Files
echolot/server/cmd/echolot-server/main.go
T
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 80d2092f1b
server-test / test (push) Successful in 37s
oidc: accept both the app's public client and the server's confidential one
Explaining public vs confidential clients surfaced a gap in my own design: I had
assumed a single client id, but there are two clients here with genuinely
different properties.

  the Android app     public + PKCE, because an APK cannot keep a secret
  the admin UI        confidential, because the server can keep one in
                      /etc/echolot-server.env and weakening it to public buys
                      nothing

So the audience check now accepts either registered client id - and only those
two. "Any client of this issuer" would let every other application registered
with the same IdP authenticate here, which is the entire reason the check
exists. Either id alone is enough to enable sign-in, since an operator may
register only the app or only the admin UI.

The profile advertises the *app's* client id, since that is what a phone should
authorize as.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 17:31:33 +02:00

570 lines
19 KiB
Go

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// echolot-server: the probe server (spec: docs/probe-protocol.md).
//
// Modes:
// - container ("docker mode"): autodetected (or --docker / ECHOLOT_DOCKER=1);
// config comes from ECHOLOT_* env vars; systemd/self-update are refused.
// - native: same flags/env, plus --install-systemd / --uninstall-systemd
// and opt-in --self-update against a Gitea releases API.
package main
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/adminauth"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/canarydns"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/compat"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/config"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/control"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/dataplane"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/oidc"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/runs"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/selftest"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/selfupdate"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/session"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/store"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/stun"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/system"
"echo-lot.app/server/internal/tcpecho"
)
// Version is stamped via -ldflags "-X main.Version=v1.2.3" in CI.
var Version = "dev"
func main() {
if err := run(); err != nil {
slog.Error("fatal", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run() error {
cfg, actions, err := config.Load(os.Args[1:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
control.Version = Version
switch {
case actions.Version:
fmt.Println(Version)
return nil
case actions.InstallSystemd:
// The unit runs this same binary in serve mode; host config comes
// from /etc/echolot-server.env. A self-update timer is installed
// only when an update API is configured.
return system.InstallSystemd(cfg.SelfUpdateAPI)
case actions.UninstallSystemd:
return system.UninstallSystemd()
case actions.SetAdminPassword:
return setAdminPassword(cfg)
case actions.SelfUpdate:
return selfupdate.Run(cfg.SelfUpdateAPI, Version)
}
return serve(cfg)
}
func serve(cfg *config.Config) error {
slog.Info("echolot-server starting", "version", Version, "mode",
map[bool]string{true: "container", false: "native"}[cfg.Docker],
"state_dir", cfg.StateDir)
st, err := store.Open(cfg.StateDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("state store: %w", err)
}
cert, err := loadOrCreateCert(cfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: %w", err)
}
pin, err := control.SpkiPinB64(cert)
if err != nil {
return err
}
slog.Info("control-plane certificate", "pin-sha256", pin)
sessions := session.NewManager(15 * time.Minute)
dp := &dataplane.Server{Sessions: sessions}
// TCP echo shares the control cert for its elt-echo TLS variant.
tcpSrv := &tcpecho.Server{
TLSConfig: &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
}
caps := []string{"udp-probe", "delayed-echo", "connect-back", "http-echo", "downtrain", "big-send", "throughput"}
// Crafted fragments need a raw socket. Advertised only when one can actually be opened —
// a capability we cannot deliver turns a missing feature into a failed measurement.
rawFrag := dataplane.RawFragSupported()
if rawFrag {
caps = append(caps, "frag-send")
} else {
slog.Info("frag-send unavailable: no raw socket (needs CAP_NET_RAW)")
}
if len(config.Addrs(cfg.TCPListen)) > 0 {
caps = append(caps, "tcp-echo", "tls-echo")
}
// Uploaded-run storage. A failure here is not fatal: measurement still works, uploads just
// stay unavailable and say so in the profile.
runStore, err := runs.Open(cfg.StateDir, runs.Policy{
Mode: runs.Mode(cfg.UploadsMode),
MaxBytes: cfg.UploadMaxBytes,
RetentionDays: cfg.UploadRetentionDays,
MaxRunsPerDevice: cfg.UploadMaxRuns,
MinAnonymization: cfg.UploadMinAnon,
})
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("uploaded-run storage unavailable — uploads disabled", "err", err)
runStore = nil
} else {
slog.Info("uploads", "mode", cfg.UploadsMode, "min_anonymization", cfg.UploadMinAnon,
"retention_days", cfg.UploadRetentionDays, "max_runs_per_device", cfg.UploadMaxRuns)
}
// A malformed window is fatal rather than ignored: an operator who set a restriction must
// not end up running without one because of a typo.
appRange, err := compat.ParseRange(cfg.MinAppVersion, cfg.MaxAppVersion)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("app version window: %w", err)
}
slog.Info("client compatibility", "accepts_app", appRange.String(),
"protocol", control.ProtocolVersion, "schema", control.SchemaVersion)
// Identity is optional. Without an issuer the server simply has no sign-in, and
// uploads=account can never be satisfied — which is the honest outcome, not a silent
// downgrade to anonymous.
var idp *oidc.Verifier
if cfg.OIDCIssuer != "" && (cfg.OIDCClientID != "" || cfg.OIDCAppClientID != "") {
idp = oidc.New(oidc.Config{
Issuer: cfg.OIDCIssuer,
ClientID: cfg.OIDCClientID,
AppClientID: cfg.OIDCAppClientID,
AdminGroup: cfg.OIDCAdminGroup,
}, nil)
slog.Info("identity provider configured", "issuer", cfg.OIDCIssuer,
"admin_client_id", cfg.OIDCClientID, "app_client_id", cfg.OIDCAppClientID,
"admin_group", cfg.OIDCAdminGroup)
if cfg.OIDCAdminGroup == "" {
slog.Warn("no admin group set: nobody will be an admin via OIDC " +
"(set ECHOLOT_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUP)")
}
} else if cfg.UploadsMode == string(runs.ModeAccount) {
slog.Warn("uploads=account but no identity provider is configured — " +
"every upload will be refused")
}
ctl := &control.Server{
Store: st, Sessions: sessions, Name: cfg.Name,
UDPPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.UDPListen)), TCPPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.TCPListen)),
StunPort: mustPort(firstAddr(cfg.StunListen)), PinB64: pin, CertChain: cert.Certificate,
DelayedEcho: dp.SendDelayedEcho,
DownTrain: dp.DownTrain,
BigSend: dp.BigSend,
TCPRecent: func(ip string) any { return tcpSrv.RecentFor(ip) },
Runs: runStore,
AppRange: appRange,
PublicControlURL: publicControlURL(cfg),
OIDC: idp,
}
// Left nil when there is no raw socket, so the handler answers "not implemented" with a
// reason rather than failing somewhere deeper.
if rawFrag {
ctl.FragSend = dp.FragSend
}
ctl.DownThroughput = dp.DownThroughput
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
ctlAddrs := config.Addrs(cfg.ControlListen)
udpAddrs := config.Addrs(cfg.UDPListen)
errCh := make(chan error, len(ctlAddrs)+len(udpAddrs)+2)
// Control plane (HTTPS, pin-based trust) — one shared server, one
// listener per configured address; Shutdown closes them all.
ctlSrv := &http.Server{
Handler: ctl.Handler(),
TLSConfig: &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
for _, addr := range ctlAddrs {
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("control listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
go func(a string, l net.Listener) {
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("control %s: %w", a, ctlSrv.ServeTLS(l, "", ""))
}(addr, ln)
}
// Self-test: prove the host is a clean measurement target. Sysctl audit is
// instant; the egress-MTU proof does network round trips, so publish the
// sysctl-only report immediately and swap in the full one when it lands.
var selftestPtr atomic.Pointer[selftest.Report]
initial := selftest.Report{Sysctls: selftest.Sysctls()}
selftestPtr.Store(&initial)
for _, c := range initial.Sysctls {
if c.Severity == selftest.Warn {
slog.Warn("sysctl not measurement-clean", "sysctl", c.Name, "got", c.Got, "want", c.Want, "why", c.Why)
}
}
go func() {
r := selftest.Run(config.Addrs(cfg.MTUProbeTargets))
selftestPtr.Store(&r)
for _, m := range r.EgressMTU {
if !m.FullMTU {
slog.Warn("egress MTU below 1500 — client MTU results measure THIS server, not the client",
"target", m.Target, "discovered_mtu", m.DiscoveredMTU, "err", m.Err)
}
}
slog.Info("self-test complete", "sysctl_ok", r.SysctlOK, "mtu_ok", r.MTUOK)
}()
ctl.ProvenGood = func() (mtuOK, sysctlOK bool) {
r := selftestPtr.Load()
return r.MTUOK, r.SysctlOK
}
// The smallest egress MTU we measured is the ceiling for DF-mode big_send: above it our own
// kernel refuses the datagram, which would otherwise look like a downstream path limit.
ctl.EgressMTU = func() int {
best := 0
for _, m := range selftestPtr.Load().EgressMTU {
if m.DiscoveredMTU > 0 && (best == 0 || m.DiscoveredMTU < best) {
best = m.DiscoveredMTU
}
}
return best
}
// Admin/health (plain HTTP, localhost by default; spec §7)
admin := http.NewServeMux()
admin.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"ok":true,"version":%q}`, Version)
})
admin.HandleFunc("GET /admin/selftest", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(selftestPtr.Load())
})
// TODO(spec §7): enrollment token management + device list. Until the
// admin UI exists, mint tokens with: echolot-admin (or curl on this
// listener once the endpoint lands).
admin.HandleFunc("POST /admin/enroll-tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
tok, err := st.NewEnrollToken(24*time.Hour, r.URL.Query().Get("note"))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
// The whole bootstrap, not just the token: this is what gets pasted or turned into a
// QR code, and assembling it here is what keeps an operator from transcribing a pin by
// hand — a pin wrong by one character fails as an inscrutable TLS error days later.
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
enc.SetEscapeHTML(false) // the link is full of / and =; escaping them helps nobody
_ = enc.Encode(map[string]any{
"token": tok,
"expires_in_s": 86400,
"enroll_uri": ctl.EnrollmentLink(tok),
})
})
adminSrv := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.AdminListen, Handler: admin, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}
go func() { errCh <- fmt.Errorf("admin: %w", adminSrv.ListenAndServe()) }()
// UDP data plane — one socket per configured address. Distinct sockets
// (not wildcard) also guarantee responses leave from the address the
// request arrived on, which stun-5780 will rely on.
var udpConns []*net.UDPConn
for _, addr := range udpAddrs {
udpAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("udp addr %s: %w", addr, err)
}
conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("udp listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
udpConns = append(udpConns, conn)
go func(a string, c *net.UDPConn) {
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("udp %s: %w", a, dp.Serve(c))
}(addr, conn)
}
// TCP echo (spec §4)
var tcpLns []net.Listener
for _, addr := range config.Addrs(cfg.TCPListen) {
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tcp listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
tcpLns = append(tcpLns, ln)
go func(a string, l net.Listener) {
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("tcp %s: %w", a, tcpSrv.Serve(l))
}(addr, ln)
}
// Optional cleartext HTTP-echo (spec §4 plaintext-path test) — only
// POST /v1/echo, no auth, no secrets. Off unless configured.
var httpEchoSrvs []*http.Server
for _, addr := range config.Addrs(cfg.HTTPEchoListen) {
hs := &http.Server{Addr: addr, Handler: ctl.EchoHandler(), ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}
httpEchoSrvs = append(httpEchoSrvs, hs)
go func(a string, srv *http.Server) { errCh <- fmt.Errorf("http-echo %s: %w", a, srv.ListenAndServe()) }(addr, hs)
}
// STUN (spec §4) — advertises stun-5780 only with ≥2 same-family addrs.
var stunSrv *stun.Server
if stunAddrs := config.Addrs(cfg.StunListen); len(stunAddrs) > 0 {
stunSrv, err = stun.Listen(stunAddrs)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stun listen: %w", err)
}
go func() { errCh <- fmt.Errorf("stun: %w", stunSrv.Serve()) }()
if stunSrv.Has5780() {
ctl.Capabilities = append(caps, "stun-5780")
} else {
ctl.Capabilities = append(caps, "stun-basic")
}
} else {
ctl.Capabilities = caps
}
// Canary DNS (spec §6.1) — authoritative for CanaryZone, udp+tcp per addr.
var dnsUDP []*net.UDPConn
var dnsTCP []net.Listener
if dnsAddrs := config.Addrs(cfg.DNSListen); len(dnsAddrs) > 0 && cfg.CanaryZone != "" {
v4, v6 := firstByFamily(dnsAddrs)
cd := canarydns.New(cfg.CanaryZone, cfg.Name, v4, v6)
for _, addr := range dnsAddrs {
ua, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns udp addr %s: %w", addr, err)
}
uc, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", ua)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns udp listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
dnsUDP = append(dnsUDP, uc)
go func(a string, c *net.UDPConn) { errCh <- fmt.Errorf("dns-udp %s: %w", a, cd.ServeUDP(c)) }(addr, uc)
tl, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dns tcp listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
dnsTCP = append(dnsTCP, tl)
go func(a string, l net.Listener) { errCh <- fmt.Errorf("dns-tcp %s: %w", a, cd.ServeTCP(l)) }(addr, tl)
}
ctl.CanaryZone = cfg.CanaryZone
ctl.CanaryQueries = func(prefix string) any { return cd.RecentForPrefix(prefix) }
ctl.Capabilities = append(ctl.Capabilities, "canary-dns")
}
slog.Info("listening",
"control", ctlAddrs, "admin", cfg.AdminListen, "udp", udpAddrs,
"tcp", config.Addrs(cfg.TCPListen), "stun", config.Addrs(cfg.StunListen),
"dns", config.Addrs(cfg.DNSListen), "capabilities", ctl.Capabilities)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
slog.Info("shutting down")
shutCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = ctlSrv.Shutdown(shutCtx)
_ = adminSrv.Shutdown(shutCtx)
for _, c := range udpConns {
_ = c.Close()
}
for _, l := range tcpLns {
_ = l.Close()
}
if stunSrv != nil {
stunSrv.Close()
}
for _, c := range dnsUDP {
_ = c.Close()
}
for _, l := range dnsTCP {
_ = l.Close()
}
for _, hs := range httpEchoSrvs {
_ = hs.Shutdown(shutCtx)
}
return nil
case err := <-errCh:
return err
}
}
// firstByFamily returns the first v4 and first v6 address from a list of
// "ip:port" specs — used for the canary zone's apex/NS answers.
func firstByFamily(addrs []string) (v4, v6 netip.Addr) {
for _, a := range addrs {
if ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(a); err == nil {
if ap.Addr().Unmap().Is4() && !v4.IsValid() {
v4 = ap.Addr().Unmap()
} else if ap.Addr().Is6() && !ap.Addr().Is4In6() && !v6.IsValid() {
v6 = ap.Addr()
}
}
}
return
}
func firstAddr(spec string) string {
if a := config.Addrs(spec); len(a) > 0 {
return a[0]
}
return ""
}
func mustPort(listen string) int {
_, p, err := net.SplitHostPort(listen)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
n, _ := strconv.Atoi(p)
return n
}
// loadOrCreateCert loads the configured cert/key, or generates a self-signed
// ECDSA P-256 cert into the state dir on first start. Self-signed is
// first-class per spec §1 — clients pin the SPKI, they don't chase CAs.
func loadOrCreateCert(cfg *config.Config) (tls.Certificate, error) {
certPath, keyPath := cfg.TLSCert, cfg.TLSKey
if certPath == "" {
certPath = filepath.Join(cfg.StateDir, "tls-cert.pem")
keyPath = filepath.Join(cfg.StateDir, "tls-key.pem")
}
if c, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certPath, keyPath); err == nil {
return c, nil
} else if cfg.TLSCert != "" {
// Explicitly configured paths must exist — do not silently overwrite.
return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("loading configured cert %s: %w", certPath, err)
}
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
serial, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 62))
tmpl := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serial,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "echolot-server"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
// Long-lived on purpose: trust is the SPKI pin from enrollment, not
// cert validity; rotation happens via next_pins in the profile.
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(10, 0, 0),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
keyDer, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
if err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg.StateDir, 0o700); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
certPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
keyPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDer})
if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, certPem, 0o644); err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPem, 0o600); err != nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, err
}
slog.Info("generated self-signed certificate", "cert", certPath)
return tls.X509KeyPair(certPem, keyPem)
}
// publicControlURL is where clients should reach this server's control plane.
//
// Configured wins; otherwise the first control listen address is used, which is correct for the
// plain case (bind an address, hand out that address). A wildcard bind has no single right answer,
// so it is left to the operator rather than guessed — a link pointing at 0.0.0.0 is worse than a
// link the operator was told to configure.
func publicControlURL(cfg *config.Config) string {
if cfg.PublicControlURL != "" {
return strings.TrimRight(cfg.PublicControlURL, "/")
}
addr := firstAddr(cfg.ControlListen)
if addr == "" {
return ""
}
if strings.HasPrefix(addr, ":") || strings.HasPrefix(addr, "0.0.0.0:") || strings.HasPrefix(addr, "[::]:") {
slog.Warn("control plane is bound to a wildcard address; set ECHOLOT_PUBLIC_URL "+
"so enrollment links point somewhere reachable", "listen", addr)
}
return "https://" + addr
}
// setAdminPassword stores the break-glass admin credential.
//
// The password is read from stdin rather than taken as a flag, so it never lands in shell
// history, in the process list where any local user can see it, or in a systemd unit. Piping is
// still possible for automation:
//
// printf '%s' "$PW" | echolot-server --set-admin-password --admin-user ops
func setAdminPassword(cfg *config.Config) error {
st, err := store.Open(cfg.StateDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("state store: %w", err)
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "New password for %q (input is not echoed if this is a terminal): ", cfg.AdminUser)
pw, err := readSecret()
if err != nil {
return err
}
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr)
cred, err := adminauth.NewCredential(cfg.AdminUser, pw)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := st.SetLocalAdmin(cred); err != nil {
return err
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Break-glass admin %q set. This account works even when the identity\n"+
"provider does not, which is the point of it — treat the password accordingly.\n", cfg.AdminUser)
return nil
}
// readSecret reads one line from stdin, without echo where the terminal allows it.
func readSecret() (string, error) {
restore, _ := system.DisableEcho(os.Stdin)
if restore != nil {
defer restore()
}
r := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin)
line, err := r.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil && line == "" {
return "", err
}
return strings.TrimSpace(line), nil
}