||||
scope.cancel()
|
||||
super.onDestroy()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun notify(text: String) {
|
||||
val nm = getSystemService(NotificationManager::class.java)
|
||||
nm?.notify(NOTIFICATION_ID, notification(text))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun notification(text: String): Notification {
|
||||
val nm = getSystemService(NotificationManager::class.java)
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.O) {
|
||||
// LOW: this is a status line for a tool the user deliberately started, not news.
|
||||
val ch = NotificationChannel(CHANNEL, "adb relay", NotificationManager.IMPORTANCE_LOW)
|
||||
ch.description = "Reports this device's wireless-debug endpoint to the Echolot server"
|
||||
nm?.createNotificationChannel(ch)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val open = android.app.PendingIntent.getActivity(
|
||||
this, 0, Intent(this, MainActivity::class.java),
|
||||
android.app.PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return Notification.Builder(this, CHANNEL)
|
||||
.setContentTitle("Echolot adb relay")
|
||||
.setContentText(text)
|
||||
.setSmallIcon(android.R.drawable.stat_sys_download_done)
|
||||
.setOngoing(true)
|
||||
.setContentIntent(open)
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
companion object {
|
||||
private const val CHANNEL = "adb-relay"
|
||||
private const val NOTIFICATION_ID = 4711
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Two minutes. The port rotates on roughly that cadence, and the freshness of the answer
|
||||
* is the whole product — but this only re-posts a cached value, so it costs one small
|
||||
* HTTPS request and never touches mDNS.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private const val HEARTBEAT_MS = 120_000L
|
||||
|
||||
fun start(ctx: Context) {
|
||||
val i = Intent(ctx, AdbRelayService::class.java)
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.O) ctx.startForegroundService(i)
|
||||
else ctx.startService(i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun stop(ctx: Context) {
|
||||
ctx.stopService(Intent(ctx, AdbRelayService::class.java))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.app
|
||||
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.safeDrawingPadding
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ fun HistoryScreen(
|
||||
onDelete: (String) -> Unit,
|
||||
onBack: () -> Unit,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(16.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().safeDrawingPadding().padding(16.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
|
||||
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
|
||||
TextButton(onClick = onBack) { Text("‹ Back") }
|
||||
Text("History", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleLarge)
|
||||
@@ -71,12 +72,20 @@ fun HistoryScreen(
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"${r.findingCount} finding(s) · ${r.sizeBytes / 1024} kB · ${r.anonymization}",
|
||||
"${r.findingCount} finding(s) · ${r.sizeBytes / 1024} kB · " +
|
||||
"kept complete on this device",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
// The upload line names the level the upload was made at, not the
|
||||
// archive's. They describe different documents, and showing the archive's
|
||||
// level here claimed more had left the device than actually did.
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
if (r.uploaded) "uploaded to ${r.uploadedTo ?: "a server"}"
|
||||
else "on this device only",
|
||||
if (r.uploaded) {
|
||||
"uploaded to ${r.uploadedTo ?: "a server"}" +
|
||||
(r.uploadedAs?.let { " as $it" } ?: "")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"on this device only"
|
||||
},
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
color = if (r.uploaded) Color(0xFF7FD17F) else Color(0xFFBBBBBB),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,9 +43,28 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
|
||||
private val permissionLauncher =
|
||||
registerForActivityResult(ActivityResultContracts.RequestMultiplePermissions()) { /* proceed regardless */ }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The intent currently being acted on, so a deep link that arrives while the app is running
|
||||
* is seen by the screen the user is already looking at.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The activity is singleTask for the same reason. As a standard activity it stacked a second
|
||||
* instance per link, each with its own ViewModel: the enrolment then happened in a throwaway
|
||||
* copy, and pressing back returned to the original screen showing none of it. Silent, and
|
||||
* indistinguishable from the link simply not working.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private val liveIntent = mutableStateOf<android.content.Intent?>(null)
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onNewIntent(intent: android.content.Intent) {
|
||||
super.onNewIntent(intent)
|
||||
setIntent(intent)
|
||||
liveIntent.value = intent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
|
||||
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)
|
||||
requestRuntimePermissions()
|
||||
resumeRelayIfEnabled()
|
||||
liveIntent.value = intent
|
||||
setContent {
|
||||
MaterialTheme(colorScheme = darkColorScheme()) {
|
||||
Surface(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.background) {
|
||||
@@ -59,8 +78,109 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
|
||||
// starts a run immediately and uploads the report, so an unattended
|
||||
// measurement needs no UI tapping and no adb round-trip to collect.
|
||||
val autorun = intent?.getBooleanExtra("autorun", false) == true
|
||||
|
||||
// An echolot://enroll link (QR scan, or a link the operator sent) opens the
|
||||
// app straight into settings with the enrollment already done, so the user
|
||||
// sees the result rather than a form they still have to fill in.
|
||||
// Both deep links land here. They are told apart by host, so a sign-in
|
||||
// redirect is never mistaken for an enrolment link — one spends a token, the
|
||||
// other completes an authorization, and confusing them would fail obscurely.
|
||||
val incoming = liveIntent.value?.takeIf { it.action == Intent.ACTION_VIEW }?.dataString
|
||||
val authUri = incoming?.takeIf { it.startsWith("echolot://auth") }
|
||||
val enrollUri = incoming?.takeIf { it.startsWith("echolot://enroll") }
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(enrollUri) {
|
||||
if (enrollUri != null) {
|
||||
vm.enroll(enrollUri)
|
||||
screen = Screen.SETTINGS
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Replacing an existing enrollment is asked about, never assumed. Following a
|
||||
// link from a web page is one tap, and the old credential does not survive it.
|
||||
vm.state.pendingEnroll?.let { pending ->
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.AlertDialog(
|
||||
onDismissRequest = { vm.cancelEnroll() },
|
||||
title = {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
|
||||
if (pending.sameServer) "Enroll again with this server?"
|
||||
else "Replace this device's server?"
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
text = {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
|
||||
// Naming the same URL twice reads as a mistake and buries the
|
||||
// one consequence that actually applies: the device is issued a
|
||||
// fresh credential and shows up as a second entry.
|
||||
if (pending.sameServer) {
|
||||
"This device is already enrolled with " +
|
||||
"${pending.currentServer}.\n\n" +
|
||||
"Enrolling again replaces its credential. The old one " +
|
||||
"stops working immediately, and the device appears on " +
|
||||
"the server as a new entry alongside the current one — " +
|
||||
"which you may want to revoke afterwards.\n\n" +
|
||||
"Runs already uploaded, and runs stored on this phone, " +
|
||||
"are not affected."
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"This device is already enrolled with " +
|
||||
"${pending.currentServer}.\n\n" +
|
||||
"Enrolling with ${pending.newServer} replaces that. Runs " +
|
||||
"already uploaded stay where they are, but this device " +
|
||||
"stops reporting to the old server and appears on the new " +
|
||||
"one as a new device.\n\n" +
|
||||
"Runs stored on this phone are not affected."
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
confirmButton = {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.TextButton(onClick = { vm.confirmEnroll() }) {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.Text(
|
||||
if (pending.sameServer) "Enroll again" else "Enroll here"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
dismissButton = {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.TextButton(onClick = { vm.cancelEnroll() }) {
|
||||
androidx.compose.material3.Text("Keep current server")
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(authUri) {
|
||||
if (authUri != null) {
|
||||
vm.completeSignIn(authUri)
|
||||
screen = Screen.SETTINGS
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A long run samples for minutes, and Android starts throttling timers and
|
||||
// network access within moments of the screen going off — so a run left to
|
||||
// itself would measure the device's power management rather than the network,
|
||||
// and would do it silently. Held only while a run is in flight, and released
|
||||
// on the way out.
|
||||
val view = androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalView.current
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.DisposableEffect(vm.state.running) {
|
||||
view.keepScreenOn = vm.state.running
|
||||
onDispose { view.keepScreenOn = false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Shizuku can be started, stopped or authorised in its own app, where nothing
|
||||
// calls back into this process. Asking again each time this screen comes
|
||||
// forward is what makes the banner right after the user has been away to fix
|
||||
// it — which is exactly the moment they look at it.
|
||||
val lifecycleOwner = androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalLifecycleOwner.current
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.DisposableEffect(lifecycleOwner) {
|
||||
val obs = androidx.lifecycle.LifecycleEventObserver { _, event ->
|
||||
if (event == androidx.lifecycle.Lifecycle.Event.ON_RESUME) {
|
||||
vm.refreshShizuku()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.addObserver(obs)
|
||||
onDispose { lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.removeObserver(obs) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Autorun stays a quick run: it is an unattended batch job driven over adb, and
|
||||
// an automation that silently held the device for five minutes would be a
|
||||
// surprise. `--es mode long` asks for the other one explicitly.
|
||||
val autorunMode =
|
||||
if (intent?.getStringExtra("mode") == "long") RunMode.LONG else RunMode.SHORT
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(autorun) {
|
||||
if (autorun) vm.run(devUpload = true)
|
||||
if (autorun) vm.run(autorunMode, devUpload = true)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// In autorun the app is a batch job: once the run is done AND the upload
|
||||
// succeeded, show the result briefly, then close so the device is left as it
|
||||
@@ -74,19 +194,46 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
|
||||
finish()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Without this, the system Back gesture leaves the activity from Settings or
|
||||
// History instead of returning to the run screen — the screen is a plain state
|
||||
// variable, so nothing connects it to the back stack. Registered only when
|
||||
// there is somewhere to go back to, so Back still exits from the run screen.
|
||||
androidx.activity.compose.BackHandler(enabled = screen != Screen.RUN) {
|
||||
screen = Screen.RUN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
when (screen) {
|
||||
Screen.SETTINGS -> SettingsScreen(
|
||||
settings = vm.settings,
|
||||
archivedRuns = vm.state.history.size,
|
||||
archivedRuns = vm.archivedRunCount(),
|
||||
archivedBytes = vm.archivedBytes(),
|
||||
onApplyRetention = vm::applyRetention,
|
||||
onDeleteAll = vm::deleteAllRuns,
|
||||
onPreviewUpload = {
|
||||
// Preview the newest run, since that is the one the user just made
|
||||
// and the one they are deciding about.
|
||||
vm.state.history.firstOrNull()?.let { r ->
|
||||
lifecycleScope.launch { preview = vm.uploadPreview(r.id) }
|
||||
// Straight from the archive: the newest run is the one the user just
|
||||
// made and the one they are deciding about. Always shows something,
|
||||
// even when there is nothing to preview yet.
|
||||
lifecycleScope.launch { preview = vm.previewNewestRun() }
|
||||
},
|
||||
onCheckServer = vm::checkServer,
|
||||
accountName = vm.accountName,
|
||||
onSignIn = {
|
||||
vm.beginSignIn { url ->
|
||||
// A plain VIEW intent rather than a Custom Tab: the browser is
|
||||
// where the user's existing IdP session already lives, and
|
||||
// androidx.browser would be a dependency for a rounded corner.
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
startActivity(Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, android.net.Uri.parse(url)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
onSignOut = vm::signOut,
|
||||
onEnroll = vm::enroll,
|
||||
serverStatus = vm.state.archiveStatus,
|
||||
enrollStatus = vm.state.enrollStatus,
|
||||
onRelayChange = { on ->
|
||||
if (on) AdbRelayService.start(this@MainActivity)
|
||||
else AdbRelayService.stop(this@MainActivity)
|
||||
},
|
||||
onBack = { screen = Screen.RUN },
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +258,8 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
|
||||
)
|
||||
Screen.RUN -> EcholotScreen(
|
||||
state = vm.state,
|
||||
onRun = { vm.run() },
|
||||
longMinutes = vm.settings.longRunMinutes,
|
||||
onRun = { mode -> vm.run(mode) },
|
||||
onCancel = vm::cancel,
|
||||
onDeveloperOptions = {
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
@@ -148,11 +296,29 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun requestRuntimePermissions() {
|
||||
val perms = mutableListOf(Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION)
|
||||
// Only so the relay's ongoing notification is visible. The service runs either way, but a
|
||||
// foreground service the user cannot see is worse than one they can dismiss knowingly.
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
|
||||
perms.add(Manifest.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val missing = perms.filter {
|
||||
ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(this, it) != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (missing.isNotEmpty()) permissionLauncher.launch(missing.toTypedArray())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Restarts the relay if it was left on.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A relay that silently fails to come back after a reboot or a process kill is worse than one
|
||||
* that was never enabled: it is trusted right up to the moment it goes quiet, and the symptom
|
||||
* is a stale endpoint that sends a developer to a port nothing is listening on.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun resumeRelayIfEnabled() {
|
||||
if (Settings(this).adbRelayEnabled) {
|
||||
runCatching { AdbRelayService.start(this) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun verdictColor(v: Verdict): Color = when (v) {
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +338,8 @@ private fun statusColor(s: TestStatus): Color = when (s) {
|
||||
@Composable
|
||||
private fun EcholotScreen(
|
||||
state: UiState,
|
||||
onRun: () -> Unit,
|
||||
longMinutes: Int,
|
||||
onRun: (RunMode) -> Unit,
|
||||
onCancel: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onShizukuAction: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onDeveloperOptions: () -> Unit,
|
||||
@@ -236,8 +403,36 @@ private fun EcholotScreen(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The choice is made before the run, not after, because it is a choice about how long the
|
||||
// user is willing to stand still — and because the two modes answer different questions.
|
||||
var mode by remember { mutableStateOf(RunMode.SHORT) }
|
||||
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp), verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
|
||||
FilterChip(
|
||||
selected = mode == RunMode.SHORT,
|
||||
onClick = { mode = RunMode.SHORT },
|
||||
enabled = !state.running,
|
||||
label = { Text("Quick") },
|
||||
)
|
||||
FilterChip(
|
||||
selected = mode == RunMode.LONG,
|
||||
onClick = { mode = RunMode.LONG },
|
||||
enabled = !state.running,
|
||||
label = { Text("Long ($longMinutes min)") },
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
if (mode == RunMode.SHORT) {
|
||||
"About 30 seconds. Describes how the network is configured right now."
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"Listens for $longMinutes minutes while it measures. Finds what a quick run " +
|
||||
"structurally cannot: links that drop and come back, signal that decays, " +
|
||||
"loss that arrives in bursts."
|
||||
},
|
||||
fontSize = 12.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp), verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
|
||||
Button(onClick = onRun, enabled = !state.running) {
|
||||
Button(onClick = { onRun(mode) }, enabled = !state.running) {
|
||||
Text(if (state.running) "Running…" else "Run measurement")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (state.running) {
|
||||
@@ -258,25 +453,55 @@ private fun EcholotScreen(
|
||||
|
||||
if (state.running) {
|
||||
Column(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp)) {
|
||||
val frac = if (state.stepsTotal > 0)
|
||||
state.stepsDone.toFloat() / state.stepsTotal else 0f
|
||||
// In a long run the window is the run: once the battery is done, four minutes of
|
||||
// listening remain, and a bar driven by the step count would sit at 100 % through
|
||||
// all of it — which reads as an app that has hung, not one that is working.
|
||||
val listening = state.windowTotalS > 0
|
||||
val frac = when {
|
||||
listening -> state.windowElapsedS.toFloat() / state.windowTotalS
|
||||
state.stepsTotal > 0 -> state.stepsDone.toFloat() / state.stepsTotal
|
||||
else -> 0f
|
||||
}
|
||||
LinearProgressIndicator(
|
||||
progress = { frac },
|
||||
progress = { frac.coerceIn(0f, 1f) },
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (listening) {
|
||||
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"listening ${clock(state.windowElapsedS)} of ${clock(state.windowTotalS)}",
|
||||
fontSize = 12.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
|
||||
)
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"${clock(state.windowTotalS - state.windowElapsedS)} left",
|
||||
fontSize = 12.sp, modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
|
||||
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
// Still shown during a long run's listening phase, where it stops at the last
|
||||
// test: the battery's progress is real information, it is simply not the whole
|
||||
// run any more.
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
if (state.stepsTotal > 0)
|
||||
"test ${state.stepsDone + 1} of ${state.stepsTotal}" else "starting",
|
||||
"test ${(state.stepsDone + 1).coerceAtMost(state.stepsTotal)} of ${state.stepsTotal}"
|
||||
else "starting",
|
||||
fontSize = 12.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
|
||||
)
|
||||
Text(state.currentStep ?: "…", fontSize = 12.sp,
|
||||
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace, modifier = Modifier.weight(1f))
|
||||
if (state.etaSeconds > 0) {
|
||||
if (!listening && state.etaSeconds > 0) {
|
||||
Text("~${state.etaSeconds}s left", fontSize = 12.sp,
|
||||
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (listening) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Cancelling keeps what has been collected so far.",
|
||||
fontSize = 11.sp, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -286,11 +511,57 @@ private fun EcholotScreen(
|
||||
|
||||
@Composable
|
||||
private fun Results(doc: MeasurementDocument) {
|
||||
// A constrained run is answered before the lights are: the verdict below is INCONCLUSIVE by
|
||||
// §7.3, and without this banner "inconclusive" reads as the app failing rather than the OS
|
||||
// (correctly) refusing to let anything past the VPN be measured.
|
||||
val constraints = doc.run.constraints
|
||||
if (constraints.constrained) {
|
||||
val blocked = constraints.unmeasuredNetworks
|
||||
.mapNotNull { id -> doc.networks.firstOrNull { it.id == id } }
|
||||
.joinToString(", ") { it.iface?.takeIf { s -> s.isNotBlank() } ?: it.transport.name.lowercase() }
|
||||
.ifBlank { "the networks beneath it" }
|
||||
// Same three-way split as the finding: saying "VPN" when the user just disconnected
|
||||
// theirs (the wall lingers during teardown) reads as the app being wrong, not the OS.
|
||||
val (headline, body) = when {
|
||||
constraints.vpnActive && constraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
|
||||
"Measured through a VPN" to
|
||||
("Android does not let apps send on the networks beneath an active VPN, so " +
|
||||
"$blocked could not be measured — these results describe the tunnel. " +
|
||||
"Disconnect the VPN and run again to measure the networks themselves.")
|
||||
constraints.perNetworkBlocked ->
|
||||
"Some networks could not be measured" to
|
||||
("Android refused this app permission to send on $blocked, so they went " +
|
||||
"unmeasured. A connected VPN is the usual cause; the refusal can also " +
|
||||
"outlast one. Everything else in this run is unaffected.")
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
"A VPN holds the default route" to
|
||||
("Default-route results describe the tunnel; per-network measurements " +
|
||||
"reached the underlying networks.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
Card(colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = Color(0xFF3A2E12))) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(12.dp)) {
|
||||
Text(headline, color = Color(0xFFFFD08A), fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold)
|
||||
Text(body, fontSize = 12.sp, color = Color(0xFFFFD08A))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val summary = doc.summary
|
||||
if (summary != null) {
|
||||
Card(colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = verdictColor(summary.overall))) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(16.dp)) {
|
||||
Text("Overall: ${summary.overall}", color = Color.White, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold, fontSize = 18.sp)
|
||||
// Which question this document answers. A green light from a quick run does not
|
||||
// mean the same thing as a green light from a long one, and the report should not
|
||||
// let the two look identical.
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
if (doc.run.mode == RunMode.LONG) {
|
||||
"long run — the network was watched continuously as well as probed"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"quick run — a snapshot; nothing here rules out an intermittent fault"
|
||||
},
|
||||
color = Color.White, fontSize = 12.sp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
FlowCategories(summary.categories)
|
||||
@@ -396,6 +667,12 @@ private fun FlowCategories(categories: Map<String, CategorySummary>) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** m:ss — minutes are how a five-minute wait is read; "247s left" is a number to convert. */
|
||||
private fun clock(seconds: Int): String {
|
||||
val s = seconds.coerceAtLeast(0)
|
||||
return "${s / 60}:${"%02d".format(s % 60)}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Composable
|
||||
private fun Dot(color: Color) {
|
||||
Surface(color = color, shape = RoundedCornerShape(50), modifier = Modifier.size(12.dp)) {}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ import app.echo_lot.measurement.MeasurementDocument
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Anonymizer
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.privacy.Salt
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.UploadRefused
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.VersionRefused
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
|
||||
@@ -66,10 +68,121 @@ class RunStore(context: Context, private val settings: Settings) {
|
||||
data class Sent(val serverName: String, val detail: String) : UploadOutcome
|
||||
/** The operator's policy says no. Not retryable, and not the user's fault. */
|
||||
data class Refused(val reason: String) : UploadOutcome
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The two builds do not go together. Kept apart from [Refused] and [Failed] because the
|
||||
* remedy is different and specific — install a particular version — and a message that
|
||||
* says so is worth more than one that says "upload failed".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
data class Incompatible(val reason: String) : UploadOutcome
|
||||
data class Failed(val detail: String) : UploadOutcome
|
||||
data object NotConfigured : UploadOutcome
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun client() = ControlClient(
|
||||
settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin), BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER,
|
||||
fallbackAddrs = settings.serverAddrList(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remembers where the server lives, so a later run can reach it without DNS. */
|
||||
private fun rememberAddrs(p: app.echo_lot.protocol.Profile) {
|
||||
val addrs = p.targets.flatMap { listOfNotNull(it.ip4, it.ip6) }
|
||||
.filter { it.isNotBlank() }
|
||||
if (addrs.isNotEmpty()) settings.serverAddrs = addrs.joinToString(",")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Checks the configured server without uploading anything: reachable, pinned, compatible, and
|
||||
* willing to accept runs. Lets the user find out in settings rather than from a failed run.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun checkServer(): String {
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) return "Fill in the server URL, pin and credential first."
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val profile = client().profile(settings.serverCredential)
|
||||
// Learned here so the next run's canary probe knows what to ask for.
|
||||
profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
|
||||
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(profile)
|
||||
rememberAddrs(profile)
|
||||
val compat = Compat.check(profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
|
||||
val head = "${profile.name} · server ${profile.serverVersion} · " +
|
||||
"protocol ${profile.compat.protocolVersion.ifBlank { "unstated" }}"
|
||||
when {
|
||||
compat.message != null -> head + "\n" + compat.message
|
||||
else -> {
|
||||
val uploads = profile.uploads.refusalReason()
|
||||
?: "uploads accepted (min anonymization: ${profile.uploads.minAnonymization})"
|
||||
head + "\nCompatible. " + uploads
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
|
||||
"This server will not serve this app: ${e.message}"
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
"Could not reach the server: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Redeems an enrollment link and stores the resulting server configuration (§2.1).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Everything is written at once or not at all: a half-applied server — say a URL and pin with
|
||||
* no credential — fails later, somewhere else, with an error that points at the wrong thing.
|
||||
* Blocking; callers run it off the main thread.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Renders what the server says about itself, for display.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Only what a person measuring against it would want to check: which addresses the tests will
|
||||
* actually use, on which ports, and what the server admits it can do. Addresses first, because
|
||||
* "which address did this result come from" is the question a report leaves open.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun describeFacts(p: app.echo_lot.protocol.Profile): String {
|
||||
val lines = ArrayList<String>()
|
||||
// "label|value" per line, laid out as real columns by the UI rather than padded with
|
||||
// spaces here. Space padding only lines up in a monospaced font, which makes the layout
|
||||
// depend on a typeface choice made somewhere else entirely.
|
||||
fun row(label: String, value: String) = lines.add("$label|$value")
|
||||
|
||||
row("server", "${p.name} · ${p.serverVersion}")
|
||||
for (t in p.targets) {
|
||||
t.ip4?.let { row("IPv4", it) }
|
||||
t.ip6?.let { row("IPv6", it) }
|
||||
// Marked rather than listed apart: it is the same server, and what matters is being
|
||||
// able to tell which address a NAT-behaviour result came from.
|
||||
t.ip4Alt?.let { row("IPv4 alt", it) }
|
||||
t.ip6Alt?.let { row("IPv6 alt", it) }
|
||||
row("ports", "udp ${t.udpPort} · tcp ${t.tcpPort} · stun ${t.stunPort}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (p.canaryZone.isNotBlank()) row("dns zone", p.canaryZone)
|
||||
if (p.capabilities.isNotEmpty()) row("measures", p.capabilities.joinToString(", "))
|
||||
return lines.joinToString(System.lineSeparator())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun enroll(link: String, deviceName: String?): String {
|
||||
val parsed = app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink.parse(link)
|
||||
?: return "That does not look like an Echolot enrollment link. It should start with " +
|
||||
"echolot://enroll and carry a URL, a pin and a token."
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val enrolled = parsed.redeem(deviceName, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
|
||||
val compat = Compat.check(enrolled.profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
|
||||
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(enrolled.profile)
|
||||
rememberAddrs(enrolled.profile)
|
||||
enrolled.profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
|
||||
settings.serverUrl = enrolled.controlUrl
|
||||
settings.serverPublicUrl = enrolled.publicUrl
|
||||
settings.serverPin = enrolled.pin
|
||||
settings.serverCredential = enrolled.credential
|
||||
val head = "Enrolled with ${enrolled.profile.name} " +
|
||||
"(server ${enrolled.profile.serverVersion})."
|
||||
if (compat.message != null) head + " " + compat.message else head
|
||||
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
|
||||
"That server will not serve this app: ${e.message}"
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
// The commonest causes are a spent token and a wrong pin, and they look nothing alike
|
||||
// in the message — so pass it through rather than flattening it to "enrollment failed".
|
||||
"Enrollment failed: ${t.message ?: t.javaClass.simpleName}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Uploads one archived run to the configured server, redacting first.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -81,8 +194,17 @@ class RunStore(context: Context, private val settings: Settings) {
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) return UploadOutcome.NotConfigured
|
||||
val docJson = read(runId) ?: return UploadOutcome.Failed("run $runId is not in the archive")
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val client = ControlClient(settings.serverUrl, setOf(settings.serverPin))
|
||||
val client = client()
|
||||
val profile = client.profile(settings.serverCredential)
|
||||
profile.canaryZone.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { settings.canaryZone = it }
|
||||
settings.serverFacts = describeFacts(profile)
|
||||
rememberAddrs(profile)
|
||||
|
||||
// Compatibility before policy: an incompatible server may well advertise an upload
|
||||
// policy it would never actually apply to us.
|
||||
val compat = Compat.check(profile, BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER)
|
||||
if (!compat.usable) return UploadOutcome.Incompatible(compat.message ?: "incompatible versions")
|
||||
|
||||
profile.uploads.refusalReason()?.let { return UploadOutcome.Refused(it) }
|
||||
|
||||
val level = PrivacyLevel.max(
|
||||
@@ -91,8 +213,12 @@ class RunStore(context: Context, private val settings: Settings) {
|
||||
)
|
||||
val body = redactedForUpload(docJson, level)
|
||||
val reply = client.uploadRun(settings.serverCredential, body)
|
||||
archive.markUploaded(runId, profile.name)
|
||||
UploadOutcome.Sent(profile.name, "as $level, ${body.toByteArray().size} bytes: ${reply.take(120)}")
|
||||
archive.markUploaded(runId, profile.name, level.wire)
|
||||
// Deliberately not echoing `reply`: it is the server's index entry as raw JSON, and
|
||||
// it ended up rendered verbatim in the UI. Size and level are what a person wants.
|
||||
UploadOutcome.Sent(profile.name, "as $level, ${body.toByteArray().size} bytes")
|
||||
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
|
||||
UploadOutcome.Incompatible(e.message ?: "the server refused this app's version")
|
||||
} catch (e: UploadRefused) {
|
||||
UploadOutcome.Refused(e.message ?: "refused by the server")
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -50,6 +50,65 @@ class Settings(context: Context) {
|
||||
maxTotalBytes = maxTotalMb.toLong() * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- measurement -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How long a long run listens, in minutes. Offered as 1 / 5 / 15.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 5 is the default because it is the shortest window in which the things long mode exists to
|
||||
* catch — a link that flaps, a signal that decays as someone walks around, loss that comes in
|
||||
* bursts — have a fair chance of happening at least twice. One minute is for checking that the
|
||||
* mode works at all; fifteen is for chasing something already suspected.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Clamped rather than trusted: a zero-minute long run would produce a document claiming a
|
||||
* window it never watched, which is the one thing `run.mode` exists to prevent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var longRunMinutes: Int
|
||||
get() = prefs.getInt(LONG_RUN_MINUTES, 5).coerceIn(1, 60)
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putInt(LONG_RUN_MINUTES, v.coerceIn(1, 60)).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- dev relay -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether this device relays adbd's wireless-debug endpoint to the enrolled server.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Off by default and never implied by anything else: it publishes where this device can be
|
||||
* reached for debugging, which is a decision rather than a side effect. Intended for a spare
|
||||
* device parked on a test network — see AdbRelay for why the OnePlus is a poor host for it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var adbRelayEnabled: Boolean
|
||||
get() = prefs.getBoolean(ADB_RELAY, false)
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putBoolean(ADB_RELAY, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- run-duration learning ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Learned duration of one test type on THIS device, or null before the first run.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The static Probe.estimatedMs values are only cold-start seeds: real durations depend on
|
||||
* the phone and the network it stands in (ICMPv6 answers in milliseconds where IPv6 works
|
||||
* and waits out full timeouts where it does not), so a fixed table is wrong for almost
|
||||
* everyone almost always. What was measured last time is the only estimate that tracks
|
||||
* reality.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun learnedDurationMs(type: String): Long? =
|
||||
prefs.getLong("$DURATION_PREFIX$type", -1L).takeIf { it > 0 }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Feeds one measured duration into the estimate — EMA, 70 % old / 30 % new. Heavy enough
|
||||
* on history that a single odd run (a captive portal stalling DNS) does not whipsaw the
|
||||
* bar, light enough that a real change (enrolling with a server un-skips three probes)
|
||||
* converges within a few runs. Recorded whatever the test's status: a probe that skips in
|
||||
* 2 ms will keep skipping in 2 ms until circumstances change, and then the EMA follows.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun recordDurationMs(type: String, ms: Long) {
|
||||
if (ms < 0) return
|
||||
val key = "$DURATION_PREFIX$type"
|
||||
val old = prefs.getLong(key, -1L)
|
||||
val next = if (old <= 0) ms else (old * 7 + ms * 3) / 10
|
||||
prefs.edit().putLong(key, next).apply()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- upload ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -97,6 +156,41 @@ class Settings(context: Context) {
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_PIN, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_PIN, v.trim()).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The address the operator handed out, for showing to a person.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Separate from [serverUrl], which is the endpoint actually dialled. They differ when the
|
||||
* server publishes one public name and points devices at another to select its pinned
|
||||
* certificate — a detail worth keeping out of the user's face but not out of the settings.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var serverPublicUrl: String
|
||||
get() = (prefs.getString(SERVER_PUBLIC_URL, "") ?: "").ifBlank { serverUrl }
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_PUBLIC_URL, v.trim()).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* What the server said about itself, last time it was asked: addresses, ports, capabilities.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Cached as a rendered block rather than as fields, because it is shown and never acted on —
|
||||
* these are facts to read, not settings to apply, and storing them as settings would invite
|
||||
* exactly the confusion of an editable box that changes nothing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var serverFacts: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_FACTS, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_FACTS, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The server's own addresses, learned from its profile, for reaching it when DNS will not.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Only the primaries: the alternate pair exists for NAT behaviour discovery and does not carry
|
||||
* the control plane, so falling back to one would fail for a second, unrelated reason.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var serverAddrs: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_ADDRS, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_ADDRS, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
fun serverAddrList(): List<String> =
|
||||
serverAddrs.split(',').map { it.trim() }.filter { it.isNotEmpty() }
|
||||
|
||||
var serverCredential: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(SERVER_CRED, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(SERVER_CRED, v.trim()).apply()
|
||||
@@ -104,6 +198,58 @@ class Settings(context: Context) {
|
||||
val serverConfigured: Boolean
|
||||
get() = serverUrl.isNotBlank() && serverPin.isNotBlank() && serverCredential.isNotBlank()
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The DNS zone this server is authoritative for, learned from its profile.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Cached because the canary probe runs at device tier, before anything has talked to the
|
||||
* server, and a probe that had to make a control-plane call first would fail on exactly the
|
||||
* networks worth measuring. Empty means "not known yet", and the probe reports itself as
|
||||
* skipped rather than inventing a zone.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var canaryZone: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(CANARY_ZONE, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(CANARY_ZONE, v.trim()).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Host part of the configured server URL, for probes that address it directly (STUN).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Derived rather than stored: a second copy of the server's name is a second thing to keep in
|
||||
* step, and it would go stale the moment someone re-enrolled against a different server.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun serverHost(): String = runCatching {
|
||||
java.net.URI(serverUrl).host?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
|
||||
}.getOrNull() ?: ""
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- account ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The PKCE verifier and state for a sign-in that is out at the browser.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Persisted rather than held in memory because handing control to a browser backgrounds this
|
||||
* process, and Android may kill it before the callback returns. An in-memory value works on a
|
||||
* developer's device and fails on a phone under memory pressure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
var pendingVerifier: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(PENDING_VERIFIER, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(PENDING_VERIFIER, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
var pendingState: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(PENDING_STATE, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(PENDING_STATE, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
fun clearPendingAuth() = prefs.edit().remove(PENDING_VERIFIER).remove(PENDING_STATE).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
/** Display name of whoever is signed in on this device; empty when nobody is. */
|
||||
var accountName: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(ACCOUNT_NAME, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(ACCOUNT_NAME, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
var accountId: String
|
||||
get() = prefs.getString(ACCOUNT_ID, "") ?: ""
|
||||
set(v) = prefs.edit().putString(ACCOUNT_ID, v).apply()
|
||||
|
||||
val signedIn: Boolean get() = accountName.isNotBlank()
|
||||
|
||||
private fun hex(s: String) = ByteArray(s.length / 2) {
|
||||
((Character.digit(s[it * 2], 16) shl 4) or Character.digit(s[it * 2 + 1], 16)).toByte()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -120,5 +266,16 @@ class Settings(context: Context) {
|
||||
const val SERVER_URL = "server_url"
|
||||
const val SERVER_PIN = "server_pin"
|
||||
const val SERVER_CRED = "server_credential"
|
||||
const val SERVER_PUBLIC_URL = "server_public_url"
|
||||
const val SERVER_FACTS = "server_facts"
|
||||
const val SERVER_ADDRS = "server_addrs"
|
||||
const val CANARY_ZONE = "server_canary_zone"
|
||||
const val PENDING_VERIFIER = "pending_auth_verifier"
|
||||
const val PENDING_STATE = "pending_auth_state"
|
||||
const val ACCOUNT_NAME = "account_name"
|
||||
const val ACCOUNT_ID = "account_id"
|
||||
const val DURATION_PREFIX = "duration_ms."
|
||||
const val ADB_RELAY = "adb_relay_enabled"
|
||||
const val LONG_RUN_MINUTES = "long_run_minutes"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,19 +4,24 @@
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.app
|
||||
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.safeDrawingPadding
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.width
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.rememberScrollState
|
||||
import androidx.compose.foundation.verticalScroll
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.Button
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.Card
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.FilterChip
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.LocalContentColor
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.OutlinedTextField
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.Surface
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.Switch
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
|
||||
import androidx.compose.material3.TextButton
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +34,7 @@ import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
|
||||
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
|
||||
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily
|
||||
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
|
||||
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.sp
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.privacy.PrivacyLevel
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +52,15 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
onApplyRetention: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onDeleteAll: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onPreviewUpload: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onCheckServer: () -> Unit,
|
||||
accountName: String,
|
||||
onSignIn: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onSignOut: () -> Unit,
|
||||
onEnroll: (String) -> Unit,
|
||||
serverStatus: String?,
|
||||
enrollStatus: String?,
|
||||
/** Starts or stops the adb relay service; the toggle only records the preference. */
|
||||
onRelayChange: (Boolean) -> Unit,
|
||||
onBack: () -> Unit,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// SharedPreferences is not observable, so mirror each value into Compose state and write
|
||||
@@ -54,15 +69,31 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
var maxRuns by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxRuns.toString()) }
|
||||
var maxAgeDays by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxAgeDays.toString()) }
|
||||
var maxTotalMb by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.maxTotalMb.toString()) }
|
||||
var longMinutes by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.longRunMinutes) }
|
||||
var autoUpload by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.autoUpload) }
|
||||
var privacy by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.privacyLevel) }
|
||||
var stableSalt by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.stableSalt) }
|
||||
var serverUrl by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverUrl) }
|
||||
var relayOn by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.adbRelayEnabled) }
|
||||
var enrollLink by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
|
||||
// The public name, which is what the operator handed out and what a person recognises. The
|
||||
// endpoint actually dialled is shown beneath it when the two differ, rather than hidden — a
|
||||
// network engineer debugging a connection wants to see where it really goes.
|
||||
var serverUrl by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverPublicUrl) }
|
||||
var serverPin by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverPin) }
|
||||
var serverCred by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverCredential) }
|
||||
// Enrolling is asynchronous, so these are re-read when its result lands rather than when the
|
||||
// button is pressed — reading them immediately showed the previous server's values and looked
|
||||
// exactly like an enrollment that had silently done nothing.
|
||||
var serverFacts by remember { mutableStateOf(settings.serverFacts) }
|
||||
androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect(enrollStatus, serverStatus) {
|
||||
serverFacts = settings.serverFacts
|
||||
serverUrl = settings.serverPublicUrl
|
||||
serverPin = settings.serverPin
|
||||
serverCred = settings.serverCredential
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Column(
|
||||
Modifier.fillMaxWidth().verticalScroll(rememberScrollState()).padding(16.dp),
|
||||
Modifier.fillMaxWidth().safeDrawingPadding().verticalScroll(rememberScrollState()).padding(16.dp),
|
||||
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +101,39 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
Text("Settings", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleLarge)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- measurement ----
|
||||
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
Text("Long runs", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"How long a long run keeps listening. The measurements themselves take about " +
|
||||
"30 seconds either way; the rest of the window is spent watching for " +
|
||||
"things that only happen sometimes.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
for (minutes in listOf(1, 5, 15)) {
|
||||
FilterChip(
|
||||
selected = longMinutes == minutes,
|
||||
onClick = { longMinutes = minutes; settings.longRunMinutes = minutes },
|
||||
label = { Text("$minutes min") },
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
when (longMinutes) {
|
||||
1 -> "Barely longer than a quick run — enough to confirm the listeners " +
|
||||
"work, rarely enough to catch anything intermittent."
|
||||
15 -> "For a fault you already suspect and have to prove. Keep the screen " +
|
||||
"on and the device where the problem happens."
|
||||
else -> "Long enough for a link that drops every couple of minutes to do " +
|
||||
"it at least once, short enough to wait out."
|
||||
},
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- archive ----
|
||||
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
@@ -125,18 +189,59 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text(privacyExplanation(privacy), style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
|
||||
|
||||
// At FULL nothing is pseudonymized, so a salt has nothing to act on. Shown
|
||||
// disabled rather than hidden: the setting is still stored and still applies the
|
||||
// moment the level changes, and a control that vanishes hides that fact.
|
||||
Toggle(
|
||||
label = "Stable pseudonyms across runs",
|
||||
detail = "Lets you compare uploaded runs over time (same SSID reads the same " +
|
||||
"each time). It also links your uploads together, so leave it off on a " +
|
||||
"server you don't run yourself.",
|
||||
checked = stableSalt,
|
||||
detail = if (privacy == PrivacyLevel.FULL) {
|
||||
"Not used at this level — nothing is pseudonymized, so there is nothing " +
|
||||
"to keep stable. Choose balanced or strict to use this."
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"Lets you compare uploaded runs over time (same SSID reads the same " +
|
||||
"each time). It also links your uploads together, so leave it off on " +
|
||||
"a server you don't run yourself."
|
||||
},
|
||||
checked = stableSalt && privacy != PrivacyLevel.FULL,
|
||||
enabled = privacy != PrivacyLevel.FULL,
|
||||
) { stableSalt = it; settings.stableSalt = it }
|
||||
|
||||
TextButton(onClick = onPreviewUpload) { Text("Preview what an upload would send") }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- account ----
|
||||
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
Text("Account", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
|
||||
if (accountName.isNotBlank()) {
|
||||
Text("Signed in as $accountName", style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium)
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Runs from every device signed in to this account share one history.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
TextButton(onClick = onSignOut) { Text("Sign out") }
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Signing in is optional. It links this device to an account on your " +
|
||||
"server, so several devices share one history — and some servers only " +
|
||||
"accept uploads from a signed-in device.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
Button(onClick = onSignIn, enabled = settings.serverConfigured) {
|
||||
Text("Sign in")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Enrol with a server first — the account belongs to the server, not " +
|
||||
"to the app.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- upload ----
|
||||
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.padding(14.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
@@ -149,10 +254,57 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
checked = autoUpload,
|
||||
) { autoUpload = it; settings.autoUpload = it }
|
||||
|
||||
// Enrollment first, because it is the path that works: one link carries the
|
||||
// URL, the pin and a single-use token. The three fields below exist for when
|
||||
// someone has to reconstruct a configuration by hand, not as the normal route.
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Paste an enrollment link from your server operator, or scan its QR code. " +
|
||||
"It fills in all three fields below. The link contains a one-time token — " +
|
||||
"treat it like a password until it is used.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
OutlinedTextField(
|
||||
value = serverUrl, onValueChange = { serverUrl = it; settings.serverUrl = it },
|
||||
value = enrollLink, onValueChange = { enrollLink = it },
|
||||
label = { Text("echolot://enroll?…") }, singleLine = true,
|
||||
textStyle = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace),
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
Button(
|
||||
onClick = {
|
||||
onEnroll(enrollLink)
|
||||
enrollLink = "" // spent either way; leaving it around invites a retry
|
||||
},
|
||||
enabled = enrollLink.isNotBlank(),
|
||||
) { Text("Enroll") }
|
||||
// Beside the button that caused it. Enrolling is asynchronous, so without this the
|
||||
// only sign of success is three fields quietly changing further down the card.
|
||||
enrollStatus?.let {
|
||||
Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OutlinedTextField(
|
||||
value = serverUrl,
|
||||
onValueChange = {
|
||||
serverUrl = it
|
||||
// Typed by hand there is no discovery to consult, so what was entered is
|
||||
// both the public name and the endpoint. Setting only one of them would
|
||||
// leave the app dialling the previous server.
|
||||
settings.serverUrl = it
|
||||
settings.serverPublicUrl = it
|
||||
},
|
||||
label = { Text("Server URL") }, singleLine = true, modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Directly under the field it explains. Anywhere else it reads as a stray sentence
|
||||
// about some other part of the screen.
|
||||
if (settings.serverUrl.isNotBlank() && settings.serverUrl != settings.serverPublicUrl) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Connects to ${settings.serverUrl} — this server publishes one name and " +
|
||||
"points devices at another, so its pinned certificate can share a port " +
|
||||
"with its web interface.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
OutlinedTextField(
|
||||
value = serverPin, onValueChange = { serverPin = it; settings.serverPin = it },
|
||||
label = { Text("Certificate pin (SPKI, base64)") }, singleLine = true,
|
||||
@@ -166,12 +318,105 @@ fun SettingsScreen(
|
||||
textStyle = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace),
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically) {
|
||||
Button(onClick = onCheckServer) { Text("Check server") }
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
if (settings.serverConfigured) "Server configured."
|
||||
" " + if (settings.serverConfigured) "Configured."
|
||||
else "Uploads stay off until all three fields are set.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Version compatibility is checked here rather than discovered mid-run: a server
|
||||
// that will refuse this build should say so before a measurement is wasted.
|
||||
serverStatus?.let {
|
||||
Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// What the server reported, placed under the button that asks it rather than among
|
||||
// the fields above: these are facts to read, not settings to apply, and an
|
||||
// editable-looking box that changes nothing is worse than no box at all.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Monospaced so the addresses line up under each other — column alignment is most
|
||||
// of what makes a list of IPs quicker to read than prose.
|
||||
if (serverFacts.isNotBlank()) {
|
||||
Surface(
|
||||
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.surfaceVariant,
|
||||
shape = RoundedCornerShape(8.dp),
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Column(
|
||||
Modifier.padding(horizontal = 12.dp, vertical = 10.dp),
|
||||
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(2.dp),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"WHAT THIS SERVER REPORTS",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
|
||||
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Real columns rather than padded text: the label column has a fixed
|
||||
// width, so values line up whatever the font does, and a long value
|
||||
// wraps inside its own column instead of under the labels.
|
||||
for (line in serverFacts.lines()) {
|
||||
val label = line.substringBefore('|')
|
||||
val value = line.substringAfter('|', "")
|
||||
Row(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
label,
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.width(72.dp),
|
||||
)
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
value,
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall.copy(
|
||||
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
|
||||
),
|
||||
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"This app is ${BuildConfig.APP_SEMVER} and speaks probe protocol " +
|
||||
"${app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat.PROTOCOL_VERSION}. It works with servers " +
|
||||
"${app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat.serverRange}.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- dev relay ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Last, and deliberately plain: this is scaffolding for driving a test device, not a
|
||||
// measurement. It publishes where this device can be reached over adb, which is why it
|
||||
// is off until someone decides otherwise.
|
||||
Card(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.padding(16.dp), verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp)) {
|
||||
Text("Developer relay", style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium)
|
||||
Toggle(
|
||||
label = "Relay this device's adb endpoint",
|
||||
detail = "Watches adbd's own mDNS announcement and reports host:port to the " +
|
||||
"enrolled server, so a developer on another network can reach this " +
|
||||
"device — mDNS does not cross subnets, and the port rotates every few " +
|
||||
"minutes. Runs in the foreground with a notification while on.",
|
||||
checked = relayOn,
|
||||
enabled = settings.serverConfigured,
|
||||
onChange = { on ->
|
||||
relayOn = on
|
||||
settings.adbRelayEnabled = on
|
||||
onRelayChange(on)
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (!settings.serverConfigured) {
|
||||
Text(
|
||||
"Needs an enrolled server: the report is authenticated with this " +
|
||||
"device's credential.",
|
||||
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
|
||||
color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = 0.7f),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Spacer(Modifier.height(24.dp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -192,13 +437,22 @@ private fun privacyExplanation(level: PrivacyLevel): String = when (level) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Composable
|
||||
private fun Toggle(label: String, detail: String, checked: Boolean, onChange: (Boolean) -> Unit) {
|
||||
private fun Toggle(
|
||||
label: String,
|
||||
detail: String,
|
||||
checked: Boolean,
|
||||
enabled: Boolean = true,
|
||||
onChange: (Boolean) -> Unit,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Row(Modifier.fillMaxWidth(), verticalAlignment = Alignment.Top) {
|
||||
Column(Modifier.weight(1f)) {
|
||||
Text(label, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium)
|
||||
Text(detail, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall)
|
||||
// Dimmed together with the switch, so "this does nothing right now" reads at a glance
|
||||
// instead of only on close inspection.
|
||||
val alpha = if (enabled) 1f else 0.5f
|
||||
Text(label, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium, color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = alpha))
|
||||
Text(detail, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall, color = LocalContentColor.current.copy(alpha = alpha))
|
||||
}
|
||||
Switch(checked = checked, onCheckedChange = onChange)
|
||||
Switch(checked = checked, onCheckedChange = onChange, enabled = enabled)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,10 +31,23 @@ data class ArchivedRun(
|
||||
val verdict: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("finding_count") val findingCount: Int = 0,
|
||||
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Long = 0,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How the *archived* document is redacted. Always "full" in practice, because the archive
|
||||
* deliberately keeps the unredacted run - see the package doc. This is not what was uploaded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val anonymization: String = "full",
|
||||
/** Whether this run has been accepted by a server, so history can show what is backed up. */
|
||||
val uploaded: Boolean = false,
|
||||
@SerialName("uploaded_to") val uploadedTo: String? = null,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The level the run was *uploaded* at, which is a different document from the archived one.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Kept separately because conflating the two is actively misleading: the history row showed
|
||||
* the archive's own level ("full") directly beneath "uploaded to fmr", which reads as "the
|
||||
* complete data was uploaded" when a redacted copy had been sent. A privacy display that
|
||||
* overstates what left the device is worse than none.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SerialName("uploaded_as") val uploadedAs: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +132,7 @@ class RunArchive(private val dir: File, private val now: () -> Long = System::cu
|
||||
fun deleteAll(): Int = list().count { delete(it.id) }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Records that a server accepted this run, so history can distinguish backed-up from local. */
|
||||
fun markUploaded(id: String, serverName: String) {
|
||||
fun markUploaded(id: String, serverName: String, uploadedAs: String? = null) {
|
||||
val f = File(dir, safe(id) + META_EXT)
|
||||
val meta = runCatching { json.decodeFromString(ArchivedRun.serializer(), f.readText()) }.getOrNull()
|
||||
?: return
|
||||
@@ -127,7 +140,7 @@ class RunArchive(private val dir: File, private val now: () -> Long = System::cu
|
||||
f,
|
||||
json.encodeToString(
|
||||
ArchivedRun.serializer(),
|
||||
meta.copy(uploaded = true, uploadedTo = serverName),
|
||||
meta.copy(uploaded = true, uploadedTo = serverName, uploadedAs = uploadedAs),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -181,7 +194,10 @@ class RunArchive(private val dir: File, private val now: () -> Long = System::cu
|
||||
id = id,
|
||||
savedAtEpochMs = now(),
|
||||
startedAt = run["started_at"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content,
|
||||
verdict = doc["summary"]?.jsonObject?.get("verdict")?.jsonPrimitive?.content,
|
||||
// The schema calls it `overall` (Summary.overall); reading `verdict` here silently
|
||||
// yielded null for every run, so the history list's most prominent element - the
|
||||
// coloured verdict - was blank on every row.
|
||||
verdict = doc["summary"]?.jsonObject?.get("overall")?.jsonPrimitive?.content,
|
||||
findingCount = (doc["findings"] as? kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonArray)?.size ?: 0,
|
||||
sizeBytes = size,
|
||||
anonymization = run["privacy"]?.jsonObject?.get("anonymization")?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "full",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ class RunArchiveTest {
|
||||
private fun doc(id: String, findings: Int = 1, pad: Int = 0): String {
|
||||
val f = (1..findings).joinToString(",") { """{"id":"f$it"}""" }
|
||||
return """{"run":{"id":"$id","started_at":"2026-08-01T10:00:00Z","privacy":{"anonymization":"balanced"}},""" +
|
||||
""""findings":[$f],"summary":{"verdict":"warn"},"pad":"${"x".repeat(pad)}"}"""
|
||||
""""findings":[$f],"summary":{"overall":"warn"},"pad":"${"x".repeat(pad)}"}"""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
@@ -120,13 +120,40 @@ class RunArchiveTest {
|
||||
fun uploadStateIsRecorded() {
|
||||
val a = archive()
|
||||
a.save(doc("run-1"))
|
||||
a.markUploaded("run-1", "fmr")
|
||||
a.markUploaded("run-1", "fmr", "balanced")
|
||||
val meta = a.list().single()
|
||||
assertTrue(meta.uploaded)
|
||||
assertEquals("fmr", meta.uploadedTo)
|
||||
assertEquals("run-1", meta.id, "marking upload must not disturb the rest of the entry")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The archive's own level and the level a run was uploaded at describe *different documents*.
|
||||
// Showing the archive's ("full", because the archive is deliberately unredacted) next to
|
||||
// "uploaded to fmr" reads as "the complete data was uploaded" when a redacted copy was sent —
|
||||
// a privacy display that overstates what left the device is worse than none.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun theUploadedLevelIsRecordedSeparatelyFromTheArchivedOne() {
|
||||
val a = archive()
|
||||
// A real archived document carries no privacy stamp: the anonymizer never runs on the
|
||||
// archive. The shared doc() fixture has one, which is exactly the unrealism that let this
|
||||
// confusion through in the first place.
|
||||
a.save("""{"run":{"id":"run-1"},"findings":[],"summary":{"overall":"green"}}""")
|
||||
a.markUploaded("run-1", "fmr", "balanced")
|
||||
val meta = a.list().single()
|
||||
assertEquals("full", meta.anonymization, "the archived copy is unredacted, by design")
|
||||
assertEquals("balanced", meta.uploadedAs, "the uploaded copy was redacted, and must say so")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The verdict is read from `summary.overall` — the schema's actual field name. Reading
|
||||
// `summary.verdict` silently yielded null for every run, so the history list's most prominent
|
||||
// element was blank on every row while everything else looked fine.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun theVerdictComesFromTheSchemasOverallField() {
|
||||
val a = archive()
|
||||
a.save("""{"run":{"id":"r1"},"findings":[],"summary":{"overall":"yellow"}}""")
|
||||
assertEquals("yellow", a.list().single().verdict)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun deleteRemovesBothFiles() {
|
||||
val a = archive()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ java { sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17; targetCompatibility = JavaV
|
||||
|
||||
tasks.test {
|
||||
useJUnitPlatform()
|
||||
listOf("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL","ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN","ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED","ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP","ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET")
|
||||
listOf("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL","ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN","ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED","ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP","ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET","ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI")
|
||||
.forEach { k -> System.getenv(k)?.let { environment(k, it) } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Splits a round-trip train into its two directions using what the server witnessed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A round trip can only report that *something* was lost somewhere. That is the least useful form
|
||||
* of the answer: "3 % loss" sends an engineer looking in both directions at once. The server
|
||||
* records every packet it received, per sequence number (probe-protocol.md §6), so the two cases
|
||||
* are actually distinguishable:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - sent, never seen by the server → **upstream** loss
|
||||
* - seen by the server, reply never arrived → **downstream** loss
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The same records give one-way delay *variation* per direction. Absolute one-way delay would
|
||||
* need synchronised clocks and we deliberately have none (measurement-schema.md's two-clock rule),
|
||||
* but the variation does not: (server_rx − client_tx) contains an unknown constant clock offset,
|
||||
* and differencing successive samples cancels it. So jitter is honestly attributable to a
|
||||
* direction even though latency is not.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object Directional {
|
||||
|
||||
/** One probe as the client saw it. [tRxNs] null means no reply came back. */
|
||||
data class Sample(val seq: Int, val tTxNs: Long, val tRxNs: Long?)
|
||||
|
||||
/** One probe as the server saw it: its own receive and transmit stamps, on its own clock. */
|
||||
data class ServerSighting(val seq: Int, val tRxNs: Long, val tTxNs: Long)
|
||||
|
||||
fun analyse(sent: List<Sample>, seen: List<ServerSighting>): DirectionalMetrics {
|
||||
val byServerSeq = seen.associateBy { it.seq }
|
||||
// Only sequences we actually sent count. A server record for a sequence we have no note
|
||||
// of is not evidence about this train — it is a bug or a stray, and silently folding it
|
||||
// in would produce loss percentages above 100 or below zero.
|
||||
val relevant = sent.filter { byServerSeq.containsKey(it.seq) }
|
||||
|
||||
val nSent = sent.size
|
||||
val nSeen = relevant.size
|
||||
val nReplied = sent.count { it.tRxNs != null }
|
||||
|
||||
// A reply can only exist if the request arrived, so downstream loss is measured against
|
||||
// what the server saw, not against what we sent — otherwise upstream loss is counted twice.
|
||||
val lostUp = nSent - nSeen
|
||||
val lostDown = (nSeen - nReplied).coerceAtLeast(0)
|
||||
|
||||
val upDeltas = relevant.sortedBy { it.seq }
|
||||
.map { byServerSeq.getValue(it.seq).tRxNs - it.tTxNs }
|
||||
val downDeltas = sent.filter { it.tRxNs != null && byServerSeq.containsKey(it.seq) }
|
||||
.sortedBy { it.seq }
|
||||
.map { it.tRxNs!! - byServerSeq.getValue(it.seq).tTxNs }
|
||||
|
||||
return DirectionalMetrics(
|
||||
sent = nSent,
|
||||
seenByServer = nSeen,
|
||||
repliesReceived = nReplied,
|
||||
lostUpstream = lostUp,
|
||||
lostDownstream = lostDown,
|
||||
lossUpstreamPct = pct(lostUp, nSent),
|
||||
// Denominator is what reached the server: of the packets that got there, how many
|
||||
// replies came back.
|
||||
lossDownstreamPct = pct(lostDown, nSeen),
|
||||
jitterUpstreamMs = jitterMs(upDeltas),
|
||||
jitterDownstreamMs = jitterMs(downDeltas),
|
||||
/** True when the server saw nothing at all, which is a different fault from loss. */
|
||||
noneReachedServer = nSent > 0 && nSeen == 0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Mean absolute difference between consecutive one-way samples (RFC 3393 IPDV, averaged).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Differencing is what makes this legitimate without synchronised clocks: each sample carries
|
||||
* the same unknown offset between the two clocks, and the difference cancels it. Fewer than
|
||||
* two samples yields null rather than zero — "no jitter" and "not enough data to say" are
|
||||
* different claims and only one of them is true here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun jitterMs(oneWayNs: List<Long>): Double? {
|
||||
if (oneWayNs.size < 2) return null
|
||||
val deltas = oneWayNs.zipWithNext { a, b -> kotlin.math.abs(b - a) }
|
||||
return round2(deltas.average() / 1_000_000.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun pct(part: Int, whole: Int): Double =
|
||||
if (whole <= 0) 0.0 else round2(part * 100.0 / whole)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun round2(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 100.0) / 100.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Directional metrics for train.udp_updown; recomputable from the columnar evidence. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class DirectionalMetrics(
|
||||
val sent: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("seen_by_server") val seenByServer: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("replies_received") val repliesReceived: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("lost_upstream") val lostUpstream: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("lost_downstream") val lostDownstream: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_upstream_pct") val lossUpstreamPct: Double,
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_downstream_pct") val lossDownstreamPct: Double,
|
||||
/** One-way delay variation (RFC 3393), per direction. Null when there were too few samples. */
|
||||
@SerialName("jitter_upstream_ms") val jitterUpstreamMs: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("jitter_downstream_ms") val jitterDownstreamMs: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("none_reached_server") val noneReachedServer: Boolean = false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Wire
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The measurements only the far end can make: what the *downstream* path does to traffic the
|
||||
* client never asked for packet-by-packet.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A client alone can measure a round trip, and it can find the largest packet it can *send*. It
|
||||
* cannot find the largest packet it can *receive*, or whether the network drops downstream
|
||||
* packets independently of upstream ones — those need a server willing to push, which is why the
|
||||
* protocol gates them behind an asymmetric grant (probe-protocol.md §3.4).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Three separate facts come out, and keeping them separate is the point:
|
||||
* - `mtu.pmtud_down` — the largest datagram that arrives *unfragmented*. This is the number
|
||||
* that matters for anything setting DF, and it is only meaningful because the server sets DF.
|
||||
* - `mtu.frag_delivery` — whether larger datagrams arrive once the network is allowed to
|
||||
* fragment them. A path can be fine for one and broken for the other; conflating them is how
|
||||
* you get "MTU is 4000" on a link that drops every DF packet over 1400.
|
||||
* - `train.udp_downstream` — loss, reordering and arrival spacing in the download direction.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class DownstreamMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
|
||||
|
||||
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
|
||||
|
||||
/** How long to wait for a granted burst after the server accepts the action. */
|
||||
private val collectWindowMs = 4_000L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Shorter, but long enough to cover the first_last mode's deliberate 250 ms hold plus a
|
||||
* reassembly. A fragment burst is one datagram: it is here quickly or not at all.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private val fragWindowMs = 1_500L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Asks the server to send one deliberately-fragmented datagram per ordering, and reports
|
||||
* which orderings survive the path.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Kernel fragmentation always emits fragments in order, first one first, so an oversized
|
||||
* datagram can only answer "do fragments get through at all". The interesting fault is about
|
||||
* ordering: only the *first* fragment carries the UDP ports, so a stateful firewall that has
|
||||
* not seen it has nothing to match the rest against, and many drop them. That failure is
|
||||
* invisible to every in-order test and shows up in the field as "large DNS answers fail here"
|
||||
* or "the tunnel breaks when the MTU drops".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun fragmentOrdering(
|
||||
credential: String,
|
||||
sessionId: String,
|
||||
control: ControlClient,
|
||||
probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String,
|
||||
sizeBytes: Int = 2000,
|
||||
fragBytes: Int = 576,
|
||||
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
val delivered = LinkedHashMap<String, Boolean>()
|
||||
val fragmentCounts = LinkedHashMap<String, Int>()
|
||||
var unsupported = false
|
||||
|
||||
for (mode in FRAG_MODES) {
|
||||
val reply = runCatching {
|
||||
control.action(
|
||||
credential, sessionId,
|
||||
"""{"action":"frag_send","size_bytes":$sizeBytes,"mode":"$mode","frag_bytes":$fragBytes}""",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (reply.isFailure) {
|
||||
// A server without a raw socket says so; that is a missing capability, not a
|
||||
// property of the network, and must not be recorded as a failed delivery.
|
||||
unsupported = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "fragments")?.let { fragmentCounts[mode] = it }
|
||||
// The burst is already on the wire when the action returns (it is sent
|
||||
// synchronously), so anything that survived is either here or lost.
|
||||
val got = probe.collectGranted(fragWindowMs).any { it.type == Wire.TYPE_FRAG_DATA }
|
||||
delivered[mode] = got
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (unsupported) {
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
error = TestError("no_raw_socket", "this server cannot craft fragments"),
|
||||
) to emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
FragOrderingMetrics(
|
||||
sizeBytes = sizeBytes,
|
||||
fragBytes = fragBytes,
|
||||
fragmentsPerBurst = fragmentCounts,
|
||||
deliveredByMode = delivered,
|
||||
inOrderDelivered = delivered[FRAG_IN_ORDER] == true,
|
||||
reorderedDelivered = delivered[FRAG_REVERSED] == true,
|
||||
delayedFirstDelivered = delivered[FRAG_FIRST_LAST] == true,
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
val inOrder = delivered[FRAG_IN_ORDER] == true
|
||||
val reversed = delivered[FRAG_REVERSED] == true
|
||||
val firstLast = delivered[FRAG_FIRST_LAST] == true
|
||||
|
||||
if (!inOrder) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED, testId,
|
||||
"IP fragments do not reach this device",
|
||||
"A fragmented datagram sent in the normal order never arrived. Anything that " +
|
||||
"relies on fragmentation — large DNS answers over UDP, some VPN traffic — " +
|
||||
"will fail here rather than slow down.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else if (!reversed || !firstLast) {
|
||||
// The precise and useful finding: fragments work, but only if they arrive tidily.
|
||||
val which = buildList {
|
||||
if (!reversed) add("out of order")
|
||||
if (!firstLast) add("with the first fragment delayed")
|
||||
}.joinToString(" or ")
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE, testId,
|
||||
"Fragments are dropped when they arrive $which",
|
||||
"In-order fragments are delivered, but the same datagram sent $which is not. " +
|
||||
"Something on the path only reassembles when the first fragment (the one " +
|
||||
"carrying the UDP ports) arrives first — typical of a stateful firewall " +
|
||||
"or NAT. It works until the network reorders, then fails intermittently, " +
|
||||
"which is the hardest kind of fault to chase.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = if (inOrder) TestStatus.OK else TestStatus.PARTIAL,
|
||||
metrics = metrics,
|
||||
) to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Runs all three against an already-primed session.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* [session] must already have sent at least one ECHO: the grant is bound to the source the
|
||||
* server has actually observed, so an unprimed session gets a 409 rather than a grant. That
|
||||
* is the anti-amplification rule doing its job, not an error to work around.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun run(
|
||||
credential: String,
|
||||
sessionId: String,
|
||||
control: ControlClient,
|
||||
probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String,
|
||||
sizes: List<Int> = DEFAULT_SIZES,
|
||||
trainCount: Int = 100,
|
||||
trainSizeBytes: Int = 300,
|
||||
trainIntervalUs: Int = 3_000,
|
||||
// DSCP to mark the train with (0-63), or -1 to leave packets unmarked. Pairing a marked
|
||||
// downtrain with the server-observed DSCP of an upstream train is the two-direction
|
||||
// sec.dscp_ecn_survival measurement.
|
||||
trainDscp: Int = -1,
|
||||
): Pair<List<Test>, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val tests = ArrayList<Test>()
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
|
||||
val df = bigSend(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, sizes, df = true)
|
||||
val frag = bigSend(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, sizes, df = false)
|
||||
val train = downTrain(
|
||||
credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef, trainCount, trainSizeBytes,
|
||||
trainIntervalUs, trainDscp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tests.add(df.test); tests.add(frag.test); tests.add(train.test)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fragment ordering only makes sense once we know fragments arrive at all; when they do
|
||||
// not, the ordering variants would all report "not delivered" and read as three faults
|
||||
// instead of one.
|
||||
if (frag.largestDelivered != null) {
|
||||
val (fragTest, fragFindings) =
|
||||
fragmentOrdering(credential, sessionId, control, probe, sessionRef)
|
||||
tests.add(fragTest)
|
||||
findings.addAll(fragFindings)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A downstream MTU below the classic 1500-byte Ethernet payload is worth saying out loud:
|
||||
// it is the usual cause of "small requests work, large responses hang".
|
||||
val pathMtu = df.largestDelivered
|
||||
if (pathMtu != null && pathMtu > 0) {
|
||||
val ipMtu = pathMtu + IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4
|
||||
if (ipMtu < 1500) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM, df.test.id,
|
||||
"Downstream path MTU is $ipMtu bytes, below 1500",
|
||||
"The largest datagram that reached this device without fragmenting was " +
|
||||
"$pathMtu bytes of payload ($ipMtu on the wire). Tunnels (PPPoE, VPN, " +
|
||||
"IPv6-in-IPv4) commonly do this; it is only a fault when something " +
|
||||
"on the path also blocks the ICMP messages that let senders discover it.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The dangerous combination: unfragmented large packets vanish AND fragments do too,
|
||||
// so a sender that never gets told will retransmit into a black hole.
|
||||
val fragLargest = frag.largestDelivered ?: 0
|
||||
if (fragLargest <= pathMtu && sizes.any { it > pathMtu }) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE, frag.test.id,
|
||||
"Datagrams above $pathMtu bytes are dropped downstream, fragmented or not",
|
||||
"Nothing larger than $pathMtu bytes arrived, even when the network was " +
|
||||
"free to fragment it. Traffic that relies on large responses will " +
|
||||
"stall rather than fail cleanly.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (train.received == 0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED, train.test.id,
|
||||
"No server-initiated packets arrived",
|
||||
"The server sent ${train.sent} packets toward this device and none arrived, " +
|
||||
"while the round-trip echo worked. Something on the path forwards replies " +
|
||||
"but drops traffic the device did not individually solicit.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else if (train.lossPct >= 5.0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.LOSS_DOWNSTREAM, train.test.id,
|
||||
"Downstream loss of ${round1(train.lossPct)}%",
|
||||
"${train.sent - train.received} of ${train.sent} packets sent toward this " +
|
||||
"device were lost. Downstream loss is invisible to a round-trip test, " +
|
||||
"which reports only that *something* was lost somewhere.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (train.reordered > 0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.DOWNSTREAM_REORDER, train.test.id,
|
||||
"${train.reordered} downstream packet(s) arrived out of order",
|
||||
"Packets arrived in a different order than they were sent. Usually per-packet " +
|
||||
"load balancing across links; harmless for most traffic, not for all of it.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return tests to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- big_send ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
private class SizeResult(val test: Test, val largestDelivered: Int?)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun bigSend(
|
||||
credential: String, sessionId: String, control: ControlClient, probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String, sizes: List<Int>, df: Boolean,
|
||||
): SizeResult {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
val requested = sizes.joinToString(",")
|
||||
|
||||
val reply = runCatching {
|
||||
control.action(
|
||||
credential, sessionId,
|
||||
"""{"action":"big_send","df":$df,"sizes_bytes":[$requested]}""",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (reply.isFailure) {
|
||||
return SizeResult(
|
||||
Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = if (df) TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN else TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY,
|
||||
sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "big_send refused"),
|
||||
),
|
||||
null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The server tells us which sizes it actually put on the wire. With DF it refuses
|
||||
// anything above its own egress MTU, and treating those as "lost downstream" would
|
||||
// blame the client's network for our own limit.
|
||||
val accepted = parseIntArray(reply.getOrNull(), "sizes_bytes").ifEmpty { sizes }
|
||||
val serverMaxDf = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "max_df_bytes")
|
||||
|
||||
val arrived = probe.collectGranted(collectWindowMs)
|
||||
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_BIG_SEND }
|
||||
.map { it.sizeBytes }
|
||||
.distinct()
|
||||
.sorted()
|
||||
val largest = arrived.maxOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
BigSendMetrics(
|
||||
requestedBytes = sizes,
|
||||
sentBytes = accepted,
|
||||
deliveredBytes = arrived,
|
||||
largestDeliveredBytes = largest,
|
||||
dontFragment = df,
|
||||
serverMaxDfBytes = serverMaxDf,
|
||||
// Only meaningful for the DF run; the IP-level MTU is the payload plus headers.
|
||||
pathMtuBytes = if (df && largest != null) largest + IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4 else null,
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val status = when {
|
||||
arrived.isEmpty() -> TestStatus.FAILED
|
||||
arrived.size < accepted.size -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
|
||||
else -> TestStatus.OK
|
||||
}
|
||||
return SizeResult(
|
||||
Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = if (df) TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN else TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY,
|
||||
sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = status, metrics = metrics,
|
||||
),
|
||||
largest,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- downtrain --------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
private class TrainResult(
|
||||
val test: Test, val sent: Int, val received: Int, val lossPct: Double, val reordered: Int,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun downTrain(
|
||||
credential: String, sessionId: String, control: ControlClient, probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String, count: Int, sizeBytes: Int, intervalUs: Int, dscp: Int = -1,
|
||||
): TrainResult {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
|
||||
// dscp is only sent when requested: an older server rejects unknown-value problems
|
||||
// louder than absent keys, and unmarked is the correct default for a plain loss train.
|
||||
val dscpField = if (dscp in 0..63) ""","dscp":$dscp""" else ""
|
||||
val reply = runCatching {
|
||||
control.action(
|
||||
credential, sessionId,
|
||||
"""{"action":"downtrain","count":$count,"size_bytes":$sizeBytes,""" +
|
||||
""""interval_us":$intervalUs$dscpField}""",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (reply.isFailure) {
|
||||
return TrainResult(
|
||||
Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM, sessionRef = sessionRef,
|
||||
tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "downtrain refused"),
|
||||
),
|
||||
0, 0, 0.0, 0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val sent = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "count") ?: count
|
||||
|
||||
val got = probe.collectGranted(collectWindowMs).filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_DOWNTRAIN_DATA }
|
||||
val received = got.size
|
||||
val lossPct = if (sent == 0) 0.0 else (sent - received) * 100.0 / sent
|
||||
|
||||
// Reordering: a packet whose sequence is below the highest already seen. Counting
|
||||
// inversions rather than "not sorted" keeps one late packet from being reported as
|
||||
// dozens of reorder events.
|
||||
var highest = -1
|
||||
var reordered = 0
|
||||
for (p in got) {
|
||||
if (p.seq < highest) reordered++ else highest = p.seq
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Columnar evidence per the schema: what arrived, when, and how big — so every metric
|
||||
// above is recomputable by a reader who does not trust our arithmetic.
|
||||
val evidence = TrainEvidence(
|
||||
epochMonoNs = started,
|
||||
seq = got.map { it.seq },
|
||||
tTxNs = got.map { null },
|
||||
tRxNs = got.map { it.tRxNs },
|
||||
sizeBytes = got.map { it.sizeBytes },
|
||||
).toEvidence()
|
||||
|
||||
val interArrival = got.zipWithNext { a, b -> (b.tRxNs - a.tRxNs) / 1_000_000.0 }
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
DownTrainMetrics(
|
||||
sent = sent, received = received, lossPct = round1(lossPct),
|
||||
reorderedPackets = reordered,
|
||||
sizeBytes = sizeBytes,
|
||||
interArrivalMsAvg = interArrival.average().takeIf { interArrival.isNotEmpty() }?.let(::round1),
|
||||
interArrivalMsMax = interArrival.maxOrNull()?.let(::round1),
|
||||
sendIntervalUs = intervalUs,
|
||||
dscpRequested = dscp.takeIf { it in 0..63 },
|
||||
// The server says whether it could actually mark (dscp_applied); recorded so a
|
||||
// survival comparison never blames the path for a marking the sender skipped.
|
||||
dscpApplied = reply.getOrNull()?.let {
|
||||
Regex("\"dscp_applied\"\\s*:\\s*(true|false)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toBoolean()
|
||||
},
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val status = when {
|
||||
received == 0 -> TestStatus.FAILED
|
||||
received < sent -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
|
||||
else -> TestStatus.OK
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TrainResult(
|
||||
Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = status, evidence = evidence, metrics = metrics,
|
||||
),
|
||||
sent, received, lossPct, reordered,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
|
||||
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
|
||||
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Minimal scalar extraction from the action reply; the shape is small and server-owned. */
|
||||
private fun parseInt(body: String?, key: String): Int? =
|
||||
body?.let { Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*(-?\\d+)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toIntOrNull() }
|
||||
|
||||
private fun parseIntArray(body: String?, key: String): List<Int> =
|
||||
body?.let { b ->
|
||||
Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*\\[([^\\]]*)\\]").find(b)?.groupValues?.get(1)
|
||||
?.split(",")?.mapNotNull { it.trim().toIntOrNull() }
|
||||
} ?: emptyList()
|
||||
|
||||
private companion object {
|
||||
/** IPv4 (20) + UDP (8). The v6 case is 48; reported per-family once v6 sessions land. */
|
||||
const val IP_UDP_OVERHEAD4 = 28
|
||||
|
||||
const val FRAG_IN_ORDER = "in_order"
|
||||
const val FRAG_REVERSED = "reversed"
|
||||
const val FRAG_FIRST_LAST = "first_last"
|
||||
val FRAG_MODES = listOf(FRAG_IN_ORDER, FRAG_REVERSED, FRAG_FIRST_LAST)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Straddles the usual suspects: 1500 Ethernet, 1492 PPPoE, 1400-ish tunnels. */
|
||||
val DEFAULT_SIZES = listOf(600, 1200, 1372, 1400, 1450, 1472, 1500, 2000, 4000)
|
||||
|
||||
fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for mtu.pmtud_down / mtu.frag_delivery. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class BigSendMetrics(
|
||||
@SerialName("requested_bytes") val requestedBytes: List<Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("sent_bytes") val sentBytes: List<Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("delivered_bytes") val deliveredBytes: List<Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("largest_delivered_bytes") val largestDeliveredBytes: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("dont_fragment") val dontFragment: Boolean,
|
||||
/** The server's own DF ceiling; sizes above it were never sent and are not path evidence. */
|
||||
@SerialName("server_max_df_bytes") val serverMaxDfBytes: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("path_mtu_bytes") val pathMtuBytes: Int? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for mtu.frag_ordering. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class FragOrderingMetrics(
|
||||
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("frag_bytes") val fragBytes: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("fragments_per_burst") val fragmentsPerBurst: Map<String, Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("delivered_by_mode") val deliveredByMode: Map<String, Boolean>,
|
||||
@SerialName("in_order_delivered") val inOrderDelivered: Boolean,
|
||||
@SerialName("reordered_delivered") val reorderedDelivered: Boolean,
|
||||
@SerialName("delayed_first_delivered") val delayedFirstDelivered: Boolean,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for train.udp_downstream. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class DownTrainMetrics(
|
||||
val sent: Int,
|
||||
val received: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double,
|
||||
@SerialName("reordered_packets") val reorderedPackets: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("inter_arrival_ms_avg") val interArrivalMsAvg: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("inter_arrival_ms_max") val interArrivalMsMax: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("send_interval_us") val sendIntervalUs: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("dscp_requested") val dscpRequested: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("dscp_applied") val dscpApplied: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -10,8 +10,13 @@ import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonArray
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.intOrNull
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.longOrNull
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Runs the server-facing measurements against one target and assembles a [MeasurementDocument]:
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +41,20 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
val udpPort: Int,
|
||||
val echoCount: Int = 20,
|
||||
val echoPaddingBytes: Int = 64,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether to ask the server to push traffic back (downstream MTU and downstream train).
|
||||
* Costs a few hundred kB of download and needs a server that advertises the grants, so
|
||||
* it is a flag rather than an assumption.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val downstream: Boolean = true,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Throughput moves real data — a 5-second run at 50 Mbps is about 30 MB — so it is off
|
||||
* unless asked for. On a metered mobile connection that is the user's money, and a
|
||||
* measurement tool that spends it without being told to is not one people keep installed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val throughput: Boolean = false,
|
||||
@Suppress("unused") val throughputSeconds: Int = 5,
|
||||
@Suppress("unused") val throughputKbps: Int = 50_000,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
fun run(cfg: Config): MeasurementDocument {
|
||||
@@ -57,11 +76,49 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
target = SessionTarget(ip4 = cfg.udpHost, udpPort = cfg.udpPort),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val (test, findings) = echoTrain(cfg, control, session, startMono)
|
||||
val tests = ArrayList<Test>()
|
||||
val allFindings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
|
||||
// One ProbeSession for the whole run. A second one would open a new socket and restart
|
||||
// the sequence counter, which the server's anti-replay window correctly rejects — so the
|
||||
// re-primed source is never recorded and every granted send goes to the old, closed port.
|
||||
// Session identity lives on the server; the socket must live as long as it does.
|
||||
ProbeSession(cfg.credential, session, cfg.udpHost, cfg.udpPort).use { ps ->
|
||||
val (test, findings) = echoTrain(cfg, ps, startMono, control, session.sessionId)
|
||||
tests.add(test)
|
||||
allFindings.addAll(findings)
|
||||
|
||||
// The upstream train needs no grant and no capability beyond udp-probe itself; a
|
||||
// server that predates trains simply never answers the report request, which the
|
||||
// measurement reports as exactly that ambiguity rather than as network loss.
|
||||
val (utTest, utFindings) = UpstreamTrainMeasurement(ids)
|
||||
.run(ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
|
||||
tests.add(utTest)
|
||||
allFindings.addAll(utFindings)
|
||||
|
||||
// Downstream needs a session the server has already seen traffic from — the echo
|
||||
// train just provided that — and a server that advertises the grants. Skipped
|
||||
// quietly against an older server rather than reported as a failure of the network.
|
||||
if (cfg.downstream && profile.supports("downtrain") && profile.supports("big-send")) {
|
||||
val (dsTests, dsFindings) = DownstreamMeasurement(ids)
|
||||
.run(cfg.credential, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
|
||||
tests.addAll(dsTests)
|
||||
allFindings.addAll(dsFindings)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (cfg.throughput && profile.supports("throughput")) {
|
||||
val (tpTest, tpFindings) = ThroughputMeasurement(ids).run(
|
||||
cfg.credential, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
|
||||
durationS = cfg.throughputSeconds, kbps = cfg.throughputKbps,
|
||||
)
|
||||
tests.add(tpTest)
|
||||
allFindings.addAll(tpFindings)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
control.deleteSession(cfg.credential, session.sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
val summary = Verdicts.derive(listOf(test), findings)
|
||||
val summary = Verdicts.derive(tests, allFindings)
|
||||
return MeasurementDocument(
|
||||
run = Run(
|
||||
id = runId, trigger = Trigger.MANUAL, startedAt = startWall, endedAt = ids.nowWall(),
|
||||
@@ -70,14 +127,15 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
tiers = Tiers(app = true),
|
||||
),
|
||||
serverSessions = listOf(serverSession),
|
||||
tests = listOf(test),
|
||||
findings = findings,
|
||||
tests = tests,
|
||||
findings = allFindings,
|
||||
summary = summary,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun echoTrain(
|
||||
cfg: Config, control: ControlClient, session: app.echo_lot.protocol.SessionResponse, startMono: Long,
|
||||
cfg: Config, ps: ProbeSession, startMono: Long,
|
||||
control: ControlClient? = null, sessionId: String? = null,
|
||||
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val seqs = ArrayList<Int>()
|
||||
@@ -87,10 +145,15 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
val rtts = ArrayList<Double>()
|
||||
val observedPorts = LinkedHashSet<Int>()
|
||||
|
||||
ProbeSession(cfg.credential, session, cfg.udpHost, cfg.udpPort).use { ps ->
|
||||
// Wire sequence numbers, kept so the server's observations can be correlated packet by
|
||||
// packet. They are not 0..n-1: the counter is shared with every other packet type on the
|
||||
// session, so "the nth echo" is not "sequence n".
|
||||
val wireSeqs = ArrayList<Int>()
|
||||
|
||||
for (i in 0 until cfg.echoCount) {
|
||||
val txMono = ids.monoNs() - startMono
|
||||
val r = ps.echo(cfg.echoPaddingBytes)
|
||||
wireSeqs.add(ps.lastSeq)
|
||||
seqs.add(i)
|
||||
tTx.add(txMono)
|
||||
sizes.add(Wire_HEADER + cfg.echoPaddingBytes)
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +165,19 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
tRx.add(null)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ask the server what it actually received. This is what turns "3 % loss somewhere" into
|
||||
// "3 % loss upstream" - the least useful form of the answer into a usable one.
|
||||
val directional: DirectionalMetrics? =
|
||||
if (control != null && sessionId != null) {
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
val samples = wireSeqs.indices.map {
|
||||
Directional.Sample(wireSeqs[it], tTx[it] ?: 0L, tRx[it])
|
||||
}
|
||||
Directional.analyse(samples, serverSightings(control, cfg, sessionId))
|
||||
}.getOrNull() // an older server without the endpoint simply yields no split
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val sent = cfg.echoCount
|
||||
@@ -113,6 +189,9 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
epochMonoNs = startMono, seq = seqs, tTxNs = tTx, tRxNs = tRx, sizeBytes = sizes,
|
||||
).toEvidence()
|
||||
|
||||
val directionalJson = directional?.let {
|
||||
json.encodeToJsonElement(DirectionalMetrics.serializer(), it) as JsonObject
|
||||
}
|
||||
val metrics: JsonObject = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
EchoMetrics(
|
||||
sent = sent, received = received, lossPct = round1(lossPct),
|
||||
@@ -122,7 +201,7 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
observedPorts = observedPorts.toList(),
|
||||
natRebindingDetected = natRebinding,
|
||||
)
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
).let { base -> JsonObject((base as JsonObject) + (directionalJson ?: JsonObject(emptyMap()))) }
|
||||
|
||||
val status = when {
|
||||
received == 0 -> TestStatus.FAILED
|
||||
@@ -137,30 +216,91 @@ class ServerMeasurement(
|
||||
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
if (received == 0) {
|
||||
findings.add(finding("nat.udp_unreachable", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH, testId,
|
||||
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE, testId,
|
||||
"No UDP echo replies from the server",
|
||||
"Every ECHO probe to the server's UDP data plane was lost — the path blocks or drops the session's UDP traffic."))
|
||||
} else if (lossPct >= 20.0) {
|
||||
findings.add(finding("connectivity.udp_loss", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM, testId,
|
||||
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_LOSS, testId,
|
||||
"High UDP loss to the server (${round1(lossPct)}%)",
|
||||
"A large fraction of ECHO probes were lost, indicating an unreliable UDP path."))
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Naming the direction is the entire value of the split, so the findings do.
|
||||
directional?.let { d ->
|
||||
when {
|
||||
d.noneReachedServer && received == 0 -> findings.add(
|
||||
finding(FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM, testId,
|
||||
"Nothing reached the server",
|
||||
"The server received none of the ${d.sent} probes, so the traffic is being " +
|
||||
"dropped on the way out, not on the way back. A firewall or NAT on " +
|
||||
"this side of the path is the place to look."),
|
||||
)
|
||||
d.lossUpstreamPct >= 2.0 -> findings.add(
|
||||
finding(FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM, testId,
|
||||
"${d.lossUpstreamPct} % of probes were lost on the way to the server",
|
||||
"${d.lostUpstream} of ${d.sent} probes never reached the server. The " +
|
||||
"return path is not implicated: replies came back for everything that " +
|
||||
"arrived."),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (d.lossDownstreamPct >= 2.0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(FindingRegistry.LOSS_DOWNSTREAM, testId,
|
||||
"${d.lossDownstreamPct} % of replies were lost on the way back",
|
||||
"The server received ${d.seenByServer} probes and answered them, but " +
|
||||
"${d.lostDownstream} of those replies never arrived. The outbound path " +
|
||||
"is fine; the fault is on the return leg."),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (natRebinding) {
|
||||
findings.add(finding("nat.udp_rebinding", Category.NAT, Severity.MEDIUM, testId,
|
||||
findings.add(finding(FindingRegistry.NAT_UDP_REBINDING, testId,
|
||||
"NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow",
|
||||
"The server observed more than one source port for this session (${observedPorts.joinToString()}), i.e. a NAT with a short UDP mapping or per-packet remapping."))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return test to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun finding(code: String, cat: Category, sev: Severity, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The server's per-packet record of this session's echoes (spec section 6). Filtered to
|
||||
* ECHO_REQ, because the observation list also holds MTU probes and anything else we sent -
|
||||
* counting those as train packets would invent loss that is not there.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun serverSightings(
|
||||
control: ControlClient, cfg: Config, sessionId: String,
|
||||
): List<Directional.ServerSighting> {
|
||||
val body = control.observations(cfg.credential, sessionId)
|
||||
val packets = Json.parseToJsonElement(body).jsonObject["udp"]
|
||||
?.jsonObject?.get("packets") as? JsonArray ?: return emptyList()
|
||||
return packets.mapNotNull { el ->
|
||||
val o = el as? JsonObject ?: return@mapNotNull null
|
||||
val type = o["type"]?.jsonPrimitive?.intOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null
|
||||
if (type != ECHO_REQ_TYPE) return@mapNotNull null
|
||||
Directional.ServerSighting(
|
||||
seq = o["seq"]?.jsonPrimitive?.intOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
|
||||
tRxNs = o["t_rx_ns"]?.jsonPrimitive?.longOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
|
||||
tTxNs = o["t_tx_ns"]?.jsonPrimitive?.longOrNull ?: return@mapNotNull null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
|
||||
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
|
||||
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(), code = code, category = cat, severity = sev, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private companion object {
|
||||
const val Wire_HEADER = 32
|
||||
const val ECHO_REQ_TYPE = 0x01
|
||||
fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Wire
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonArray
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.jsonPrimitive
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Downstream throughput: the server sends at a paced rate for a bounded time and the client
|
||||
* measures what arrives (`perf.throughput_udp`).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The number this produces is only meaningful with a qualifier attached, and getting that
|
||||
* qualifier right is most of the work here. A throughput test reports the *smallest* limit on the
|
||||
* path, and the sender's own ceiling is one of the candidates: if the server was asked for 50 Mbps
|
||||
* and 50 Mbps arrived, the network was never the constraint and "50 Mbps" says nothing about it.
|
||||
* Reporting that as a capacity measurement would be a confident lie, so the result always carries
|
||||
* [ThroughputMetrics.limitedBy] and a finding is only raised when the network is actually
|
||||
* implicated.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Comparing against the *sender's* count rather than the requested rate is the other half: the
|
||||
* server reports how much it actually put on the wire, and the gap between that and what arrived
|
||||
* is the loss. A receiver alone cannot tell "the network dropped it" from "the sender never sent
|
||||
* it", and guessing turns a healthy server-side limit into a phantom network fault.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class ThroughputMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
|
||||
|
||||
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
|
||||
|
||||
fun run(
|
||||
credential: String,
|
||||
sessionId: String,
|
||||
control: ControlClient,
|
||||
probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String,
|
||||
durationS: Int = 5,
|
||||
kbps: Int = 50_000,
|
||||
sizeBytes: Int = 1200,
|
||||
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
|
||||
val reply = runCatching {
|
||||
control.action(
|
||||
credential, sessionId,
|
||||
"""{"action":"throughput","direction":"down","duration_s":$durationS,""" +
|
||||
""""kbps":$kbps,"size_bytes":$sizeBytes}""",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (reply.isFailure) {
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "throughput refused"),
|
||||
) to emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The server may have shortened the run to fit its own byte budget; listen for what it
|
||||
// actually promised, not for what we asked.
|
||||
val plannedMs = parseInt(reply.getOrNull(), "duration_ms") ?: (durationS * 1000)
|
||||
|
||||
// A margin past the planned end so the tail of the run is not counted as loss: packets
|
||||
// still in flight when we stop listening were not dropped, they were merely late.
|
||||
val received = probe.collectGranted(plannedMs + 1_500L)
|
||||
.filter { it.type == Wire.TYPE_THROUGHPUT_DATA }
|
||||
|
||||
val bytes = received.sumOf { it.sizeBytes.toLong() }
|
||||
val spanNs = if (received.size >= 2) {
|
||||
received.maxOf { it.tRxNs } - received.minOf { it.tRxNs }
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0L
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Measured over the arrival span rather than our listening window, which includes the
|
||||
// request round trip and the trailing margin and would understate the rate.
|
||||
val receivedKbps = if (spanNs > 0) (bytes * 8 * 1_000_000 / spanNs).toInt() else 0
|
||||
|
||||
val sender = senderReport(control, credential, sessionId)
|
||||
val sentPackets = sender?.packets ?: 0
|
||||
val lossPct = if (sentPackets > 0) {
|
||||
round2((sentPackets - received.size).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sentPackets)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Only a run the *clock* ended measured the network. One stopped by our own byte budget
|
||||
// or rate ceiling measured this server.
|
||||
val limitedBy = sender?.limitedBy ?: "unknown"
|
||||
val networkLimited = limitedBy == "duration" &&
|
||||
sender != null && receivedKbps > 0 && receivedKbps < sender.kbps * 9 / 10
|
||||
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
ThroughputMetrics(
|
||||
requestedKbps = kbps,
|
||||
plannedDurationMs = plannedMs,
|
||||
packetsReceived = received.size,
|
||||
bytesReceived = bytes,
|
||||
receivedKbps = receivedKbps,
|
||||
senderPackets = sender?.packets,
|
||||
senderBytes = sender?.bytes,
|
||||
senderKbps = sender?.kbps,
|
||||
lossPct = lossPct,
|
||||
limitedBy = limitedBy,
|
||||
measuresNetwork = networkLimited,
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
when {
|
||||
sender == null -> Unit // no sender report: nothing can be concluded, so nothing is
|
||||
received.isEmpty() -> findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, testId,
|
||||
"No throughput traffic arrived",
|
||||
"The server sent ${sender.packets} packets and none arrived. This is a " +
|
||||
"connectivity fault rather than a slow link.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
networkLimited -> findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED, testId,
|
||||
"Downstream throughput ${receivedKbps / 1000} Mbit/s, below the " +
|
||||
"${sender.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s offered",
|
||||
"The server sent at ${sender.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s for the full run and " +
|
||||
"${receivedKbps / 1000} Mbit/s arrived" +
|
||||
(lossPct?.let { ", losing $it % of packets" } ?: "") +
|
||||
". The path could not carry what was offered.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = if (received.isEmpty()) TestStatus.FAILED else TestStatus.OK,
|
||||
metrics = metrics,
|
||||
) to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Upstream throughput: the client sends, the server counts.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The mirror image of the downstream case, and it needs no grant — the client is generating
|
||||
* its own traffic, so there is no amplification to gate. What it does need is the server's
|
||||
* count: only the far end knows how much arrived, and without that number a sender can
|
||||
* measure how fast it can *transmit*, which is not the same question and is usually just the
|
||||
* speed of the local NIC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun runUpstream(
|
||||
credential: String,
|
||||
sessionId: String,
|
||||
control: ControlClient,
|
||||
probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String,
|
||||
durationS: Int = 5,
|
||||
kbps: Int = 20_000,
|
||||
sizeBytes: Int = 1200,
|
||||
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
|
||||
// Zeroes the server's counter so this run measures itself rather than inheriting the
|
||||
// packets of an earlier one on the same session.
|
||||
val reply = runCatching {
|
||||
control.action(credential, sessionId, """{"action":"throughput","direction":"up"}""")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (reply.isFailure) {
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
error = TestError("action_refused", reply.exceptionOrNull()?.message ?: "refused"),
|
||||
) to emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val sent = probe.sendThroughput(durationS * 1000L, kbps, sizeBytes)
|
||||
// A moment for the tail of the run to arrive; counting still-in-flight packets as lost
|
||||
// would inflate the loss figure by whatever the path's delay happens to be.
|
||||
Thread.sleep(500)
|
||||
val seen = upstreamCount(control, credential, sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
val lossPct = if (sent.packets > 0 && seen != null) {
|
||||
round2((sent.packets - seen.packets).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sent.packets)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The receiver's rate is the measurement. The sender's is what we managed to emit, which
|
||||
// is a property of this phone and its radio, not of the network.
|
||||
val achievedKbps = seen?.kbps ?: 0
|
||||
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
UpstreamThroughputMetrics(
|
||||
requestedKbps = kbps,
|
||||
sentPackets = sent.packets,
|
||||
sentBytes = sent.bytes,
|
||||
sentKbps = sent.kbps,
|
||||
receivedPackets = seen?.packets,
|
||||
receivedBytes = seen?.bytes,
|
||||
receivedKbps = achievedKbps,
|
||||
lossPct = lossPct,
|
||||
// Same honesty rule as downstream: if what arrived matches what we offered, the
|
||||
// path was never the constraint and this number says nothing about it.
|
||||
measuresNetwork = seen != null && achievedKbps > 0 && achievedKbps < sent.kbps * 9 / 10,
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
if (seen != null && seen.packets == 0 && sent.packets > 0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, testId,
|
||||
"No upstream traffic reached the server",
|
||||
"This device sent ${sent.packets} packets and the server received none. " +
|
||||
"That is a connectivity fault on the outbound path rather than a slow link.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else if (lossPct != null && lossPct >= 2.0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
finding(
|
||||
FindingRegistry.THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED, testId,
|
||||
"Upstream loss of $lossPct % at ${sent.kbps / 1000} Mbit/s",
|
||||
"The server received ${seen?.packets} of the ${sent.packets} packets this " +
|
||||
"device sent. The outbound path could not carry what was offered.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = if (seen == null || seen.packets == 0) TestStatus.FAILED else TestStatus.OK,
|
||||
metrics = metrics,
|
||||
) to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private data class UpstreamCount(val packets: Int, val bytes: Long, val kbps: Int)
|
||||
|
||||
/** The server's tally for this session's upstream run. */
|
||||
private fun upstreamCount(
|
||||
control: ControlClient, credential: String, sessionId: String,
|
||||
): UpstreamCount? = runCatching {
|
||||
val o = Json.parseToJsonElement(control.observations(credential, sessionId))
|
||||
.jsonObject["throughput_up"]?.jsonObject ?: return null
|
||||
UpstreamCount(
|
||||
packets = o["packets"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
bytes = o["bytes"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toLongOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
kbps = o["kbps"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
private data class SenderReport(
|
||||
val packets: Int, val bytes: Long, val kbps: Int, val limitedBy: String,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** The server's own account of the run, from the observations API. */
|
||||
private fun senderReport(
|
||||
control: ControlClient, credential: String, sessionId: String,
|
||||
): SenderReport? = runCatching {
|
||||
val arr = Json.parseToJsonElement(control.observations(credential, sessionId))
|
||||
.jsonObject["throughput"]?.jsonArray ?: return null
|
||||
val last = arr.lastOrNull()?.jsonObject ?: return null
|
||||
SenderReport(
|
||||
packets = last["packets"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
bytes = last["bytes"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toLongOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
kbps = last["kbps"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0,
|
||||
limitedBy = last["limited_by"]?.jsonPrimitive?.content ?: "unknown",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
|
||||
private fun parseInt(body: String?, key: String): Int? =
|
||||
body?.let { Regex("\"$key\"\\s*:\\s*(-?\\d+)").find(it)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toIntOrNull() }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Builds a finding from a registry entry, which supplies the code, category and severity.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Taking a [FindingSpec] rather than three loose values is the point: a typo becomes a
|
||||
* compile error, and two call sites cannot disagree about which category a finding belongs
|
||||
* to - a disagreement that would split one fault across two verdict lights.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun finding(spec: FindingSpec, testId: String, title: String, desc: String) =
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(), code = spec.code, category = spec.category, severity = spec.severity,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = title, description = desc, evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun round2(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 100.0) / 100.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for perf.throughput_udp in the upstream direction. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class UpstreamThroughputMetrics(
|
||||
val direction: String = "up",
|
||||
@SerialName("requested_kbps") val requestedKbps: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("sent_packets") val sentPackets: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("sent_bytes") val sentBytes: Long,
|
||||
/** What this device managed to emit — a property of the phone and its radio, not the path. */
|
||||
@SerialName("sent_kbps") val sentKbps: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("received_packets") val receivedPackets: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("received_bytes") val receivedBytes: Long? = null,
|
||||
/** What arrived, measured by the only party that can measure it. This is the result. */
|
||||
@SerialName("received_kbps") val receivedKbps: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("measures_network") val measuresNetwork: Boolean,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for perf.throughput_udp. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class ThroughputMetrics(
|
||||
val direction: String = "down",
|
||||
@SerialName("requested_kbps") val requestedKbps: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("planned_duration_ms") val plannedDurationMs: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("packets_received") val packetsReceived: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("bytes_received") val bytesReceived: Long,
|
||||
@SerialName("received_kbps") val receivedKbps: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("sender_packets") val senderPackets: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("sender_bytes") val senderBytes: Long? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("sender_kbps") val senderKbps: Int? = null,
|
||||
/** Against the sender's count, so a server-side limit is never counted as network loss. */
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double? = null,
|
||||
/** What ended the run: duration | budget | rate | send_error | unknown. */
|
||||
@SerialName("limited_by") val limitedBy: String,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether this number says anything about the network. False when the sender's own ceiling
|
||||
* was the binding constraint — in which case the rate is a property of the test, not the path.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SerialName("measures_network") val measuresNetwork: Boolean,
|
||||
)
|
||||
+159
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* train.udp_updown — the client sends a paced train (types 0x03), then asks the server what
|
||||
* arrived (0x04 → 0x05) and lines both views up per sequence number.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is the measurement a round trip cannot make: an echo run only says "lost somewhere", the
|
||||
* train's two ledgers say lost on the way OUT, specifically, because the server's report names
|
||||
* exactly which sequence numbers reached it. The downstream direction has its own test
|
||||
* (train.udp_downstream) under a grant; this one needs none, since the client generates all the
|
||||
* traffic itself.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The evidence is the schema's columnar TrainEvidence: one index per sent packet, with the
|
||||
* server-side columns null where a packet never arrived. Server timestamps are on the server's
|
||||
* own clock — only differences within that clock mean anything unless time.server_offset maps
|
||||
* them (two-clock rule).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class UpstreamTrainMeasurement(private val ids: IdSource) {
|
||||
|
||||
private val json = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
|
||||
|
||||
fun run(
|
||||
probe: ProbeSession,
|
||||
sessionRef: String,
|
||||
count: Int = 200,
|
||||
sizeBytes: Int = 200,
|
||||
interPacketMs: Long = 5,
|
||||
): Pair<Test, List<Finding>> {
|
||||
val testId = ids.uuid()
|
||||
val started = ids.monoNs()
|
||||
// The id only needs to be unique within this session; a clash across sessions is
|
||||
// meaningless because trains are buffered per session on the server.
|
||||
val trainId = (System.nanoTime() and 0x7FFFFFFF).toInt()
|
||||
|
||||
val sent = probe.sendTrain(trainId, count, sizeBytes, interPacketMs)
|
||||
// Let the tail arrive before asking for the ledger; packets still in flight when the
|
||||
// report is cut would read as upstream loss.
|
||||
Thread.sleep(300)
|
||||
val report = probe.trainReport(trainId)
|
||||
|
||||
if (report == null) {
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, sessionRef = sessionRef,
|
||||
tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = TestStatus.FAILED,
|
||||
// Honest ambiguity: an old server drops 0x04 silently, and a lost report looks
|
||||
// identical from here. Neither says anything about the train itself.
|
||||
error = TestError(
|
||||
"no_report",
|
||||
"no train report arrived — the report was lost, or the server predates trains",
|
||||
),
|
||||
) to emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val bySeq = report.rows.associateBy { it.seq }
|
||||
fun col255(v: Int): Int? = v.takeIf { it != 255 } // 255 = "not observed" on the wire
|
||||
|
||||
val evidence = TrainEvidence(
|
||||
epochMonoNs = started,
|
||||
seq = sent.map { it.seq },
|
||||
tTxNs = sent.map { it.tTxNs },
|
||||
tSrvRxNs = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.tRxNs },
|
||||
tRxNs = sent.map { null }, // upstream only: nothing comes back per packet
|
||||
sizeBytes = sent.map { it.sizeBytes },
|
||||
ttlSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.ttl) } },
|
||||
dscpSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.dscp) } },
|
||||
ecnSeenByServer = sent.map { bySeq[it.seq]?.let { r -> col255(r.ecn) } },
|
||||
evidenceTruncated = report.truncated,
|
||||
).toEvidence()
|
||||
|
||||
// Loss against the server's total count, not its row list: rows past the server's buffer
|
||||
// cap are counted but not kept, and treating them as lost would invent loss exactly on
|
||||
// the biggest trains.
|
||||
val lossPct = if (sent.isEmpty()) 0.0 else {
|
||||
(sent.size - report.received).coerceAtLeast(0) * 100.0 / sent.size
|
||||
}
|
||||
val metrics = json.encodeToJsonElement(
|
||||
UpstreamTrainMetrics(
|
||||
sent = sent.size,
|
||||
receivedByServer = report.received,
|
||||
lossPct = round1(lossPct),
|
||||
reportPartsExpected = report.partsExpected,
|
||||
reportPartsReceived = report.partsReceived,
|
||||
truncated = report.truncated,
|
||||
),
|
||||
) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
val findings = ArrayList<Finding>()
|
||||
if (sent.isNotEmpty() && report.received == 0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(),
|
||||
code = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.code,
|
||||
category = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.category,
|
||||
severity = FindingRegistry.UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM.severity,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = "The server received none of ${sent.size} upstream packets",
|
||||
description = "Every train packet vanished on the way out, while the " +
|
||||
"report request's reply made it back — the outbound path drops this " +
|
||||
"traffic, the return path works.",
|
||||
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else if (lossPct >= 2.0) {
|
||||
findings.add(
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = ids.uuid(),
|
||||
code = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.code,
|
||||
category = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.category,
|
||||
severity = FindingRegistry.LOSS_UPSTREAM.severity,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = "Upstream loss of ${round1(lossPct)} %",
|
||||
description = "The server received ${report.received} of the ${sent.size} " +
|
||||
"packets this device sent, and its per-sequence ledger names the " +
|
||||
"missing ones. This is outbound loss specifically; the return path " +
|
||||
"delivered the report.",
|
||||
evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef(testId)),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val status = when {
|
||||
report.received == 0 && sent.isNotEmpty() -> TestStatus.FAILED
|
||||
report.partsReceived < report.partsExpected -> TestStatus.PARTIAL
|
||||
else -> TestStatus.OK
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Test(
|
||||
id = testId, type = TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, sessionRef = sessionRef, tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = started, endedMonoNs = ids.monoNs(),
|
||||
status = status, evidence = evidence, metrics = metrics,
|
||||
) to findings
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun round1(v: Double) = Math.round(v * 10.0) / 10.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Metrics for train.udp_updown. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class UpstreamTrainMetrics(
|
||||
val sent: Int,
|
||||
/** The server's total count — includes packets past its row buffer (counted, not listed). */
|
||||
@SerialName("received_by_server") val receivedByServer: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("loss_pct") val lossPct: Double,
|
||||
@SerialName("report_parts_expected") val reportPartsExpected: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("report_parts_received") val reportPartsReceived: Int,
|
||||
/** The server's row buffer overflowed: rows are a sample, the count is still complete. */
|
||||
val truncated: Boolean,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.engine.Directional.Sample
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.engine.Directional.ServerSighting
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The arithmetic that turns "3 % loss somewhere" into "3 % loss upstream". Getting a denominator
|
||||
* wrong here does not crash anything — it produces a plausible number pointing at the wrong half
|
||||
* of the network, which is worse than no number at all. Hence a test per claim.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class DirectionalTest {
|
||||
|
||||
/** A clean train: every packet sent, seen and answered. Server clock offset by a constant. */
|
||||
private fun clean(n: Int, offsetNs: Long = 5_000_000_000L): Pair<List<Sample>, List<ServerSighting>> {
|
||||
val sent = (1..n).map { Sample(it, tTxNs = it * 10_000_000L, tRxNs = it * 10_000_000L + 4_000_000L) }
|
||||
val seen = (1..n).map {
|
||||
ServerSighting(it, tRxNs = offsetNs + it * 10_000_000L + 2_000_000L,
|
||||
tTxNs = offsetNs + it * 10_000_000L + 2_100_000L)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sent to seen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun aCleanTrainReportsNoLossInEitherDirection() {
|
||||
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen)
|
||||
assertEquals(10, m.sent)
|
||||
assertEquals(10, m.seenByServer)
|
||||
assertEquals(10, m.repliesReceived)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
|
||||
assertFalse(m.noneReachedServer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The whole point: a packet the server never saw was lost on the way there.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun packetsTheServerNeverSawAreUpstreamLoss() {
|
||||
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen.filter { it.seq !in setOf(3, 7) })
|
||||
assertEquals(2, m.lostUpstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(0, m.lostDownstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "a packet that never arrived cannot be lost coming back")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun repliesThatNeverArrivedAreDownstreamLoss() {
|
||||
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
|
||||
val withHoles = sent.map { if (it.seq in setOf(2, 5)) it.copy(tRxNs = null) else it }
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(withHoles, seen)
|
||||
assertEquals(0, m.lostUpstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(2, m.lostDownstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Downstream loss is measured against what actually reached the server. Using "sent" as the
|
||||
// denominator would count every upstream loss a second time and overstate the return path.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun downstreamLossIsRelativeToWhatReachedTheServer() {
|
||||
val (sent, seen) = clean(10)
|
||||
// 5 lost on the way there; of the 5 that arrived, 1 reply is lost coming back.
|
||||
val seenPartial = seen.filter { it.seq > 5 }
|
||||
val withHole = sent.map {
|
||||
when {
|
||||
it.seq <= 5 -> it.copy(tRxNs = null) // never got there, so never came back
|
||||
it.seq == 6 -> it.copy(tRxNs = null) // arrived, reply lost
|
||||
else -> it
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(withHole, seenPartial)
|
||||
assertEquals(5, m.lostUpstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(50.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertEquals(1, m.lostDownstream)
|
||||
assertEquals(20.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "1 of the 5 that arrived, not 1 of 10")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun aServerThatSawNothingIsCalledOutSeparately() {
|
||||
val (sent, _) = clean(6)
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(sent.map { it.copy(tRxNs = null) }, emptyList())
|
||||
assertTrue(m.noneReachedServer)
|
||||
assertEquals(100.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct, "with nothing arriving there is no return path to blame")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Jitter is legitimate without synchronised clocks because the offset cancels when successive
|
||||
// one-way samples are differenced. This pins that: a huge constant offset must not show up.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun jitterIsUnaffectedByTheClockOffsetBetweenTheTwoMachines() {
|
||||
val (sent, near) = clean(10, offsetNs = 0)
|
||||
val (_, far) = clean(10, offsetNs = 9_999_999_999L)
|
||||
val a = Directional.analyse(sent, near)
|
||||
val b = Directional.analyse(sent, far)
|
||||
assertEquals(a.jitterUpstreamMs, b.jitterUpstreamMs,
|
||||
"a constant clock offset must cancel when consecutive samples are differenced")
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, assertNotNull(a.jitterUpstreamMs), "an evenly spaced train has no jitter")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun jitterReflectsUnevenArrival() {
|
||||
val sent = listOf(
|
||||
Sample(1, 0, 10_000_000),
|
||||
Sample(2, 10_000_000, 20_000_000),
|
||||
Sample(3, 20_000_000, 30_000_000),
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Server receive times drift: +2ms, +7ms, +3ms relative to send.
|
||||
val seen = listOf(
|
||||
ServerSighting(1, 2_000_000, 2_100_000),
|
||||
ServerSighting(2, 17_000_000, 17_100_000),
|
||||
ServerSighting(3, 23_000_000, 23_100_000),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen)
|
||||
// one-way samples: 2ms, 7ms, 3ms → |7-2| and |3-7| → mean 4.5ms
|
||||
assertEquals(4.5, assertNotNull(m.jitterUpstreamMs))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// "No jitter" and "not enough data to say" are different claims, and only one is true here.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun tooFewSamplesReportsNoJitterRatherThanZero() {
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(
|
||||
listOf(Sample(1, 0, 10_000_000)),
|
||||
listOf(ServerSighting(1, 2_000_000, 2_100_000)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertNull(m.jitterUpstreamMs)
|
||||
assertNull(m.jitterDownstreamMs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A server record for a sequence we never sent is not evidence about this train; folding it
|
||||
// in would yield loss percentages outside 0–100.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun strayServerRecordsAreIgnored() {
|
||||
val (sent, seen) = clean(5)
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(sent, seen + ServerSighting(99, 1, 2) + ServerSighting(100, 3, 4))
|
||||
assertEquals(5, m.seenByServer)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertTrue(m.lossDownstreamPct in 0.0..100.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun anEmptyTrainDoesNotDivideByZero() {
|
||||
val m = Directional.analyse(emptyList(), emptyList())
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossUpstreamPct)
|
||||
assertEquals(0.0, m.lossDownstreamPct)
|
||||
assertFalse(m.noneReachedServer, "nothing sent is not the same as nothing arriving")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.Compat
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.VersionRefused
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
import kotlin.test.fail
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Checks the version gate against a LIVE server — the half that unit tests cannot reach, because
|
||||
* the whole point is that two independently-built artifacts agree. Self-skips without
|
||||
* ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class LiveCompatTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
|
||||
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
|
||||
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
|
||||
|
||||
private fun clientAs(version: String) = ControlClient(url!!, setOf(pin!!), version)
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun theServerAdvertisesAndEnforcesItsWindow() {
|
||||
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null) {
|
||||
println("LiveCompatTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The profile must state the window — without it the app cannot pre-empt a refusal.
|
||||
val profile = clientAs("0.2.0").profile(cred)
|
||||
println("server ${profile.serverVersion} protocol=${profile.compat.protocolVersion} " +
|
||||
"accepts app [${profile.compat.appMin}, ${profile.compat.appMax})")
|
||||
assertTrue(profile.compat.protocolVersion.isNotBlank(), "profile omits protocol_version")
|
||||
assertTrue(profile.compat.appMin.isNotBlank(), "profile omits app_min")
|
||||
|
||||
// This build must be inside it, or every other live test here is meaningless.
|
||||
val verdict = Compat.check(profile, "0.2.0")
|
||||
assertEquals(Compat.Verdict.OK, verdict.verdict, verdict.message ?: "")
|
||||
|
||||
// The profile stays reachable for a version the server would otherwise refuse: that is
|
||||
// how a refused client discovers what it needs.
|
||||
val ancient = clientAs("0.1.0")
|
||||
val stillReadable = ancient.profile(cred)
|
||||
assertEquals(profile.serverVersion, stillReadable.serverVersion,
|
||||
"the profile endpoint must never be gated on app version")
|
||||
|
||||
// And a gated endpoint refuses it, with a message naming the window.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
ancient.createSession(cred, System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr")
|
||||
fail("server accepted a session from an out-of-window app")
|
||||
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
|
||||
val msg = assertNotNull(e.message)
|
||||
println("refused as expected: $msg")
|
||||
assertTrue(msg.contains("0.1.0"), "refusal should name the offending version: $msg")
|
||||
assertTrue(msg.contains(profile.compat.appMin), "refusal should name the window: $msg")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Too new is refused the same way — the window is a range, not a floor.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
clientAs("99.0.0").createSession(cred, System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr")
|
||||
fail("server accepted a session from an app above its window")
|
||||
} catch (e: VersionRefused) {
|
||||
println("too-new refused as expected: ${e.message}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestType
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Runs DownstreamMeasurement against a LIVE server and checks the *documents* it produces, not
|
||||
* just that packets moved: the tests must carry recomputable metrics and land on the right test
|
||||
* types, because that is what an archived run is read back as. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class LiveDownstreamTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
|
||||
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
|
||||
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
|
||||
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
|
||||
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun producesDownstreamTestsAndFindings() {
|
||||
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
|
||||
println("LiveDownstreamTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin))
|
||||
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
|
||||
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val (tests, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
|
||||
ps.echo() // prime: the grant binds to the source the server has actually observed
|
||||
DownstreamMeasurement(SystemIdSource())
|
||||
.run(cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1")
|
||||
}
|
||||
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
for (t in tests) println("${t.type} status=${t.status} metrics=${t.metrics}")
|
||||
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert on what is present, not on how many: adding a measurement should not be a
|
||||
// test edit. (It was, once — hence the note.)
|
||||
assertTrue(tests.size >= 3, "expected at least the three downstream tests, got ${tests.size}")
|
||||
val byType = tests.associateBy { it.type }
|
||||
|
||||
val pmtud = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.MTU_PMTUD_DOWN], "no mtu.pmtud_down test")
|
||||
assertTrue(pmtud.status == TestStatus.OK || pmtud.status == TestStatus.PARTIAL,
|
||||
"DF probe did not deliver anything: ${pmtud.status}")
|
||||
val pathMtu = pmtud.metrics?.get("path_mtu_bytes")?.toString()?.toIntOrNull()
|
||||
assertNotNull(pathMtu, "pmtud_down must report a path MTU")
|
||||
assertTrue(pathMtu in 576..9000, "implausible downstream path MTU: $pathMtu")
|
||||
println("downstream path MTU = $pathMtu bytes")
|
||||
|
||||
val frag = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY], "no mtu.frag_delivery test")
|
||||
assertNotNull(frag.metrics?.get("largest_delivered_bytes"))
|
||||
|
||||
// Fragment ordering runs only when fragments arrive at all, and only against a server
|
||||
// that can craft them — so it is checked when present rather than required.
|
||||
byType[TestType.MTU_FRAG_ORDERING]?.let { fo ->
|
||||
val m = fo.metrics?.toString() ?: ""
|
||||
println("fragment ordering: ${fo.status} $m")
|
||||
if (fo.status != TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED) {
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("in_order"), "no per-ordering result: $m")
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("reversed"), "reversed ordering was never attempted: $m")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val train = assertNotNull(byType[TestType.TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM], "no downstream train")
|
||||
assertNotNull(train.evidence, "a train without columnar evidence is not recomputable")
|
||||
val received = train.metrics?.get("received")?.toString()?.toIntOrNull() ?: 0
|
||||
assertTrue(received > 0, "no downstream train packets arrived")
|
||||
println("downstream train: $received received, loss=${train.metrics?.get("loss_pct")}, " +
|
||||
"reordered=${train.metrics?.get("reordered_packets")}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.EnrollmentLink
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
import kotlin.test.fail
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Enrolls against a LIVE server using the link the server itself minted (probe-protocol.md §2.1).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is the test that matters for enrollment, because the failure mode it guards against is a
|
||||
* *disagreement* between two programs: the Go side assembles the link, the Kotlin side takes it
|
||||
* apart, and if they differ by one percent-encoding the pin is wrong by one character — which
|
||||
* does not fail loudly, it fails as an inscrutable TLS error days later. A unit test on either
|
||||
* side alone cannot see that.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Needs ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI (minted over SSH by scripts/test-fmr.sh); self-skips without it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class LiveEnrollmentTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val enrollUri = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI")
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun enrollsFromTheServersOwnLink() {
|
||||
if (enrollUri.isNullOrBlank()) {
|
||||
println("LiveEnrollmentTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_ENROLL_URI)"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
println("link: ${enrollUri.take(60)}…")
|
||||
|
||||
val link = assertNotNull(
|
||||
EnrollmentLink.parse(enrollUri),
|
||||
"the client could not parse a link the server produced — the two sides disagree",
|
||||
)
|
||||
println("parsed: url=${link.controlUrl} pin=${link.pin.take(12)}… token=${link.token.take(8)}…")
|
||||
|
||||
// Redeeming applies the pin to the very request that spends the token, so a wrong pin
|
||||
// fails here at the handshake rather than after the token is gone.
|
||||
val enrolled = link.redeem(deviceName = "live-test", appVersion = "0.2.0")
|
||||
assertTrue(enrolled.credential.isNotBlank(), "no credential came back")
|
||||
assertTrue(enrolled.deviceId.isNotBlank(), "no device id came back")
|
||||
println("enrolled: device=${enrolled.deviceId} server=${enrolled.profile.name} " +
|
||||
"${enrolled.profile.serverVersion}")
|
||||
|
||||
// The credential must actually work, and the pin from the link must be the one that
|
||||
// verifies the server — that is the whole claim the link is making.
|
||||
assertEquals(link.controlUrl, enrolled.controlUrl)
|
||||
assertTrue(enrolled.profile.capabilities.contains("udp-probe"),
|
||||
"profile fetched with the new credential looks wrong: ${enrolled.profile.capabilities}")
|
||||
|
||||
// Single-use: a token that still works after redemption is a token an attacker can reuse.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
link.redeem(deviceName = "should-not-happen", appVersion = "0.2.0")
|
||||
fail("the enrollment token was accepted twice — it must be single-use")
|
||||
} catch (t: Throwable) {
|
||||
println("second redemption correctly refused: ${t.message?.take(120)}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import app.echo_lot.measurement.*
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -47,8 +48,11 @@ class LiveMeasurementTest {
|
||||
|
||||
assertEquals(1, doc.serverSessions.size)
|
||||
assertTrue(doc.serverSessions[0].capabilities.contains("udp-probe"))
|
||||
val test = doc.tests.single()
|
||||
assertEquals(TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN, test.type)
|
||||
// A full run is the echo train plus the three downstream tests; assert on the one this
|
||||
// test is about rather than on the count, so adding a measurement is not a test edit.
|
||||
for (t in doc.tests) println(" ${t.type} → ${t.status}")
|
||||
for (f in doc.findings) println(" finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
|
||||
val test = doc.tests.first { it.type == TestType.TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN }
|
||||
assertTrue(test.status == TestStatus.OK || test.status == TestStatus.PARTIAL,
|
||||
"expected replies from live server, got ${test.status}")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,6 +60,18 @@ class LiveMeasurementTest {
|
||||
println("metrics: $metrics")
|
||||
assertTrue(metrics.toString().contains("rtt_ms_avg"))
|
||||
|
||||
// The directional split is the point of asking the server what it saw: without it a
|
||||
// lossy path is reported as "loss" with no direction, which sends an engineer looking
|
||||
// in both at once. Correlation is by wire sequence number, so a mismatch here means the
|
||||
// two sides disagree about which packet is which.
|
||||
val m = metrics.toString()
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("seen_by_server"), "no directional split in the metrics: $m")
|
||||
val seen = Regex(""""seen_by_server":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
assertNotNull(seen, "seen_by_server missing")
|
||||
assertEquals(20, seen, "the server should have seen every probe on a healthy path")
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("jitter_upstream_ms"), "no per-direction jitter: $m")
|
||||
println("directional: $m")
|
||||
|
||||
assertTrue(doc.summary != null)
|
||||
// A healthy local->fmr path should be green (no loss, no rebinding) or yellow.
|
||||
println("summary: ${doc.summary}")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Downstream throughput against a LIVE server. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The assertions are about *honesty* rather than speed: a rate is only a measurement if the run
|
||||
* was ended by the clock and the sender's own count backs it up. A test that just asserted "some
|
||||
* Mbps arrived" would pass equally well against a broken implementation.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class LiveThroughputTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
|
||||
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
|
||||
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
|
||||
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
|
||||
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun measuresDownstreamRateAndSaysWhatLimitedIt() {
|
||||
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
|
||||
println("LiveThroughputTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
|
||||
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
|
||||
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
|
||||
ps.echo() // prime: the grant binds to the observed source
|
||||
ThroughputMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).run(
|
||||
cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
|
||||
durationS = 3, kbps = 20_000,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
|
||||
println("throughput: ${test.status} $m")
|
||||
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
|
||||
|
||||
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "no throughput traffic arrived: $m")
|
||||
|
||||
// The sender's own count must be present — without it, loss cannot be attributed and the
|
||||
// number is not a measurement.
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("sender_packets"), "no sender report to compare against: $m")
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains("limited_by"), "the result must say what ended the run: $m")
|
||||
|
||||
val received = Regex(""""received_kbps":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
assertNotNull(received)
|
||||
assertTrue(received > 0, "measured 0 kbps: $m")
|
||||
println("received ${received / 1000} Mbit/s")
|
||||
|
||||
// A run this short and this far below the ceiling should end on the clock. Anything else
|
||||
// means the grant was the constraint, and then the rate says nothing about the path.
|
||||
assertTrue(m.contains(""""limited_by":"duration""""),
|
||||
"the run did not end on the clock, so the rate measures the server, not the path: $m")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Upstream is the direction only the far end can measure. The assertion that matters is that
|
||||
// the server's count is present and plausible against what we sent — a test that only checked
|
||||
// "we transmitted some Mbps" would pass against a server that counted nothing at all.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun measuresUpstreamAgainstTheServersCount() {
|
||||
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
|
||||
println("LiveThroughputTest(up) skipped"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
|
||||
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
|
||||
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
|
||||
ps.echo()
|
||||
ThroughputMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).runUpstream(
|
||||
cred, session.sessionId, control, ps, sessionRef = "sess-1",
|
||||
durationS = 3, kbps = 10_000,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
|
||||
println("upstream: ${test.status} $m")
|
||||
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
|
||||
|
||||
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "the server counted nothing: $m")
|
||||
val recv = Regex(""""received_packets":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
val sent = Regex(""""sent_packets":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
assertNotNull(recv); assertNotNull(sent)
|
||||
assertTrue(sent > 100, "barely anything was sent, so the rate means nothing: $m")
|
||||
assertTrue(recv > 0, "the server received none of $sent packets: $m")
|
||||
// The counts should be close on a healthy path; wildly different means the two sides are
|
||||
// counting different things rather than the network losing packets.
|
||||
assertTrue(recv <= sent, "the server counted MORE than we sent — the counter is not being reset")
|
||||
println("sent $sent, server saw $recv")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.engine
|
||||
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.measurement.TestStatus
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ControlClient
|
||||
import app.echo_lot.protocol.ProbeSession
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Upstream train (types 0x03-0x05) against a LIVE server. Self-skips without ECHOLOT_LIVE_*.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* What is asserted is the ledger property: the server's report must account for what was sent,
|
||||
* per sequence number, because directional loss attribution is the entire reason trains exist —
|
||||
* a test that only checked "a report came back" would pass against a server that counts nothing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class LiveUpstreamTrainTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val url = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_URL")
|
||||
private val pin = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_PIN")
|
||||
private val cred = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_CRED")
|
||||
private val udp = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_UDP")
|
||||
private val target = System.getenv("ECHOLOT_LIVE_TARGET") ?: "fmr"
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun serverLedgerAccountsForTheTrain() {
|
||||
if (url == null || pin == null || cred == null || udp == null) {
|
||||
println("LiveUpstreamTrainTest skipped (no ECHOLOT_LIVE_* env)"); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val control = ControlClient(url, setOf(pin), "0.2.0")
|
||||
val session = control.createSession(cred, target)
|
||||
val (host, port) = udp.split(":").let { it[0] to it[1].toInt() }
|
||||
|
||||
val (test, findings) = ProbeSession(cred, session, host, port).use { ps ->
|
||||
ps.echo() // prime the session so its source is known
|
||||
UpstreamTrainMeasurement(SystemIdSource()).run(
|
||||
ps, sessionRef = "sess-1", count = 120, sizeBytes = 200, interPacketMs = 3,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
control.deleteSession(cred, session.sessionId)
|
||||
|
||||
val m = assertNotNull(test.metrics).toString()
|
||||
println("updown: ${test.status} $m")
|
||||
for (f in findings) println("finding ${f.code} [${f.severity}] ${f.title}")
|
||||
|
||||
assertEquals(TestStatus.OK, test.status, "train report incomplete or absent: $m")
|
||||
|
||||
val sent = Regex(""""sent":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
val received = Regex(""""received_by_server":(\d+)""").find(m)?.groupValues?.get(1)?.toInt()
|
||||
assertNotNull(sent); assertNotNull(received)
|
||||
assertTrue(sent > 0, "nothing was sent: $m")
|
||||
// Over a working path the ledger must be near-complete; a lossy wifi may drop a few, but
|
||||
// a server that fails to count would show up as massive phantom loss here.
|
||||
assertTrue(received >= sent * 9 / 10, "server counted $received of $sent: $m")
|
||||
|
||||
// The columnar evidence must carry a server timestamp for arrived packets — that column
|
||||
// is what one-way delay math consumes after timesync.
|
||||
val ev = assertNotNull(test.evidence).toString()
|
||||
assertTrue(ev.contains("t_srv_rx_ns"), "no server rx column in evidence")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
// Package measurement models one measurement run (measurement-schema.md) — the archived,
|
||||
// diffable, exportable unit. Design rules honored in the types: observation/interpretation
|
||||
// separated (tests[] vs findings[]), two clocks (wall RFC3339 for humans, *_mono_ns for math),
|
||||
// units in field names, columnar trains. params/evidence/metrics are per-test-type, so they are
|
||||
// carried as JsonObject (the probe engine fills them; consumers ignore unknown fields).
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class MeasurementDocument(
|
||||
val schema: String = "echolot/measurement",
|
||||
@SerialName("schema_version") val schemaVersion: String = "1.0.0",
|
||||
val run: Run,
|
||||
val networks: List<Network> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("server_sessions") val serverSessions: List<ServerSession> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val tests: List<Test> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val findings: List<Finding> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val summary: Summary? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Run(
|
||||
val id: String, // UUIDv7
|
||||
val trigger: Trigger,
|
||||
@SerialName("started_at") val startedAt: String, // RFC3339 UTC, human correlation only
|
||||
@SerialName("ended_at") val endedAt: String? = null,
|
||||
val clock: Clock,
|
||||
val app: AppInfo,
|
||||
val device: DeviceInfo,
|
||||
val tiers: Tiers,
|
||||
@SerialName("profiles_used") val profilesUsed: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val notes: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Trigger {
|
||||
@SerialName("manual") MANUAL,
|
||||
@SerialName("scheduled") SCHEDULED,
|
||||
@SerialName("monitor") MONITOR,
|
||||
@SerialName("peer") PEER,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** The two-clock anchor: mono_origin_wall maps the monotonic epoch to a wall time for humans;
|
||||
* all math uses *_mono_ns relative to that monotonic origin. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Clock(
|
||||
@SerialName("mono_origin_wall") val monoOriginWall: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("ntp_offset_ms") val ntpOffsetMs: Double? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("ntp_offset_source") val ntpOffsetSource: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class AppInfo(
|
||||
val version: String,
|
||||
val build: Int,
|
||||
val git: String? = null,
|
||||
val flavor: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class DeviceInfo(
|
||||
val manufacturer: String,
|
||||
val model: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("android_sdk") val androidSdk: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("android_release") val androidRelease: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("security_patch") val securityPatch: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** What each tier was *available*; each test records what it *used*. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Tiers(
|
||||
val app: Boolean = true,
|
||||
val shizuku: Boolean = false,
|
||||
val root: Boolean = false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class ServerSession(
|
||||
val id: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("profile_id") val profileId: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("profile_name") val profileName: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("control_url") val controlUrl: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("server_version") val serverVersion: String? = null,
|
||||
val capabilities: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("session_id") val sessionId: String,
|
||||
val target: SessionTarget,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class SessionTarget(
|
||||
val ip4: String? = null,
|
||||
val ip6: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("udp_port") val udpPort: Int = 0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.encodeToJsonElement
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Typed builders for the per-test-type evidence shapes the schema fixes (§6.2/§6.3/§6.4). Probe
|
||||
* code fills these and folds them into [Test.evidence] via [toEvidence]; keeping them typed here
|
||||
* means the columnar/traceroute/resolver contracts live in one place.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
@PublishedApi
|
||||
internal val evidenceJson = Json { encodeDefaults = true; explicitNulls = true }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Serialize any typed evidence object into the JsonObject the Test envelope carries. */
|
||||
inline fun <reified T> T.toEvidence(): JsonObject =
|
||||
evidenceJson.encodeToJsonElement(this) as JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Packet-train evidence (§6.2): columnar parallel arrays, one index per probe packet. Missing
|
||||
* observations are null at that index — a 10k-packet train stays in the hundreds of kB. Server
|
||||
* columns use the server session epoch; only differences within one clock are meaningful unless a
|
||||
* time.server_offset test maps them.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class TrainEvidence(
|
||||
@SerialName("epoch_mono_ns") val epochMonoNs: Long,
|
||||
val seq: List<Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("t_tx_ns") val tTxNs: List<Long?>,
|
||||
@SerialName("t_srv_rx_ns") val tSrvRxNs: List<Long?> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("t_srv_tx_ns") val tSrvTxNs: List<Long?> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("t_rx_ns") val tRxNs: List<Long?>,
|
||||
@SerialName("size_bytes") val sizeBytes: List<Int>,
|
||||
@SerialName("dscp_sent") val dscpSent: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("dscp_seen_by_server") val dscpSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("ecn_sent") val ecnSent: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("ecn_seen_by_server") val ecnSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("ttl_seen_by_server") val ttlSeenByServer: List<Int?> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("evidence_truncated") val evidenceTruncated: Boolean = false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Traceroute evidence (§6.3): fixed-tuple flow + per-TTL probe replies. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class TracerouteEvidence(val flow: Flow, val hops: List<Hop>)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Flow(
|
||||
@SerialName("src_port") val srcPort: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("dst_port") val dstPort: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("fixed_tuple") val fixedTuple: Boolean = true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Hop(val ttl: Int, val probes: List<HopProbe>)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class HopProbe(
|
||||
@SerialName("reply_from") val replyFrom: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("rtt_ns") val rttNs: Long? = null,
|
||||
val icmp: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("reply_ttl") val replyTtl: Int? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Resolver under test (§6.4); every dns.* test carries this in params. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class ResolverSpec(
|
||||
val source: ResolverSource,
|
||||
val address: String? = null,
|
||||
val port: Int = 53,
|
||||
val transport: String, // do53-udp | do53-tcp | dot | doh
|
||||
@SerialName("doh_url") val dohUrl: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class ResolverSource {
|
||||
@SerialName("system") SYSTEM,
|
||||
@SerialName("manual") MANUAL,
|
||||
@SerialName("server-recursive") SERVER_RECURSIVE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
|
||||
/** Interpretation with references back to evidence (measurement-schema.md §7.1). A finding with
|
||||
* no evidence_refs is invalid — every finding must be re-derivable from the evidence alone. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Finding(
|
||||
val id: String, // UUIDv7
|
||||
val code: String, // stable registry (findings-registry.md), lint-rule style
|
||||
val category: Category,
|
||||
val severity: Severity,
|
||||
val confidence: Confidence,
|
||||
@SerialName("network_ref") val networkRef: String? = null,
|
||||
val title: String,
|
||||
val description: String,
|
||||
@SerialName("evidence_refs") val evidenceRefs: List<EvidenceRef>,
|
||||
val recommendation: String? = null,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
init {
|
||||
require(evidenceRefs.isNotEmpty()) { "a finding must reference at least one piece of evidence" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class EvidenceRef(val test: String, val pointer: String? = null)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Fixed §7.2 categories; each maps to one traffic light. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Category {
|
||||
@SerialName("connectivity") CONNECTIVITY,
|
||||
@SerialName("dns") DNS,
|
||||
@SerialName("nat") NAT,
|
||||
@SerialName("mtu") MTU,
|
||||
@SerialName("ipv6") IPV6,
|
||||
@SerialName("security") SECURITY,
|
||||
@SerialName("performance") PERFORMANCE,
|
||||
@SerialName("local") LOCAL,
|
||||
@SerialName("wifi") WIFI,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Ordered worst→best via [rank]; drives the §7.3 light mapping. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Severity(val rank: Int) {
|
||||
@SerialName("critical") CRITICAL(4),
|
||||
@SerialName("high") HIGH(3),
|
||||
@SerialName("medium") MEDIUM(2),
|
||||
@SerialName("low") LOW(1),
|
||||
@SerialName("info") INFO(0);
|
||||
|
||||
/** §7.3: critical|high → red, medium|low → yellow, info → green. */
|
||||
fun toLight(): Verdict = when (this) {
|
||||
CRITICAL, HIGH -> Verdict.RED
|
||||
MEDIUM, LOW -> Verdict.YELLOW
|
||||
INFO -> Verdict.GREEN
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Confidence {
|
||||
@SerialName("high") HIGH,
|
||||
@SerialName("medium") MEDIUM,
|
||||
@SerialName("low") LOW,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
/** One Android Network in play (measurement-schema.md §4). Shizuku-tier fields (route proto,
|
||||
* lifetimes) are absent at app tier — absence means "not observed", never "not present". */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Network(
|
||||
val id: String,
|
||||
val transport: Transport,
|
||||
@SerialName("interface") val iface: String? = null,
|
||||
val link: Link,
|
||||
val wifi: Wifi? = null,
|
||||
val cellular: Cellular? = null,
|
||||
val changes: List<NetworkChange> = emptyList(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Transport {
|
||||
@SerialName("wifi") WIFI,
|
||||
@SerialName("cellular") CELLULAR,
|
||||
@SerialName("ethernet") ETHERNET,
|
||||
@SerialName("vpn") VPN,
|
||||
@SerialName("other") OTHER,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Link(
|
||||
val mtu: Int? = null,
|
||||
val addresses: List<Address> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val routes: List<Route> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val dns: DnsConfig? = null,
|
||||
val dhcp: Dhcp? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("captive_portal") val captivePortal: CaptivePortal? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Address(
|
||||
val addr: String, // ip4 | ip6 (logical type, §8)
|
||||
@SerialName("prefix_len") val prefixLen: Int,
|
||||
val scope: String? = null,
|
||||
val flags: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("valid_lft_s") val validLftS: Long? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("pref_lft_s") val prefLftS: Long? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Route(
|
||||
val dst: String,
|
||||
val gateway: String? = null,
|
||||
val iface: String? = null,
|
||||
val proto: RouteProto? = null, // shizuku tier; null = not observed
|
||||
@SerialName("expires_s") val expiresS: Long? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class RouteProto {
|
||||
@SerialName("dhcp") DHCP,
|
||||
@SerialName("ra") RA,
|
||||
@SerialName("static") STATIC,
|
||||
@SerialName("unknown") UNKNOWN,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class DnsConfig(
|
||||
val servers: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("private_dns_mode") val privateDnsMode: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("private_dns_hostname") val privateDnsHostname: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("search_domains") val searchDomains: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("nat64_prefix") val nat64Prefix: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Dhcp(val server: String? = null, @SerialName("lease_s") val leaseS: Long? = null)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class CaptivePortal(
|
||||
val detected: Boolean = false,
|
||||
@SerialName("api_url") val apiUrl: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("venue_url") val venueUrl: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Wifi(
|
||||
val ssid: String? = null, // ssid (logical type)
|
||||
val bssid: String? = null, // bssid (logical type)
|
||||
@SerialName("rssi_dbm") val rssiDbm: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("link_speed_mbps") val linkSpeedMbps: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("frequency_mhz") val frequencyMhz: Int? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("channel_width_mhz") val channelWidthMhz: Int? = null,
|
||||
val standard: String? = null,
|
||||
val security: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("mac_randomization") val macRandomization: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Cellular(
|
||||
val rat: String? = null,
|
||||
val operator: String? = null,
|
||||
val band: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class NetworkChange(
|
||||
@SerialName("at_mono_ns") val atMonoNs: Long,
|
||||
val kind: String, // lost | gained | link_changed
|
||||
val detail: JsonObject? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Verdict {
|
||||
@SerialName("green") GREEN,
|
||||
@SerialName("yellow") YELLOW,
|
||||
@SerialName("red") RED,
|
||||
@SerialName("inconclusive") INCONCLUSIVE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Summary(
|
||||
val overall: Verdict,
|
||||
val categories: Map<String, CategorySummary>,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class CategorySummary(
|
||||
val verdict: Verdict,
|
||||
@SerialName("worst_finding") val worstFinding: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("tests_run") val testsRun: Int,
|
||||
@SerialName("tests_failed") val testsFailed: Int,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Deterministic verdict derivation, fixed by measurement-schema.md §7.3:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - A category's verdict = the light of its worst-severity finding
|
||||
* (critical|high → red, medium|low → yellow, info/none → green).
|
||||
* - A category is `inconclusive` when > 50% of its tests are failed/unsupported.
|
||||
* - Overall = the worst category light; `inconclusive` only when ALL categories are.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The mapping test-type → category comes from [TestType.category]. Only categories that have
|
||||
* findings or tests appear in the summary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object Verdicts {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun isInconclusiveTest(s: TestStatus) =
|
||||
s == TestStatus.FAILED || s == TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED
|
||||
|
||||
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>): Summary {
|
||||
val testsByCat = tests.groupBy { TestType.category(it.type) }
|
||||
val findingsByCat = findings.groupBy { it.category }
|
||||
val categories = (testsByCat.keys + findingsByCat.keys)
|
||||
|
||||
val perCat = LinkedHashMap<String, CategorySummary>()
|
||||
for (cat in Category.entries) {
|
||||
if (cat !in categories) continue
|
||||
val catTests = testsByCat[cat].orEmpty()
|
||||
val catFindings = findingsByCat[cat].orEmpty()
|
||||
|
||||
val failed = catTests.count { isInconclusiveTest(it.status) }
|
||||
val inconclusive = catTests.isNotEmpty() && failed * 2 > catTests.size
|
||||
|
||||
val worst = catFindings.maxByOrNull { it.severity.rank }
|
||||
val verdict = when {
|
||||
inconclusive -> Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
|
||||
worst == null -> Verdict.GREEN
|
||||
else -> worst.severity.toLight()
|
||||
}
|
||||
perCat[serialName(cat)] = CategorySummary(
|
||||
verdict = verdict,
|
||||
worstFinding = worst?.id,
|
||||
testsRun = catTests.size,
|
||||
testsFailed = failed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val overall = deriveOverall(perCat.values)
|
||||
return Summary(overall = overall, categories = perCat)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Overall = worst light; inconclusive only if every category is inconclusive. */
|
||||
private fun deriveOverall(cats: Collection<CategorySummary>): Verdict {
|
||||
if (cats.isEmpty()) return Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
|
||||
if (cats.all { it.verdict == Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE }) return Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
|
||||
val rank = mapOf(Verdict.GREEN to 0, Verdict.YELLOW to 1, Verdict.RED to 2)
|
||||
// Non-inconclusive categories decide the overall light.
|
||||
return cats.filter { it.verdict != Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE }
|
||||
.maxByOrNull { rank.getValue(it.verdict) }!!.verdict
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun serialName(cat: Category): String = cat.name.lowercase()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
|
||||
|
||||
/** The generic test envelope (measurement-schema.md §6). params must fully reproduce the test;
|
||||
* evidence is append-only raw truth; metrics must be recomputable from evidence. All three are
|
||||
* per-test-type JSON, so they are carried as JsonObject. */
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Test(
|
||||
val id: String, // UUIDv7
|
||||
val type: String, // TestType registry (§6.1)
|
||||
@SerialName("network_ref") val networkRef: String? = null,
|
||||
@SerialName("session_ref") val sessionRef: String? = null, // null for local-only tests
|
||||
val tier: Tier,
|
||||
@SerialName("started_mono_ns") val startedMonoNs: Long,
|
||||
@SerialName("ended_mono_ns") val endedMonoNs: Long,
|
||||
val status: TestStatus,
|
||||
val error: TestError? = null,
|
||||
val params: JsonObject? = null,
|
||||
val evidence: JsonObject? = null,
|
||||
val metrics: JsonObject? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Tier {
|
||||
@SerialName("app") APP,
|
||||
@SerialName("shizuku") SHIZUKU,
|
||||
@SerialName("root") ROOT,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class TestStatus {
|
||||
@SerialName("ok") OK,
|
||||
@SerialName("failed") FAILED,
|
||||
@SerialName("unsupported") UNSUPPORTED,
|
||||
@SerialName("skipped") SKIPPED,
|
||||
@SerialName("partial") PARTIAL,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class TestError(val code: String, val detail: String? = null)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The v1 test-type registry (§6.1). String constants (dotted, family-first) so probe code and the
|
||||
* server's measurement-schema test-type registry stay aligned. [category] maps a type to one of
|
||||
* the fixed §7.2 categories for verdict rollup.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object TestType {
|
||||
// link
|
||||
const val LINK_SNAPSHOT = "link.snapshot"
|
||||
const val LINK_DHCP_RENEWAL_WATCH = "link.dhcp_renewal_watch"
|
||||
const val LINK_IP_MONITOR = "link.ip_monitor"
|
||||
/** Who advertises IPv6 on this link (+ gateway identity). Registry addition, v1.1. */
|
||||
const val LINK_RA_SOURCE = "link.ra_source"
|
||||
// net — connectivity validation (reproduces Android's NetworkMonitor generate_204 checks)
|
||||
const val NET_CAPTIVE_PORTAL = "net.captive_portal"
|
||||
// icmp
|
||||
const val ICMP_PING4 = "icmp.ping4"
|
||||
const val ICMP_PING6 = "icmp.ping6"
|
||||
// trace
|
||||
const val TRACEROUTE_UDP4 = "traceroute.udp4"
|
||||
const val TRACEROUTE_UDP6 = "traceroute.udp6"
|
||||
const val TRACEROUTE_ICMP4 = "traceroute.icmp4"
|
||||
const val TRACEROUTE_ICMP6 = "traceroute.icmp6"
|
||||
// train
|
||||
const val TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN = "train.udp_updown"
|
||||
// mtu
|
||||
const val MTU_PMTUD_UP = "mtu.pmtud_up"
|
||||
const val MTU_PMTUD_DOWN = "mtu.pmtud_down"
|
||||
const val MTU_BLACKHOLE = "mtu.blackhole"
|
||||
const val MTU_MSS_OBSERVED = "mtu.mss_observed"
|
||||
const val MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY = "mtu.frag_delivery"
|
||||
// nat
|
||||
const val NAT_STUN_5780 = "nat.stun_5780"
|
||||
const val NAT_MAPPING_LIFETIME_UDP = "nat.mapping_lifetime_udp"
|
||||
const val NAT_MAPPING_LIFETIME_TCP = "nat.mapping_lifetime_tcp"
|
||||
const val NAT_HAIRPIN = "nat.hairpin"
|
||||
const val NAT_CONNECT_BACK = "nat.connect_back"
|
||||
const val NAT_CGNAT_DETECT = "nat.cgnat_detect"
|
||||
// dns
|
||||
const val DNS_RESOLVER_INVENTORY = "dns.resolver_inventory"
|
||||
const val DNS_CANARY = "dns.canary"
|
||||
const val DNS_INTERCEPTION = "dns.interception"
|
||||
const val DNS_TTL_INTEGRITY = "dns.ttl_integrity"
|
||||
const val DNS_ANSWER_INTEGRITY = "dns.answer_integrity"
|
||||
const val DNS_DNSSEC = "dns.dnssec"
|
||||
const val DNS_NXDOMAIN_WILDCARD = "dns.nxdomain_wildcard"
|
||||
const val DNS_REBIND_FILTER = "dns.rebind_filter"
|
||||
const val DNS_AAAA_FILTER = "dns.aaaa_filter"
|
||||
const val DNS_DNS64 = "dns.dns64"
|
||||
const val DNS_COMPARE = "dns.compare"
|
||||
// sec
|
||||
const val SEC_TLS_REFERENCE = "sec.tls_reference"
|
||||
const val SEC_CLIENTHELLO_ECHO = "sec.clienthello_echo"
|
||||
const val SEC_HTTP_ECHO = "sec.http_echo"
|
||||
const val SEC_SNI_FILTER = "sec.sni_filter"
|
||||
const val SEC_DSCP_ECN_SURVIVAL = "sec.dscp_ecn_survival"
|
||||
const val SEC_ARP_WATCH = "sec.arp_watch"
|
||||
// port
|
||||
const val PORT_REACH_SWEEP = "port.reach_sweep"
|
||||
const val PORT_UDP_USABILITY = "port.udp_usability"
|
||||
// perf
|
||||
const val PERF_THROUGHPUT_TCP = "perf.throughput_tcp"
|
||||
const val PERF_THROUGHPUT_UDP = "perf.throughput_udp"
|
||||
const val PERF_BUFFERBLOAT = "perf.bufferbloat"
|
||||
const val PERF_RRC_LATENCY = "perf.rrc_latency"
|
||||
// v6
|
||||
const val V6_DUALSTACK_COMPARE = "v6.dualstack_compare"
|
||||
const val V6_HAPPY_EYEBALLS = "v6.happy_eyeballs"
|
||||
const val V6_BROKENNESS = "v6.brokenness"
|
||||
const val V6_NAT64_CLAT = "v6.nat64_clat"
|
||||
// wifi
|
||||
const val WIFI_ENVIRONMENT_SCAN = "wifi.environment_scan"
|
||||
const val WIFI_ROAM_LOG = "wifi.roam_log"
|
||||
const val WIFI_SIGNAL_LOG = "wifi.signal_log"
|
||||
// local
|
||||
const val LOCAL_MDNS_INVENTORY = "local.mdns_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_SSDP_INVENTORY = "local.ssdp_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_LLMNR_INVENTORY = "local.llmnr_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_GATEWAY_SERVICES = "local.gateway_services"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_NTP = "local.ntp"
|
||||
// peer
|
||||
const val PEER_REACHABILITY = "peer.reachability"
|
||||
const val PEER_ISOLATION = "peer.isolation"
|
||||
const val PEER_MULTICAST = "peer.multicast"
|
||||
const val PEER_LAN_TRAIN = "peer.lan_train"
|
||||
const val PEER_LEASE_DIFF = "peer.lease_diff"
|
||||
// time
|
||||
const val TIME_SERVER_OFFSET = "time.server_offset"
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps a dotted test type to its §7.2 category for verdict rollup. */
|
||||
fun category(type: String): Category = when (type.substringBefore('.')) {
|
||||
"link", "icmp", "trace", "traceroute", "train", "port", "time", "net" -> Category.CONNECTIVITY
|
||||
"dns" -> Category.DNS
|
||||
"nat" -> Category.NAT
|
||||
"mtu" -> Category.MTU
|
||||
"v6" -> Category.IPV6
|
||||
"sec" -> Category.SECURITY
|
||||
"perf" -> Category.PERFORMANCE
|
||||
"local", "peer" -> Category.LOCAL
|
||||
"wifi" -> Category.WIFI
|
||||
else -> Category.CONNECTIVITY
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
class SerializationTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private val json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true; encodeDefaults = true }
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun documentRoundTrips() {
|
||||
val doc = MeasurementDocument(
|
||||
run = Run(
|
||||
id = "0198c5f2-0000-7000-8000-000000000000",
|
||||
trigger = Trigger.MANUAL,
|
||||
startedAt = "2026-07-31T14:03:21.114Z",
|
||||
clock = Clock(monoOriginWall = "2026-07-31T14:03:21.114Z"),
|
||||
app = AppInfo(version = "0.1.0", build = 1),
|
||||
device = DeviceInfo("OnePlus", "CPH2747", 36, "16"),
|
||||
tiers = Tiers(app = true, shizuku = true),
|
||||
),
|
||||
networks = listOf(
|
||||
Network(
|
||||
id = "net-1", transport = Transport.WIFI, iface = "wlan0",
|
||||
link = Link(mtu = 1500, addresses = listOf(Address("192.0.2.23", 24, "global"))),
|
||||
wifi = Wifi(ssid = "example", rssiDbm = -54),
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
tests = listOf(
|
||||
Test(
|
||||
id = "t-1", type = TestType.ICMP_PING4, networkRef = "net-1", tier = Tier.APP,
|
||||
startedMonoNs = 0, endedMonoNs = 38_000_000, status = TestStatus.OK,
|
||||
evidence = TrainEvidence(
|
||||
epochMonoNs = 0, seq = listOf(0, 1), tTxNs = listOf(0L, 20_000_000L),
|
||||
tRxNs = listOf(16_500_000L, null), sizeBytes = listOf(64, 64),
|
||||
).toEvidence(),
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val encoded = json.encodeToString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), doc)
|
||||
val decoded = json.decodeFromString(MeasurementDocument.serializer(), encoded)
|
||||
assertEquals(doc.run.id, decoded.run.id)
|
||||
assertEquals(Transport.WIFI, decoded.networks[0].transport)
|
||||
assertEquals(TestType.ICMP_PING4, decoded.tests[0].type)
|
||||
// snake_case field names on the wire
|
||||
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"schema_version\""))
|
||||
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"mono_origin_wall\""))
|
||||
assertTrue(encoded.contains("\"t_tx_ns\""))
|
||||
// null preserved at train index 1
|
||||
assertTrue(encoded.contains("[16500000,null]"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun findingRequiresEvidence() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = "f-1", code = "x", category = Category.DNS, severity = Severity.INFO,
|
||||
confidence = Confidence.LOW, title = "t", description = "d", evidenceRefs = emptyList(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
throw AssertionError("expected IllegalArgumentException for empty evidence_refs")
|
||||
} catch (e: IllegalArgumentException) {
|
||||
// expected — a finding with no evidence is invalid (§7.1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test as JTest
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
|
||||
class VerdictsTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun test(type: String, status: TestStatus, id: String = type): Test =
|
||||
Test(id = id, type = type, tier = Tier.APP, startedMonoNs = 0, endedMonoNs = 1, status = status)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun finding(cat: Category, sev: Severity, id: String = "f-$cat-$sev"): Finding =
|
||||
Finding(
|
||||
id = id, code = "x.$cat", category = cat, severity = sev, confidence = Confidence.HIGH,
|
||||
title = "t", description = "d", evidenceRefs = listOf(EvidenceRef("some-test")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun categoryLightFromWorstSeverity() {
|
||||
val tests = listOf(test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.OK))
|
||||
val findings = listOf(
|
||||
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.LOW),
|
||||
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH), // worst → red
|
||||
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.INFO),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, findings)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
assertEquals("f-DNS-HIGH", s.categories["dns"]!!.worstFinding)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.overall)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun noFindingsIsGreen() {
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(listOf(test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK)), emptyList())
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.categories["mtu"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.overall)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun mediumAndLowAreYellow() {
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(
|
||||
listOf(test(TestType.SEC_HTTP_ECHO, TestStatus.OK)),
|
||||
listOf(finding(Category.SECURITY, Severity.MEDIUM)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.YELLOW, s.categories["security"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun majorityFailedIsInconclusive() {
|
||||
// 2 of 3 dns tests failed → > 50% → inconclusive, even with a finding present.
|
||||
val tests = listOf(
|
||||
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.FAILED, "a"),
|
||||
test(TestType.DNS_TTL_INTEGRITY, TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED, "b"),
|
||||
test(TestType.DNS_COMPARE, TestStatus.OK, "c"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, listOf(finding(Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH)))
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
assertEquals(2, s.categories["dns"]!!.testsFailed)
|
||||
assertEquals(3, s.categories["dns"]!!.testsRun)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun exactlyHalfFailedIsNotInconclusive() {
|
||||
// 1 of 2 failed → not > 50% → the finding decides.
|
||||
val tests = listOf(
|
||||
test(TestType.NAT_HAIRPIN, TestStatus.FAILED, "a"),
|
||||
test(TestType.NAT_CONNECT_BACK, TestStatus.OK, "b"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, listOf(finding(Category.NAT, Severity.CRITICAL)))
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.categories["nat"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun overallIsWorstCategory() {
|
||||
val tests = listOf(
|
||||
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.OK, "d"),
|
||||
test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK, "m"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val findings = listOf(
|
||||
finding(Category.DNS, Severity.MEDIUM), // yellow
|
||||
finding(Category.MTU, Severity.CRITICAL), // red
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, findings)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.RED, s.overall)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun overallInconclusiveOnlyWhenAllAre() {
|
||||
val tests = listOf(
|
||||
test(TestType.DNS_CANARY, TestStatus.FAILED, "d"), // dns inconclusive
|
||||
test(TestType.MTU_BLACKHOLE, TestStatus.OK, "m"), // mtu green
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = Verdicts.derive(tests, emptyList())
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE, s.categories["dns"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.categories["mtu"]!!.verdict)
|
||||
assertEquals(Verdict.GREEN, s.overall) // not all inconclusive → mtu decides
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@JTest
|
||||
fun categoryMappingCoversFamilies() {
|
||||
assertEquals(Category.CONNECTIVITY, TestType.category(TestType.TRACEROUTE_UDP4))
|
||||
assertEquals(Category.IPV6, TestType.category(TestType.V6_BROKENNESS))
|
||||
assertEquals(Category.LOCAL, TestType.category(TestType.PEER_MULTICAST))
|
||||
assertEquals(Category.PERFORMANCE, TestType.category(TestType.PERF_BUFFERBLOAT))
|
||||
assertEquals(Category.CONNECTIVITY, TestType.category(TestType.TIME_SERVER_OFFSET))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ data class MeasurementDocument(
|
||||
data class Run(
|
||||
val id: String, // UUIDv7
|
||||
val trigger: Trigger,
|
||||
val mode: RunMode = RunMode.SHORT,
|
||||
@SerialName("started_at") val startedAt: String, // RFC3339 UTC, human correlation only
|
||||
@SerialName("ended_at") val endedAt: String? = null,
|
||||
val clock: Clock,
|
||||
@@ -35,9 +36,58 @@ data class Run(
|
||||
val device: DeviceInfo,
|
||||
val tiers: Tiers,
|
||||
@SerialName("profiles_used") val profilesUsed: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
val constraints: Constraints = Constraints(),
|
||||
val notes: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* What limited this run — the counterpart to [Tiers], which records what was available.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A constrained run is not a failed run, and it is not a normal one either. Without this, a run
|
||||
* taken through a VPN looks exactly like a clean run of a healthy network: the same shape, the
|
||||
* same green verdict, and no way for a reader — or a server aggregating thousands of these — to
|
||||
* know that almost nothing was actually measured.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class Constraints(
|
||||
/** A VPN held the default route while this ran. */
|
||||
@SerialName("vpn_active") val vpnActive: Boolean = false,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Per-network probing was refused by the OS.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Android blocks `Network.bindSocket()` on the underlying networks whenever a VPN is up, to
|
||||
* stop apps leaking around the tunnel. Every per-network test then measures nothing, so any
|
||||
* conclusion drawn about the wifi or cellular link underneath is unfounded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SerialName("per_network_blocked") val perNetworkBlocked: Boolean = false,
|
||||
/** Networks that could not be measured, by id. */
|
||||
@SerialName("unmeasured_networks") val unmeasuredNetworks: List<String> = emptyList(),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
/** True when this run's results mean something different from an unconstrained one. */
|
||||
val constrained: Boolean get() = vpnActive || perNetworkBlocked
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How long the run watched the network — and therefore what its silence is worth.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A [SHORT] run is a sequence of one-shot probes: each looks at the network for a second or two and
|
||||
* moves on. That is enough to characterise a network's *configuration*, and it is structurally
|
||||
* incapable of seeing anything intermittent. A wifi link that drops for four seconds every two
|
||||
* minutes, a resolver that stalls under load, an AP that roams — none of these leave a trace in
|
||||
* thirty seconds of probing unless the run happened to coincide with one.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A [LONG] run starts continuous listeners at t=0, runs the same battery beside them, and keeps
|
||||
* sampling until the window closes. It answers a different question, so a reader must not treat the
|
||||
* two alike: **the mode is what licenses an argument from absence**. "No drops were observed" means
|
||||
* something after five minutes of watching and nothing at all after a thirty-second run, and
|
||||
* without this field the two documents are indistinguishable.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class RunMode {
|
||||
@SerialName("short") SHORT,
|
||||
@SerialName("long") LONG,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
enum class Trigger {
|
||||
@SerialName("manual") MANUAL,
|
||||
|
||||
+341
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The registry of finding codes (measurement-schema.md §9, open item 1).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A finding code is the stable, machine-readable half of a result: the prose changes, the code is
|
||||
* what a dashboard groups by and what someone greps a year of archived runs for. That only holds
|
||||
* if a code means exactly one thing forever — which is not something ad-hoc string literals at
|
||||
* fifteen call sites can promise.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The failure this exists to prevent had already happened by the time it was written. Two
|
||||
* independently-added emitters produced `connectivity.downstream_loss` and
|
||||
* `connectivity.loss_downstream` for the same concept, and nothing anywhere objected. Anyone
|
||||
* aggregating either one would have silently seen half their data.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* So codes are declared here as typed specs, each carrying its category and default severity, and
|
||||
* emitters reference the spec rather than retyping the string. That makes a typo a compile error,
|
||||
* and makes it impossible for two call sites to disagree about which category a finding belongs
|
||||
* to — a disagreement that would otherwise split one fault across two verdict lights.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
data class FindingSpec(
|
||||
val code: String,
|
||||
val category: Category,
|
||||
/** Severity when nothing about the specific run argues otherwise; emitters may escalate. */
|
||||
val severity: Severity,
|
||||
/** One line: what this finding asserts. Present tense, no hedging. */
|
||||
val meaning: String,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* What the finding rules *out*, where that is the useful half. "Loss upstream" is worth much
|
||||
* more when it also says the return path is fine, because that halves where to look next.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val rulesOut: String? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
object FindingRegistry {
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- connectivity ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
// Renamed from nat.* before anything shipped: neither of these is about NAT, and the
|
||||
// prefix is what decides which category - and therefore which verdict light - a finding
|
||||
// rolls up into. A nat.* code landing under connectivity would be a permanent puzzle.
|
||||
val UDP_UNREACHABLE = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.udp_unreachable", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"No UDP echo replies came back from the server at all.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.udp_unreachable_upstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"The server received none of the probes, so traffic is dropped on the way out.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "The return path: nothing arrived to be replied to.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val UDP_LOSS = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.udp_loss", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"A large fraction of round-trip probes were lost, direction unknown.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val LOSS_UPSTREAM = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.loss_upstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"Probes were lost on the way to the server.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "The return path: replies came back for everything that arrived.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The single code for "lost on the return path", whichever measurement found it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Two emitters had independently invented `connectivity.downstream_loss` and
|
||||
* `connectivity.loss_downstream` for this, and nothing objected. Anyone aggregating either
|
||||
* one would have silently seen half their data. Paired with [LOSS_UPSTREAM] so the two
|
||||
* directions read as a set.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val LOSS_DOWNSTREAM = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.loss_downstream", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"Packets were lost on the way back from the server.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "The outbound path: the server received what it was answering.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.downstream_blocked", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"Server-initiated packets never arrive, although round trips work.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "Basic reachability: the path forwards replies, just not unsolicited traffic.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val DOWNSTREAM_REORDER = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.downstream_reorder", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.LOW,
|
||||
"Downstream packets arrive in a different order than they were sent.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// MEDIUM, not HIGH: a captive portal is a condition to report, not necessarily a fault - on
|
||||
// hotel or cafe wifi it is exactly what should be there, and logging in clears it. NO_INTERNET
|
||||
// is the HIGH one, because nothing the user does locally fixes that. The registry first said
|
||||
// HIGH; the probe emitting it had always said MEDIUM, and the probe was the considered value.
|
||||
val CAPTIVE_PORTAL = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.captive_portal", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"A captive portal is intercepting connectivity checks.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val NO_INTERNET = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.no_internet", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"Android's own connectivity checks fail on this network.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The finding a short run cannot make.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Every one-shot probe describes the network during its own two seconds. A link that drops and
|
||||
* returns between two of them leaves no trace anywhere in the document — the probes before and
|
||||
* after both succeed, and the run reports a healthy network. Only a listener that watches the
|
||||
* whole window sees the gap, which is why this is emitted from `networks[].changes[]` (§4)
|
||||
* rather than from any test's evidence.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* MEDIUM by default and escalated by the emitter on repeat: one drop in five minutes is worth
|
||||
* knowing about, three is the difference between "the wifi hiccuped" and "this link is why
|
||||
* calls keep dropping". Deliberately claims a *completed* cycle — lost and then regained — so
|
||||
* it never fires for a network that was simply turned off partway through the run.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val LINK_FLAPPING = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"connectivity.link_flapping", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"A network dropped and came back one or more times during the run.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "A momentary probe failure: the drop was watched happening, not inferred from silence.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- mtu -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
val MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"mtu.reduced_downstream", Category.MTU, Severity.LOW,
|
||||
"The downstream path MTU is below the usual 1500 bytes.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"mtu.downstream_blackhole", Category.MTU, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"Datagrams above the path MTU are dropped downstream, fragmented or not.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"mtu.fragments_blocked", Category.MTU, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"IP fragments do not reach this device even when sent in order.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"mtu.fragment_reorder_sensitive", Category.MTU, Severity.LOW,
|
||||
"Fragments are delivered in order but dropped when reordered or delayed.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "Fragmentation itself: in-order fragments arrive fine.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- nat -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
val NAT_UDP_REBINDING = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"nat.udp_rebinding", Category.NAT, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"A NAT remapped the UDP source port mid-flow.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val NAT_SYMMETRIC = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"nat.symmetric", Category.NAT, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"The NAT assigns a different external port per destination.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- perf ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
val THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"perf.throughput_no_delivery", Category.PERFORMANCE, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"No throughput traffic arrived, although the server sent it.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"perf.throughput_below_offered", Category.PERFORMANCE, Severity.LOW,
|
||||
"Less throughput arrived than the server sent for the whole run.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- dns -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
val DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"dns.answer_rewritten", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"A resolver returned an answer that differs from the authoritative record.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"dns.authoritative_unreachable", Category.DNS, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"The canary zone's authoritative server could not be reached.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- v6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prefix is `v6.`, matching the test-type registry (v6.brokenness, v6.happy_eyeballs, ...).
|
||||
// These were `ipv6.*` while declaring Category.IPV6, but the prefix map only knows "v6", so
|
||||
// they silently rolled up under connectivity: the third instance of a prefix disagreeing with
|
||||
// its category and quietly moving a fault to a different verdict light.
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Renamed from `v6.broken`, which claimed more than the evidence supports.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The only signal behind it is ICMPv6 echo getting no reply — and ICMPv6 echo is widely
|
||||
* filtered on networks where IPv6 otherwise works perfectly. A phone that reported this while
|
||||
* happily loading an IPv6-only site over TCP is what caught it. From here the two cases look
|
||||
* identical, so the finding now says what was observed and names both explanations rather than
|
||||
* picking one.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It is worth reporting either way: filtered ICMPv6 breaks Path MTU Discovery, which is its
|
||||
* own fault even when IPv6 works.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A global IPv6 address with no default route.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is the structural version of the same complaint, and it is worth far more than the
|
||||
* ICMP one because it admits no other explanation: the device has an address it cannot route
|
||||
* with. Nothing is filtered, nothing is inferred — the routing table says so directly, and it
|
||||
* is already in the link snapshot.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Not always a fault. A VPN that installs host routes to specific destinations produces
|
||||
* exactly this shape on purpose, and it works. What makes it worth reporting either way is
|
||||
* that applications cannot tell: having a global address, they will try IPv6 first and stall
|
||||
* for every destination the routes do not cover.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* An IPv6 default route with no global address to use it from — the mirror of
|
||||
* [V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE], and the more common misconfiguration of the two.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The router is sending RAs that name it as a default gateway, but SLAAC produced no address:
|
||||
* no prefix information option, or a prefix without the autonomous flag, or DHCPv6-only
|
||||
* addressing the device did not complete. The network is announcing IPv6 service it does not
|
||||
* actually deliver.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is worth flagging above the ICMP signal because it is both certain and consequential.
|
||||
* Hosts see router advertisements, believe IPv6 is available, and pay a connection-attempt
|
||||
* timeout on every dual-stack destination before falling back to IPv4 — the classic "the
|
||||
* internet feels slow" complaint with no packet loss anywhere to explain it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"v6.route_without_address", Category.IPV6, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"The network advertises an IPv6 default route but the device has no global IPv6 address.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "A working IPv6 setup: SLAAC did not produce a usable address on this link.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A VPN prevented the underlying networks from being measured.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Reported rather than worked around: Android refuses `Network.bindSocket()` on the networks
|
||||
* beneath a VPN precisely so apps cannot leak around the tunnel, and that is correct
|
||||
* behaviour. What is not acceptable is a run that quietly measures nothing and calls the
|
||||
* result healthy, so this says plainly which networks went unmeasured and why.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve through it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Worth separating from every other DNS failure because the remedy is somewhere else entirely.
|
||||
* A name that will not resolve looks identical to a user whatever the cause, and the two causes
|
||||
* pull in opposite directions: a server that does not answer means the network is broken and
|
||||
* the router is the thing to examine, while a server that answers a direct query on a device
|
||||
* that still cannot resolve means the platform resolver has wedged — fixed by toggling wifi,
|
||||
* and nothing to do with the network at all.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Proven rather than inferred: the probe sends its own UDP query, bypassing the component under
|
||||
* suspicion, and compares that against what the platform returns for the same name.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The network hands out a search domain its DNS server will not answer for.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A resolver appends search domains to lookups, so every name a client asks about can stall on
|
||||
* a domain the server ignores. The failure mode is silence rather than a negative answer, and
|
||||
* silence is indistinguishable from packet loss: clients retry instead of moving on, and some
|
||||
* give up on the lookup entirely. That makes it look like the device is broken when the
|
||||
* network is.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Whether it bites depends on the resolver — some try the bare name first and never notice —
|
||||
* which is why two devices on the same network can disagree about whether DNS works.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"dns.search_domain_unanswered", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"The network advertises a DNS search domain that its own server does not answer for.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "A fault on this device: the same server answers ordinary names normally.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"dns.system_resolver_broken", Category.DNS, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"The network's DNS server answers, but this device cannot resolve names through it.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "A network fault: the server replied to a query sent from this device.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"measurement.vpn_constrained", Category.CONNECTIVITY, Severity.INFO,
|
||||
"A VPN was active, so the networks underneath it could not be measured.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "Nothing — this run says little about the underlying network either way.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"v6.no_default_route", Category.IPV6, Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
"The device has a global IPv6 address but no IPv6 default route.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "Guesswork: this is read from the routing table, not inferred from silence.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"v6.no_icmp_reply", Category.IPV6, Severity.LOW,
|
||||
"IPv6 is configured but ICMPv6 echo gets no reply.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "Nothing on its own: IPv6 may work fine with ICMP filtered.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* IPv6 is advertised and does not work — the claim `v6.broken` originally made on ICMP
|
||||
* silence alone, now reinstated because it can finally be backed: it is only emitted when a
|
||||
* real IPv6 TCP connection (v6.brokenness) failed on the same network whose ICMPv6 went
|
||||
* unanswered. Two independent transports failing on a network that advertises IPv6 is what
|
||||
* "broken" actually means; either signal alone still gets [V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY].
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val V6_BROKEN = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"v6.broken", Category.IPV6, Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
"IPv6 is advertised on this network but carries no traffic.",
|
||||
rulesOut = "ICMP filtering as the benign explanation: a TCP connection over IPv6 failed too.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* INFO deliberately, and it needs to stay that way.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Most networks still do not offer IPv6, and that is not a fault. Reporting it as a warning
|
||||
* lights a yellow verdict on a perfectly healthy network, which teaches people to ignore the
|
||||
* light — the one thing a diagnostic must never do.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val V6_NOT_OFFERED = FindingSpec(
|
||||
"v6.not_offered", Category.IPV6, Severity.INFO,
|
||||
"This network does not offer IPv6.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Every registered finding, in declaration order. */
|
||||
val all: List<FindingSpec> = listOf(
|
||||
UDP_UNREACHABLE, UDP_UNREACHABLE_UPSTREAM, UDP_LOSS, LOSS_UPSTREAM, LOSS_DOWNSTREAM,
|
||||
DOWNSTREAM_BLOCKED, DOWNSTREAM_REORDER, CAPTIVE_PORTAL, NO_INTERNET, LINK_FLAPPING,
|
||||
MTU_REDUCED_DOWNSTREAM, MTU_DOWNSTREAM_BLACKHOLE, FRAGMENTS_BLOCKED,
|
||||
FRAGMENT_REORDER_SENSITIVE,
|
||||
NAT_UDP_REBINDING, NAT_SYMMETRIC,
|
||||
THROUGHPUT_NO_DELIVERY, THROUGHPUT_BELOW_OFFERED,
|
||||
DNS_ANSWER_REWRITTEN, DNS_AUTHORITATIVE_UNREACHABLE,
|
||||
DNS_SEARCH_DOMAIN_UNANSWERED, DNS_SYSTEM_RESOLVER_BROKEN, MEASUREMENT_VPN_CONSTRAINED,
|
||||
V6_NO_DEFAULT_ROUTE, V6_ROUTE_WITHOUT_ADDRESS, V6_NO_ICMP_REPLY, V6_BROKEN, V6_NOT_OFFERED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private val byCode: Map<String, FindingSpec> = all.associateBy { it.code }
|
||||
|
||||
fun byCode(code: String): FindingSpec? = byCode[code]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +18,39 @@ data class Network(
|
||||
val wifi: Wifi? = null,
|
||||
val cellular: Cellular? = null,
|
||||
val changes: List<NetworkChange> = emptyList(),
|
||||
@SerialName("system_verdict") val systemVerdict: SystemVerdict? = null,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether an ordinary app may send on this network at all.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* False for the carrier's special-purpose networks — IMS/VoLTE, MMS, XCAP — which appear
|
||||
* beside the real ones in Android's list and carry neither `INTERNET` nor `NOT_RESTRICTED`.
|
||||
* Binding to those needs `CONNECTIVITY_USE_RESTRICTED_NETWORKS`, a privileged permission no
|
||||
* normal app can hold, so the refusal is permanent and says nothing about the network's
|
||||
* health. Recorded rather than hidden: a reader seeing an interface with no measurements
|
||||
* against it deserves to know the OS forbade them, instead of concluding the link is dead.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SerialName("app_usable") val appUsable: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* What Android itself concluded about a network, as opposed to what we measured.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Recorded because it is the verdict the user can see — the "no internet" warning in the status
|
||||
* bar — and because it is free: the platform has already done the work by the time a run starts.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Its real value is disagreement. When Android says a network is unusable and our own probes reach
|
||||
* the internet regardless, the fault is in the device rather than the network, and that distinction
|
||||
* is the difference between "fix your router" and "toggle your wifi". Neither number alone can say
|
||||
* that; only the two together.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
data class SystemVerdict(
|
||||
/** Android's own connectivity check passed. Null when the platform did not say. */
|
||||
val validated: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
/** Android believes a captive portal is intercepting this network. */
|
||||
@SerialName("captive_portal") val captivePortal: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
/** Some traffic works and some does not — Android's own hedge. */
|
||||
@SerialName("partial_connectivity") val partialConnectivity: Boolean? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Serializable
|
||||
@@ -111,3 +144,38 @@ data class NetworkChange(
|
||||
val kind: String, // lost | gained | link_changed
|
||||
val detail: JsonObject? = null,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* What a network's `changes[]` add up to.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Lives beside the type rather than in the collector that produces it because two independent
|
||||
* consumers ask the same question — the watcher, computing its metrics, and the run engine,
|
||||
* deciding whether to emit `connectivity.link_flapping` — and a document whose metric and finding
|
||||
* disagreed about how many times the link dropped would be worse than one reporting neither.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object NetworkChanges {
|
||||
|
||||
const val LOST = "lost"
|
||||
const val GAINED = "gained"
|
||||
const val LINK_CHANGED = "link_changed"
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Completed drop-and-return cycles: a `lost` with a later `gained` on the same network.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A cycle has to *complete*. A link that goes away at minute four and is still gone when the
|
||||
* window closes was not flapping — it was switched off, or the device was carried out of
|
||||
* range, and calling that the same fault would put a phone in a lift beside a failing access
|
||||
* point.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun flapCycles(kinds: List<String>): Int {
|
||||
var cycles = 0
|
||||
var down = false
|
||||
for (k in kinds) {
|
||||
if (k == LOST) down = true
|
||||
else if (k == GAINED && down) { cycles++; down = false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cycles
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun flapCyclesOf(changes: List<NetworkChange>): Int = flapCycles(changes.map { it.kind })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ data class CategorySummary(
|
||||
* (critical|high → red, medium|low → yellow, info/none → green).
|
||||
* - A category is `inconclusive` when > 50% of its tests are failed/unsupported.
|
||||
* - Overall = the worst category light; `inconclusive` only when ALL categories are.
|
||||
* - A run whose per-network probing was blocked is `inconclusive` outright, whatever the
|
||||
* categories say. The lights describe what the tests found; when the OS refused to let the
|
||||
* tests run, a green light would describe nothing at all.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The mapping test-type → category comes from [TestType.category]. Only categories that have
|
||||
* findings or tests appear in the summary.
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +47,10 @@ object Verdicts {
|
||||
private fun isInconclusiveTest(s: TestStatus) =
|
||||
s == TestStatus.FAILED || s == TestStatus.UNSUPPORTED
|
||||
|
||||
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>): Summary {
|
||||
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>): Summary =
|
||||
derive(tests, findings, Constraints())
|
||||
|
||||
fun derive(tests: List<Test>, findings: List<Finding>, constraints: Constraints): Summary {
|
||||
val testsByCat = tests.groupBy { TestType.category(it.type) }
|
||||
val findingsByCat = findings.groupBy { it.category }
|
||||
val categories = (testsByCat.keys + findingsByCat.keys)
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +78,14 @@ object Verdicts {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val overall = deriveOverall(perCat.values)
|
||||
// A run that could not measure the networks it was asked about has not found them
|
||||
// healthy; it has found out nothing. Reporting that as green is the single most
|
||||
// misleading thing this function could do, so the constraint outranks the lights.
|
||||
val overall = if (constraints.perNetworkBlocked) {
|
||||
Verdict.INCONCLUSIVE
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
deriveOverall(perCat.values)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Summary(overall = overall, categories = perCat)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,12 +69,16 @@ object TestType {
|
||||
const val TRACEROUTE_ICMP6 = "traceroute.icmp6"
|
||||
// train
|
||||
const val TRAIN_UDP_UPDOWN = "train.udp_updown"
|
||||
/** Server-to-client train under a §3.4 grant: the direction a round trip cannot separate. */
|
||||
const val TRAIN_UDP_DOWNSTREAM = "train.udp_downstream"
|
||||
// mtu
|
||||
const val MTU_PMTUD_UP = "mtu.pmtud_up"
|
||||
const val MTU_PMTUD_DOWN = "mtu.pmtud_down"
|
||||
const val MTU_BLACKHOLE = "mtu.blackhole"
|
||||
const val MTU_MSS_OBSERVED = "mtu.mss_observed"
|
||||
const val MTU_FRAG_DELIVERY = "mtu.frag_delivery"
|
||||
/** Whether fragments survive arriving out of order, not merely whether they survive. */
|
||||
const val MTU_FRAG_ORDERING = "mtu.frag_ordering"
|
||||
// nat
|
||||
const val NAT_STUN_5780 = "nat.stun_5780"
|
||||
const val NAT_MAPPING_LIFETIME_UDP = "nat.mapping_lifetime_udp"
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +89,13 @@ object TestType {
|
||||
// dns
|
||||
const val DNS_RESOLVER_INVENTORY = "dns.resolver_inventory"
|
||||
const val DNS_CANARY = "dns.canary"
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Does this device's own resolver work, as distinct from the network's DNS.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Registry addition, v1.1. Kept apart from [DNS_CANARY], which asks whether answers are being
|
||||
* tampered with; this asks whether answers arrive at all, and where the failure sits.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const val DNS_RESOLVER = "dns.resolver"
|
||||
const val DNS_INTERCEPTION = "dns.interception"
|
||||
const val DNS_TTL_INTEGRITY = "dns.ttl_integrity"
|
||||
const val DNS_ANSWER_INTEGRITY = "dns.answer_integrity"
|
||||
@@ -122,6 +133,16 @@ object TestType {
|
||||
const val LOCAL_MDNS_INVENTORY = "local.mdns_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_SSDP_INVENTORY = "local.ssdp_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_LLMNR_INVENTORY = "local.llmnr_inventory"
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* WS-Discovery (UDP 3702) and NetBIOS name service (UDP 137). Registry additions, v1.2.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Both are passive: the traffic is broadcast to the segment whether or not anyone asks, so
|
||||
* listening is the whole measurement. They earn their own ids rather than folding into
|
||||
* [LOCAL_SSDP_INVENTORY] because what they imply differs — WS-Discovery inventories printers
|
||||
* and cameras, while NetBIOS/LLMNR chatter is a security finding in its own right.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const val LOCAL_WSD_INVENTORY = "local.wsd_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_NETBIOS_INVENTORY = "local.netbios_inventory"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_GATEWAY_SERVICES = "local.gateway_services"
|
||||
const val LOCAL_NTP = "local.ntp"
|
||||
// peer
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The two ways a network can be half-configured for IPv6, read from the link snapshot.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Pure model logic rather than something a ViewModel does, because "is this network's IPv6
|
||||
* broken, and in which direction" is exactly the kind of judgement that should be checkable
|
||||
* against a captured routing table without a phone in the loop.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object V6Analysis {
|
||||
|
||||
/** Linux tunnel interfaces: WireGuard/Netbird (tun*, wg*), plus the usual VPN names. */
|
||||
private val TUNNEL_IFACE = Regex("""^(tun|tap|wg|ppp|ipsec|utun)\d*$""")
|
||||
|
||||
/** What one network's IPv6 configuration looks like. */
|
||||
data class Shape(
|
||||
val iface: String,
|
||||
/** A global address with no ::/0 route: an address the device cannot route with. */
|
||||
val addressWithoutRoute: Boolean,
|
||||
/** A ::/0 route with no global address: a route the device cannot source from. */
|
||||
val routeWithoutAddress: Boolean,
|
||||
/** The routes belong to a tunnel, so a partial view of IPv6 is likely deliberate. */
|
||||
val tunnel: Boolean,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Classifies each network's IPv6 configuration.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Both shapes are read straight from the link snapshot rather than inferred from silence, so
|
||||
* unlike an ICMP signal there is no competing explanation for what was observed — and both
|
||||
* matter for the same reason: an application cannot tell in advance, so it tries IPv6 first
|
||||
* and waits.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* They differ in what they mean. An address with no route is what a VPN installing host routes
|
||||
* to specific destinations produces on purpose, and it works; calling that a fault would be the
|
||||
* "lack of IPv6 is a yellow condition" mistake in a new costume, so a tunnel downgrades it to
|
||||
* information. A route with no address is the opposite: the router advertised itself as a
|
||||
* default gateway but SLAAC produced nothing usable, so the network is announcing IPv6 service
|
||||
* it does not deliver. That one is a real misconfiguration however it arises.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun classify(networks: List<Network>): List<Shape> = networks.map { n ->
|
||||
val globalV6 = n.link.addresses.any { isGlobalV6(it.addr) }
|
||||
val v6Routes = n.link.routes.filter { it.dst.contains(':') }
|
||||
val hasDefault = v6Routes.any { it.dst == "::/0" }
|
||||
Shape(
|
||||
iface = n.iface ?: v6Routes.firstOrNull()?.iface.orEmpty(),
|
||||
addressWithoutRoute = globalV6 && !hasDefault,
|
||||
routeWithoutAddress = hasDefault && !globalV6,
|
||||
// Android labels the transport itself, which beats guessing from a name; the regex
|
||||
// stays as a backstop for tunnels Android does not own (a userspace WireGuard, say,
|
||||
// or anything seen through the shell tier).
|
||||
tunnel = n.transport == Transport.VPN ||
|
||||
v6Routes.any { TUNNEL_IFACE.containsMatchIn(it.iface.orEmpty()) },
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Whether an address is IPv6 and usable as a source for off-link traffic.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ULAs count. A ULA is not globally routable, but it is a global-*scope* address the stack
|
||||
* will happily select as a source, which is the property that matters here — an overlay
|
||||
* network handing out fc00::/7 addresses is providing working IPv6 to the destinations it
|
||||
* carries, and treating that as "no address" would misreport every VPN as broken.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun isGlobalV6(addr: String): Boolean {
|
||||
if (!addr.contains(':')) return false
|
||||
val a = addr.substringBefore('%').lowercase() // strip any zone index
|
||||
return !a.startsWith("fe80") && a != "::1" && a != "::"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+133
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import java.io.File
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
import kotlin.test.fail
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Keeps the finding registry honest.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The interesting test is the last one: it reads `docs/findings-registry.md` and fails when the
|
||||
* document and the code disagree. Documentation that drifts from its implementation is worse than
|
||||
* none, because it still looks authoritative — and a finding registry is precisely the artifact
|
||||
* other people build tooling against.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class FindingRegistryTest {
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun codesAreUnique() {
|
||||
val dupes = FindingRegistry.all.groupBy { it.code }.filterValues { it.size > 1 }.keys
|
||||
assertTrue(dupes.isEmpty(), "duplicate finding codes: $dupes")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun everyDeclaredSpecIsInTheAllList() {
|
||||
// Reflection over the object's properties: a spec that is declared but left out of `all`
|
||||
// is invisible to the doc check and to any consumer enumerating the registry.
|
||||
val declared = FindingRegistry::class.java.declaredMethods
|
||||
.filter { it.parameterCount == 0 && it.returnType == FindingSpec::class.java }
|
||||
.mapNotNull { runCatching { it.invoke(FindingRegistry) as FindingSpec }.getOrNull() }
|
||||
.map { it.code }
|
||||
.toSet()
|
||||
val listed = FindingRegistry.all.map { it.code }.toSet()
|
||||
assertEquals(declared, listed, "declared specs and the `all` list disagree")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The prefix decides the category, and the category decides which verdict light the finding
|
||||
// rolls up into. A code whose prefix disagrees with its category silently moves a fault to a
|
||||
// different light — the exact bug that got two codes renamed out of nat.*.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun everyPrefixMatchesItsCategory() {
|
||||
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
|
||||
val fromPrefix = TestType.category(spec.code)
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
fromPrefix, spec.category,
|
||||
"${spec.code} is declared as ${spec.category} but its prefix maps to $fromPrefix",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun codesFollowTheNamingConvention() {
|
||||
val shape = Regex("^[a-z0-9]+\\.[a-z0-9_]+$")
|
||||
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
|
||||
assertTrue(shape.matches(spec.code), "malformed code: ${spec.code}")
|
||||
assertTrue(spec.meaning.isNotBlank(), "${spec.code} has no meaning")
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
spec.meaning.trimEnd().endsWith("."),
|
||||
"${spec.code}'s meaning should be a sentence: '${spec.meaning}'",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Two near-identical codes are how one fault ends up split across two dashboards. This is a
|
||||
// blunt check — it will not catch every synonym — but it catches the shape that already
|
||||
// happened: the same words in a different order.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun noTwoCodesAreAnagramsOfEachOther() {
|
||||
val normalised = FindingRegistry.all.associate { spec ->
|
||||
spec.code to spec.code.substringAfter('.').split('_').sorted().joinToString("_")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val clashes = normalised.entries.groupBy { it.value }.filterValues { it.size > 1 }
|
||||
if (clashes.isNotEmpty()) {
|
||||
fail("codes differing only in word order: ${clashes.values.map { g -> g.map { it.key } }}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun theDocumentAndTheRegistryAgree() {
|
||||
val doc = findDoc() ?: run {
|
||||
println("findings-registry.md not found from ${File(".").absolutePath} — skipping")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
val text = doc.readText()
|
||||
|
||||
// Only table rows count as "documented". Prose may legitimately mention a code that no
|
||||
// longer exists — the rules section explains why two were merged — and treating that as
|
||||
// a registry entry would force the document to forget its own history.
|
||||
val documented = text.lines()
|
||||
.filter { it.trimStart().startsWith("|") }
|
||||
.flatMap { row -> Regex("`([a-z0-9]+\\.[a-z0-9_]+)`").findAll(row).map { it.groupValues[1] } }
|
||||
.toSet()
|
||||
val registered = FindingRegistry.all.map { it.code }.toSet()
|
||||
|
||||
val missingFromDoc = registered - documented
|
||||
val missingFromCode = documented - registered
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
missingFromDoc.isEmpty(),
|
||||
"these codes exist in FindingRegistry but not in docs/findings-registry.md: $missingFromDoc",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
missingFromCode.isEmpty(),
|
||||
"docs/findings-registry.md documents codes that no longer exist: $missingFromCode",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// And the severities must match, or the document is describing a different system.
|
||||
for (spec in FindingRegistry.all) {
|
||||
val row = text.lines().firstOrNull {
|
||||
it.trimStart().startsWith("|") && it.contains("`${spec.code}`")
|
||||
} ?: continue
|
||||
val severity = spec.severity.name.lowercase()
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
row.contains("| $severity |"),
|
||||
"${spec.code} is ${severity} in code but the doc row says otherwise: $row",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Walks up from the test's working directory to find the repo's docs/ folder. */
|
||||
private fun findDoc(): File? {
|
||||
var dir: File? = File(".").absoluteFile
|
||||
repeat(6) {
|
||||
val candidate = File(dir, "docs/findings-registry.md")
|
||||
if (candidate.isFile) return candidate
|
||||
dir = dir?.parentFile
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+65
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Pins the counting behind `connectivity.link_flapping`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The finding claims a link went away and came back, and its severity escalates on repetition, so
|
||||
* this is arithmetic a person reading a report will act on. The cases that matter are the ones
|
||||
* where the naive count is wrong: a link still down when the window closed, and a run that started
|
||||
* while the link was already gone.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class NetworkChangesTest {
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun aQuietWindowHasNoCycles() {
|
||||
assertEquals(0, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(emptyList()))
|
||||
assertEquals(0, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("link_changed", "link_changed")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun oneDropAndReturnIsOneCycle() {
|
||||
assertEquals(1, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("lost", "gained")))
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
1,
|
||||
NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("link_changed", "lost", "link_changed", "gained")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun repeatedDropsCountSeparately() {
|
||||
assertEquals(3, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("lost", "gained", "lost", "gained", "lost", "gained")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A link that is still down when the run ends was not flapping — it was switched off, or the
|
||||
// device left its range. Counting that as a cycle would put a phone in a lift beside a failing
|
||||
// access point.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun aDropThatNeverReturnsIsNotACycle() {
|
||||
assertEquals(0, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("lost")))
|
||||
assertEquals(1, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("lost", "gained", "lost")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The mirror case: the window opened while the network was already gone, so its return is the
|
||||
// first thing seen. Nothing was watched dropping, so nothing is claimed.
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun aReturnWithNoObservedDropIsNotACycle() {
|
||||
assertEquals(0, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("gained")))
|
||||
assertEquals(0, NetworkChanges.flapCycles(listOf("gained", "link_changed")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun theChangeOverloadAgreesWithTheKindsOverload() {
|
||||
val changes = listOf(
|
||||
NetworkChange(atMonoNs = 1, kind = NetworkChanges.LOST),
|
||||
NetworkChange(atMonoNs = 2, kind = NetworkChanges.GAINED),
|
||||
NetworkChange(atMonoNs = 3, kind = NetworkChanges.LINK_CHANGED),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertEquals(1, NetworkChanges.flapCyclesOf(changes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+125
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
|
||||
package app.echo_lot.measurement
|
||||
|
||||
import kotlin.test.Test
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertFalse
|
||||
import kotlin.test.assertTrue
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The fixtures here are a real device's routing table, transcribed from `dumpsys connectivity`
|
||||
* on a OnePlus 15 with a Netbird tunnel up: wifi advertising a default route it cannot source
|
||||
* from, cellular working properly, and a VPN carrying host routes to two destinations.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Using a captured table rather than invented ones matters, because the bug this guards against
|
||||
* is not "the boolean logic is wrong" — it is "the shapes I imagined are not the shapes real
|
||||
* networks produce".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class V6AnalysisTest {
|
||||
|
||||
private fun net(
|
||||
id: String,
|
||||
transport: Transport,
|
||||
iface: String,
|
||||
addrs: List<String>,
|
||||
routes: List<Pair<String, String>>,
|
||||
) = Network(
|
||||
id = id,
|
||||
transport = transport,
|
||||
iface = iface,
|
||||
link = Link(
|
||||
addresses = addrs.map { Address(addr = it.substringBefore('/'), prefixLen = 64) },
|
||||
routes = routes.map { (dst, dev) -> Route(dst = dst, iface = dev) },
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** wlan0: an IPv6 default route via a link-local gateway, but SLAAC produced no address. */
|
||||
private val wifi = net(
|
||||
"w", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
|
||||
addrs = listOf("fe80::bcf6:edff:fe67:b139", "10.13.102.122"),
|
||||
routes = listOf(
|
||||
"fe80::/64" to "wlan0",
|
||||
"::/0" to "wlan0",
|
||||
"0.0.0.0/0" to "wlan0",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** rmnet_data1: a properly configured cellular link — global address and a default route. */
|
||||
private val cellular = net(
|
||||
"c", Transport.CELLULAR, "rmnet_data1",
|
||||
addrs = listOf("2001:4bb8:46a:e724:289d:87ff:feb6:ebd3"),
|
||||
routes = listOf("::/0" to "rmnet_data1", "2001:4bb8:46a:e724::/64" to "rmnet_data1"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/** tun1: Netbird, with a ULA and host routes to exactly two destinations. */
|
||||
private val vpn = net(
|
||||
"v", Transport.VPN, "tun1",
|
||||
addrs = listOf("100.64.158.131", "fdfd:c4fe:c4fe:c4fe:1f3c:98a0:dd66:ac7"),
|
||||
routes = listOf(
|
||||
"2001:1ad0:c4fe:6767::2/128" to "tun1",
|
||||
"2001:1ad0:c4fe:a::136/128" to "tun1",
|
||||
"fdfd:c4fe:c4fe:c4fe::/64" to "tun1",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `wifi advertising a route it cannot source from is reported`() {
|
||||
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(wifi)).single()
|
||||
assertTrue(s.routeWithoutAddress, "::/0 with only a link-local address is the RA-without-SLAAC case")
|
||||
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
|
||||
assertFalse(s.tunnel, "wifi is not a tunnel")
|
||||
assertEquals("wlan0", s.iface)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `a properly configured link produces no finding`() {
|
||||
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(cellular)).single()
|
||||
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `a tunnel with host routes is deliberate, not broken`() {
|
||||
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(vpn)).single()
|
||||
assertTrue(s.addressWithoutRoute, "a ULA and no ::/0 is an address with nothing to route it")
|
||||
assertTrue(s.tunnel, "so it must be reported as information, not as a fault")
|
||||
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `each network is judged on its own`() {
|
||||
// The whole point of per-network classification: "IPv6 is broken" is useless advice when
|
||||
// wifi is the broken one and cellular is fine.
|
||||
val shapes = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(wifi, cellular, vpn)).associateBy { it.iface }
|
||||
assertTrue(shapes.getValue("wlan0").routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
assertFalse(shapes.getValue("rmnet_data1").routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
assertFalse(shapes.getValue("rmnet_data1").addressWithoutRoute)
|
||||
assertTrue(shapes.getValue("tun1").addressWithoutRoute)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `a link-local-only network with no v6 route says nothing either way`() {
|
||||
// Plain IPv4-only wifi: no IPv6 offered at all. That is v6.not_offered's business, and
|
||||
// reporting it here as well would double up on a network that is merely legacy, not broken.
|
||||
val v4only = net(
|
||||
"4", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
|
||||
addrs = listOf("fe80::1", "192.168.1.5"),
|
||||
routes = listOf("0.0.0.0/0" to "wlan0"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val s = V6Analysis.classify(listOf(v4only)).single()
|
||||
assertFalse(s.routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
assertFalse(s.addressWithoutRoute)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun `a zone index does not hide a link-local address`() {
|
||||
val zoned = net(
|
||||
"z", Transport.WIFI, "wlan0",
|
||||
addrs = listOf("fe80::1%wlan0"),
|
||||
routes = listOf("::/0" to "wlan0"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertTrue(V6Analysis.classify(listOf(zoned)).single().routeWithoutAddress)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -20,4 +20,8 @@ kotlin {
|
||||
}
|
||||
java { sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17; targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17 }
|
||||
|
||||
tasks.test { useJUnitPlatform() }
|
||||
tasks.test {
|
||||
useJUnitPlatform()
|
||||
// Opt-in: point this at a captured run to check the anonymizer against real data.
|
||||
System.getenv("ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN")?.let { environment("ECHOLOT_REAL_RUN", it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,12 +108,22 @@ class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
|
||||
is JsonObject -> walkObject(v, path)
|
||||
is JsonArray -> JsonArray(v.map { walk(key, it, path) })
|
||||
is JsonPrimitive ->
|
||||
if (v.isString) transform(Classification.typeOf(key, path), v.content).let(::JsonPrimitive)
|
||||
else v
|
||||
if (v.isString) {
|
||||
// Name first (it is precise), then shape (it is exhaustive). A field nobody
|
||||
// classified must not be a field that leaks.
|
||||
val type = Classification.typeOf(key, path) ?: Classification.inferFromValue(v.content)
|
||||
JsonPrimitive(transform(type, v.content))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
v
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun transform(type: LogicalType?, value: String): String = when (type) {
|
||||
null -> value
|
||||
// Unclassified strings still get their *embedded* identifiers scrubbed. A whole-value
|
||||
// check cannot see them: raw shell output is one long string that is neither a MAC nor an
|
||||
// address, so it sailed through both the name table and the shape check carrying every
|
||||
// MAC on the user's LAN.
|
||||
null -> scrubEmbedded(value)
|
||||
LogicalType.SSID -> pseudo("ssid", value) { "net-" + it.take(6) }
|
||||
LogicalType.MAC, LogicalType.BSSID -> macPreservingOui(value)
|
||||
LogicalType.IP4 -> ip4(value)
|
||||
@@ -123,6 +133,38 @@ class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
|
||||
LogicalType.FREETEXT -> "[removed: may contain identifying text]"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Replaces addresses and MACs found *inside* a longer string.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Shizuku probes embed raw command output verbatim — `ip neigh`, `ip route`, `dumpsys` — which
|
||||
* is genuinely valuable evidence and also a complete inventory of every device on the user's
|
||||
* network, with hardware addresses. measurement-schema.md §9 flagged these as "hard to
|
||||
* anonymize" and proposed dropping them from exports.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Scrubbing beats dropping: the output stays readable and auditable — you can still see the
|
||||
* shape of the neighbour table and how many hosts there were — while the identifiers become
|
||||
* the same pseudonyms used everywhere else in the document. So a MAC appearing both in a
|
||||
* parsed field and in a raw dump still reads as one device.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Only addresses and MACs are touched, for the same reason as [Classification.inferFromValue]:
|
||||
* they are the patterns that cannot be mistaken for something else in free text.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun scrubEmbedded(value: String): String {
|
||||
// Cheap bail-out: the overwhelming majority of strings are short and contain neither.
|
||||
if (value.length < 7 || (!value.contains(':') && !value.contains('.'))) return value
|
||||
// One pass, not three. Sequential passes re-process their own output: after a MAC became
|
||||
// 78:9a:18:xx:yy:zz the IPv6 pattern matched it — six hex groups separated by colons is
|
||||
// exactly an address — and mangled the vendor prefix that the MAC rule had just taken
|
||||
// care to preserve. Ordered alternation resolves each position once, MAC first.
|
||||
return EMBEDDED.replace(value) { m ->
|
||||
when {
|
||||
m.groups[1] != null -> macPreservingOui(m.value)
|
||||
m.groups[2] != null -> ip6(m.value)
|
||||
else -> ip4(m.value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- per-type transforms -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -147,6 +189,11 @@ class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
|
||||
* Public addresses keep only their /16 so the network is still locatable at ISP granularity.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun ip4(value: String): String {
|
||||
// A route destination carries a prefix length; pseudonymize the address and put it back,
|
||||
// or "0.0.0.0/0" turns into nonsense and the routing table becomes unreadable.
|
||||
value.substringAfter('/', "").takeIf { it.isNotEmpty() && value.contains('/') }?.let { len ->
|
||||
return ip4(value.substringBefore('/')) + "/" + len
|
||||
}
|
||||
val o = value.split(".")
|
||||
if (o.size != 4 || o.any { it.toIntOrNull() == null }) return value
|
||||
val n = o.map { it.toInt() }
|
||||
@@ -167,8 +214,36 @@ class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
|
||||
* is a device fingerprint, especially with EUI-64.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun ip6(value: String): String {
|
||||
// Dotted quads reach here through the family-agnostic field names (addr, gateway, dst);
|
||||
// hand them to the IPv4 path rather than mangling them as if they were v6.
|
||||
if (value.count { it == ':' } < 2) return ip4(value)
|
||||
if (value.contains('/')) {
|
||||
return ip6(value.substringBefore('/')) + "/" + value.substringAfter('/')
|
||||
}
|
||||
val v = value.lowercase(Locale.ROOT)
|
||||
// The unspecified address and the default route are not identities; mangling them would
|
||||
// make a routing table unreadable for no privacy gain.
|
||||
if (v == "::1" || v == "::" || v.startsWith("fe80:") || v.startsWith("ff")) return v
|
||||
|
||||
// Unique local addresses (fc00::/7) need the *whole* prefix replaced, not the tail.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// They look like the v6 equivalent of RFC1918, and the first instinct is to keep them for
|
||||
// the same reason: private, topological, says nothing about anyone. That reasoning does
|
||||
// not carry over. An RFC1918 prefix is shared by millions of networks and identifies
|
||||
// none of them; a ULA global ID is 40 *random* bits, unique to one network by
|
||||
// construction (RFC 4193). It is a network fingerprint. Passing the leading groups
|
||||
// through - which is what the general path does - leaked 32 of those 40 bits.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The prefix is pseudonymized as a unit, so two addresses on the same ULA subnet still
|
||||
// land on the same pseudonymous prefix. "These hosts are on one network" survives;
|
||||
// "this is *that* network" does not.
|
||||
if (v.startsWith("fc") || v.startsWith("fd")) {
|
||||
val groups = v.substringBefore('%').split(":")
|
||||
val prefix = pseudo("ula-prefix", groups.take(3).joinToString(":")) { it }
|
||||
val host = pseudo("ula-host", v) { it }
|
||||
return "fd${prefix.substring(0, 2)}:${prefix.substring(2, 6)}:${prefix.substring(6, 10)}" +
|
||||
"::${host.substring(0, 4)}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val groups = v.substringBefore('%').split(":")
|
||||
if (groups.size < 3) return v
|
||||
val h = pseudo("ip6", value) { it }
|
||||
@@ -219,7 +294,7 @@ class Anonymizer(private val level: PrivacyLevel, private val salt: Salt) {
|
||||
|
||||
/** Deterministic per (domain, value, salt); memoized so one value maps to one pseudonym. */
|
||||
private fun pseudo(domain: String, value: String, shape: (String) -> String): String =
|
||||
cache.getOrPut("$domain | ||||