big_send now forces the Don't-Fragment bit for the whole burst by default, so the largest size that arrives IS the downstream path MTU rather than "fragments got through" — two different measurements the schema already separates. Sizes above our own egress MTU (from the startup self-test) are refused up front and reported as max_df_bytes, because absence caused by our kernel must not be read as a limit of the client's path. Uploads: one JSON file per run under the state dir, with the policy the operator actually cares about — who may upload (off / anonymous / account), how large, how long to keep, and the least anonymization accepted. The profile advertises all of it so the app can present the switch honestly instead of discovering the rules by failing. `account` refuses today rather than falling back to anonymous: picking the strict setting before OIDC lands must not silently mean the loose one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
248 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
248 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
|
|
|
// Package dataplane implements the binary UDP probe protocol (spec §3):
|
|
// 32-byte header, HMAC gate, anti-replay, ECHO with observation block.
|
|
// Skeleton scope: ECHO_REQ/ECHO_RESP and TIMESYNC only; trains, MTU probes
|
|
// and delayed echo land with the corresponding client tests.
|
|
package dataplane
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/hmac"
|
|
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
"encoding/binary"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/netip"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/session"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
Magic = "ELT1"
|
|
HeaderSize = 32
|
|
|
|
TypeEchoReq = 0x01
|
|
TypeEchoResp = 0x02
|
|
TypeTimesyncReq = 0x07
|
|
TypeTimesyncRsp = 0x08
|
|
TypeMtuProbe = 0x09
|
|
TypeMtuAck = 0x0A
|
|
TypeDelayedEcho = 0x0B
|
|
// Server->client under an asymmetric grant (spec §3.4/§5).
|
|
TypeDownTrainData = 0x06
|
|
TypeBigSend = 0x0C
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type Server struct {
|
|
Sessions *session.Manager
|
|
// Epoch for server-side t_rx/t_tx: process start; observation consumers
|
|
// only need differences plus the timesync exchange, not absolute time.
|
|
start time.Time
|
|
|
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
conns []*net.UDPConn
|
|
|
|
// dfMu serialises DF windows: the listening socket is shared by every session on that
|
|
// family, so two concurrent big_sends must not overlap their DF on/off transitions.
|
|
dfMu sync.Mutex
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Serve runs the read loop for one socket; call once per bound address.
|
|
// The socket is retained so actions (delayed echo) can pick a family-matching
|
|
// sender later.
|
|
func (s *Server) Serve(conn *net.UDPConn) error {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
if s.start.IsZero() {
|
|
s.start = time.Now()
|
|
}
|
|
s.conns = append(s.conns, conn)
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
buf := make([]byte, 65535)
|
|
for {
|
|
n, raddr, err := conn.ReadFromUDPAddrPort(buf)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
tRx := time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()
|
|
s.handle(conn, raddr, buf[:n], tRx)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connFor picks a retained socket whose family matches the target.
|
|
func (s *Server) connFor(target netip.AddrPort) *net.UDPConn {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
want4 := target.Addr().Unmap().Is4()
|
|
for _, c := range s.conns {
|
|
la := c.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).AddrPort()
|
|
if la.Addr().Unmap().Is4() == want4 {
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SendDelayedEcho fires one DELAYED_ECHO packet at the session's observed
|
|
// data-plane source (spec §5: the NAT-mapping-lifetime primitive). The
|
|
// payload carries the action id for correlation.
|
|
func (s *Server) SendDelayedEcho(sess *session.Session, actionID string) error {
|
|
target := sess.DataSource()
|
|
if !target.IsValid() {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("session has no observed data-plane source yet")
|
|
}
|
|
conn := s.connFor(target)
|
|
if conn == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("no data-plane socket matches target family")
|
|
}
|
|
s.send(conn, target, sess, TypeDelayedEcho, 0, []byte(actionID))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handle enforces spec §3.1/§3.4: unknown prefix, bad HMAC, expired session,
|
|
// replayed seq → silent drop, never a response.
|
|
func (s *Server) handle(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, pkt []byte, tRxNs int64) {
|
|
if len(pkt) < HeaderSize || string(pkt[0:4]) != Magic {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
typ := pkt[4]
|
|
payloadLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])
|
|
if int(HeaderSize+payloadLen) > len(pkt) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var prefix [8]byte
|
|
copy(prefix[:], pkt[8:16])
|
|
seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[16:20])
|
|
|
|
sess := s.Sessions.ByWirePrefix(prefix)
|
|
if sess == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, sess.Key[:])
|
|
mac.Write(pkt[0:28])
|
|
mac.Write(pkt[HeaderSize : HeaderSize+int(payloadLen)])
|
|
if !hmac.Equal(mac.Sum(nil)[:4], pkt[28:32]) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !sess.CheckSeq(seq) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sess.NoteDataSource(raddr)
|
|
sess.RecordUDP(session.UDPObservation{
|
|
Seq: seq, TRxNs: tRxNs, TTxNs: time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds(),
|
|
Src: raddr.String(), Size: len(pkt), Type: typ,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
switch typ {
|
|
case TypeEchoReq:
|
|
s.echoResp(conn, raddr, sess, pkt, seq, tRxNs)
|
|
case TypeTimesyncReq:
|
|
s.timesyncResp(conn, raddr, sess, pkt, seq, tRxNs)
|
|
case TypeMtuProbe:
|
|
s.mtuAck(conn, raddr, sess, seq, len(pkt))
|
|
default:
|
|
slog.Debug("unhandled data-plane type", "type", typ)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mtuAck replies to an MTU_PROBE with a small MTU_ACK carrying the total
|
|
// datagram size the server actually received (spec §3.2). The client sends
|
|
// DF-flagged probes of increasing size and binary-searches the path MTU / a
|
|
// black hole from which sizes stop being acknowledged. The ACK is tiny, so it
|
|
// can never amplify regardless of probe size.
|
|
func (s *Server) mtuAck(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, seq uint32, received int) {
|
|
var payload [4]byte
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[:], uint32(received))
|
|
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeMtuAck, seq, payload[:])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Observation block (spec §3.3), fixed 40 bytes appended to the RESP header:
|
|
// 0 8 t_rx_ns (server clock, process epoch)
|
|
// 8 8 t_tx_ns
|
|
// 16 16 observed source IP (v4-mapped when v4)
|
|
// 32 2 observed source port
|
|
// 34 1 received TTL (0xFF = not observed yet; needs recvmsg cmsgs)
|
|
// 35 1 received DSCP/ECN byte (0xFF = not observed)
|
|
// 36 4 received size
|
|
func observation(tRxNs, tTxNs int64, src netip.AddrPort, rcvd int) []byte {
|
|
b := make([]byte, 40)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[0:8], uint64(tRxNs))
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[8:16], uint64(tTxNs))
|
|
a16 := src.Addr().As16()
|
|
copy(b[16:32], a16[:])
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[32:34], src.Port())
|
|
b[34], b[35] = 0xFF, 0xFF
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[36:40], uint32(rcvd))
|
|
return b
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// echoResp mirrors the request header (type flipped), appends the observation
|
|
// block, and re-HMACs with the session key. Anti-amplification: the response
|
|
// is capped at the request size (spec §3.4) — the observation block replaces
|
|
// padding rather than growing the datagram; if the request was smaller than
|
|
// header+observation, the block is truncated to fit.
|
|
func (s *Server) echoResp(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, req []byte, seq uint32, tRxNs int64) {
|
|
obs := observation(tRxNs, time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds(), raddr, len(req))
|
|
max := len(req)
|
|
if max < HeaderSize {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
payload := obs
|
|
if HeaderSize+len(payload) > max {
|
|
payload = payload[:max-HeaderSize]
|
|
}
|
|
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeEchoResp, seq, payload)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// timesyncResp: payload = client t1 (echoed back) + t2 (rx) + t3 (tx), spec §3.2.
|
|
func (s *Server) timesyncResp(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, req []byte, seq uint32, tRxNs int64) {
|
|
payload := make([]byte, 24)
|
|
copy(payload[0:8], req[20:28]) // client's t_ns from the request header
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(payload[8:16], uint64(tRxNs))
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(payload[16:24], uint64(time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()))
|
|
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeTimesyncRsp, seq, payload)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Server) send(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, typ byte, seq uint32, payload []byte) {
|
|
_ = s.sendErr(conn, raddr, sess, typ, seq, payload)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendErr is send with the write error surfaced. Only the DF-mode big_send cares: there an
|
|
// EMSGSIZE means our own egress MTU refused the datagram, which is a different fact from the
|
|
// client not receiving it.
|
|
func (s *Server) sendErr(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, typ byte, seq uint32, payload []byte) error {
|
|
pkt := make([]byte, HeaderSize+len(payload))
|
|
copy(pkt[0:4], Magic)
|
|
pkt[4] = typ
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], uint16(len(payload)))
|
|
idBytes := sess.ID[:16] // hex chars of the 8-byte prefix
|
|
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
|
|
pkt[8+i] = hexByte(idBytes[i*2], idBytes[i*2+1])
|
|
}
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[16:20], seq)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(pkt[20:28], uint64(time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()))
|
|
copy(pkt[HeaderSize:], payload)
|
|
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, sess.Key[:])
|
|
mac.Write(pkt[0:28])
|
|
mac.Write(payload)
|
|
copy(pkt[28:32], mac.Sum(nil)[:4])
|
|
_, err := conn.WriteToUDPAddrPort(pkt, raddr)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hexByte(hi, lo byte) byte {
|
|
h := func(c byte) byte {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
|
|
return c - '0'
|
|
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'f':
|
|
return c - 'a' + 10
|
|
}
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
return h(hi)<<4 | h(lo)
|
|
}
|