Files
echolot/server/internal/session/session.go
T
mrambossekandClaude Fable 5 ce1aaa332a
server-release / image (push) Successful in 15s
server-test / test (push) Successful in 30s
server-release / release (push) Successful in 30s
server: send granted traffic from the address the session actually used
fmr binds two IPv4 addresses. connFor picked whichever socket of the right
family came first in the bind list, so a downtrain for a session established on
.150 went out from .151 — and every packet was dropped by the client's NAT,
which has no mapping for that pair. tcpdump on the server showed all 50 leaving;
the client saw none. Read as "100% downstream loss", which is the worst kind of
wrong: a confident measurement of something that never happened.

Sessions now record which of our own bound addresses received their traffic, and
granted sends (and delayed echo) go back out through that socket. The fallback
to a family match is kept for the case where nothing has been received yet, and
the test pins both paths — a single-homed lab can never reproduce this.

Also: the client-side halves of the same work — anonymizer (core-privacy), local
run archive with retention (core-archive), upload client, and the app's settings
and history screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 10:45:43 +02:00

221 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Echolot contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
// Package session implements spec §2.4 sessions and the §2.4 key schedule:
// HKDF-SHA256(ikm=device_credential, salt=key_salt, info="echolot-v1/"+session_id).
package session
import (
"crypto/hkdf"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"time"
)
type Session struct {
ID string // opaque hex; first 8 bytes (16 hex chars) are the wire prefix
Key [32]byte // derived, never crosses the wire
Epoch time.Time // server wall clock at creation (spec: RFC3339 in the response)
Expires time.Time
Device string // device ID
// Observed source of the session-creating request — the ONLY address
// reflected/generated traffic may target (spec §2.5).
ControlSource netip.Addr
// Last data-plane source seen with a valid HMAC (NAT rebinding evidence).
mu sync.Mutex
dataSource netip.AddrPort
dataLocal netip.AddrPort
// Replay window (spec §3.1: 1024-wide seq window). Highest seq seen plus
// a bitmask of the 1024 preceding.
maxSeq uint32
window [16]uint64
// Active asymmetric grants (spec §3.4/§5) — the only licence to send more than we receive.
grants []*Grant
// Observations (spec §6): per-packet UDP view + connect-back results.
packetsSeen uint64
udpObs []UDPObservation // ring, newest last, cap obsCap
connectBack []ConnectBackResult
}
const obsCap = 4096
// UDPObservation is the server's witnessed view of one data-plane packet.
type UDPObservation struct {
Seq uint32 `json:"seq"`
TRxNs int64 `json:"t_rx_ns"`
TTxNs int64 `json:"t_tx_ns"`
Src string `json:"src"`
Size int `json:"size"`
Type uint8 `json:"type"`
}
// ConnectBackResult records one connect-back action outcome.
type ConnectBackResult struct {
ActionID string `json:"action_id"`
Result string `json:"result"` // connected | refused | timeout
RttMs float64 `json:"rtt_ms"`
}
// RecordUDP appends a packet observation (ring-capped).
func (s *Session) RecordUDP(o UDPObservation) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.packetsSeen++
if len(s.udpObs) >= obsCap {
s.udpObs = s.udpObs[1:]
}
s.udpObs = append(s.udpObs, o)
}
// RecordConnectBack appends a connect-back outcome.
func (s *Session) RecordConnectBack(r ConnectBackResult) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.connectBack = append(s.connectBack, r)
}
// Observations returns a copy of everything witnessed so far.
func (s *Session) Observations() (packetsSeen uint64, udp []UDPObservation, cb []ConnectBackResult) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.packetsSeen, append([]UDPObservation(nil), s.udpObs...),
append([]ConnectBackResult(nil), s.connectBack...)
}
// DataSource returns the last verified data-plane source (invalid when the
// session has not sent data-plane traffic yet).
func (s *Session) DataSource() netip.AddrPort {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.dataSource
}
// KeySalt returns nothing — the salt is not retained after derivation; it is
// generated in New and returned once for the response body.
type Manager struct {
mu sync.Mutex
byPrefix map[string]*Session // key: first 16 hex chars of ID
ttl time.Duration
}
func NewManager(ttl time.Duration) *Manager {
return &Manager{byPrefix: map[string]*Session{}, ttl: ttl}
}
// New creates a session for a device credential per the spec key schedule.
// Returns the session and the one-time key_salt for the response.
func (m *Manager) New(deviceID, credential string, controlSource netip.Addr) (*Session, []byte, error) {
idBytes := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(idBytes); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
salt := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
id := hex.EncodeToString(idBytes)
key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, []byte(credential), salt, "echolot-v1/"+id, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
s := &Session{
ID: id,
Epoch: time.Now().UTC(),
Expires: time.Now().Add(m.ttl),
Device: deviceID,
ControlSource: controlSource,
}
copy(s.Key[:], key)
m.mu.Lock()
m.byPrefix[id[:16]] = s
m.mu.Unlock()
return s, salt, nil
}
// ByWirePrefix resolves the 8-byte on-the-wire prefix (as raw bytes).
func (m *Manager) ByWirePrefix(prefix [8]byte) *Session {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
s := m.byPrefix[hex.EncodeToString(prefix[:])]
if s == nil || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
return nil
}
return s
}
// ByID resolves a full session id (sessions are keyed by their wire prefix).
func (m *Manager) ByID(id string) *Session {
if len(id) < 16 {
return nil
}
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
s := m.byPrefix[id[:16]]
if s == nil || s.ID != id || time.Now().After(s.Expires) {
return nil
}
return s
}
func (m *Manager) Delete(id string) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
delete(m.byPrefix, id[:16])
}
// CheckSeq enforces the 1024-wide anti-replay window. Returns false for
// replays and for packets older than the window.
func (s *Session) CheckSeq(seq uint32) bool {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
switch {
case seq > s.maxSeq:
shift := seq - s.maxSeq
for i := uint32(0); i < shift && i < 1024; i++ {
idx := (s.maxSeq + 1 + i) % 1024
s.window[idx/64] &^= 1 << (idx % 64)
}
s.maxSeq = seq
case s.maxSeq-seq >= 1024:
return false
}
idx := seq % 1024
if s.window[idx/64]&(1<<(idx%64)) != 0 {
return false
}
s.window[idx/64] |= 1 << (idx % 64)
return true
}
// DataLocal returns the server-side address that received this session's data-plane traffic.
//
// This matters more than it looks: a server bound to several addresses must send granted traffic
// back from the one the client has been talking to. Any stateful firewall or NAT in between has
// a mapping keyed on that exact pair, and a reply from a sibling address is dropped — which the
// client would then measure as downstream loss. See connFor.
func (s *Session) DataLocal() netip.AddrPort {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.dataLocal
}
// NoteDataLocal records which of our own bound addresses saw this session's traffic.
func (s *Session) NoteDataLocal(ap netip.AddrPort) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.dataLocal = ap
}
// NoteDataSource records the latest verified data-plane source.
func (s *Session) NoteDataSource(ap netip.AddrPort) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.dataSource = ap
s.mu.Unlock()
}