echolot/server/internal/session/session.go

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later

// Package session implements spec §2.4 sessions and the §2.4 key schedule:
// HKDF-SHA256(ikm=device_credential, salt=key_salt, info="echolot-v1/"+session_id).
package session

import (
	"crypto/hkdf"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"net/netip"
	"sync"
	"time"
)

type Session struct {
	ID      string    // opaque hex; first 8 bytes (16 hex chars) are the wire prefix
	Key     [32]byte  // derived, never crosses the wire
	Epoch   time.Time // server wall clock at creation (spec: RFC3339 in the response)
	Expires time.Time
	Device  string // device ID
	// Observed source of the session-creating request — the ONLY address
	// reflected/generated traffic may target (spec §2.5).
	ControlSource netip.Addr
	// Last data-plane source seen with a valid HMAC (NAT rebinding evidence).
	mu         sync.Mutex
	dataSource netip.AddrPort
	dataLocal  netip.AddrPort
	// Replay window (spec §3.1: 1024-wide seq window). Highest seq seen plus
	// a bitmask of the 1024 preceding.
	maxSeq uint32
	window [16]uint64

	// Active asymmetric grants (spec §3.4/§5) — the only licence to send more than we receive.
	grants []*Grant

	// Observations (spec §6): per-packet UDP view + connect-back results.
	packetsSeen uint64
	udpObs      []UDPObservation // ring, newest last, cap obsCap
	connectBack []ConnectBackResult
	throughput  []ThroughputReport
}

const obsCap = 4096

// UDPObservation is the server's witnessed view of one data-plane packet.
type UDPObservation struct {
	Seq   uint32 `json:"seq"`
	TRxNs int64  `json:"t_rx_ns"`
	TTxNs int64  `json:"t_tx_ns"`
	Src   string `json:"src"`
	Size  int    `json:"size"`
	Type  uint8  `json:"type"`
}

// ThroughputReport is the server's own account of a sustained send: what it managed to put on
// the wire, and what stopped it. The client needs this to interpret its own count — the gap
// between the two IS the loss, and without the sender's number a receiver can only guess.
type ThroughputReport struct {
	ActionID   string `json:"action_id"`
	Packets    int    `json:"packets"`
	Bytes      int64  `json:"bytes"`
	DurationMs int64  `json:"duration_ms"`
	Kbps       int    `json:"kbps"`
	LimitedBy  string `json:"limited_by"`
}

// ConnectBackResult records one connect-back action outcome.
type ConnectBackResult struct {
	ActionID string  `json:"action_id"`
	Result   string  `json:"result"` // connected | refused | timeout
	RttMs    float64 `json:"rtt_ms"`
}

// RecordUDP appends a packet observation (ring-capped).
func (s *Session) RecordUDP(o UDPObservation) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	s.packetsSeen++
	if len(s.udpObs) >= obsCap {
		s.udpObs = s.udpObs[1:]
	}
	s.udpObs = append(s.udpObs, o)
}

// RecordConnectBack appends a connect-back outcome.
func (s *Session) RecordConnectBack(r ConnectBackResult) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	s.connectBack = append(s.connectBack, r)
}

// Observations returns a copy of everything witnessed so far.
func (s *Session) Observations() (packetsSeen uint64, udp []UDPObservation, cb []ConnectBackResult) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	return s.packetsSeen, append([]UDPObservation(nil), s.udpObs...),
		append([]ConnectBackResult(nil), s.connectBack...)
}

// RecordThroughput stores the server's account of one sustained send.
//
// Kept as a per-action summary rather than per-packet records: a ten-second run at 50 Mbps is
// half a million packets, and holding one struct each would turn a measurement into a memory
// exhaustion. The client has the per-packet view; the server only needs to say how many it sent.
func (s *Session) RecordThroughput(actionID string, packets int, bytes, durationMs int64, kbps int, limitedBy string) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	s.throughput = append(s.throughput, ThroughputReport{
		ActionID: actionID, Packets: packets, Bytes: bytes,
		DurationMs: durationMs, Kbps: kbps, LimitedBy: limitedBy,
	})
}

// ThroughputReports returns the server's account of every sustained send in this session.
func (s *Session) ThroughputReports() []ThroughputReport {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	return append([]ThroughputReport(nil), s.throughput...)
}

// DataSource returns the last verified data-plane source (invalid when the
// session has not sent data-plane traffic yet).
func (s *Session) DataSource() netip.AddrPort {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	return s.dataSource
}

// KeySalt returns nothing — the salt is not retained after derivation; it is
// generated in New and returned once for the response body.

type Manager struct {
	mu       sync.Mutex
	byPrefix map[string]*Session // key: first 16 hex chars of ID
	ttl      time.Duration
}

func NewManager(ttl time.Duration) *Manager {
	return &Manager{byPrefix: map[string]*Session{}, ttl: ttl}
}

// New creates a session for a device credential per the spec key schedule.
// Returns the session and the one-time key_salt for the response.
func (m *Manager) New(deviceID, credential string, controlSource netip.Addr) (*Session, []byte, error) {
	idBytes := make([]byte, 16)
	if _, err := rand.Read(idBytes); err != nil {
		return nil, nil, err
	}
	salt := make([]byte, 16)
	if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
		return nil, nil, err
	}
	id := hex.EncodeToString(idBytes)
	key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, []byte(credential), salt, "echolot-v1/"+id, 32)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, nil, err
	}
	s := &Session{
		ID:            id,
		Epoch:         time.Now().UTC(),
		Expires:       time.Now().Add(m.ttl),
		Device:        deviceID,
		ControlSource: controlSource,
	}
	copy(s.Key[:], key)
	m.mu.Lock()
	m.byPrefix[id[:16]] = s
	m.mu.Unlock()
	return s, salt, nil
}

// ByWirePrefix resolves the 8-byte on-the-wire prefix (as raw bytes).
func (m *Manager) ByWirePrefix(prefix [8]byte) *Session {
	m.mu.Lock()
	defer m.mu.Unlock()
	s := m.byPrefix[hex.EncodeToString(prefix[:])]
	if s == nil || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
		return nil
	}
	return s
}

// ByID resolves a full session id (sessions are keyed by their wire prefix).
func (m *Manager) ByID(id string) *Session {
	if len(id) < 16 {
		return nil
	}
	m.mu.Lock()
	defer m.mu.Unlock()
	s := m.byPrefix[id[:16]]
	if s == nil || s.ID != id || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
		return nil
	}
	return s
}

func (m *Manager) Delete(id string) {
	m.mu.Lock()
	defer m.mu.Unlock()
	delete(m.byPrefix, id[:16])
}

// CheckSeq enforces the 1024-wide anti-replay window. Returns false for
// replays and for packets older than the window.
func (s *Session) CheckSeq(seq uint32) bool {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	switch {
	case seq > s.maxSeq:
		shift := seq - s.maxSeq
		for i := uint32(0); i < shift && i < 1024; i++ {
			idx := (s.maxSeq + 1 + i) % 1024
			s.window[idx/64] &^= 1 << (idx % 64)
		}
		s.maxSeq = seq
	case s.maxSeq-seq >= 1024:
		return false
	}
	idx := seq % 1024
	if s.window[idx/64]&(1<<(idx%64)) != 0 {
		return false
	}
	s.window[idx/64] |= 1 << (idx % 64)
	return true
}

// DataLocal returns the server-side address that received this session's data-plane traffic.
//
// This matters more than it looks: a server bound to several addresses must send granted traffic
// back from the one the client has been talking to. Any stateful firewall or NAT in between has
// a mapping keyed on that exact pair, and a reply from a sibling address is dropped — which the
// client would then measure as downstream loss. See connFor.
func (s *Session) DataLocal() netip.AddrPort {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	return s.dataLocal
}

// NoteDataLocal records which of our own bound addresses saw this session's traffic.
func (s *Session) NoteDataLocal(ap netip.AddrPort) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	s.dataLocal = ap
}

// NoteDataSource records the latest verified data-plane source.
func (s *Session) NoteDataSource(ap netip.AddrPort) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	s.dataSource = ap
	s.mu.Unlock()
}