Files
mrambossekandClaude Opus 5 8118e213ae server: upstream trains, observed TTL/DSCP/ECN, rate limits, action ids
Types 0x03/0x04/0x05 land with a bounded columnar train buffer (head kept,
truncation declared) and grant-free multi-part reports - a report row is
smaller than the packet it answers, so $3.4 holds without a grant. The
read loop now collects TTL/TOS cmsgs on Linux, replacing the 0xFF stubs in
the observation block with what the kernel saw; downtrain gained a dscp
parameter, so DSCP survival is measurable in both directions.

Rate limiting ($2.5) exists now: per-credential AND per-source buckets,
429 on the control plane, silent drop on the data plane after the HMAC
gate and before the replay window. UDP ceilings default above the largest
legitimate run - a limit that clips a real measurement produces a
confidently wrong number.

Every granted packet carries its action_id at payload[8:16]; overlapping
actions were unattributable before. Canary DNS logs now honor the stated
24h privacy default. /admin/enroll-tokens answers the spec's JSON shape.
protocol_version 1.0.1 (additive).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 13:04:54 +02:00

267 lines
9.2 KiB
Go

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
//go:build linux
package dataplane
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/session"
)
// Crafted IPv4 fragmentation (spec §5 frag_send).
//
// Letting the kernel fragment an oversized datagram — which is what big_send with df=false does —
// answers one question: do fragments get through at all. It cannot answer the more interesting
// one, because the kernel always emits fragments in order, first one first.
//
// The classic middlebox fault is precisely about that ordering. Only the *first* fragment carries
// the UDP header, and therefore the ports; a stateful firewall or NAT that has not seen it has no
// flow to match later fragments against. Plenty of implementations drop them. Others hold them
// briefly and reassemble; others leak. The difference is invisible to any test that sends
// fragments in order, and it shows up in the real world as "large DNS answers fail on this
// network" or "the VPN works until the MTU drops".
//
// So this builds the fragments by hand and controls their order and timing. That needs a raw
// socket (CAP_NET_RAW); when we do not have one the capability is not advertised, rather than
// advertised and failing later.
// FragMode is how a fragmented datagram is put on the wire.
type FragMode string
const (
// FragInOrder is the baseline: first fragment first, as the kernel would. A path that fails
// this fails everything, and it tells the others apart from a path that drops all fragments.
FragInOrder FragMode = "in_order"
// FragReversed sends the last fragment first. This is the one that finds stateful devices
// which need the first fragment to build state.
FragReversed FragMode = "reversed"
// FragFirstLast holds the first fragment back until the others have arrived, which tests
// whether the path buffers non-first fragments at all and for how long.
FragFirstLast FragMode = "first_last"
)
var fragIPID atomic.Uint32
// RawFragSupported reports whether crafted fragments can actually be sent here.
//
// Checked by opening the socket rather than by inspecting capabilities: the question is "will
// this work", and a permission model has more ways to say no than a capability bit has to say yes
// (user namespaces, seccomp, LSM). Advertising a capability we cannot deliver would turn a
// missing feature into a failed measurement.
func RawFragSupported() bool {
fd, err := syscall.Socket(syscall.AF_INET, syscall.SOCK_RAW, syscall.IPPROTO_RAW)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_ = syscall.Close(fd)
return true
}
// FragResult is what happened to one crafted fragment burst.
type FragResult struct {
Mode FragMode `json:"mode"`
SizeBytes int `json:"size_bytes"`
Fragments int `json:"fragments"`
Sent bool `json:"sent"`
Err string `json:"err,omitempty"`
}
// FragSend emits one ELT1 packet of sizeBytes as hand-built IPv4 fragments, in the given order.
//
// The datagram is assembled whole and then cut up, so what the client reassembles — if it
// reassembles — is a normal, HMAC-valid packet indistinguishable from any other. That matters:
// the client must not be able to tell a crafted fragment burst from a kernel one, or it would be
// measuring our sender rather than the path.
func (s *Server) FragSend(
sess *session.Session, g *session.Grant, sizeBytes int, mode FragMode, fragSize int,
) (FragResult, error) {
res := FragResult{Mode: mode, SizeBytes: sizeBytes}
target := sess.DataSource()
if !target.IsValid() {
return res, fmt.Errorf("no observed data-plane source")
}
if !target.Addr().Unmap().Is4() {
// IPv6 has no in-network fragmentation: only the source may fragment, via an extension
// header. Worth building, but it is a different mechanism and belongs in its own code
// path rather than pretending this one covers it.
return res, fmt.Errorf("crafted fragmentation is IPv4-only for now")
}
conn := s.connFor(target, sess.DataLocal())
if conn == nil {
return res, fmt.Errorf("no data-plane socket matches target family")
}
local := sess.DataLocal()
if !local.IsValid() {
return res, fmt.Errorf("session has no recorded local address")
}
if sizeBytes < HeaderSize+32 {
sizeBytes = HeaderSize + 32
}
if sizeBytes > 8000 {
sizeBytes = 8000
}
if !g.Allow(sizeBytes) {
return res, fmt.Errorf("grant exhausted")
}
// The ELT1 packet, signed exactly as any other, then wrapped in UDP.
payload := make([]byte, sizeBytes-HeaderSize)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[0:4], uint32(sizeBytes))
// [8:16]: the action id, as on every granted packet (spec §5 correlation); the mode string
// sits past the reserved slot.
putActionID(payload, g.ActionID)
copy(payload[16:], mode)
elt := s.buildPacket(sess, TypeFragData, 0, payload)
udp := buildUDP(local, target, elt)
// Fragment offsets are in 8-byte units, so every fragment except the last must be a multiple
// of 8. A payload that is not is not an error — it is a fragment that no host will reassemble.
if fragSize <= 0 {
fragSize = 576
}
fragSize = (fragSize / 8) * 8
if fragSize < 8 {
fragSize = 8
}
fragments := splitIPv4(local.Addr(), target.Addr(), udp, fragSize, uint16(fragIPID.Add(1)))
res.Fragments = len(fragments)
fd, err := syscall.Socket(syscall.AF_INET, syscall.SOCK_RAW, syscall.IPPROTO_RAW)
if err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
defer syscall.Close(fd)
if err := syscall.SetsockoptInt(fd, syscall.IPPROTO_IP, syscall.IP_HDRINCL, 1); err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
dst := syscall.SockaddrInet4{}
copy(dst.Addr[:], target.Addr().Unmap().AsSlice())
send := func(pkt []byte) error { return syscall.Sendto(fd, pkt, 0, &dst) }
switch mode {
case FragReversed:
for i := len(fragments) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
if err := send(fragments[i]); err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
case FragFirstLast:
for i := 1; i < len(fragments); i++ {
if err := send(fragments[i]); err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
// Long enough to be a real test of whether anything holds fragments, short enough to stay
// inside the usual 30-second reassembly timeout by a wide margin.
time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
if err := send(fragments[0]); err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
default:
for _, f := range fragments {
if err := send(f); err != nil {
res.Err = err.Error()
return res, err
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
}
res.Sent = true
return res, nil
}
// buildUDP wraps a payload in a UDP header with a computed checksum.
//
// The checksum is optional in IPv4 and it would be less code to send zero, but a zero-checksum
// datagram is dropped by some middleboxes — and that drop would be recorded as a fragmentation
// failure, which is exactly the wrong conclusion.
func buildUDP(src, dst netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, 8+len(payload))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[0:2], src.Port())
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:4], dst.Port())
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:6], uint16(8+len(payload)))
copy(out[8:], payload)
// Pseudo-header + UDP header + data, per RFC 768.
var sum uint32
s4, d4 := src.Addr().Unmap().As4(), dst.Addr().Unmap().As4()
for _, b := range [][]byte{s4[:], d4[:]} {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[0:2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
}
sum += uint32(syscall.IPPROTO_UDP)
sum += uint32(len(out))
for i := 0; i+1 < len(out); i += 2 {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(out[i : i+2]))
}
if len(out)%2 == 1 {
sum += uint32(out[len(out)-1]) << 8
}
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xFFFF) + (sum >> 16)
}
ck := ^uint16(sum)
if ck == 0 {
ck = 0xFFFF // 0 means "no checksum" in IPv4; the all-ones form is the same value
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[6:8], ck)
return out
}
// splitIPv4 cuts a UDP datagram into IPv4 fragments of at most fragSize payload bytes each.
//
// Every fragment carries the same IP ID — that is what marks them as one datagram — and every one
// but the last sets MF. The kernel fills in the header checksum and total length for us under
// IP_HDRINCL (raw(7)); the ID it only fills when zero, which is why it is set explicitly here.
func splitIPv4(src, dst netip.Addr, udp []byte, fragSize int, id uint16) [][]byte {
s4, d4 := src.Unmap().As4(), dst.Unmap().As4()
var out [][]byte
for off := 0; off < len(udp); off += fragSize {
end := off + fragSize
if end > len(udp) {
end = len(udp)
}
chunk := udp[off:end]
more := end < len(udp)
hdr := make([]byte, 20, 20+len(chunk))
hdr[0] = 0x45 // IPv4, 5 words of header
hdr[1] = 0 // DSCP/ECN
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(20+len(chunk)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], id)
flagsOff := uint16(off / 8)
if more {
flagsOff |= 0x2000 // MF
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[6:8], flagsOff)
hdr[8] = 64 // TTL
hdr[9] = syscall.IPPROTO_UDP
// hdr[10:12] checksum left zero: the kernel computes it under IP_HDRINCL.
copy(hdr[12:16], s4[:])
copy(hdr[16:20], d4[:])
out = append(out, append(hdr, chunk...))
}
return out
}