The beacon this replaces was a separate service wildcard-bound to
0.0.0.0:443 - it silently occupied port 443 on the reserved measurement
addresses, voiding the IPv4 interception proof for as long as it ran, and
it accepted a port report from anyone who could reach it. So this lives
where the repo's own post-mortem said it belongs: POST on the control
plane authenticated by the device credential, GET on the admin UI behind
the existing apiAdmin helper. No new listener, no new port, no wildcard.
Entries expire after 24h (ECHOLOT_ADB_ENDPOINT_RETENTION_H) on both write
and read - a LAN address is a breadcrumb for driving a test device, not
measurement data worth keeping.
Also records the BLE peer-comparison design: the case for it is that BLE
is out-of-band, which is what makes client isolation measurable at all -
silence over IP cannot distinguish an isolating AP from an absent peer,
and a peer confirming out-of-band that it was listening turns that
silence into proof.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Types 0x03/0x04/0x05 land with a bounded columnar train buffer (head kept,
truncation declared) and grant-free multi-part reports - a report row is
smaller than the packet it answers, so $3.4 holds without a grant. The
read loop now collects TTL/TOS cmsgs on Linux, replacing the 0xFF stubs in
the observation block with what the kernel saw; downtrain gained a dscp
parameter, so DSCP survival is measurable in both directions.
Rate limiting ($2.5) exists now: per-credential AND per-source buckets,
429 on the control plane, silent drop on the data plane after the HMAC
gate and before the replay window. UDP ceilings default above the largest
legitimate run - a limit that clips a real measurement produces a
confidently wrong number.
Every granted packet carries its action_id at payload[8:16]; overlapping
actions were unattributable before. Canary DNS logs now honor the stated
24h privacy default. /admin/enroll-tokens answers the spec's JSON shape.
protocol_version 1.0.1 (additive).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enrolling a device that cannot reach the admin UI meant transcribing a
200-character link with a base64 pin in it — the step the link format
exists to avoid, and the one where a pin wrong by one character fails
later as an inscrutable TLS error.
Rendered as inline SVG rather than a PNG data: URI, because the page's
CSP is default-src 'none' and means it: a data: image would need img-src
opened, markup needs nothing. One path rather than a rect per module,
since a link this long encodes to about 60x60 and two thousand elements
is a lot of DOM for a picture of a square. It is generated from the same
validated value as the href, so a rejected link produces neither.
This relaxes the stdlib-only rule, deliberately and recorded in CLAUDE.md.
The rule bought one self-contained binary with no supply chain to audit,
which one small pure-Go package barely dents; F-Droid never applied to
the server, only the app ships there. A correct QR encoder is ~500 lines
of Reed-Solomon that nobody should be hand-writing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
html/template rewrites an href whose scheme it does not recognise to
"#ZgotmplZ". echolot:// is not on its list, so "Open in the Echolot app"
was not a link at all — tapping it did nothing, and nothing showed it:
the markup reads correctly, the app resolves the scheme, and only the
sanitised attribute in the served HTML gives it away.
Marking the value template.URL opts out of that sanitising, which is only
safe because the shape is now checked first. The link arrives in a query
parameter, so without the check a crafted /devices?link=javascript:… would
put a script URL into the page for an admin to click.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signing in and being allowed to administer the server were the same
question: the OIDC callback refused a session outright to anyone outside
the admin group. A legitimate user could authenticate, be told what they
could not do, and be left with no way to see or delete the data their own
devices had uploaded.
They are separate questions now. Everyone who authenticates gets a
session; the admin flag rides inside the MAC'd payload, so promoting
yourself means forging a signature rather than editing a cookie, and a
role that does not parse fails closed to "user".
Pages scope themselves through visibleDevices/mayTouchRun rather than
filtering individually — per-page scoping is what the next page added
will be missing, and that failure is silent, since a listing that leaks
other people's uploads looks exactly like one that does not. Someone
else's run answers 404, not 403: a distinguishable refusal would confirm
the run exists. Revoking devices and minting enrolment tokens affect the
whole server and stay behind adminOnly at the route table, where someone
looking for who-may-do-what will actually find it.
Ownership is re-read per request instead of captured at sign-in, so
unlinking an account takes effect immediately rather than at session
expiry. Tests cover that, plus the degenerate case of an empty subject,
which must own nothing rather than everything with an empty account id.
Also: attribute the ICMPv6 finding per network. It compared "is IPv6
configured anywhere on this device" against "did any network answer",
which on a phone reports IPv6-is-broken about a network where IPv6 was
never configured. network_ref is null on every test, so the probe now
records per-network outcomes structurally rather than as prose a finding
would have to parse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the unauthenticated admin mux. Everything but /healthz requires a
session, and that is the point: the previous arrangement relied on binding to
loopback, which worked exactly until the address changed and then failed
silently and publicly. A binding address is a deployment detail, not an access
control, and this package does not treat it as one.
Two ways in. OIDC through the confidential client, with state and PKCE - PKCE
even here, because it costs one hash and closes code interception independently
of the secret. And the break-glass password, throttled, for when the IdP is the
thing that is broken. Signing in without the admin group is refused with the
group named, because "you are not an admin" is a different problem from "your
password is wrong" and the remedy is elsewhere.
Sessions are MAC-checked cookies: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure when TLS is on.
CSRF tokens are derived from the session rather than stored, so there is no
server-side table to keep in sync, and they are required on every state-changing
POST - SameSite already blocks cross-site posts in current browsers, but this is
the control that does not depend on the browser being current.
Server-rendered with html/template and no JavaScript: the pages are lists and
forms, and a framework would add a build step, a dependency tree and an update
treadmill to a program that has none of those. The CSP is default-src 'none'
accordingly.
Pages: overview, devices (with revocation and enrolment-link minting), uploaded
runs and a run viewer. Revocations and deletions are logged with who did them.
Runs are shown exactly as uploaded, at the privacy level their uploader chose -
nothing in the UI can un-redact one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
