Files
echolot/server/internal/dataplane/udp.go
T
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ce1aaa332a
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server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used
fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right
family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on
.150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT,
which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving;
the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of
wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened.

Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and
granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback
to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and
the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this.

Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local
run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings
and history screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00

265 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package dataplane implements the binary UDP probe protocol (spec §3):
// 32-byte header, HMAC gate, anti-replay, ECHO with observation block.
// Skeleton scope: ECHO_REQ/ECHO_RESP and TIMESYNC only; trains, MTU probes
// and delayed echo land with the corresponding client tests.
package dataplane
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"time"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/session"
)
const (
Magic = "ELT1"
HeaderSize = 32
TypeEchoReq = 0x01
TypeEchoResp = 0x02
TypeTimesyncReq = 0x07
TypeTimesyncRsp = 0x08
TypeMtuProbe = 0x09
TypeMtuAck = 0x0A
TypeDelayedEcho = 0x0B
// Server->client under an asymmetric grant (spec §3.4/§5).
TypeDownTrainData = 0x06
TypeBigSend = 0x0C
)
type Server struct {
Sessions *session.Manager
// Epoch for server-side t_rx/t_tx: process start; observation consumers
// only need differences plus the timesync exchange, not absolute time.
start time.Time
mu sync.Mutex
conns []*net.UDPConn
// dfMu serialises DF windows: the listening socket is shared by every session on that
// family, so two concurrent big_sends must not overlap their DF on/off transitions.
dfMu sync.Mutex
}
// Serve runs the read loop for one socket; call once per bound address.
// The socket is retained so actions (delayed echo) can pick a family-matching
// sender later.
func (s *Server) Serve(conn *net.UDPConn) error {
s.mu.Lock()
if s.start.IsZero() {
s.start = time.Now()
}
s.conns = append(s.conns, conn)
s.mu.Unlock()
buf := make([]byte, 65535)
for {
n, raddr, err := conn.ReadFromUDPAddrPort(buf)
if err != nil {
return err
}
tRx := time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()
s.handle(conn, raddr, buf[:n], tRx)
}
}
// connFor picks a retained socket whose family matches the target.
// connFor picks the socket to send to target from.
//
// When the session recorded which local address it has been talking to (local), that socket wins
// outright. Falling back to "any socket of the right family" is only correct for a single-homed
// server: on a multi-homed one it sends from a sibling address the client's NAT has no mapping
// for, the packets are dropped in transit, and the client reports downstream loss that does not
// exist. That bug is invisible in a lab with one address, which is exactly why this is explicit.
func (s *Server) connFor(target, local netip.AddrPort) *net.UDPConn {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if local.IsValid() {
for _, c := range s.conns {
if c.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).AddrPort() == local {
return c
}
}
}
want4 := target.Addr().Unmap().Is4()
for _, c := range s.conns {
la := c.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).AddrPort()
if la.Addr().Unmap().Is4() == want4 {
return c
}
}
return nil
}
// SendDelayedEcho fires one DELAYED_ECHO packet at the session's observed
// data-plane source (spec §5: the NAT-mapping-lifetime primitive). The
// payload carries the action id for correlation.
func (s *Server) SendDelayedEcho(sess *session.Session, actionID string) error {
target := sess.DataSource()
if !target.IsValid() {
return fmt.Errorf("session has no observed data-plane source yet")
}
conn := s.connFor(target, sess.DataLocal())
if conn == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no data-plane socket matches target family")
}
s.send(conn, target, sess, TypeDelayedEcho, 0, []byte(actionID))
return nil
}
// handle enforces spec §3.1/§3.4: unknown prefix, bad HMAC, expired session,
// replayed seq → silent drop, never a response.
func (s *Server) handle(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, pkt []byte, tRxNs int64) {
if len(pkt) < HeaderSize || string(pkt[0:4]) != Magic {
return
}
typ := pkt[4]
payloadLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])
if int(HeaderSize+payloadLen) > len(pkt) {
return
}
var prefix [8]byte
copy(prefix[:], pkt[8:16])
seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[16:20])
sess := s.Sessions.ByWirePrefix(prefix)
if sess == nil {
return
}
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, sess.Key[:])
mac.Write(pkt[0:28])
mac.Write(pkt[HeaderSize : HeaderSize+int(payloadLen)])
if !hmac.Equal(mac.Sum(nil)[:4], pkt[28:32]) {
return
}
if !sess.CheckSeq(seq) {
return
}
sess.NoteDataSource(raddr)
if la, ok := conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr); ok {
sess.NoteDataLocal(la.AddrPort())
}
sess.RecordUDP(session.UDPObservation{
Seq: seq, TRxNs: tRxNs, TTxNs: time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds(),
Src: raddr.String(), Size: len(pkt), Type: typ,
})
switch typ {
case TypeEchoReq:
s.echoResp(conn, raddr, sess, pkt, seq, tRxNs)
case TypeTimesyncReq:
s.timesyncResp(conn, raddr, sess, pkt, seq, tRxNs)
case TypeMtuProbe:
s.mtuAck(conn, raddr, sess, seq, len(pkt))
default:
slog.Debug("unhandled data-plane type", "type", typ)
}
}
// mtuAck replies to an MTU_PROBE with a small MTU_ACK carrying the total
// datagram size the server actually received (spec §3.2). The client sends
// DF-flagged probes of increasing size and binary-searches the path MTU / a
// black hole from which sizes stop being acknowledged. The ACK is tiny, so it
// can never amplify regardless of probe size.
func (s *Server) mtuAck(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, seq uint32, received int) {
var payload [4]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[:], uint32(received))
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeMtuAck, seq, payload[:])
}
// Observation block (spec §3.3), fixed 40 bytes appended to the RESP header:
// 0 8 t_rx_ns (server clock, process epoch)
// 8 8 t_tx_ns
// 16 16 observed source IP (v4-mapped when v4)
// 32 2 observed source port
// 34 1 received TTL (0xFF = not observed yet; needs recvmsg cmsgs)
// 35 1 received DSCP/ECN byte (0xFF = not observed)
// 36 4 received size
func observation(tRxNs, tTxNs int64, src netip.AddrPort, rcvd int) []byte {
b := make([]byte, 40)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[0:8], uint64(tRxNs))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[8:16], uint64(tTxNs))
a16 := src.Addr().As16()
copy(b[16:32], a16[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[32:34], src.Port())
b[34], b[35] = 0xFF, 0xFF
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[36:40], uint32(rcvd))
return b
}
// echoResp mirrors the request header (type flipped), appends the observation
// block, and re-HMACs with the session key. Anti-amplification: the response
// is capped at the request size (spec §3.4) — the observation block replaces
// padding rather than growing the datagram; if the request was smaller than
// header+observation, the block is truncated to fit.
func (s *Server) echoResp(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, req []byte, seq uint32, tRxNs int64) {
obs := observation(tRxNs, time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds(), raddr, len(req))
max := len(req)
if max < HeaderSize {
return
}
payload := obs
if HeaderSize+len(payload) > max {
payload = payload[:max-HeaderSize]
}
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeEchoResp, seq, payload)
}
// timesyncResp: payload = client t1 (echoed back) + t2 (rx) + t3 (tx), spec §3.2.
func (s *Server) timesyncResp(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, req []byte, seq uint32, tRxNs int64) {
payload := make([]byte, 24)
copy(payload[0:8], req[20:28]) // client's t_ns from the request header
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(payload[8:16], uint64(tRxNs))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(payload[16:24], uint64(time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()))
s.send(conn, raddr, sess, TypeTimesyncRsp, seq, payload)
}
func (s *Server) send(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, typ byte, seq uint32, payload []byte) {
_ = s.sendErr(conn, raddr, sess, typ, seq, payload)
}
// sendErr is send with the write error surfaced. Only the DF-mode big_send cares: there an
// EMSGSIZE means our own egress MTU refused the datagram, which is a different fact from the
// client not receiving it.
func (s *Server) sendErr(conn *net.UDPConn, raddr netip.AddrPort, sess *session.Session, typ byte, seq uint32, payload []byte) error {
pkt := make([]byte, HeaderSize+len(payload))
copy(pkt[0:4], Magic)
pkt[4] = typ
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], uint16(len(payload)))
idBytes := sess.ID[:16] // hex chars of the 8-byte prefix
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
pkt[8+i] = hexByte(idBytes[i*2], idBytes[i*2+1])
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[16:20], seq)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(pkt[20:28], uint64(time.Since(s.start).Nanoseconds()))
copy(pkt[HeaderSize:], payload)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, sess.Key[:])
mac.Write(pkt[0:28])
mac.Write(payload)
copy(pkt[28:32], mac.Sum(nil)[:4])
_, err := conn.WriteToUDPAddrPort(pkt, raddr)
return err
}
func hexByte(hi, lo byte) byte {
h := func(c byte) byte {
switch {
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
return c - '0'
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'f':
return c - 'a' + 10
}
return 0
}
return h(hi)<<4 | h(lo)
}